Yes. And I don't see either of them being prepared to do that. Not yet at least.
Russia claimed that the Russian-speaking minority was being persecuted, particularly in the eastern provinces. It's not going to row back on that one or relinquish The Crimea that easily.
We are talking stalemate or escalation. Unless someone can come up with a deal both sides can accept. It doesn't sound to me that Boris has done so. Nor can I think of one that either side would accept. But then, unlike Boris, I don't claim to be an expert on international relations and conflict management and reconciliation.
Yes. And I don't see either of them being prepared to do that. Not yet at least.
Russia claimed that the Russian-speaking minority was being persecuted, particularly in the eastern provinces. It's not going to row back on that one or relinquish The Crimea that easily.
We are talking stalemate or escalation. Unless someone can come up with a deal both sides can accept. It doesn't sound to me that Boris has done so. Nor can I think of one that either side would accept. But then, unlike Boris, I don't claim to be an expert on international relations and conflict management and reconciliation.
Though there’s just about an argument that he might know more than the average person about the Ukraine government, and (from FCO briefings when PM) probably a bit about the Russians.
Just for a moment I had a ‘Nixon goes to China’ premonition about how the Ukraine war gets solved by President Trump with (to mix metaphors) Boris Johnson in the David Owen/Paddy Ashdown roles….
To be fair, if they pulled it off I’d take my hat off.
Yes. And I don't see either of them being prepared to do that. Not yet at least.
Russia claimed that the Russian-speaking minority was being persecuted, particularly in the eastern provinces. It's not going to row back on that one or relinquish The Crimea that easily.
Russia's real objection is that it doesn't want a West-leaning, peaceful and prosperous liberal democracy on its border. The official Russian position is that liberal democracy doesn't work and a nearby example showing otherwise might get ordinary Russians thinking dangerous ideas. Which is why I suspect that the Putin regime has come to regard the war as an end in itself rather than a means to an end.
Russian has three basic strategic options for keeping Ukraine from doing that.
Install a puppet government. This was pretty much Russia's approach prior to 2014. It became no longer feasible when Yanukovych fled Ukraine.
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Maintain a low-level war on Ukraine's frontier. This was the approach from 2014 to 2022 and is premised on the understanding that Western powers would not extend NATO membership (or other diplomatic ties) to a country with an active territorial dispute.
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Military occupation or outright annexation of Ukraine. This was the strategy in 2022. It's still the official strategy but I suspect in practical terms Russia is now pursuing a hybrid of #2 and #3.
In other words the war, in and of itself, is seen by Russia as its means for preventing Ukraine from establishing closer ties to the West.
Just for a moment I had a ‘Nixon goes to China’ premonition about how the Ukraine war gets solved by President Trump with (to mix metaphors) Boris Johnson in the David Owen/Paddy Ashdown roles….
To be fair, if they pulled it off I’d take my hat off.
I'm imagining a "deal" worked out by Trump to be something like the Munich Agreement, except negotiated by Oswald Mosley instead of Neville Chamberlain.
Well it looks like the Ukrainians have invaded Kursk. Good show. Reports are that this area was lightly defended and they have broken through all existing defensive lines. Russia niw has a dilemma: divert forces to contain the breakthrough, let it be and let a new entry into Russia itself open up and suffer the humiliation and and at worst, let their existing forces be flanked.
Apparently these are uniformed, regular Ukrainian troops with takes, drones and artillery, not the Free Russia Legion
I'm not sure about the Kursk invasion. It seems to have been brilliantly executed on a tactical level, especially avoiding the kinds of intelligence leaks that bedeviled the 2023 Ukrainian offensive. Someone in the Ukrainian military hierarchy was obviously watching the Wagner mutiny and noticed how much difficulty Russia had defending itself against an offensive from an unexpected direction.
On a strategic level I'm not sure I understand their goal. I don't think Ukraine has the manpower to effectively defend this territory over the long term, when coupled with their existing defensive obligations in Donbas. Assuming that holding the territory is not Ukraine's strategic object here, a couple possibilities suggest themselves, none of which are mutually exclusive. Perhaps this is Ukraine's attempt to demonstrate to the West in general (and the Biden administration in particular) the hollowness of their obsession with escalation management. This crosses just about every imaginable "red line" ascribed to Putin and his response has been muted at best. Perhaps this is an attempt to disrupt Russian supply lines to a Donbas offensive that's already approaching culmination. Maybe the Ukrainians are trying to increase domestic Russian discontent with the war special military operation. Maybe it's a large scale operational test of Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities. Perhaps the Ukrainians are trying a really long flanking maneuver against Russian forces near Kharkiv. I honestly don't know, but I suspect all will be clear eventually, including whether this was a good idea or not.
I am reminded of the First Gulf War. Colin Powell recounted how Schwartzkopf poured over how to break into Kuwait as it was highly fortified. Then he realized the eastern desert flank was empty, stood back and thought it would be a great task for tanks and asked for amoured divisions launch the biggest armoured punch the US had launched since WWII.
The rest is history.
If you don't like the question, redefine it until you do.
It may be that Ukraine wants a big chunk of Russia to bargain with, The Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is within striking distance. It would make a great bargaining set-off against the Zhaporizhia Nuclear Plant.
Russian logistics is highly railway dependent and rely on a few key junctions that are now threatened by the Ukrainians. That hurts.
Good operations do not cause problems (with one solution) they cause dilemmas with multiple solutions all of which are equally bad. Russia now has the dilemma of risking their supply lines or weakening their front lines. They may soon have a nuclear and electrical supply issue. Putin either has to do something he doesn't want to do and redeploy forces or look weak and fails to protect Russia from invasion.
Ukraine now looks like the most aggressive, audacious and competant partner the US has had in decades. They are a democracy with a government that isn't embarrassing (see Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam and South Korea). The Defense and State departments should be beside themselves with glee.
I am reminded of the First Gulf War. Colin Powell recounted how Schwartzkopf poured over how to break into Kuwait as it was highly fortified. Then he realized the eastern desert flank was empty, stood back and thought it would be a great task for tanks and asked for amoured divisions launch the biggest armoured punch the US had launched since WWII.
The rest is history.
If you don't like the question, redefine it until you do.
This strategy actually led to another question, which was "will the sands in that area of desert support a modern tank?" They were actually able to find the answer (yes!) in a pre-WWII geographic survey of the area.
One possible motive for Ukraine to invade Russian territory in Kursk is to be able to exchange it for Ukrainian lands held by Russia in peace talks.
Besides, it was obvious with current Russian incursions into Ukraine, and operations to defend them, there had to be a soft underbelly somewhere along other parts of the border. Now Russia will be forced to reposition its forces in Ukraine.
I hope the Kursk incursion can expand. It might get Russia to the peace table.
Superb tactics (combined with taking out hundreds of glide bombs at Lipetsk). And analyses above. Deep hit and run I suspect. Force the Russians to defend their entire border with free Ukraine for the duration, diverting much from the east. After making them pay dearly to take back their territory. That convoy looked like a troop transport massacre. Ukraine cannot possibly be allowed to hold any Russian territory. But it has for 4 days so far. But squared, one should beware of advancing too far into Russia.
The Russians have never had a good history of defending their homeland. Remember the time when the Wagner Group mutinied against Putin? They were less than 60 miles from Moscow when they stopped. You think the Ukrainians learned something? All they have to do is move from fuel staging area to fuel staging area.
Isn't this the first invasion of Russia since 1941?
There was an invasion by a few thousand Chechen fighters in Aug/Sept 1999. But, as Chechnya had no effective government at the time that could be argued to not be an invasion by a national army.
Isn't this the first invasion of Russia since 1941?
There was an invasion by a few thousand Chechen fighters in Aug/Sept 1999. But, as Chechnya had no effective government at the time that could be argued to not be an invasion by a national army.
And it was part, a republic, of Russia? I cannot establish if it was an independent nation state at that time.
Dagestan is a republic of Russia, and thus as much a part of Russia as Kursk. The republics were created by Lenin (and, revised by Stalin) as a compromise for areas within Russia that had distinctive ethnicities to be semi-autonomous entities, rather than other parts of the old Russian Empire that became independent nations within the USSR (eg: Ukraine).
I read somewhere that Ukrainian forces have taken control of Sudzha because it is a hub for natural gas being pumped from Russia into the EU. Is that right? Surprised to hear Russian natural gas was still being piped into the EU.
Dagestan is a republic of Russia, and thus as much a part of Russia as Kursk. The republics were created by Lenin (and, revised by Stalin) as a compromise for areas within Russia that had distinctive ethnicities to be semi-autonomous entities, rather than other parts of the old Russian Empire that became independent nations within the USSR (eg: Ukraine).
Yes, just a change of empire title. As you say, Dagestan, which was invaded by Chechens in '99, is a republic of the Russian Federation. Wasn't Chechnya? Kursk is an oblast of Russia 'proper'? So the Ukrainian invasion, six days so far with no sign of being turned, is the first since '41? Although it being a former Soviet Republic, part of the empire since C18th Catherine the Great and, in fact, the Mother of Russia in Kyiv, makes it all somewhat moot.
Another Chernobyl in the making? Brilliant Russian distraction tactics, as was mooted over a year ago. From yourself I realise that reactors can't just be turned off and walked away from. What is the risk of criticality?
If the fire is contained in the cooling towers and immediate surroundings there should be no risk to the reactors themselves. The biggest risk is still interruption to the electricity supply to the power station if there's insufficient fuel for the emergency generators. The cores are in shut down, but still require active cooling and hence for the pumps to be working. The cores can't go critical unless someone deliberately removes the control rods that were inserted to shut the reactors down. But, without cooling it's still possible for the fuel elements to overheat and potentially crack or deform - with risks of release of radioactive material into the cooling system and potentially beyond, and probably making it all but impossible to safely restart the reactors.
The core temperatures are low enough that the cooling towers are not needed to dissipate excess heat, but the fire damage would mean that at the end of the war there will need to be repairs done to the cooling towers before restarting the reactors, along with a full inspection of the entire site and repairs to other parts of the site.
I doubt that the Russian military staff would know how to operate the reactor, though the Russians presumably could bring in staff from one of their own reactors. There would be a load of safety systems that would need to be bypassed to remove the control rods for the plant to go critical, and only trained operators would know how to do that - and, they're not going to deliberately destroy the reactor and contaminate a large area of their country. It may even be that some of the fuel rods have been removed, and so even if the control rods are taken out the core can't go critical (I don't know whether that has been done - there are risks with fuel rod handling that may have been considered greater than the risk of someone deliberately removing control rods).
Lots of high explosive placed next to and within the containment building could result in a radioactive release, or for the cooling ponds with spent fuel stores. But, that's not something that could be plausibly called an accident or the result of artillery fire.
Ooooh, they'd just lie. Say it was sabotage after they withdrew, whatever.
And in answer to my question re invasion of Russia, 'We can't underestimate the significance of such a huge incursion by Ukraine: The occupation of Russian territory for the first time since the Second World War.' Sarah Rainsford 13:02 BBC.
Manstein invaded the Soviet Union. The Russian Federation is NOT the Soviet Union.
Much of what the Germans actually invaded is now Belarus and Ukraine.
From what I can see, the Ukrainians have evolved their own combined-arms tactics which incorporate fewer manned aircraft, more drones and far more EM warfare than WWII-style operations did.
I would say that the Ukrainian goal generally is to operationally destabilize the Russian Army by presenting the dilemma of forcing Russia to choose to either defend Kursk and weaken their front or let Kursk be and give Ukraine a occupation win. It's lose-lose for Russia.
Russian conscripts have not proven equal to the defence task and conscript causalities have proven to be major political issues for the Russian hierarchy.
There seem to be a range of possible goals for the operation, and it's likely that the operation was planned to meet several of them. These could include:
1. Morale boost to the Ukrainian public and military (this appears to have been achieved)
2. Divert Russian forces from the front lines within Ukraine (this also appears to be happening)
3. Force Russia to deploy more forces along the Ukrainian border to prevent Ukrainian forces repeating this easy incursion, more forces here equals less available for the fight within Ukraine
4. Disrupt Russian supply lines (though, that requires a push deep into Kursk at very high risk for little gain)
5. Bring the reality of war to the people of Russia, and raise questions about the Russian narrative about the "special military operation" - which is a double edged goal as it also plays into the narrative of Ukraine being a threat to Russia
6. Degrade Russian military capability by destroying equipment in circumstances where this is more exposed than the entrenched positions in Ukraine
7. Occupy territory that can be a bargaining chip in peace talks
It seems that the biggest risk Ukraine faces is in overstretching themselves, advancing too far and leaving their flanks exposed. If they can set up a defence line and hold territory they have gained that allows ongoing diversion of Russian forces to fight in Russia. But, they need to be able to retain the means of withdrawing back into Ukraine if needed, I'm not sure the gains would be worth the loss of their best troops if they get surrounded without a route back.
There seem to be a range of possible goals for the operation, and it's likely that the operation was planned to meet several of them. These could include:
1. Morale boost to the Ukrainian public and military (this appears to have been achieved)
2. Divert Russian forces from the front lines within Ukraine (this also appears to be happening)
3. Force Russia to deploy more forces along the Ukrainian border to prevent Ukrainian forces repeating this easy incursion, more forces here equals less available for the fight within Ukraine
4. Disrupt Russian supply lines (though, that requires a push deep into Kursk at very high risk for little gain)
5. Bring the reality of war to the people of Russia, and raise questions about the Russian narrative about the "special military operation" - which is a double edged goal as it also plays into the narrative of Ukraine being a threat to Russia
6. Degrade Russian military capability by destroying equipment in circumstances where this is more exposed than the entrenched positions in Ukraine
7. Occupy territory that can be a bargaining chip in peace talks
It seems that the biggest risk Ukraine faces is in overstretching themselves, advancing too far and leaving their flanks exposed. If they can set up a defence line and hold territory they have gained that allows ongoing diversion of Russian forces to fight in Russia. But, they need to be able to retain the means of withdrawing back into Ukraine if needed, I'm not sure the gains would be worth the loss of their best troops if they get surrounded without a route back.
I would just add that discomforting Putin and giving a lie to the notion that he keeps Russia and Russians safe must surely be an objective.
There seem to be a range of possible goals for the operation, and it's likely that the operation was planned to meet several of them. These could include:
1. Morale boost to the Ukrainian public and military (this appears to have been achieved)
2. Divert Russian forces from the front lines within Ukraine (this also appears to be happening)
3. Force Russia to deploy more forces along the Ukrainian border to prevent Ukrainian forces repeating this easy incursion, more forces here equals less available for the fight within Ukraine
4. Disrupt Russian supply lines (though, that requires a push deep into Kursk at very high risk for little gain)
5. Bring the reality of war to the people of Russia, and raise questions about the Russian narrative about the "special military operation" - which is a double edged goal as it also plays into the narrative of Ukraine being a threat to Russia
6. Degrade Russian military capability by destroying equipment in circumstances where this is more exposed than the entrenched positions in Ukraine
7. Occupy territory that can be a bargaining chip in peace talks
It seems that the biggest risk Ukraine faces is in overstretching themselves, advancing too far and leaving their flanks exposed. If they can set up a defence line and hold territory they have gained that allows ongoing diversion of Russian forces to fight in Russia. But, they need to be able to retain the means of withdrawing back into Ukraine if needed, I'm not sure the gains would be worth the loss of their best troops if they get surrounded without a route back.
I would just add that discomforting Putin and giving a lie to the notion that he keeps Russia and Russians safe must surely be an objective.
One that he easily blocks by controlling the narrative, even for a minority(?) in the West, let alone the global majority.
There seem to be a range of possible goals for the operation, and it's likely that the operation was planned to meet several of them. These could include:
1. Morale boost to the Ukrainian public and military (this appears to have been achieved)
2. Divert Russian forces from the front lines within Ukraine (this also appears to be happening)
3. Force Russia to deploy more forces along the Ukrainian border to prevent Ukrainian forces repeating this easy incursion, more forces here equals less available for the fight within Ukraine
4. Disrupt Russian supply lines (though, that requires a push deep into Kursk at very high risk for little gain)
5. Bring the reality of war to the people of Russia, and raise questions about the Russian narrative about the "special military operation" - which is a double edged goal as it also plays into the narrative of Ukraine being a threat to Russia
6. Degrade Russian military capability by destroying equipment in circumstances where this is more exposed than the entrenched positions in Ukraine
7. Occupy territory that can be a bargaining chip in peace talks
It seems that the biggest risk Ukraine faces is in overstretching themselves, advancing too far and leaving their flanks exposed. If they can set up a defence line and hold territory they have gained that allows ongoing diversion of Russian forces to fight in Russia. But, they need to be able to retain the means of withdrawing back into Ukraine if needed, I'm not sure the gains would be worth the loss of their best troops if they get surrounded without a route back.
I would just add that discomforting Putin and giving a lie to the notion that he keeps Russia and Russians safe must surely be an objective.
One that he easily blocks by controlling the narrative, even for a minority(?) in the West, let alone the global majority.
I don't think you can stop mass evacuations becoming widely known.
I read somewhere that Ukrainian forces have taken control of Sudzha because it is a hub for natural gas being pumped from Russia into the EU. Is that right? Surprised to hear Russian natural gas was still being piped into the EU.
Given that the pipeline served by the Sudzha hub actually goes through Ukraine, occupying Sudzha does not give Ukraine any leverage it didn't already have.
An additional goal that could be added to @Alan Cresswell 's list is killing or capturing numerous Russian conscripts. Most of the combat-oriented front-line positions in Russia's war against Ukraine are staffed by volunteers or mercenaries. Most conscripts serve in behind the lines roles or in areas where there is not a lot of active fighting (like Kursk until recently). Russian popular support of the Afghan War really started to collapse when large numbers of conscripts (as opposed to professional career military troops) started getting killed. An analysis:
In this context, conscript soldiers hold particular value, as Russian society is generally more sensitive to the plight of conscripts than to that of contract soldiers. This sensitivity is underscored by Putin’s promise in the spring of 2022 to address the issue of conscripts being used in combat situations.
The writer, using the pseudonym "Tatarigami", is a well-known Ukrainian partisan but his analysis seems accurate.
There seem to be a range of possible goals for the operation, and it's likely that the operation was planned to meet several of them. These could include:
1. Morale boost to the Ukrainian public and military (this appears to have been achieved)
2. Divert Russian forces from the front lines within Ukraine (this also appears to be happening)
3. Force Russia to deploy more forces along the Ukrainian border to prevent Ukrainian forces repeating this easy incursion, more forces here equals less available for the fight within Ukraine
4. Disrupt Russian supply lines (though, that requires a push deep into Kursk at very high risk for little gain)
5. Bring the reality of war to the people of Russia, and raise questions about the Russian narrative about the "special military operation" - which is a double edged goal as it also plays into the narrative of Ukraine being a threat to Russia
6. Degrade Russian military capability by destroying equipment in circumstances where this is more exposed than the entrenched positions in Ukraine
7. Occupy territory that can be a bargaining chip in peace talks
It seems that the biggest risk Ukraine faces is in overstretching themselves, advancing too far and leaving their flanks exposed. If they can set up a defence line and hold territory they have gained that allows ongoing diversion of Russian forces to fight in Russia. But, they need to be able to retain the means of withdrawing back into Ukraine if needed, I'm not sure the gains would be worth the loss of their best troops if they get surrounded without a route back.
I would just add that discomforting Putin and giving a lie to the notion that he keeps Russia and Russians safe must surely be an objective.
One that he easily blocks by controlling the narrative, even for a minority(?) in the West, let alone the global majority.
I don't think you can stop mass evacuations becoming widely known.
Indeed, but he still controls the narrative, except here, and in few Western capitals, where it doesn't matter. There is no Russian von Stauffenberg, since the even less baked Prigozhin. Let alone someone who'd actually get the job done. There's only one way to do that.
This has all the makings of a body-blow to Putin. It is now one week and Ukraine is still advancing. Images have emerged of the Russian Tricolour being captured and lowered by Ukrainian Army troops in Russia itself. Sidenote: I never thought I would see such classic images of conventional war in my lifetime.
There hasn't been a serious Russian Army counterpunch yet. Report are that Putin has placed an FSB general in charge of the Kursk defences, not an Army general. Joy, that appears to be a fiasco in progress.
Russia hasn't, as yet, done the basics of self-defence that Ukraine did within hours of the invasion in 2022: Declare martial law, call for general mobilization, hand out weapons to local defenders and send in conscripts.
What is the point of having conscription if you can't use the conscripts for home defence?
Just watch him spin in power. Like the trials of Trump, he will make copious lemonade out of the lemons. His army is winning in the east. He can keep this up forever. Ukraine will have to retreat without opposition to face his grinding forward in the east. He has no need to overreact.
Did I hear correctly that Ukraine has now entered the Belgorod region? Is that a second front, or is it still considered part of the Kursk incursion since Belgorod is nearby?
Did I hear correctly that Ukraine has now entered the Belgorod region? Is that a second front, or is it still considered part of the Kursk incursion since Belgorod is nearby?
I believe it is the latter. Invasions don't always neatly observe lines on a map, unless that line is a border with a neutral country.
No fear. And Putin could not care less how much territory they take. The more the better. They will give it up, whereas he won't give up what he's taking in the east.
No fear. And Putin could not care less how much territory they take. The more the better. They will give it up, whereas he won't give up what he's taking in the east.
That's a little ridiculous. Of course the Ukraine has no intention of holding on to the territory long term, but the idea that Putin doesn't care is at odds with everything we know about him. Mother Russia and the right to a Russian empire (based on 19th century boundaries as far as we can tell) is tied very strongly to his identity. And even if it wasn't, a dictator's survival depends on being able to project strength. This is by no means an existential threat to Russia but it is a chink in Putin's existential armour.
I heard an expert analysis yesterday. The Ukrainian strategic planners have a few options here. It is not just a raid to score a psychological win. They're staying a bit longer. It may be that they plan to make the Russians force them out, thereby relieving the pressures inside Ukraine as Russia is forced to divert forces for the expulsion of Ukraine's forces from Russian soil.
So don't. It's easy to spin. Ukraine is weakening itself in the east for a distraction in the north that can go nowhere. Rodina should intensify its attack in the east.
One possible motive for Ukraine to invade Russian territory in Kursk is to be able to exchange it for Ukrainian lands held by Russia in peace talks.
Besides, it was obvious with current Russian incursions into Ukraine, and operations to defend them, there had to be a soft underbelly somewhere along other parts of the border. Now Russia will be forced to reposition its forces in Ukraine.
I hope the Kursk incursion can expand. It might get Russia to the peace table.
Ukraine need to be careful and not be sucked too far into Russia. Is Russia trying to trap the Ukrainian forces inside Russia and then eliminate them at their leisure?
One possible motive for Ukraine to invade Russian territory in Kursk is to be able to exchange it for Ukrainian lands held by Russia in peace talks.
Besides, it was obvious with current Russian incursions into Ukraine, and operations to defend them, there had to be a soft underbelly somewhere along other parts of the border. Now Russia will be forced to reposition its forces in Ukraine.
I hope the Kursk incursion can expand. It might get Russia to the peace table.
Ukraine need to be careful and not be sucked too far into Russia. Is Russia trying to trap the Ukrainian forces inside Russia and then eliminate them at their leisure?
It could be a bit like 1943 Kursk in reverse.
How so?
Russia is trying, successfully, to irreversibly conquer east Ukraine. It just got easier.
One possible motive for Ukraine to invade Russian territory in Kursk is to be able to exchange it for Ukrainian lands held by Russia in peace talks.
Besides, it was obvious with current Russian incursions into Ukraine, and operations to defend them, there had to be a soft underbelly somewhere along other parts of the border. Now Russia will be forced to reposition its forces in Ukraine.
I hope the Kursk incursion can expand. It might get Russia to the peace table.
Ukraine need to be careful and not be sucked too far into Russia. Is Russia trying to trap the Ukrainian forces inside Russia and then eliminate them at their leisure?
It could be a bit like 1943 Kursk in reverse.
How so?
Russia is trying, successfully, to irreversibly conquer east Ukraine. It just got easier.
I am not making predictions here. I just want Ukraine to be careful
One possible motive for Ukraine to invade Russian territory in Kursk is to be able to exchange it for Ukrainian lands held by Russia in peace talks.
Besides, it was obvious with current Russian incursions into Ukraine, and operations to defend them, there had to be a soft underbelly somewhere along other parts of the border. Now Russia will be forced to reposition its forces in Ukraine.
I hope the Kursk incursion can expand. It might get Russia to the peace table.
Ukraine need to be careful and not be sucked too far into Russia. Is Russia trying to trap the Ukrainian forces inside Russia and then eliminate them at their leisure?
It could be a bit like 1943 Kursk in reverse.
How so?
Russia is trying, successfully, to irreversibly conquer east Ukraine. It just got easier.
I am not making predictions here. I just want Ukraine to be careful
Understood as it's a Ukrainian salient in Kursk, and they can be pinched off, which the Germans failed to do in '43 in the biggest battle in history.
I don't think that's the risk at all. Ukraine is using the seasoned 82nd and 95th air assault brigades, among 15,000 troops, from the eastern front west to north of Donetsk city. As a mediocre chess player who has beaten far better players, I'd let them. Where are they going to go? And I'd just keep grinding west to north of Donetsk in particular.
One possible motive for Ukraine to invade Russian territory in Kursk is to be able to exchange it for Ukrainian lands held by Russia in peace talks.
Besides, it was obvious with current Russian incursions into Ukraine, and operations to defend them, there had to be a soft underbelly somewhere along other parts of the border. Now Russia will be forced to reposition its forces in Ukraine.
I hope the Kursk incursion can expand. It might get Russia to the peace table.
Ukraine need to be careful and not be sucked too far into Russia. Is Russia trying to trap the Ukrainian forces inside Russia and then eliminate them at their leisure?
It could be a bit like 1943 Kursk in reverse.
How so?
Russia is trying, successfully, to irreversibly conquer east Ukraine. It just got easier.
I am not making predictions here. I just want Ukraine to be careful
Understood as it's a Ukrainian salient in Kursk, and they can be pinched off, which the Germans failed to do in '43 in the biggest battle in history.
I don't think that's the risk at all. Ukraine is using the seasoned 82nd and 95th air assault brigades, among 15,000 troops, from the eastern front west to north of Donetsk city. As a mediocre chess player who has beaten far better players, I'd let them. Where are they going to go? And I'd just keep grinding west to north of Donetsk in particular.
Again, strategically Ukraine's incursion is mostly irrelevant at the moment. Unless they start disrupting the Russian war effort. However, psychologically it's really bad for Putin.
As a mediocre chess player who has beaten far better players
So you're Russia in this? Assuming both parts of your statement are accurate*, what that tells me is that you might beat the 'far better player' sometimes, but mostly you won't. Otherwise you wouldn't be 'mediocre' and they wouldn't be 'far better'
*as in false modesty, I'm not saying you're lying!
Comments
Russia claimed that the Russian-speaking minority was being persecuted, particularly in the eastern provinces. It's not going to row back on that one or relinquish The Crimea that easily.
We are talking stalemate or escalation. Unless someone can come up with a deal both sides can accept. It doesn't sound to me that Boris has done so. Nor can I think of one that either side would accept. But then, unlike Boris, I don't claim to be an expert on international relations and conflict management and reconciliation.
Though there’s just about an argument that he might know more than the average person about the Ukraine government, and (from FCO briefings when PM) probably a bit about the Russians.
Just for a moment I had a ‘Nixon goes to China’ premonition about how the Ukraine war gets solved by President Trump with (to mix metaphors) Boris Johnson in the David Owen/Paddy Ashdown roles….
To be fair, if they pulled it off I’d take my hat off.
Russia's real objection is that it doesn't want a West-leaning, peaceful and prosperous liberal democracy on its border. The official Russian position is that liberal democracy doesn't work and a nearby example showing otherwise might get ordinary Russians thinking dangerous ideas. Which is why I suspect that the Putin regime has come to regard the war as an end in itself rather than a means to an end.
Russian has three basic strategic options for keeping Ukraine from doing that.
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In other words the war, in and of itself, is seen by Russia as its means for preventing Ukraine from establishing closer ties to the West.
I'm imagining a "deal" worked out by Trump to be something like the Munich Agreement, except negotiated by Oswald Mosley instead of Neville Chamberlain.
Apparently these are uniformed, regular Ukrainian troops with takes, drones and artillery, not the Free Russia Legion
On a strategic level I'm not sure I understand their goal. I don't think Ukraine has the manpower to effectively defend this territory over the long term, when coupled with their existing defensive obligations in Donbas. Assuming that holding the territory is not Ukraine's strategic object here, a couple possibilities suggest themselves, none of which are mutually exclusive. Perhaps this is Ukraine's attempt to demonstrate to the West in general (and the Biden administration in particular) the hollowness of their obsession with escalation management. This crosses just about every imaginable "red line" ascribed to Putin and his response has been muted at best. Perhaps this is an attempt to disrupt Russian supply lines to a Donbas offensive that's already approaching culmination. Maybe the Ukrainians are trying to increase domestic Russian discontent with the war special military operation. Maybe it's a large scale operational test of Ukrainian electronic warfare capabilities. Perhaps the Ukrainians are trying a really long flanking maneuver against Russian forces near Kharkiv. I honestly don't know, but I suspect all will be clear eventually, including whether this was a good idea or not.
The rest is history.
If you don't like the question, redefine it until you do.
It may be that Ukraine wants a big chunk of Russia to bargain with, The Kursk Nuclear Power Plant is within striking distance. It would make a great bargaining set-off against the Zhaporizhia Nuclear Plant.
Russian logistics is highly railway dependent and rely on a few key junctions that are now threatened by the Ukrainians. That hurts.
Good operations do not cause problems (with one solution) they cause dilemmas with multiple solutions all of which are equally bad. Russia now has the dilemma of risking their supply lines or weakening their front lines. They may soon have a nuclear and electrical supply issue. Putin either has to do something he doesn't want to do and redeploy forces or look weak and fails to protect Russia from invasion.
Ukraine now looks like the most aggressive, audacious and competant partner the US has had in decades. They are a democracy with a government that isn't embarrassing (see Saudi Arabia, South Vietnam and South Korea). The Defense and State departments should be beside themselves with glee.
This strategy actually led to another question, which was "will the sands in that area of desert support a modern tank?" They were actually able to find the answer (yes!) in a pre-WWII geographic survey of the area.
Besides, it was obvious with current Russian incursions into Ukraine, and operations to defend them, there had to be a soft underbelly somewhere along other parts of the border. Now Russia will be forced to reposition its forces in Ukraine.
I hope the Kursk incursion can expand. It might get Russia to the peace table.
And it was part, a republic, of Russia? I cannot establish if it was an independent nation state at that time.
Yes, just a change of empire title. As you say, Dagestan, which was invaded by Chechens in '99, is a republic of the Russian Federation. Wasn't Chechnya? Kursk is an oblast of Russia 'proper'? So the Ukrainian invasion, six days so far with no sign of being turned, is the first since '41? Although it being a former Soviet Republic, part of the empire since C18th Catherine the Great and, in fact, the Mother of Russia in Kyiv, makes it all somewhat moot.
Another Chernobyl in the making? Brilliant Russian distraction tactics, as was mooted over a year ago. From yourself I realise that reactors can't just be turned off and walked away from. What is the risk of criticality?
The core temperatures are low enough that the cooling towers are not needed to dissipate excess heat, but the fire damage would mean that at the end of the war there will need to be repairs done to the cooling towers before restarting the reactors, along with a full inspection of the entire site and repairs to other parts of the site.
Lots of high explosive placed next to and within the containment building could result in a radioactive release, or for the cooling ponds with spent fuel stores. But, that's not something that could be plausibly called an accident or the result of artillery fire.
And in answer to my question re invasion of Russia, 'We can't underestimate the significance of such a huge incursion by Ukraine: The occupation of Russian territory for the first time since the Second World War.' Sarah Rainsford 13:02 BBC.
Because they’ve read some books and know Manstein ran out of petrol?
Just because Germany invaded Russia doesn’t make it the plan to follow.
So what lessons did the Russians learn from Manstein's charges behind them? How do you prevent that? Apart from cutting off their fuel supply?
Much of what the Germans actually invaded is now Belarus and Ukraine.
From what I can see, the Ukrainians have evolved their own combined-arms tactics which incorporate fewer manned aircraft, more drones and far more EM warfare than WWII-style operations did.
I would say that the Ukrainian goal generally is to operationally destabilize the Russian Army by presenting the dilemma of forcing Russia to choose to either defend Kursk and weaken their front or let Kursk be and give Ukraine a occupation win. It's lose-lose for Russia.
Russian conscripts have not proven equal to the defence task and conscript causalities have proven to be major political issues for the Russian hierarchy.
1. Morale boost to the Ukrainian public and military (this appears to have been achieved)
2. Divert Russian forces from the front lines within Ukraine (this also appears to be happening)
3. Force Russia to deploy more forces along the Ukrainian border to prevent Ukrainian forces repeating this easy incursion, more forces here equals less available for the fight within Ukraine
4. Disrupt Russian supply lines (though, that requires a push deep into Kursk at very high risk for little gain)
5. Bring the reality of war to the people of Russia, and raise questions about the Russian narrative about the "special military operation" - which is a double edged goal as it also plays into the narrative of Ukraine being a threat to Russia
6. Degrade Russian military capability by destroying equipment in circumstances where this is more exposed than the entrenched positions in Ukraine
7. Occupy territory that can be a bargaining chip in peace talks
It seems that the biggest risk Ukraine faces is in overstretching themselves, advancing too far and leaving their flanks exposed. If they can set up a defence line and hold territory they have gained that allows ongoing diversion of Russian forces to fight in Russia. But, they need to be able to retain the means of withdrawing back into Ukraine if needed, I'm not sure the gains would be worth the loss of their best troops if they get surrounded without a route back.
I would just add that discomforting Putin and giving a lie to the notion that he keeps Russia and Russians safe must surely be an objective.
One that he easily blocks by controlling the narrative, even for a minority(?) in the West, let alone the global majority.
I don't think you can stop mass evacuations becoming widely known.
Given that the pipeline served by the Sudzha hub actually goes through Ukraine, occupying Sudzha does not give Ukraine any leverage it didn't already have.
An additional goal that could be added to @Alan Cresswell 's list is killing or capturing numerous Russian conscripts. Most of the combat-oriented front-line positions in Russia's war against Ukraine are staffed by volunteers or mercenaries. Most conscripts serve in behind the lines roles or in areas where there is not a lot of active fighting (like Kursk until recently). Russian popular support of the Afghan War really started to collapse when large numbers of conscripts (as opposed to professional career military troops) started getting killed. An analysis:
The writer, using the pseudonym "Tatarigami", is a well-known Ukrainian partisan but his analysis seems accurate.
Indeed, but he still controls the narrative, except here, and in few Western capitals, where it doesn't matter. There is no Russian von Stauffenberg, since the even less baked Prigozhin. Let alone someone who'd actually get the job done. There's only one way to do that.
There hasn't been a serious Russian Army counterpunch yet. Report are that Putin has placed an FSB general in charge of the Kursk defences, not an Army general. Joy, that appears to be a fiasco in progress.
Russia hasn't, as yet, done the basics of self-defence that Ukraine did within hours of the invasion in 2022: Declare martial law, call for general mobilization, hand out weapons to local defenders and send in conscripts.
What is the point of having conscription if you can't use the conscripts for home defence?
Hopefully Putin’s ‘suddenly’ is coming soon. 🙏
This is beginning to sound like Whack a Mole.
I believe it is the latter. Invasions don't always neatly observe lines on a map, unless that line is a border with a neutral country.
That's a little ridiculous. Of course the Ukraine has no intention of holding on to the territory long term, but the idea that Putin doesn't care is at odds with everything we know about him. Mother Russia and the right to a Russian empire (based on 19th century boundaries as far as we can tell) is tied very strongly to his identity. And even if it wasn't, a dictator's survival depends on being able to project strength. This is by no means an existential threat to Russia but it is a chink in Putin's existential armour.
I heard an expert analysis yesterday. The Ukrainian strategic planners have a few options here. It is not just a raid to score a psychological win. They're staying a bit longer. It may be that they plan to make the Russians force them out, thereby relieving the pressures inside Ukraine as Russia is forced to divert forces for the expulsion of Ukraine's forces from Russian soil.
Ukraine need to be careful and not be sucked too far into Russia. Is Russia trying to trap the Ukrainian forces inside Russia and then eliminate them at their leisure?
It could be a bit like 1943 Kursk in reverse
How so?
Russia is trying, successfully, to irreversibly conquer east Ukraine. It just got easier.
I am not making predictions here. I just want Ukraine to be careful
Understood as it's a Ukrainian salient in Kursk, and they can be pinched off, which the Germans failed to do in '43 in the biggest battle in history.
I don't think that's the risk at all. Ukraine is using the seasoned 82nd and 95th air assault brigades, among 15,000 troops, from the eastern front west to north of Donetsk city. As a mediocre chess player who has beaten far better players, I'd let them. Where are they going to go? And I'd just keep grinding west to north of Donetsk in particular.
🕯🕯🕯🕯🕯
Again, strategically Ukraine's incursion is mostly irrelevant at the moment. Unless they start disrupting the Russian war effort. However, psychologically it's really bad for Putin.
https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/ukraines-invasion-of-russia-exposes-the-folly-of-the-wests-escalation-fears/
So you're Russia in this? Assuming both parts of your statement are accurate*, what that tells me is that you might beat the 'far better player' sometimes, but mostly you won't. Otherwise you wouldn't be 'mediocre' and they wouldn't be 'far better'
*as in false modesty, I'm not saying you're lying!