The point is that, before Hesgeth’s declaration of the US position, there remained some uncertainty over what NATO might do. That uncertainty was worth something in any peace negotiations. If Russia made bellicose noises, NATO might have been prepared to do more in defence of Ukraine.
At least as I see it, the uncertainty about how NATO might respond to Zelensky’s appeal was a negotiating lever.
Indeed, Trump appears to have taken a potential bargaining chip off the table for whenever Zelensky and Putin sit down to negotiate peace terms. Zelensky no longer has the option of offering Putin a guarantee not to pursue NATO membership in exchange for a concession from Putin. It seems like a very strange way to approach a deal, especially from someone who projects a reputation as an expert in the art of the deal.
The point is that, before Hesgeth’s declaration of the US position, there remained some uncertainty over what NATO might do. That uncertainty was worth something in any peace negotiations. If Russia made bellicose noises, NATO might have been prepared to do more in defence of Ukraine.
At least as I see it, the uncertainty about how NATO might respond to Zelensky’s appeal was a negotiating lever.
Indeed, Trump appears to have taken a potential bargaining chip off the table for whenever Zelensky and Putin sit down to negotiate peace terms. Zelensky no longer has the option of offering Putin a guarantee not to pursue NATO membership in exchange for a concession from Putin. It seems like a very strange way to approach a deal, especially from someone who projects a reputation as an expert in the art of the deal.
It depends which side he is representing, no? If he's working for Putin it makes perfect sense.
I saw a report that Zelensky described the long call from Trump (after he talked to Putin) as “constructive”. Possibly Zelensky being diplomatic? I doubt he could say that Trump has thrown his country to the wolves.
And Trump also pointed to Zelensky’s current unpopularity in Ukraine. (Elections currently due in May this year but have been much delayed due to martial law). That casts a doubt over Zelensky’s continuing legitimacy and authority. Which also looks like undermining his negotiating position.
Sure, what he's up to is pulling out of US support for the Ukraine so that European nations start to develop their own defensive capacity without relying too heavily on the US.
He thinks that ny doing that he will force the rest if us to take more responsibility for our defence without relying so much on Uncle Sam.
So he reckons that Ukraine can lose the Donbas and Crimea and then, once things have settled down, if Putin tries to expand into the rest of the Ukraine or threaten Poland and the Baltic States then the onus is on Western European countries to foot the bill and look to their own defence.
He's taking a tough line in the hopes that we'll take the hint and up our own spending on defence so that the US can concentrate it's efforts elsewhere, such as China.
I'd have thought what he's up to is pretty obvious and could have been foreseen.
Well it was foreseen. It's just disappointing and worrying that the foresight proved accurate.
So does that mean a re-armed Germany then? I would have thought that is the obvious implication! Or perhaps an EU army - but that seems fraught with a number of problems.
It's just a more honest version of Biden's policy. The US has always thought of Ukraine as an inconvenience. The US has been clear for the last 20 years that they intend to downplay Europe and focus on Asia. Trump has been clear on this, so was Obama.
I will grant that if the US wants to broker a deal then somebody needs to talk to Putin.
The problem is for Trump that there are too many moving parts in his peace deal. He wants to impose peace but with no US boots on the ground so he needs to goad the UK, France and Germany to provide those boots, He wants Russia to agree to a ceasefire but only using sanctions leverage that Russia has until now ignored. He wants territorial concessions but Ukraine can't constitutionally cede land unless approved in a national (pre 2014 borders) referendum which won't happen and won't pass, This territorial line of thinking also ignores that Russia explicitly wants to puppet Ukraine and has tried multiple times to do so.
If Ukraine really feels existentially threatened then there is always the nuclear weapons option. That mention of it a few months ago was a shot across the bow.
Hegseth is appalling. I’ve just finished watching his press conference following the NATO meeting. Trump will have loved every dismissive word. “Trump is the only one who can get a deal. The outcome won’t please either Putin or Zelensky. Nobody else can do better. No guarantees in advance. Trump holds all the strong cards”.
The starting bid for NATO members’ minimum GDP defence spend is apparently going to be 5%.
Which in the UK, where 2.5% at some point in the future is a government aspiration, is bleakly amusing.
On the other hand, as I noted pages ago (or maybe on another thread), 5% in an environment of US European drawdown is actually a realistic number that we ought to be open to.
As a Canadian who has felt the butt end of Trump's arrogance, that is silly.
As my brother said, it isn't the 19th Century anymore. Border changes by force were made illegal and illegitimate after WW2. You just can't buy a colony. Trump needs to grow up.
The starting bid for NATO members’ minimum GDP defence spend is apparently going to be 5%.
It should be noted that the U.S. currently spends a little over 3% of its GDP on defense.
Tbh, and I can’t believe I’m agreeing with the US administration on this, I think that’s because economies of scale kick in when your spend and forces are the size of the US’
Ie I can well believe it will cost European nations relatively more to do less.
Relative freeloading by European NATO members is a real thing, and it’s one of those moments where unfortunately he’s got a point IMO. Previous US administrations have bitten their lips in the furtherance of playing nicely.
Russia, on a war footing, spent 5.9% of its GDP on the military in 2023.
Of course, the EU has a much larger GDP than the Russian Federation. To match Russian military spending euro-for-euro (or ruble-for-ruble) would require the EU to spend . . . 0.6% of its GDP on defense, or about one-third the current level of expenditure.
One thing to remember about the Trump administration is that they more or less pick impressive sounding numbers out of a hat. I'd like to see some of the reasoning about why 4% isn't enough, 6% is too much, but 5% is the Goldilocks number. Pete Hegseth's bare assertion isn't enough.
Russia, on a war footing, spent 5.9% of its GDP on the military in 2023.
Of course, the EU has a much larger GDP than the Russian Federation. To match Russian military spending euro-for-euro (or ruble-for-ruble) would require the EU to spend . . . 0.6% of its GDP on defense, or about one-third the current level of expenditure.
One thing to remember about the Trump administration is that they more or less pick impressive sounding numbers out of a hat. I'd like to see some of the reasoning about why 4% isn't enough, 6% is too much, but 5% is the Goldilocks number. Pete Hegseth's bare assertion isn't enough.
Agree, but remember the US is spending 3 and a bit percent on its own forces. The EU doesn’t have a common military (not does it particularly want one) and NATO’s membership and EU membership are not the same thing.
So you’ve actually not got a notional 0.6% to spend by the EU, because each EU member will be spending whatever on their own forces.
Then you’ve got Ireland within the EU but not NATO and wedded to neutrality, Britain and Turkey in NATO but not the EU. Canada, in NATO but not Europe, etc.
So 0.6% feels very much like ‘you can do anything with statistics’ rather than a helpful number.
On the other hand, totally agree about numbers being plucked out of the air. What worries me is that 5% *is* the sort of number that NATO members have always talked about if the US took its ball home, so I doubt it is quite as random as some of the other stuff coming out of the US government these days.
Ie I too want to see their working, but I don’t instinctively dismiss it.
NATO Secretary General Mark Rutte, in contrast to Hegseth, was very good in both his statement and responses to the press.
Don’t fancy his job right now.
One point which came up was the possibility that the US membership of NATO was moving in the direction of “nuclear deterrent only” in its commitment to defend Europe. Discounted in the short term, it struck me as consistent with Trump noises. Conventional military defence in Europe will be “delegated” to European countries. It occurred to me it might be behind the higher expenditure target. Rutte talked about NATO countries using the 3.4% US figure as a target and the need for increase as urgent. Some weight was also put, sympathetically, on the US need to look at defence expenditure in the Far East.
All that provides a significant clue that US will be rebalancing its defence priorities away from Europe and towards the Far East. Rutte’s use of the word “urgent” for increases in European countries’ defence contributions (applauded by Hegseth) is another big clue.
The starting bid for NATO members’ minimum GDP defence spend is apparently going to be 5%.
It should be noted that the U.S. currently spends a little over 3% of its GDP on defense.
Tbh, and I can’t believe I’m agreeing with the US administration on this, I think that’s because economies of scale kick in when your spend and forces are the size of the US’
Ie I can well believe it will cost European nations relatively more to do less.
Relative freeloading by European NATO members is a real thing, and it’s one of those moments where unfortunately he’s got a point IMO. Previous US administrations have bitten their lips in the furtherance of playing nicely.
I was under the impression that US insisted they had to have command of a NATO response and that would be one of the reasons they paid more. (And also the same reason we’ve been supplying Ukraine - Europes would be in harms way in a manner the US is not but us fighting Russia would be in the US interest)
Russia, on a war footing, spent 5.9% of its GDP on the military in 2023.
Of course, the EU has a much larger GDP than the Russian Federation. To match Russian military spending euro-for-euro (or ruble-for-ruble) would require the EU to spend . . . 0.6% of its GDP on defense, or about one-third the current level of expenditure.
One thing to remember about the Trump administration is that they more or less pick impressive sounding numbers out of a hat. I'd like to see some of the reasoning about why 4% isn't enough, 6% is too much, but 5% is the Goldilocks number. Pete Hegseth's bare assertion isn't enough.
Agree, but remember the US is spending 3 and a bit percent on its own forces. The EU doesn’t have a common military (not does it particularly want one) and NATO’s membership and EU membership are not the same thing.
So you’ve actually not got a notional 0.6% to spend by the EU, because each EU member will be spending whatever on their own forces.
Then you’ve got Ireland within the EU but not NATO and wedded to neutrality, Britain and Turkey in NATO but not the EU. Canada, in NATO but not Europe, etc.
So 0.6% feels very much like ‘you can do anything with statistics’ rather than a helpful number.
That's simply noting how much of its GDP the members of the EU would have to spend to exactly match Russia's current wartime military budget. What you would get for that money is an open question, but the percentage number is fairly easy to calculate. NATO-minus-the-US has a slightly larger GDP (US$24.4 trillion) than the EU (US$19.4 trillion), but it's within the same general area and puts current Russian military spending at about 0.5% of the current GDP of NATO-minus-the-US.
Now there may be very good reasons why NATO members other than the U.S. need to spend (collectively) ten times the current wartime Russian military budget (possibilities include, but are not limited to, the inefficiencies of coordinating multiple militaries, basic geography, the possible need to confront other geopolitical actors in addition to Russia, and insufficient nuclear deterrence absent the U.S.), but absent some kind of detailed analysis it seems excessive.
Have they... have they chosen Munich for the peace talks deliberately?
Many years ago I had a conversation with someone who had been a UK civil servant in 1938. The view of the civil service was that the 1938 Munich Agreement bought us twelve months to re-arm and prepare for war.
By 1938 France and Britain were already gearing up towards war, albeit reluctantly. The consensus was that war with Germany was inevitable. And, Germany was also gearing up for war. The delay between 1938 and 1939 served both sides well, though in 1939 no one was really ready (that's the main reason for the "phoney war", the German military wasn't ready for war in 1939 - the German forces which invaded Poland were barely mechanised, a small proportion of crack divisions were mechanised but most of the army was on foot reliant on horses to transport supplies, the mythical Polish cavalry charges weren't against mechanised units (they weren't that stupid) but had flanked the mechanised advanced units and were attacking infantry and horse-drawn supply lines).
If the western nations are currently gearing up for war against Russia they're doing a fantastic job of hiding it. We're not seeing increased production of military equipment, training new fighter pilots and tank crews. We're not in 1938 because we're not in a position to use another year to prepare for the inevitable war, we're not even certain there will be war. If the western European nations and USA appease Putin by giving him all he wants - occupation of a large portion of a sovereign European nation and a puppet government in the rest - are we going to use that pause to prepare for the next Russian attack against Poland, or the Baltic States? Will that pause maintain sanctions against Russia to slow the rebuilding of the military from losses in Ukraine?
By 1938 France and Britain were already gearing up towards war, albeit reluctantly. The consensus was that war with Germany was inevitable. And, Germany was also gearing up for war. The delay between 1938 and 1939 served both sides well, though in 1939 no one was really ready (that's the main reason for the "phoney war", the German military wasn't ready for war in 1939 - the German forces which invaded Poland were barely mechanised, a small proportion of crack divisions were mechanised but most of the army was on foot reliant on horses to transport supplies, the mythical Polish cavalry charges weren't against mechanised units (they weren't that stupid) but had flanked the mechanised advanced units and were attacking infantry and horse-drawn supply lines).
If the western nations are currently gearing up for war against Russia they're doing a fantastic job of hiding it. We're not seeing increased production of military equipment, training new fighter pilots and tank crews. We're not in 1938 because we're not in a position to use another year to prepare for the inevitable war, we're not even certain there will be war. If the western European nations and USA appease Putin by giving him all he wants - occupation of a large portion of a sovereign European nation and a puppet government in the rest - are we going to use that pause to prepare for the next Russian attack against Poland, or the Baltic States? Will that pause maintain sanctions against Russia to slow the rebuilding of the military from losses in Ukraine?
As an aside, this is a great demonstration of turning the historic oil tanker. Historians had largely decided by the end of the 1950s that Stanley Baldwin was a man who was trying his best to get the UK ready for a war. The public (such as are even aware he existed) still aren’t quite there yet…
As an aside off an aside, the German army of 1945 was still barely mechanised, never mind 1938! ‘On foot reliant on horses’ was one of the reasons they eventually lost.
As an aside off an aside, the German army of 1945 was still barely mechanised, never mind 1938! ‘On foot reliant on horses’ was one of the reasons they eventually lost.
As an aside off an aside, the German army of 1945 was still barely mechanised, never mind 1938! ‘On foot reliant on horses’ was one of the reasons they eventually lost.
The American, British and to a large extent Soviet Armies in 1945 were what the Wehrmact pretended to be: modern, completely motorized with excellent combined arms capabilities.
It's largely forgotten too that Nazi strategic planning and economic management were a joke while Allied strategic planning and economic management was excellent,
The American, British and to a large extent Soviet Armies in 1945 were what the Wehrmact pretended to be: modern, completely motorized with excellent combined arms capabilities.
It's largely forgotten too that Nazi strategic planning and economic management were a joke while Allied strategic planning and economic management was excellent,
Exactly. I *think* Britain’s army (not including colonial forces) was fully mechanised by 1939. Then had to do it again having left most of the kit somewhere outside Dunkirk…
Anyway, back on topic the worry is that the Russians have had to relearn (at enormous cost) how to fight wars. Meanwhile, in the West, we’re sort of hoping it won’t happen again.
From a military pov I worry we’re drawing the wrong lesson. Not, ‘the Russians have realised they can’t do the things their mouths threaten’ (which keeps coming up in newspapers) but rather ‘the Russians have got back in the groove. A groove they probably doubted they were in from about 1986.’
The Wehrmacht struggled with a common problem with despotic governments - command positions in the military and other senior government appointments made on the basis of loyalty to party and/or leader rather than ability. Plus a recognition that survival depended on letting the leadership hear what they wanted to hear rather than what they needed to hear. Strategic planning and economic management were very unlikely to be great under those circumstances.
I don’t think the historical analogy works. Except maybe getting to the point where we draw the line. Appeasement makes sense for a long while. And sending “our people” to fight for “someone else” is probably even less popular than it was in 1938. Iraq2 kind of reinforced that. So did Afghanistan.
And that’s just the conventional war argument. Throwing in the nuclear weapon that takes the terror to a whole different level.
Russia has been damaged by the Ukraine conflict. Will that slow down Putin’s remaining territorial ambitions. At this negotiating table the real question may be “who’s bluffing who the most?”
I think conventional European war is more likely now than it has been for decades. I worry that we’ve moved past MAD to the extent neither side would ever actually launch.
So nuclear weapons aren’t the deterrent their advocates claim *and* simultaneously for the anti-nuclear weapons camp we’re back in the world of mass mobilisation and grim hand to hand fighting (and an assumption that might will prevail). Sort of a reverse Pangloss - the worst of all possible worlds.
Russia, on a war footing, spent 5.9% of its GDP on the military in 2023.
Of course, the EU has a much larger GDP than the Russian Federation. To match Russian military spending euro-for-euro (or ruble-for-ruble) would require the EU to spend . . . 0.6% of its GDP on defense, or about one-third the current level of expenditure.
One thing to remember about the Trump administration is that they more or less pick impressive sounding numbers out of a hat. I'd like to see some of the reasoning about why 4% isn't enough, 6% is too much, but 5% is the Goldilocks number. Pete Hegseth's bare assertion isn't enough.
Agree, but remember the US is spending 3 and a bit percent on its own forces. The EU doesn’t have a common military (not does it particularly want one) and NATO’s membership and EU membership are not the same thing.
So you’ve actually not got a notional 0.6% to spend by the EU, because each EU member will be spending whatever on their own forces.
Then you’ve got Ireland within the EU but not NATO and wedded to neutrality, Britain and Turkey in NATO but not the EU. Canada, in NATO but not Europe, etc.
So 0.6% feels very much like ‘you can do anything with statistics’ rather than a helpful number.
That's simply noting how much of its GDP the members of the EU would have to spend to exactly match Russia's current wartime military budget. What you would get for that money is an open question, but the percentage number is fairly easy to calculate. NATO-minus-the-US has a slightly larger GDP (US$24.4 trillion) than the EU (US$19.4 trillion), but it's within the same general area and puts current Russian military spending at about 0.5% of the current GDP of NATO-minus-the-US.
Now there may be very good reasons why NATO members other than the U.S. need to spend (collectively) ten times the current wartime Russian military budget (possibilities include, but are not limited to, the inefficiencies of coordinating multiple militaries, basic geography, the possible need to confront other geopolitical actors in addition to Russia, and insufficient nuclear deterrence absent the U.S.), but absent some kind of detailed analysis it seems excessive.
I presume that's what Euro-NATO + Canada would have to spend to match America's total military spending?
There is no sign of Euro-NATO doubling its defence budget. Let alone non-NATO Europe. Which will have to be made to pay in other ways.
I think conventional European war is more likely now than it has been for decades. I worry that we’ve moved past MAD to the extent neither side would ever actually launch.
So nuclear weapons aren’t the deterrent their advocates claim *and* simultaneously for the anti-nuclear weapons camp we’re back in the world of mass mobilisation and grim hand to hand fighting (and an assumption that might will prevail). Sort of a reverse Pangloss - the worst of all possible worlds.
I don't want to contemplate it, but if we had to ... what would it look like? An extensive WW1 style trench system across Poland with each side droning each other and occasionally engaging in gruesome stalemate close-quarter combat?
The Russians haven't performed particularly effectively in Ukraine to put it mildly. Their initial push towards Kyiv was halted relatively easily, but then things settled into a hard slog where despite inefficiencies Russia's greater resources made them impossible to dislodge, but where Ukraine's resilience and Russian incompetence made it impossible for them to advance.
I can't see Russia performing that well militarily against Poland or the Baltic States even with NATO's current capacity. The only thing they would have in their favour was weight of numbers. Other than by introducing conscription and completely militarising the Russian state could Putin hope to gain any traction.
I can't see the Poles crumbling, and they would almost certainly get the backing of Scandinavian technology and resolve.
The French would be a force to be reckoned with too. Not sure about Germany's capacity. Ours? Well, we don't have that many boots to put on the ground but we tend to do ok when it comes to technology and special forces operations, intelligence etc.
To fight the forever war against W. & central Europe, he'd have to mobilise, which is the cart he actually wants to put before the horse? Mobilisation, military dictatorship, is what he must have to stay in power for 15 years? To become Stalin 2?
Normally I’d say it depends on insider knowledge about the real state of the Russian military and the Russian economy. Given that the official information about both is full of lies (a pretty safe given).
But Trump will not wish to give one iota of credit to the Biden administration re sanctions and armaments help. Hegseth made that abundantly clear in his Trump-fawning remarks.
I expect his vanity will get in the way of his negotiating. Which isn’t good news for Ukraine. “Peace in our time. But at what cost?”
This is the greatest change since 1945. America does not regard Europe as its tripwire as of two weeks ago. It's entirely up to us. And we can't do it. Trunp could offer to stay if we pay him. But he won't. Ukraine becomes Belarus. Moldova next, via Transnistria. Putin's already got Hungary in the bag. Austria. Serbia. It takes very little when it's done right. He took Crimea in an afternoon.
It remains to be seen what Europe can or will do. Meanwhile a drone has damaged the Chernobyl containment vessel. The Russians say they don’t attack nuclear targets …..
If Trump accepts the Russian explanation then Europe should know where it stands.
A new world order? American aligned with Russia to put the brakes on China? Europe can go to hell?
Sounds mad doesn’t it? Maybe not to some people in power?
I think Europe already knows where it stands irrespective of whatever the explanation for the drone damage might be.
We should have seen this coming.
Yes, Serbia, yes, Hungary and Moldova. I'm not so convinced about Austria though.
It does look like we are going back towards 1979 Cold War conditions though.
He doesn't have to take any but Moldova (as he's taken Belarus fully 'under his wing', at least). The others are on his side regardless. As is every European fascist party. Like AfD.
I think Europe already knows where it stands irrespective of whatever the explanation for the drone damage might be.
We should have seen this coming.
Yes, Serbia, yes, Hungary and Moldova. I'm not so convinced about Austria though.
It does look like we are going back towards 1979 Cold War conditions though.
This is not a Cold War setup. In the Cold War it was clear that Europe could rely on America's full attention and support against Russia. This is quite the reverse.
I think Europe already knows where it stands irrespective of whatever the explanation for the drone damage might be.
We should have seen this coming.
Yes, Serbia, yes, Hungary and Moldova. I'm not so convinced about Austria though.
It does look like we are going back towards 1979 Cold War conditions though.
This is not a Cold War setup. In the Cold War it was clear that Europe could rely on America's full attention and support against Russia. This is quite the reverse.
A new world order? American aligned with Russia to put the brakes on China? Europe can go to hell?
Sounds mad doesn’t it? Maybe not to some people in power?
Whereas this is much closer to the mark I fear.
Agreed. This is the greatest tumult in 80 years. There is nothing but a spectrum of Fascism across the world now. Europe is in utter disarray. In fact it's worse than anything since the Siege of Vienna in 1529. Or Möngke Khan in 1259. (Same numbers!). Atilla in 453.
Putin will do whatever he is conventionally capable of, we will not nuke.
Putin is not a young man and he has ample enemies. He is not likely to live another 15 years. Of course, he will have a successor.
He's 5 years younger than my husband and is probably in better health. Judo is Putin's way of life since a youngster, he's fed every day from the garden of the Patriarch of Moscow (not McDonalds).
My husband has done yoga every day for almost 50 years, cycles and swims daily, and eats organic and I expect hime to be here and compos mentis 10 years from now.
So I think "don't get your hopes up". This dude is in it for the long haul, he has a lot more reasons to wake up every day than my husband does. Just sayin'.
That's all true, but MAGA appears to be a T**** cult, and T**** (despite being a 'stable genius' with a BMI 'right in the middle of the green zone' (I paraphrase - can't remember the quote)) is...a fat, elderly, angry liar with a lot less than 10 years in him.
That's all true, but MAGA appears to be a T**** cult, and T**** (despite being a 'stable genius' with a BMI 'right in the middle of the green zone' (I paraphrase - can't remember the quote)) is...a fat, elderly, angry liar with a lot less than 10 years in him.
And so many people are praying for their hoped-for outcomes with regard to this individual. I'm just saying let's not be too optimistic about his counterparty.
Are people saying that Trump's deal with Putin will be reversed? Unlikely. Ukraine is being dismembered. What I find weird is that Europe seems surprised.
Britain has two very big aircraft carriers, undercrewed and with too few planes, and too few escort vessels. And insufficient time to rebuild our forces.
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It depends which side he is representing, no? If he's working for Putin it makes perfect sense.
That’s the worry, of course.
I saw a report that Zelensky described the long call from Trump (after he talked to Putin) as “constructive”. Possibly Zelensky being diplomatic? I doubt he could say that Trump has thrown his country to the wolves.
And Trump also pointed to Zelensky’s current unpopularity in Ukraine. (Elections currently due in May this year but have been much delayed due to martial law). That casts a doubt over Zelensky’s continuing legitimacy and authority. Which also looks like undermining his negotiating position.
Trump is up to something.
He thinks that ny doing that he will force the rest if us to take more responsibility for our defence without relying so much on Uncle Sam.
So he reckons that Ukraine can lose the Donbas and Crimea and then, once things have settled down, if Putin tries to expand into the rest of the Ukraine or threaten Poland and the Baltic States then the onus is on Western European countries to foot the bill and look to their own defence.
He's taking a tough line in the hopes that we'll take the hint and up our own spending on defence so that the US can concentrate it's efforts elsewhere, such as China.
I'd have thought what he's up to is pretty obvious and could have been foreseen.
So does that mean a re-armed Germany then? I would have thought that is the obvious implication! Or perhaps an EU army - but that seems fraught with a number of problems.
My guess would be that the French will rise to the challenge and that the Scandinavians will increase their military capability.
Not sure about Germany.
Nor a pan-EU army, although the EU does currently have some small scale military capacity.
I will grant that if the US wants to broker a deal then somebody needs to talk to Putin.
The problem is for Trump that there are too many moving parts in his peace deal. He wants to impose peace but with no US boots on the ground so he needs to goad the UK, France and Germany to provide those boots, He wants Russia to agree to a ceasefire but only using sanctions leverage that Russia has until now ignored. He wants territorial concessions but Ukraine can't constitutionally cede land unless approved in a national (pre 2014 borders) referendum which won't happen and won't pass, This territorial line of thinking also ignores that Russia explicitly wants to puppet Ukraine and has tried multiple times to do so.
If Ukraine really feels existentially threatened then there is always the nuclear weapons option. That mention of it a few months ago was a shot across the bow.
Which in the UK, where 2.5% at some point in the future is a government aspiration, is bleakly amusing.
On the other hand, as I noted pages ago (or maybe on another thread), 5% in an environment of US European drawdown is actually a realistic number that we ought to be open to.
It should be noted that the U.S. currently spends a little over 3% of its GDP on defense.
As my brother said, it isn't the 19th Century anymore. Border changes by force were made illegal and illegitimate after WW2. You just can't buy a colony. Trump needs to grow up.
Tbh, and I can’t believe I’m agreeing with the US administration on this, I think that’s because economies of scale kick in when your spend and forces are the size of the US’
Ie I can well believe it will cost European nations relatively more to do less.
Relative freeloading by European NATO members is a real thing, and it’s one of those moments where unfortunately he’s got a point IMO. Previous US administrations have bitten their lips in the furtherance of playing nicely.
Of course, the EU has a much larger GDP than the Russian Federation. To match Russian military spending euro-for-euro (or ruble-for-ruble) would require the EU to spend . . . 0.6% of its GDP on defense, or about one-third the current level of expenditure.
One thing to remember about the Trump administration is that they more or less pick impressive sounding numbers out of a hat. I'd like to see some of the reasoning about why 4% isn't enough, 6% is too much, but 5% is the Goldilocks number. Pete Hegseth's bare assertion isn't enough.
Agree, but remember the US is spending 3 and a bit percent on its own forces. The EU doesn’t have a common military (not does it particularly want one) and NATO’s membership and EU membership are not the same thing.
So you’ve actually not got a notional 0.6% to spend by the EU, because each EU member will be spending whatever on their own forces.
Then you’ve got Ireland within the EU but not NATO and wedded to neutrality, Britain and Turkey in NATO but not the EU. Canada, in NATO but not Europe, etc.
So 0.6% feels very much like ‘you can do anything with statistics’ rather than a helpful number.
On the other hand, totally agree about numbers being plucked out of the air. What worries me is that 5% *is* the sort of number that NATO members have always talked about if the US took its ball home, so I doubt it is quite as random as some of the other stuff coming out of the US government these days.
Ie I too want to see their working, but I don’t instinctively dismiss it.
Don’t fancy his job right now.
One point which came up was the possibility that the US membership of NATO was moving in the direction of “nuclear deterrent only” in its commitment to defend Europe. Discounted in the short term, it struck me as consistent with Trump noises. Conventional military defence in Europe will be “delegated” to European countries. It occurred to me it might be behind the higher expenditure target. Rutte talked about NATO countries using the 3.4% US figure as a target and the need for increase as urgent. Some weight was also put, sympathetically, on the US need to look at defence expenditure in the Far East.
All that provides a significant clue that US will be rebalancing its defence priorities away from Europe and towards the Far East. Rutte’s use of the word “urgent” for increases in European countries’ defence contributions (applauded by Hegseth) is another big clue.
I was under the impression that US insisted they had to have command of a NATO response and that would be one of the reasons they paid more. (And also the same reason we’ve been supplying Ukraine - Europes would be in harms way in a manner the US is not but us fighting Russia would be in the US interest)
That's simply noting how much of its GDP the members of the EU would have to spend to exactly match Russia's current wartime military budget. What you would get for that money is an open question, but the percentage number is fairly easy to calculate. NATO-minus-the-US has a slightly larger GDP (US$24.4 trillion) than the EU (US$19.4 trillion), but it's within the same general area and puts current Russian military spending at about 0.5% of the current GDP of NATO-minus-the-US.
Now there may be very good reasons why NATO members other than the U.S. need to spend (collectively) ten times the current wartime Russian military budget (possibilities include, but are not limited to, the inefficiencies of coordinating multiple militaries, basic geography, the possible need to confront other geopolitical actors in addition to Russia, and insufficient nuclear deterrence absent the U.S.), but absent some kind of detailed analysis it seems excessive.
Many years ago I had a conversation with someone who had been a UK civil servant in 1938. The view of the civil service was that the 1938 Munich Agreement bought us twelve months to re-arm and prepare for war.
If the western nations are currently gearing up for war against Russia they're doing a fantastic job of hiding it. We're not seeing increased production of military equipment, training new fighter pilots and tank crews. We're not in 1938 because we're not in a position to use another year to prepare for the inevitable war, we're not even certain there will be war. If the western European nations and USA appease Putin by giving him all he wants - occupation of a large portion of a sovereign European nation and a puppet government in the rest - are we going to use that pause to prepare for the next Russian attack against Poland, or the Baltic States? Will that pause maintain sanctions against Russia to slow the rebuilding of the military from losses in Ukraine?
As an aside, this is a great demonstration of turning the historic oil tanker. Historians had largely decided by the end of the 1950s that Stanley Baldwin was a man who was trying his best to get the UK ready for a war. The public (such as are even aware he existed) still aren’t quite there yet…
As an aside off an aside, the German army of 1945 was still barely mechanised, never mind 1938! ‘On foot reliant on horses’ was one of the reasons they eventually lost.
Plus the fact that fascists are bad at war.
Well that too
It's largely forgotten too that Nazi strategic planning and economic management were a joke while Allied strategic planning and economic management was excellent,
Exactly. I *think* Britain’s army (not including colonial forces) was fully mechanised by 1939. Then had to do it again having left most of the kit somewhere outside Dunkirk…
Anyway, back on topic the worry is that the Russians have had to relearn (at enormous cost) how to fight wars. Meanwhile, in the West, we’re sort of hoping it won’t happen again.
From a military pov I worry we’re drawing the wrong lesson. Not, ‘the Russians have realised they can’t do the things their mouths threaten’ (which keeps coming up in newspapers) but rather ‘the Russians have got back in the groove. A groove they probably doubted they were in from about 1986.’
Don’t have nightmares…
And that’s just the conventional war argument. Throwing in the nuclear weapon that takes the terror to a whole different level.
Russia has been damaged by the Ukraine conflict. Will that slow down Putin’s remaining territorial ambitions. At this negotiating table the real question may be “who’s bluffing who the most?”
So nuclear weapons aren’t the deterrent their advocates claim *and* simultaneously for the anti-nuclear weapons camp we’re back in the world of mass mobilisation and grim hand to hand fighting (and an assumption that might will prevail). Sort of a reverse Pangloss - the worst of all possible worlds.
I presume that's what Euro-NATO + Canada would have to spend to match America's total military spending?
There is no sign of Euro-NATO doubling its defence budget. Let alone non-NATO Europe. Which will have to be made to pay in other ways.
Shee-it!!
I don't want to contemplate it, but if we had to ... what would it look like? An extensive WW1 style trench system across Poland with each side droning each other and occasionally engaging in gruesome stalemate close-quarter combat?
The Russians haven't performed particularly effectively in Ukraine to put it mildly. Their initial push towards Kyiv was halted relatively easily, but then things settled into a hard slog where despite inefficiencies Russia's greater resources made them impossible to dislodge, but where Ukraine's resilience and Russian incompetence made it impossible for them to advance.
I can't see Russia performing that well militarily against Poland or the Baltic States even with NATO's current capacity. The only thing they would have in their favour was weight of numbers. Other than by introducing conscription and completely militarising the Russian state could Putin hope to gain any traction.
I can't see the Poles crumbling, and they would almost certainly get the backing of Scandinavian technology and resolve.
The French would be a force to be reckoned with too. Not sure about Germany's capacity. Ours? Well, we don't have that many boots to put on the ground but we tend to do ok when it comes to technology and special forces operations, intelligence etc.
But it's not a scenario I want to contemplate.
But Trump will not wish to give one iota of credit to the Biden administration re sanctions and armaments help. Hegseth made that abundantly clear in his Trump-fawning remarks.
I expect his vanity will get in the way of his negotiating. Which isn’t good news for Ukraine. “Peace in our time. But at what cost?”
And I would love to be wrong.
You're not wrong about that.
If Trump accepts the Russian explanation then Europe should know where it stands.
A new world order? American aligned with Russia to put the brakes on China? Europe can go to hell?
Sounds mad doesn’t it? Maybe not to some people in power?
We should have seen this coming.
Yes, Serbia, yes, Hungary and Moldova. I'm not so convinced about Austria though.
It does look like we are going back towards 1979 Cold War conditions though.
He doesn't have to take any but Moldova (as he's taken Belarus fully 'under his wing', at least). The others are on his side regardless. As is every European fascist party. Like AfD.
This is not a Cold War setup. In the Cold War it was clear that Europe could rely on America's full attention and support against Russia. This is quite the reverse.
Whereas this is much closer to the mark I fear.
Agreed. This is the greatest tumult in 80 years. There is nothing but a spectrum of Fascism across the world now. Europe is in utter disarray. In fact it's worse than anything since the Siege of Vienna in 1529. Or Möngke Khan in 1259. (Same numbers!). Atilla in 453.
Putin will do whatever he is conventionally capable of, we will not nuke.
He's 5 years younger than my husband and is probably in better health. Judo is Putin's way of life since a youngster, he's fed every day from the garden of the Patriarch of Moscow (not McDonalds).
My husband has done yoga every day for almost 50 years, cycles and swims daily, and eats organic and I expect hime to be here and compos mentis 10 years from now.
So I think "don't get your hopes up". This dude is in it for the long haul, he has a lot more reasons to wake up every day than my husband does. Just sayin'.
AFF
And so many people are praying for their hoped-for outcomes with regard to this individual. I'm just saying let's not be too optimistic about his counterparty.
AFF