So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
What. Is. Putin's. Strategic. Objective?
Greater Great Rus'. The territorial unification of East Slavic language speakers. And friends; Serbs. And anyone in the back yard; Chechens.
So it seems that Putin believes he has a historic /?divine mission to create Greater Great Rus with hegemony over most if not all Europe, while Trump has a mission of some sort to Make America Great Again by putting America First and Avoiding Foreign Wars. What an interesting future beckons the rest of us! And how far=sighted was the UK's strategic tilt towards the India-Pacific region! (That last sentence is ironic.)
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
What. Is. Putin's. Strategic. Objective?
Greater Great Rus'. The territorial unification of East Slavic language speakers. And friends; Serbs. And anyone in the back yard; Chechens.
But it's not losing either, despite some setbacks.
It's got a stack of new missiles and seems to be gradually building up its forces by paying handsome sums to recruits from minority groups desperate for the money.
I'm not sure its propaganda efforts on the home-front are as effective as Putin likes to think but they aren't going to throw in the towel any time soon.
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
What. Is. Putin's. Strategic. Objective?
Greater Great Rus'. The territorial unification of East Slavic language speakers. And friends; Serbs. And anyone in the back yard; Chechens.
Ok. Close enough. So how's that going then?
Horribly badly for all concerned, but quantifiably at the rate of a couple of percent of Ukraine a year since 2014, 5% of his goal a year, in fits and starts. He was up to 27%, went down to 18. Last year he took 518 sq km - 200 sq m. This year it's at least double that. American politics could give Putin all of the Donbas remaining and more in four months (Trump). Or stretch out the agony for eight years (Harris). He's over half way.
But it's not losing either, despite some setbacks.
It's got a stack of new missiles and seems to be gradually building up its forces by paying handsome sums to recruits from minority groups desperate for the money.
I'm not sure its propaganda efforts on the home-front are as effective as Putin likes to think but they aren't going to throw in the towel any time soon.
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
What. Is. Putin's. Strategic. Objective?
Greater Great Rus'. The territorial unification of East Slavic language speakers. And friends; Serbs. And anyone in the back yard; Chechens.
Ok. Close enough. So how's that going then?
Horribly badly for all concerned, but quantifiably at the rate of a couple of percent of Ukraine a year since 2014, 5% of his goal a year, in fits and starts. He was up to 27%, went down to 18. Last year he took 518 sq km - 200 sq m. This year it's at least double that. American politics could give Putin all of the Donbas remaining and more in four months (Trump). Or stretch out the agony for eight years (Harris). He's over half way.
This is not a rational analysis. One does not conquer a country by percentages. Moreover, Ukraine is not the endpoint and the impact on how Ukraine is going on future hoped-for campaigns is not insignificant.
But to make it simple for you: Russia is nowhere near achieving its strategic aim.
That might change if Trump wins in November but the current situation does not provide any reason to think Russia is winning. It is foolish to suggest that they are.
That does not mean they cannot win. Of course it does not mean that but the current evidence is not remotely supportative of an argument that they are. Even by a war of extreme attrition.
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
What. Is. Putin's. Strategic. Objective?
Greater Great Rus'. The territorial unification of East Slavic language speakers. And friends; Serbs. And anyone in the back yard; Chechens.
Ok. Close enough. So how's that going then?
Horribly badly for all concerned, but quantifiably at the rate of a couple of percent of Ukraine a year since 2014, 5% of his goal a year, in fits and starts. He was up to 27%, went down to 18. Last year he took 518 sq km - 200 sq m. This year it's at least double that. American politics could give Putin all of the Donbas remaining and more in four months (Trump). Or stretch out the agony for eight years (Harris). He's over half way.
This is not a rational analysis. One does not conquer a country by percentages. Moreover, Ukraine is not the endpoint and the impact on how Ukraine is going on future hoped-for campaigns is not insignificant.
But to make it simple for you: Russia is nowhere near achieving its strategic aim.
That might change if Trump wins in November but the current situation does not provide any reason to think Russia is winning. It is foolish to suggest that they are.
That does not mean they cannot win. Of course it does not mean that but the current evidence is not remotely supportative of an argument that they are. Even by a war of extreme attrition.
AFZ
That's his rationale. Just keep grinding away. What's his strategic aim in Armenia? Transnistria? Ossetia? Georgia? Africa? The West? Apart from Trump and fascism everywhere else. I can't see how he'll get what he was going for 30 months ago, the whole of Ukraine, but he can get a good third. What's irrational about my saying that and above?
So its relentless advance in the Donbas is losing?
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
What. Is. Putin's. Strategic. Objective?
Greater Great Rus'. The territorial unification of East Slavic language speakers. And friends; Serbs. And anyone in the back yard; Chechens.
Ok. Close enough. So how's that going then?
Horribly badly for all concerned, but quantifiably at the rate of a couple of percent of Ukraine a year since 2014, 5% of his goal a year, in fits and starts. He was up to 27%, went down to 18. Last year he took 518 sq km - 200 sq m. This year it's at least double that. American politics could give Putin all of the Donbas remaining and more in four months (Trump). Or stretch out the agony for eight years (Harris). He's over half way.
This is not a rational analysis. One does not conquer a country by percentages. Moreover, Ukraine is not the endpoint and the impact on how Ukraine is going on future hoped-for campaigns is not insignificant.
But to make it simple for you: Russia is nowhere near achieving its strategic aim.
That might change if Trump wins in November but the current situation does not provide any reason to think Russia is winning. It is foolish to suggest that they are.
That does not mean they cannot win. Of course it does not mean that but the current evidence is not remotely supportative of an argument that they are. Even by a war of extreme attrition.
AFZ
That's his rationale. Just keep grinding away. What's his strategic aim in Armenia? Transnistria? Ossetia? Georgia? Africa? The West? Apart from Trump and fascism everywhere else. I can't see how he'll get what he was going for 30 months ago, the whole of Ukraine, but he can get a good third. What's irrational about my saying that and above?
Taking 1/3 of Ukraine is not a strategic end point. It is a recipe for on-going low-level conflict at best. Moreover, whilst Ukraine would rightly think this unacceptable, it would still be a defeat for Russia.
Such a defeat makes future campaigns harder and reduces Putin's influence in Eastern Europe. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Romania etc. fear Russian intentions but they no longer fear Russia's capabilities. This war has reduced their sphere of influence.
To allow Ukraine to use western supplied missiles in Russia would even the field more. There is some calculated risk involved as well. How much is Putin bluffing? He has set up a number of red lines which have been violated, and he did not retaliate.
Then too, the recent missile launches of Iran against Israel showed a combined defense would likely be able to destroy a very large number of ballistic missiles against the allies. The only system that Putin has which would do any damage are the strategic missiles, but he would be a damn fool for taking that step.
Ok. So Putin could hit NATO targets in Poland or Estonia etc.
How would the West respond and how could it not escalate?
According to The Times, various former Defence Secretaries and at least one former PM (guess who? Yes, Boris. Got it in one) are trying to persuade Starmer to go it alone with Biden.
Risky.
There is talk that both sides are exhausted and will aim to reach some kind of agreement. But Putin will probably try to sit things out until he knows whether it's his man or Harris in the White House.
Ok. So Putin could hit NATO targets in Poland or Estonia etc.
How would the West respond and how could it not escalate?
Making war on NATO is escalation. You seem to be asking how could this escalation not be escalation.
Every time the West has talked about upping its support to Ukraine in some form, Putin has called it 'escalation' and 'provocation' and threatened Western/NATO targets. Then has done nothing when the West has provided vital help to the invaded country.
This is nothing new.
This is the guy who has already used chemical weapons on UK streets twice (that we know about*). This is also the guy who invaded Ukraine because he thought the West would do nothing.
My point is 1) EVERYTHING is a calculated risk. 2) The evidence thus far is that standing up to Putin is more effective than pandering...
AFZ
*I.e. what's in the public domain. Who knows if there were other incidents or attempting attacks?
(This is not in-line with the current discussion from this thread, but I leave it here as I found it informative and moving. A recent interview with a Russian contract (signed-on, not conscript) soldier captured in Kursk oblast. The channel seems reputable, from what else I have seen of them. Twenty minute duration, filmed with the subject's permission as required by POW conventions.)
I do not think Putin would settle for 1/3 of Ukraine. I think he would want all of what are now countries and used to be SSRs. I think most European leaders know this.
I do not think Putin would settle for 1/3 of Ukraine. I think he would want all of what are now countries and used to be SSRs. I think most European leaders know this.
The fact that that's now out of reach (and, has been since 2022 when the Russian army failed to roll over the whole of Ukraine in a few days to be greeted by crowds cheering their redeemers) is why in a real sense Putin has already lost. His apparent aim is unachievable, even if Russian forces manage to capture the whole of Ukraine it would be a pyrrhic victory at great cost and requiring constant military occupation to try to suppress partisan Ukrainian uprisings against the occupying forces.
Most of the missiles launched (300) by Iran against Israel were taken down by American, British, and French interceptors. Everyone talks about the Iron Dome, but it was the last of a multilayered system. There are only ten iron dome batteries in Israel. They are very similar to the American Patriot Systems. Point is, Europe also has a multilayered system available.
Moreover, the allied retaliatory response would be overwhelming. Putin would be out of his mind.
Sorry, did not post this earlier. Had to board the ship.
Russia reportedly aims to achieve a decisive victory in Ukraine by 2026 before likely medium- to long-term economic and force generation constraints begin to significantly degrade Russia's ability to sustain its war effort in Ukraine.
Russia will likely face growing challenges in the production and procurement of the materiel that Russian operations in Ukraine require, and the Kremlin will likely become increasingly reliant on foreign partners to meet its materiel needs.
Ukrainian forces reportedly advanced in Glushkovsky Raion, Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces reportedly recently recaptured territory in the area as of September 15.
Ukrainian forces continued offensive operations throughout their salient in Kursk Oblast, and Russian forces recently advanced in the salient.
Russian forces recently advanced near Svatove, Siversk, and Donetsk City.
As I said. Russia is not winning.
What is unspoken in this analysis is also really important. 2025 looks like being the key. If Ukraine can continue its level of operations, Russia will not break-through in any meaningful way and Russia will lose. What that looks like in terms of Eastern Ukraine remains up for debate but Russia's attritional approach cannot last another two years.
However, we all know that if Trump wins, the ability of Ukraine to continue its current operational tempo is very much up for debate. As is the wider defence situation with Eastern Europe and NATO.
My main thought here is that Putin is mostly in a holding pattern in Ukraine for the next 6 months. If and When Trump becomes President, then he'll move to change the dynamic in 2025. That also implies lots of Russian actions in the US Presidential Election, of course.
@Telford it's only a specific type of missile that the Iranians manufacture. As far as I am aware they aren't reliant on Iran for other munitions.
Lots of countries bought Exocet missiles from France. Including ourselves, I think. That doesn't mean they were 'desperate' or wholly dependant on the French.
Police forces 'import' officers from other counties when there is a particularly serious incident or they need extra help. That doesn't mean that they rely on other forces for routine operations.
At any rate, I agree that 2025 will be crucial, Trump or no Trump.
I don't have a crystal-ball but can't see Putin withdrawing empty-handed.
Putin first set a redline when the West was considering sending Centurions, Leopards, and Abrams to Ukraine. We did, and Putin blinked.
He then set a redline when the Allies were considering sending F16s to Ukraine. We did, and he stalled.
I think we would get a strong indication this new redline is the real thing if Putin were to begin moving nuclear warheads to tactical delivery systems. Moveover, we would also see some other indication Putin is serious if the Ballistic system starts to activate--increased signals, advanced placement of mobile missiles, deployment of naval launching systems. Not happening--yet.
If those things start to happen, then I think the allies have the option of disrupting such preparations.
If that was the case we'd be seeing a potential Cuban Missile Crisis.
Putin doesn't have that many options. A cornered beast will lash out with its fangs and claws.
The invasion of Ukraine has backfired on him as the quick victory he expected has not come about.
If he withdraws then he faces the ignominy of explaining that to the Russian people.
He risks being toppled.
I'm not being paranoid but the rhetoric coming out of some elements of the Russian Orthodox Church is frankly alarming.
Patriarch Kyrill declared that he hoped Putin would remain Russian President until the 'end of the world.'
What does he mean by that?
A hyperbolic rhetorical flourish?
Or something more concerning?
There are elements in Russia which mirror the kind of eschatologically obsessed Protestant fundamentalist crazies in the US.
All you need is for some whacko like that to get Putin's ear in a Rasputin-like way and who knows what might be unleashed?
Ok, from what I can gather, support for Putin's war is not as strong as he'd like everyone to believe, but if people thought Russia was really under threat, that might change.
The Ukrainian incursion around Kursk hasn't fazed him, nor the Russian people. They can contain that. Western-supplied missiles landing deep within Russia might change all that.
Just imagine if the US were engaged in some kind of military operation in Mexico or Canada. There'd be mixed views, a range of varied opinions within the US itself. Some hawks. Some doves. Some unsure.
Now, if missiles began to hit targets around Chicago, Alburqueque or Milwaukee, attitudes might drastically change.
I have no idea what the outcome of this ghastly war will be. But Putin isn't going to throw in the towel and concede defeat. Russia isn't going to relinquish Crimea.
Sure, they may be red line after red line but that isn't going to go on indefinitely.
I'm not saying Putin is going to launch an all-out nuclear attack on the West. But he could unleash some heavy shit.
We are talking about a regime that has poisoned British citizens on UK soil. We are dealing with someone who is clearly unhinged.
Putin, like Netanyahu, is fighting for his political life. In Putin's case, that could conceivably be his actual life. What odds on Zelensky's life if Ukraine were to fall under Putin's sway.
It depends on who becomes the next US president, but if all things are equal, I am thinking the Russian war machine will collapse in 2026. The downside to that is the amount of damage the Ukrainians would have to suffer.
Harris will likely allow Zelensky to conduct limited attacks deeper in Russia.
Trump has already said he will concede to Putin.
If Trump wins, Biden will likely release Zelenski to allow the deeper strikes. After, all what does Z have to lose?
@Gamma Gamaliel your examples of Canada and Mexico are preposterous. But it would be within the realm of possibility if Russia would attack Anchorage, or Fairbanks. Two large military bases there. The Russian Navy has been encroaching on Alaskan waters all summer. They will fly their Bears (bombers) along the safety zone every so often.
Just got a message on my phone that says a nuclear bomb (unarmed) accidently fell from an American bomber in South Carolina. Sometimes, we are our own worst enemy.
Just got a message on my phone that says a nuclear bomb (unarmed) accidently fell from an American bomber in South Carolina.
Again? Another broken arrow - "I don't know what's scarier, losing nuclear weapons, or that it happens so often there's actually a term for it." (from the film "Broken Arrow")
Also the film uses "broken arrow" as a term for a stolen nuke, the term actually relates to a lost or damaged nuke - eg: one that's fallen off a bomber, which happens quite regularly usually with nothing more than it going thud on the runway (takeoff, and especially landing, are when a bomb is most likely to come loose). But, there are still areas of Spain contaminated by broken arrows that broke.
Putin, like Netanyahu, is fighting for his political life. In Putin's case, that could conceivably be his actual life. What odds on Zelensky's life if Ukraine were to fall under Putin's sway.
Surely that is conceivable in Netanyahu's case too?
@Gramps49 - of course my examples of hypothetical US military action in Canada or Mexico are preposterous.
I only used them because they each share a border with the US in the same way as Russia shares a border with Ukraine. My point was that missiles falling deep within any country's territory are likely to change public opinion, whether in the US, Russia or anywhere else.
Incidentally, as things stand, I don't envisage Ukraine falling to Putin and Zelensky disappearing. The more likely outcome, I think, is some kind of deal - unpalatable as it may sound - with Russia retaining The Crimea and some territories it's seized since 2022.
That wouldn't 'resolve' anything and leave the door open for future conflict.
As for the Russian military machine collapsing during 2025, what evidence is there for this possibility?
As for the Russian military machine collapsing during 2025, what evidence is there for this possibility?
Depends what you mean by collapse. And 2025 is probably a little soon.
The truth is that Russia is expending very large quantities of men and equipment to fight to a stalemate. That is not sustainable indefinitely. It's always worth remembering that losing large numbers of soldiers has a military cost as well as a human one. Training and experience takes time. A mass mobilisation may help with numbers but it still takes time to turn those numbers into an effective fighting force.
The expert analysis I referred to in a previous post estimates that Russia can maintain the current level of operations throughout 2025 but not far beyond. Therefore they need a decisive breakthrough by early '26. Whilst I can see them strengthening their hold on Donbass, I think there is zero chance of any other progress as long as the West keeps supplying the aid that Ukraine needs.
The point about 2025 is the simple question of What does the World look like at 12:01pm on January 20th? with a side order of How is Europe going to behave?
I was chatting to an ex-Royal Navy submariner this week.* His strategic view is the same as mine** that complaints about the cost of supporting Ukraine from the West are pathetic and totally misguided. If Ukraine falls, there will be a much bigger conflict that could easily go global and none of the key Western countries will avoid being drawn in to it. The cost of not supporting Ukraine is far, far higher than the cost of supporting them. The West is getting to fight Putin on the cheap. It is a vital strategic opportunity that must not be missed.
So for military and geopolitical reasons, 2025 looks pivotal.
AFZ
*The difference between a submariner and a sailor is that submariners consider all ships to be a target.
**I am most definitely an armchair general and I am open to the fact that I may be completely wrong but this is what I think based on reading and listening to the best information I can find.
Training and experience takes time. A mass mobilisation may help with numbers but it still takes time to turn those numbers into an effective fighting force.
There have been reports that Russia has been largely skipping the training part, which has contributed to the massive casualty rate that they're experiencing.
Training and experience takes time. A mass mobilisation may help with numbers but it still takes time to turn those numbers into an effective fighting force.
There have been reports that Russia has been largely skipping the training part, which has contributed to the massive casualty rate that they're experiencing.
Indeed. And that partly explains their lack of effectiveness.
I have a hunch that the Russian military would move against Putin rather than be seeb to fail in Ukraine.
A very plausible scenario. If Harris wins at the beginning of November, A Russian coup before the end of November would not be especially surprising. Of course, what happens next is the inevitable question that follows.
First of all, I said the Russian Military Machine would likely collapse in 2026, not 2025. Others may have said '25.
Why do I say 26?
Three items.
If Ukraine is allowed to use longer range missiles, more ammunition dumps will be vulnerable. North Korea, China and Iran cannot continue to replenish the Russian machine.
Russia's has not been able to develop newer weapons systems in order to keep its military machine modern. No new planes, no new tanks, no new missile systems, no new naval ships. It just does not have the funding to put into systems development.
A key weak point is the support of the Russian mothers. Up until now, Russia has been able to draft people from the prisons and eastern regions. It will need to start drawing from the Russian cities of Moscow and St Petersburg. When this happened during their war with Afghanistan, the mothers rose up, and the regime fell.
Ok, sorry. Yes, you said 2026. I must have misread it.
Yes, the Russian mothers thing played out in Afghanistan. As yet, there hasn't been much appetite among non-ethnic minority Russians to join up. I don’t see that changing any time soon despite the best efforts of the Putin propaganda machine.
What might change that, though, is Russian humiliation or a sense that the country is under some kind of 'existential' threat. That's the point I was trying to make rather clumsily.
I find it interesting that Ukraine is under inexorable, inevitable, existential threat, but doesn't use Western weapons in its arsenal inside Russia. Regardless of permission. Why? What does it fear? That the West won't resupply them? Why wouldn't they? Or does it fear something else?
I find it interesting that Ukraine is under inexorable, inevitable, existential threat, but doesn't use Western weapons in its arsenal inside Russia. Regardless of permission. Why? What does it fear? That the West won't resupply them? Why wouldn't they? Or does it fear something else?
But Ukraine does not have the permission it needs to Western supplied weapons deep inside Russia. It cannot risk losing Allied support.
I may need wrong but the software on those systems also won't lock on to a target outside ukraine. To enforce said prohibition.
I think you are right about the software. I know much of the munitions are precision guided which--at least from the American side--need GPS to operate.
I do know many of the Ukrainian drones are guided by Starlink which is a commercial system owned, in large part, by Elan Musk. At one time, he had threatened to shut that system off for Ukraine, but I think the US government cut a deal with him.
The Russians claim to have their own system, but it is either jammed or of very poor quality, it is amazing they can even find Ukraine to hit.
Comments
I think we can indeed blame this on Putin. He’s a monster.
The incredibly slow progress of a 'superpower' against its smaller neighbour at huge materiel and manpower cost is not bringing its strategic ambitions any closer.
Of course it is. At the rate of 6 sq. km. per day. 40 a week. 170 a month. A thousand a year.
Storm Shadows and Tauri hitting glide bomb supply lines in Russia would make it yet slower. All of the remaining Donbas and Zaporizhzhia and Dnipropetrovsk to the Dnipro would not happen this year. As it won't now anyway with the autumn rasputitsa looming. But it can't not happen. He can spend a thousand dead a week. Ten. Zelenskyy can't. The only limit is Putin's lifespan. He can easily take the region above in 10-20 years. What's the rush?
What. Is. Putin's. Strategic. Objective?
Greater Great Rus'. The territorial unification of East Slavic language speakers. And friends; Serbs. And anyone in the back yard; Chechens.
Ok. Close enough. So how's that going then?
But it's not losing either, despite some setbacks.
It's got a stack of new missiles and seems to be gradually building up its forces by paying handsome sums to recruits from minority groups desperate for the money.
I'm not sure its propaganda efforts on the home-front are as effective as Putin likes to think but they aren't going to throw in the towel any time soon.
Horribly badly for all concerned, but quantifiably at the rate of a couple of percent of Ukraine a year since 2014, 5% of his goal a year, in fits and starts. He was up to 27%, went down to 18. Last year he took 518 sq km - 200 sq m. This year it's at least double that. American politics could give Putin all of the Donbas remaining and more in four months (Trump). Or stretch out the agony for eight years (Harris). He's over half way.
That is indeed true.
This is not a rational analysis. One does not conquer a country by percentages. Moreover, Ukraine is not the endpoint and the impact on how Ukraine is going on future hoped-for campaigns is not insignificant.
But to make it simple for you: Russia is nowhere near achieving its strategic aim.
That might change if Trump wins in November but the current situation does not provide any reason to think Russia is winning. It is foolish to suggest that they are.
That does not mean they cannot win. Of course it does not mean that but the current evidence is not remotely supportative of an argument that they are. Even by a war of extreme attrition.
AFZ
That's his rationale. Just keep grinding away. What's his strategic aim in Armenia? Transnistria? Ossetia? Georgia? Africa? The West? Apart from Trump and fascism everywhere else. I can't see how he'll get what he was going for 30 months ago, the whole of Ukraine, but he can get a good third. What's irrational about my saying that and above?
Taking 1/3 of Ukraine is not a strategic end point. It is a recipe for on-going low-level conflict at best. Moreover, whilst Ukraine would rightly think this unacceptable, it would still be a defeat for Russia.
Such a defeat makes future campaigns harder and reduces Putin's influence in Eastern Europe. Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Poland, Romania etc. fear Russian intentions but they no longer fear Russia's capabilities. This war has reduced their sphere of influence.
Russia is not remotely winning at present.
AFZ
Then too, the recent missile launches of Iran against Israel showed a combined defense would likely be able to destroy a very large number of ballistic missiles against the allies. The only system that Putin has which would do any damage are the strategic missiles, but he would be a damn fool for taking that step.
It may be a calculated risk but it's still a risk.
It’s a worked example of how to spend such billions though, which other countries might want to follow.
They’re more at the ‘let’s choose to spend billions and in 5-10 years we could have this…’ stage.
How would the West respond and how could it not escalate?
According to The Times, various former Defence Secretaries and at least one former PM (guess who? Yes, Boris. Got it in one) are trying to persuade Starmer to go it alone with Biden.
Risky.
There is talk that both sides are exhausted and will aim to reach some kind of agreement. But Putin will probably try to sit things out until he knows whether it's his man or Harris in the White House.
Making war on NATO is escalation. You seem to be asking how could this escalation not be escalation.
Every time the West has talked about upping its support to Ukraine in some form, Putin has called it 'escalation' and 'provocation' and threatened Western/NATO targets. Then has done nothing when the West has provided vital help to the invaded country.
This is nothing new.
This is the guy who has already used chemical weapons on UK streets twice (that we know about*). This is also the guy who invaded Ukraine because he thought the West would do nothing.
My point is 1) EVERYTHING is a calculated risk. 2) The evidence thus far is that standing up to Putin is more effective than pandering...
AFZ
*I.e. what's in the public domain. Who knows if there were other incidents or attempting attacks?
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=s4mFH6PNwsk&t=1s
Moreover, the allied retaliatory response would be overwhelming. Putin would be out of his mind.
Sorry, did not post this earlier. Had to board the ship.
https://understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-september-15-2024
Here's a couple of exerts:
As I said. Russia is not winning.
What is unspoken in this analysis is also really important. 2025 looks like being the key. If Ukraine can continue its level of operations, Russia will not break-through in any meaningful way and Russia will lose. What that looks like in terms of Eastern Ukraine remains up for debate but Russia's attritional approach cannot last another two years.
However, we all know that if Trump wins, the ability of Ukraine to continue its current operational tempo is very much up for debate. As is the wider defence situation with Eastern Europe and NATO.
My main thought here is that Putin is mostly in a holding pattern in Ukraine for the next 6 months. If and When Trump becomes President, then he'll move to change the dynamic in 2025. That also implies lots of Russian actions in the US Presidential Election, of course.
AFZ
Lots of countries bought Exocet missiles from France. Including ourselves, I think. That doesn't mean they were 'desperate' or wholly dependant on the French.
Police forces 'import' officers from other counties when there is a particularly serious incident or they need extra help. That doesn't mean that they rely on other forces for routine operations.
At any rate, I agree that 2025 will be crucial, Trump or no Trump.
I don't have a crystal-ball but can't see Putin withdrawing empty-handed.
Do you think he is bluffing?
I wouldn't want to chance it. I know that's not a popular view here though.
He then set a redline when the Allies were considering sending F16s to Ukraine. We did, and he stalled.
I think we would get a strong indication this new redline is the real thing if Putin were to begin moving nuclear warheads to tactical delivery systems. Moveover, we would also see some other indication Putin is serious if the Ballistic system starts to activate--increased signals, advanced placement of mobile missiles, deployment of naval launching systems. Not happening--yet.
If those things start to happen, then I think the allies have the option of disrupting such preparations.
Putin doesn't have that many options. A cornered beast will lash out with its fangs and claws.
The invasion of Ukraine has backfired on him as the quick victory he expected has not come about.
If he withdraws then he faces the ignominy of explaining that to the Russian people.
He risks being toppled.
I'm not being paranoid but the rhetoric coming out of some elements of the Russian Orthodox Church is frankly alarming.
Patriarch Kyrill declared that he hoped Putin would remain Russian President until the 'end of the world.'
What does he mean by that?
A hyperbolic rhetorical flourish?
Or something more concerning?
There are elements in Russia which mirror the kind of eschatologically obsessed Protestant fundamentalist crazies in the US.
All you need is for some whacko like that to get Putin's ear in a Rasputin-like way and who knows what might be unleashed?
Ok, from what I can gather, support for Putin's war is not as strong as he'd like everyone to believe, but if people thought Russia was really under threat, that might change.
The Ukrainian incursion around Kursk hasn't fazed him, nor the Russian people. They can contain that. Western-supplied missiles landing deep within Russia might change all that.
Just imagine if the US were engaged in some kind of military operation in Mexico or Canada. There'd be mixed views, a range of varied opinions within the US itself. Some hawks. Some doves. Some unsure.
Now, if missiles began to hit targets around Chicago, Alburqueque or Milwaukee, attitudes might drastically change.
I have no idea what the outcome of this ghastly war will be. But Putin isn't going to throw in the towel and concede defeat. Russia isn't going to relinquish Crimea.
Sure, they may be red line after red line but that isn't going to go on indefinitely.
I'm not saying Putin is going to launch an all-out nuclear attack on the West. But he could unleash some heavy shit.
We are talking about a regime that has poisoned British citizens on UK soil. We are dealing with someone who is clearly unhinged.
Harris will likely allow Zelensky to conduct limited attacks deeper in Russia.
Trump has already said he will concede to Putin.
If Trump wins, Biden will likely release Zelenski to allow the deeper strikes. After, all what does Z have to lose?
@Gamma Gamaliel your examples of Canada and Mexico are preposterous. But it would be within the realm of possibility if Russia would attack Anchorage, or Fairbanks. Two large military bases there. The Russian Navy has been encroaching on Alaskan waters all summer. They will fly their Bears (bombers) along the safety zone every so often.
Just got a message on my phone that says a nuclear bomb (unarmed) accidently fell from an American bomber in South Carolina. Sometimes, we are our own worst enemy.
Also the film uses "broken arrow" as a term for a stolen nuke, the term actually relates to a lost or damaged nuke - eg: one that's fallen off a bomber, which happens quite regularly usually with nothing more than it going thud on the runway (takeoff, and especially landing, are when a bomb is most likely to come loose). But, there are still areas of Spain contaminated by broken arrows that broke.
Surely that is conceivable in Netanyahu's case too?
I only used them because they each share a border with the US in the same way as Russia shares a border with Ukraine. My point was that missiles falling deep within any country's territory are likely to change public opinion, whether in the US, Russia or anywhere else.
Incidentally, as things stand, I don't envisage Ukraine falling to Putin and Zelensky disappearing. The more likely outcome, I think, is some kind of deal - unpalatable as it may sound - with Russia retaining The Crimea and some territories it's seized since 2022.
That wouldn't 'resolve' anything and leave the door open for future conflict.
As for the Russian military machine collapsing during 2025, what evidence is there for this possibility?
Depends what you mean by collapse. And 2025 is probably a little soon.
The truth is that Russia is expending very large quantities of men and equipment to fight to a stalemate. That is not sustainable indefinitely. It's always worth remembering that losing large numbers of soldiers has a military cost as well as a human one. Training and experience takes time. A mass mobilisation may help with numbers but it still takes time to turn those numbers into an effective fighting force.
The expert analysis I referred to in a previous post estimates that Russia can maintain the current level of operations throughout 2025 but not far beyond. Therefore they need a decisive breakthrough by early '26. Whilst I can see them strengthening their hold on Donbass, I think there is zero chance of any other progress as long as the West keeps supplying the aid that Ukraine needs.
The point about 2025 is the simple question of What does the World look like at 12:01pm on January 20th? with a side order of How is Europe going to behave?
I was chatting to an ex-Royal Navy submariner this week.* His strategic view is the same as mine** that complaints about the cost of supporting Ukraine from the West are pathetic and totally misguided. If Ukraine falls, there will be a much bigger conflict that could easily go global and none of the key Western countries will avoid being drawn in to it. The cost of not supporting Ukraine is far, far higher than the cost of supporting them. The West is getting to fight Putin on the cheap. It is a vital strategic opportunity that must not be missed.
So for military and geopolitical reasons, 2025 looks pivotal.
AFZ
*The difference between a submariner and a sailor is that submariners consider all ships to be a target.
**I am most definitely an armchair general and I am open to the fact that I may be completely wrong but this is what I think based on reading and listening to the best information I can find.
Indeed. And that partly explains their lack of effectiveness.
A very plausible scenario. If Harris wins at the beginning of November, A Russian coup before the end of November would not be especially surprising. Of course, what happens next is the inevitable question that follows.
AFZ
First of all, I said the Russian Military Machine would likely collapse in 2026, not 2025. Others may have said '25.
Why do I say 26?
Three items.
If Ukraine is allowed to use longer range missiles, more ammunition dumps will be vulnerable. North Korea, China and Iran cannot continue to replenish the Russian machine.
Russia's has not been able to develop newer weapons systems in order to keep its military machine modern. No new planes, no new tanks, no new missile systems, no new naval ships. It just does not have the funding to put into systems development.
A key weak point is the support of the Russian mothers. Up until now, Russia has been able to draft people from the prisons and eastern regions. It will need to start drawing from the Russian cities of Moscow and St Petersburg. When this happened during their war with Afghanistan, the mothers rose up, and the regime fell.
https://inews.co.uk/opinion/russian-morale-collapsing-time-help-ukraine-3289542
Yes, the Russian mothers thing played out in Afghanistan. As yet, there hasn't been much appetite among non-ethnic minority Russians to join up. I don’t see that changing any time soon despite the best efforts of the Putin propaganda machine.
What might change that, though, is Russian humiliation or a sense that the country is under some kind of 'existential' threat. That's the point I was trying to make rather clumsily.
A Trump victory would also change everything too.
But Ukraine does not have the permission it needs to Western supplied weapons deep inside Russia. It cannot risk losing Allied support.
I think you are right about the software. I know much of the munitions are precision guided which--at least from the American side--need GPS to operate.
I do know many of the Ukrainian drones are guided by Starlink which is a commercial system owned, in large part, by Elan Musk. At one time, he had threatened to shut that system off for Ukraine, but I think the US government cut a deal with him.
The Russians claim to have their own system, but it is either jammed or of very poor quality, it is amazing they can even find Ukraine to hit.