Many of us live in societies profoundly shaped by Christianity, and it seems to me that it is easier to decide that whether or not there is a God doesn’t matter and/or reject deism when a lot of the - for want of a better word - benefits are baked in, (This is not exclusive to Christian religion I think, all the stuff about the golden rule etc, but I know less about those communities and faiths).
That is I’ve never seen a good argument from a humanist, why you wouldn’t - on rejecting faith - go for the perspective of Nietzsche or Ayn Rand, (Of course some people do.). But there seems to be a general expectation people will profess to be broadly prosocial, mildly selfless etc.
Even self-declared satanists do this.
Imagine if you lived in a society that didn’t default to golden rule - then what people’s faith and your own was would become much more important to you personally.
Social contract philosophers like Rawls (ok that’s the only one I know about but I imagine there are others) have tried to back engineer a logic for the prosocial, equal before the law, everybody matters perspective - but it’s rather artificial.
Of course it’s possible for atheists and agnostic people to be moral - and most are: the question is why ? Is that really derived from a different set of first principles, or is to do with being raised in a religiously informed culture which promotes a set of fundamental values “knowing right from wrong” (whether or not it actually adheres to them.)
When we say we know right from wrong, who is defining those values and based on what ?
It’s wrong to steal. Why ? The law says so. Maybe the law should be changed. Why should you not be able to have what you want if you are strong or cunning enough to take it ? There have been societies where that has been the explicit value (as opposed to professing a different idea but functionally ending up in that position.)
Murder is wrong. Why ? Because human life is special. Why ? Says who ?
Yes. I believe there was some conflict between mainstream Roman culture and the early Christians over such things, as the Christians were doing embarrassing stuff like picking up abandoned infants, nursing plague victims and the like.
In miniature, we've seen something similar in the Vietnamese mini-culture I live in. Take what follows with a grain of salt, but it seems to me that there is no default "It's expected to help the poor, be kind to those in trouble, etc." standard as a matter of public decency. I mean, those are recognized as good things, but nobody (not part of the Christian community) seems to feel particularly called upon, they themselves, to live up to that stuff right here, right now, and those who do are considered to be either crazy or trying for sainthood. Or both, I suppose.
The result is a local proverb--the Buddhists get the rich and the Christians get the poor--because only the Christians are fool enough not to charge everything the market will bear for human care / altruistic services. Which leads to the edifying spectacle of the local Christian church doing pastoral care for the Buddhist temple (e.g. visiting the grieving, helping them settle estates or whatever).
I treated my stepson with courtesy and kindness, and a bunch of people absolutely flipped at the idea that one could care for (let alone love!) a child from one's husband's previous relationship. Wha-a-a-a?
I dunno, it's just weird when the background culture doesn't have things like the Golden Rule baked in.
I think there are arguments in biology, as to why cooperation is advantageous, in fact, for many animals. It's getting late, but I will dig up some references.
Absolutely. And it's easy to argue that there are principles or themes in all human cultures that we all recognize as good, however we argue about the details.
But speaking from my very limited experience, there is a notable difference between a culture that's been soaked in Christianity for a thousand years (however it is rebelling against it now) and one that hasn't. Makes me go "hmmm"...
Many of us live in societies profoundly shaped by Christianity, and it seems to me that it is easier to decide that whether or not there is a God doesn’t matter and/or reject deism when a lot of the - for want of a better word - benefits are baked in, (This is not exclusive to Christian religion I think, all the stuff about the golden rule etc, but I know less about those communities and faiths).
That is I’ve never seen a good argument from a humanist, why you wouldn’t - on rejecting faith - go for the perspective of Nietzsche or Ayn Rand, (Of course some people do.). But there seems to be a general expectation people will profess to be broadly prosocial, mildly selfless etc.
Even self-declared satanists do this.
Imagine if you lived in a society that didn’t default to golden rule - then what people’s faith and your own was would become much more important to you personally.
That's rather like saying "imagine you live in a society that isn't a society".
The Golden Rule isn't absolute - it is entirely relative to any given culture's behavioural norms. It contains no other inherent standards of behaviour. At face value, the Golden Rule just requires you to treat other people as you wish to be treated. If you want to be left alone, it requires you to leave other people alone.
Fairly obviously (I would hope), that's not what it means at all. It could be considered somewhat disingenuous or maybe just misleading in that regard, when trying to read it from a modern western, individualistic, point of view. The assumed context is that a given society has a given set of behavioural norms. And that individuals are expected to prioritise these behaviours over their own desires and in the face of their experience of other people's behaviours.
But individualism's conception of the Golden Rule, in which each individual determines their own set of acceptable behavioural norms, is pretty disastrous when it comes to addressing prejudice. The version of the rule required for individualistic societies is "treat others as *they* wish to be treated". Unfortunately, with the breakdown of shared societal norms, this requires everyone to be able discern how other people wish to be treated.
Meanwhile, as Johnny Hart put it in the Wizard of Id, the rather more substantive version of the Golden Rule is that "whoever has the gold, makes the rules". The irony is that western Christianity is as guilty as any institution of disseminating and perpetuating this version, while congratulating itself on its attitude to the poor.
What makes you think atheists and agnostics question the existence of God?
After some reflection, the short answer to that question would be "people such as C S Lewis", and a longer answer would speculate on the possible meanings of the terms "atheist" and "agnostic".
Lewis had a rather unfortunate habit of normalizing his own experience.
Does that mean you're discounting it? What about this guy then? (Or anyone else who walks in Lewis' shoes.)
No, I'm saying it's not universal and may not even be the majority experience. Piling the plate with anecdotes does not create actual data.
Ah.
I'm not saying it's universal or a majority experience. I was referring to those people identifying as atheists and agnostics who have the particular experience of questioning their beliefs at particular points in their lives. I'm not saying that all atheists or agnostics live in a perpetual state of questioning. It seems uncontroversial that many would be comfortable with their belief or absence of belief, the majority of the time.
This is a similar sense to my original post (that you quoted), which addressed just those individuals questioning the existence of God, not all individuals.
Ah, so some small minority of questioning atheists. And this is relevant to the larger question how?
As for the meanings of those two words, it doesn't really matter what the possible meanings are, except as an exercise in lexicography. It matters what an individual uses that word to mean of themself. As Dafyd points out, if we are going to talk to others about their religion or ours or lack thereof, we all have to accept what the others say about their own inner states, without projection or Procrustean adjustments.
In that case, C S Lewis or, for that matter, the majority of people describing themselves as an atheist who came to believe in the existence of God, would seem to address your question.
Only if there is nobody else who uses the words of themselves. See previous question.
With respect to your meaning of the words "atheist" and "agnostic", the only aspect about which I currently have any confidence is that you think
The atheist/agnostic does not feel he/she has a problem.
What is your point here?
As an experiment, do you question the existence of Cthulu or Ra?
It would be quite difficult to answer that question without doing so. Belief is a many-splendoured thing.
So, you're not willing to engage on that question.
I just did. I was pointing out the difficulty of engaging with a question about the existence of anything without considering the existence of that thing.
What is the point of this comment? How does it affect the atheist's (or the believer's) life in any way?
It might not have been what you had in mind with the question, but that's the thing about questions and the way people understand them.
They can just make up whatever they want to get out of an argument they're losing?
Many of us live in societies profoundly shaped by Christianity, and it seems to me that it is easier to decide that whether or not there is a God doesn’t matter and/or reject deism when a lot of the - for want of a better word - benefits are baked in, (This is not exclusive to Christian religion I think, all the stuff about the golden rule etc, but I know less about those communities and faiths).
That is I’ve never seen a good argument from a humanist, why you wouldn’t - on rejecting faith - go for the perspective of Nietzsche or Ayn Rand, (Of course some people do.). But there seems to be a general expectation people will profess to be broadly prosocial, mildly selfless etc.
Even self-declared satanists do this.
Imagine if you lived in a society that didn’t default to golden rule - then what people’s faith and your own was would become much more important to you personally.
Social contract philosophers like Rawls (ok that’s the only one I know about but I imagine there are others) have tried to back engineer a logic for the prosocial, equal before the law, everybody matters perspective - but it’s rather artificial.
Ah, the old "atheists have no basis for morality". What's wrong with defaulting to the golden rule? Morality is invented by mankind to further the race, and after that the individual. Nietzsche and Ayn Rand run contrary to this, and therefore are immoral. There you go.
Of course it’s possible for atheists and agnostic people to be moral - and most are: the question is why ? Is that really derived from a different set of first principles, or is to do with being raised in a religiously informed culture which promotes a set of fundamental values “knowing right from wrong” (whether or not it actually adheres to them.)
When we say we know right from wrong, who is defining those values and based on what ?
See above.
It’s wrong to steal. Why ? The law says so. Maybe the law should be changed.
No, the law has nowt to do with it, except after the fact. Human morality is based on species survival.
Why should you not be able to have what you want if you are strong or cunning enough to take it ? There have been societies where that has been the explicit value (as opposed to professing a different idea but functionally ending up in that position.)
Murder is wrong. Why ? Because human life is special. Why ? Says who ?
Ah, the old "atheists have no basis for morality". What's wrong with defaulting to the golden rule? Morality is invented by mankind to further the race, and after that the individual. Nietzsche and Ayn Rand run contrary to this, and therefore are immoral. There you go.
Theres nothing wrong with defaulting to the golden rule from my perspective - I just don't think it is a purely rational position.
I think social darwinists would argue it's not an evolutionary imperative either.
When you say morality is invented by mankind to further the race, you don't explain why the invention of the golden rule as a moral basis is better than Neitche or Rand's moral inventions.
Ah, the old "atheists have no basis for morality". What's wrong with defaulting to the golden rule? Morality is invented by mankind to further the race, and after that the individual. Nietzsche and Ayn Rand run contrary to this, and therefore are immoral. There you go.
The Golden Rule, as noted above, is purely contentless - it just says that whatever standards of behaviour society expects should be exceptionless.
If you and the neighboring tribe routinely engage in glorious battle with each other and the winners slaughter the prisoners honourably, that is compatible with the golden rule as long as your side thinks it's equally honourable for the other tribe to behave the same way.
Secondly, why on earth should we care about the species? The survival of the species qua the species is not a premoral evolutionary imperative: indeed, it's more the opposite. Darwin was only the first to point out that an organism's chief competitors are members of the same species. Wanting to further the survival of the species is a moral judgement, and basing morality upon it is circular.
Nietzsche and I suppose Rand(*) think that their preferred morality furthers the species, by weeding out the weak and encouraging the strong. Saying that you're furthering the species requires a value judgement about what counts as furthering the species; so basing morality on furthering the species is, again, circular.
(*) I don't actually know Rand's opinions on furthering the species nor do I care enough to find out.
That is I’ve never seen a good argument from a humanist, why you wouldn’t - on rejecting faith - go for the perspective of Nietzsche or Ayn Rand, (Of course some people do.). But there seems to be a general expectation people will profess to be broadly prosocial, mildly selfless etc.
Even self-declared satanists do this.
Well, regarding Satanists specifically, yes and no. The Satanic Temple (the one that makes news by putting up statues of Baphomet as a kind of protest when Christian fundamentalists try to blur the line between church and state in the US) does basically believe in decent behavior. The Church of Satan started by LaVey, however, is essentially Ayn Rand dressed up as Alice Cooper (be a selfish jerk, etc., basically). Neither group believes in Satan, as a side note. (They are also not connected, and really don’t like each other.)
Ah, the old "atheists have no basis for morality". What's wrong with defaulting to the golden rule? Morality is invented by mankind to further the race, and after that the individual. Nietzsche and Ayn Rand run contrary to this, and therefore are immoral. There you go.
Theres nothing wrong with defaulting to the golden rule from my perspective - I just don't think it is a purely rational position.
I think social darwinists would argue it's not an evolutionary imperative either.
When you say morality is invented by mankind to further the race, you don't explain why the invention of the golden rule as a moral basis is better than Neitche or Rand's moral inventions.
...
Secondly, why on earth should we care about the species? The survival of the species qua the species is not a premoral evolutionary imperative: indeed, it's more the opposite. Darwin was only the first to point out that an organism's chief competitors are members of the same species.
Except in the case of social animals, where members of the same species are an organism's chief supporters. (Through modifying or restraining their behaviour for group living to be sustained and furthered.)
Wanting to further the survival of the species is a moral judgement, and basing morality upon it is circular.
An evolutionary imperative for species survival is only impossible up to the point when a species becomes self-aware. At this point, it is possible for a species, especially a social species, to start conceptualising the survival of the species as a whole. And, for example, to start thinking about the point at which co-operation starts or stops being a survival advantage. And it's possible to consider these things without reference to morality. For example, with reference to available resources - you don't need a value system to recognise the amount of food required to survive the winter. (Assessing the allocation of resources between social groups and within social groups could itself be the start of a value system that includes "fairness".)
In other words, your assertion depends on morality pre-dating species self-awareness.
Death seems like an effective tool for eliminating noncooperative members of social species. Loner types die alone for themselves. Non-cooperatives may find themselves ostracized or cannibalized. Except for Osiris, the dead don't breed.
Death seems like an effective tool for eliminating noncooperative members of social species. Loner types die alone for themselves. Non-cooperatives may find themselves ostracized or cannibalized. Except for Osiris, the dead don't breed.
Ah, the old "atheists have no basis for morality". What's wrong with defaulting to the golden rule? Morality is invented by mankind to further the race, and after that the individual. Nietzsche and Ayn Rand run contrary to this, and therefore are immoral. There you go.
Theres nothing wrong with defaulting to the golden rule from my perspective - I just don't think it is a purely rational position.
I think you're asking too much. There is no purely rational position on anything, much less on the basis of morality.
Death seems like an effective tool for eliminating noncooperative members of social species. Loner types die alone for themselves. Non-cooperatives may find themselves ostracized or cannibalized. Except for Osiris, the dead don't breed.
On the other hand, it seems to work for cats.
I wouldn't exactly call most cats social. The loaner species survive because they are equipped to. Or they don't.
Social cats like lions work well together with their group or die. I doubt that death is a concept they think about or comprehend. It is simply a natural consequence that ends a breeding line, if it happens early enough.
Social cats like lions work well together with their group or die. I doubt that death is a concept they think about or comprehend. It is simply a natural consequence that ends a breeding line, if it happens early enough.
Male lions on joining a pride will kill all the pre-existing cubs. Working well within one's group is compatible with a lot of behaviour we would consider immoral.
What makes you think atheists and agnostics question the existence of God?
After some reflection, the short answer to that question would be "people such as C S Lewis", and a longer answer would speculate on the possible meanings of the terms "atheist" and "agnostic".
Lewis had a rather unfortunate habit of normalizing his own experience.
Does that mean you're discounting it? What about this guy then? (Or anyone else who walks in Lewis' shoes.)
No, I'm saying it's not universal and may not even be the majority experience. Piling the plate with anecdotes does not create actual data.
Ah.
I'm not saying it's universal or a majority experience. I was referring to those people identifying as atheists and agnostics who have the particular experience of questioning their beliefs at particular points in their lives. I'm not saying that all atheists or agnostics live in a perpetual state of questioning. It seems uncontroversial that many would be comfortable with their belief or absence of belief, the majority of the time.
This is a similar sense to my original post (that you quoted), which addressed just those individuals questioning the existence of God, not all individuals.
Ah, so some small minority of questioning atheists. And this is relevant to the larger question how?
It isn't. It's related to the question I was addressing in my initial post (which didn't mention atheists). You subsequently addressed a different, broader question. The point I was making was that, for those people who question the existence of God, the nature of the problem as they experience it has changed. I wasn't addressing the issue of whether they see themselves as atheists or agnostics.
As for the meanings of those two words, it doesn't really matter what the possible meanings are, except as an exercise in lexicography. It matters what an individual uses that word to mean of themself. As Dafyd points out, if we are going to talk to others about their religion or ours or lack thereof, we all have to accept what the others say about their own inner states, without projection or Procrustean adjustments.
In that case, C S Lewis or, for that matter, the majority of people describing themselves as an atheist who came to believe in the existence of God, would seem to address your question.
Only if there is nobody else who uses the words of themselves. See previous question.
With respect to your meaning of the words "atheist" and "agnostic", the only aspect about which I currently have any confidence is that you think
The atheist/agnostic does not feel he/she has a problem.
What is your point here?
That I still don't know what point you're making in relation to my initial post.
As an experiment, do you question the existence of Cthulu or Ra?
It would be quite difficult to answer that question without doing so. Belief is a many-splendoured thing.
So, you're not willing to engage on that question.
I just did. I was pointing out the difficulty of engaging with a question about the existence of anything without considering the existence of that thing.
What is the point of this comment? How does it affect the atheist's (or the believer's) life in any way?
It seemed relevant to consider the nature of ontological questions. When you asked the question, you didn't indicate anything about what it was supposed to demonstrate other than it was an experiment. It is often in the nature of experimental questions that if you don't get an answer you consider to be relevant, you change the question.
It might not have been what you had in mind with the question, but that's the thing about questions and the way people understand them.
They can just make up whatever they want to get out of an argument they're losing?
If you want to couch it in terms of winning and losing an argument, that's OK.
Social cats like lions work well together with their group or die. I doubt that death is a concept they think about or comprehend. It is simply a natural consequence that ends a breeding line, if it happens early enough.
Male lions on joining a pride will kill all the pre-existing cubs. Working well within one's group is compatible with a lot of behaviour we would consider immoral.
Sure. I should have quoted originally Pease's comments to you; so I will now:
Wanting to further the survival of the species is a moral judgement, and basing morality upon it is circular.
An evolutionary imperative for species survival is only impossible up to the point when a species becomes self-aware. At this point, it is possible for a species, especially a social species, to start conceptualising the survival of the species as a whole. And, for example, to start thinking about the point at which co-operation starts or stops being a survival advantage. And it's possible to consider these things without reference to morality. For example, with reference to available resources - you don't need a value system to recognise the amount of food required to survive the winter. (Assessing the allocation of resources between social groups and within social groups could itself be the start of a value system that includes "fairness".)
In other words, your assertion depends on morality pre-dating species self-awareness.
I was pointing out, I think in agreement with you, that death does a pretty good, amoral job of stripping out members of species (even without self-awareness) who hinder the group's survival, either because of their unwillingness to stay with the group, or because of their unwillingness or inability to submit to the groups norms, if they are unable to dominate them.
Nothing like morality is part of the consideration. The species that survives is the one that does the best job surviving under the circumstances in which it exists.
Unfortunately, your example with lions has many long analogous variations among humans, who do (claim to) have some sort of morals, and who manage to justify such variations.
When you say morality is invented by mankind to further the race, you don't explain why the invention of the golden rule as a moral basis is better than Neitche or Rand's moral inventions.
Everything we are is based on emergent evolutionary properties. That includes basic moral impulses, such as compassion, ambition, self-advancement, aggression, group loyalty, xenophobia, a sense of fairness, disgust at sexual activity perceived as deviant, purity codes generally, and so on.
The question is, which of those emergent evolutionary impulses do we accept as 'moral' and which as 'immoral'. They're all equally emergent evolutionary impulses and they've all contributed to us being here now, or they wouldn't have their basis in evolution.
That's if we leave alone questions such as utilitarianism vs say Rawls' justice as fairness.
Secondly, why on earth should we care about the species? The survival of the species qua the species is not a premoral evolutionary imperative: indeed, it's more the opposite. Darwin was only the first to point out that an organism's chief competitors are members of the same species.
Except in the case of social animals, where members of the same species are an organism's chief supporters. (Through modifying or restraining their behaviour for group living to be sustained and furthered.)
Social animals are not an exception. Baboons may rely on each other for support; they equally compete with each other.
Wanting to further the survival of the species is a moral judgement, and basing morality upon it is circular.
An evolutionary imperative for species survival is only impossible up to the point when a species becomes self-aware. At this point, it is possible for a species, especially a social species, to start conceptualising the survival of the species as a whole. And, for example, to start thinking about the point at which co-operation starts or stops being a survival advantage. And it's possible to consider these things without reference to morality. For example, with reference to available resources - you don't need a value system to recognise the amount of food required to survive the winter. (Assessing the allocation of resources between social groups and within social groups could itself be the start of a value system that includes "fairness".)
In other words, your assertion depends on morality pre-dating species self-awareness.
A species cannot be self-aware. Only the members of a species can be aware of belonging to that species, and they may treat that fact as being of more or less importance. Species are just groups of individuals. (Also, would we not owe moral obligations to sentient members of other species, if there are any?)
You suggest above that morality is an emergent evolutionary property. Now you're suggesting that it does not pre-date the ability to conceptualise our species as a species. That seems like shifting the goalposts.
Is it within our evolved human nature to treat the species as being of more importance than say, our nation, or our tribe, or our family? History suggests that more often than not those other groups take priority over the species, often violently so. I return to the point above: morality is a particular selection out of human emotions and impulses, all of which must have some form of survival value or they would not have evolved. Therefore survival value and evolutionary history cannot be a sufficient criterion as to which human emotions and impulses are moral.
Is it within our evolved human nature to treat the species as being of more importance than say, our nation, or our tribe, or our family? History suggests that more often than not those other groups take priority over the species, often violently so.
Unfortunately, your example with lions has many long analogous variations among humans, who do (claim to) have some sort of morals, and who manage to justify such variations.
I've just been working on a display at work dealing with African-American history and culture in the U.S. (where I live). Our allegiances to nation, tribe or family have nothing to do with our survival as a species. They regularly work against it. Although we regularly create "moral" justifications for the destructive behavior that comes out of those allegiances.
Everything we are is based on emergent evolutionary properties. That includes basic moral impulses, such as compassion, ambition, self-advancement, aggression, group loyalty, xenophobia, a sense of fairness, disgust at sexual activity perceived as deviant, purity codes generally, and so on.
The question is, which of those emergent evolutionary impulses do we accept as 'moral' and which as 'immoral'. They're all equally emergent evolutionary impulses and they've all contributed to us being here now, or they wouldn't have their basis in evolution.
Is it within our evolved human nature to treat the species as being of more importance than say, our nation, or our tribe, or our family? History suggests that more often than not those other groups take priority over the species, often violently so.
I return to the point above: morality is a particular selection out of human emotions and impulses, all of which must have some form of survival value or they would not have evolved. Therefore survival value and evolutionary history cannot be a sufficient criterion as to which human emotions and impulses are moral.
That looks like a more tractable formulation. As you say, the question is how that selection is made.
But you make what appears to be an arbitrary distinction between "basic moral impulses" and the process of selecting those impulses into a morality, in effect asserting that the former is evolutionary and the latter is not, which results in a circular argument. (That evolution can't be a criterion for selecting moral impulses because it's not involved in the process for selecting moral impulses.)
And it looks like evolution has a longer reach than we reckon with. Recent research (typically twin and sibling studies) is starting to suggest that aspects of our morality *are* affected by genetic factors.
It’s wrong to steal. Why ? The law says so. Maybe the law should be changed. Why should you not be able to have what you want if you are strong or cunning enough to take it ? There have been societies where that has been the explicit value (as opposed to professing a different idea but functionally ending up in that position.)
Murder is wrong. Why ? Because human life is special. Why ? Says who ?
Laws are not the source of "morality" or "moral" behavior, or even the measure of it. Laws reflect the ability of those with power to use their access to power to codify strategies that help them maintain and wield that power. Civil order and related structures (government, for example) can simplify the use and maintenance of power, and may look "moral" because there appears to be less violence.
To use your example, "Murder" -- based on carefully crafted legal definitions -- may be illegal, but the laws and definitions have little or nothing to do with the "morality" or immorality of taking another life. Definitions can be used to mask the immorality of laws (nearly all race- and other class-related laws in the U.S.) that harm less powerful groups. Or depending on the tastes of the powerful at any one time or another, no effort is made to sweeten the code; it is self-justifying.
Having laws allows those with access to power to employ the power of the state to exert their will. No morality is necessary.
But you make what appears to be an arbitrary distinction between "basic moral impulses" and the process of selecting those impulses into a morality, in effect asserting that the former is evolutionary and the latter is not, which results in a circular argument. (That evolution can't be a criterion for selecting moral impulses because it's not involved in the process for selecting moral impulses.)
I think you may need to be more concrete before this appears to be more than a theoretical possibility that misses the point.
I take it that the ultimate point of talking about morality is in deciding what to do. Do we break the law to protest against government policy that is harming the environment, or do we defer to authority? Both options could be considered moral: deference to authority is considered a moral value in most societies (less often in the affluent West than in others; but no society is uniform). Do I help my single parent sibling look after their disabled child in a small town or do I pursue my dreams of becoming an actor in the big city? All courses of action are equally the result of evolution. Saying morality is the product of evolution is of no help in practical decision making. And something that has nothing to say to deciding what to do isn't morality.
An appeal to evolution logically boils down to asserting that whatever is is right.
We clearly can distinguish between evolutionary capability and cultural adaptation. The capacity for language is evolved; there is no evolved disposition to speak English rather than Arabic.
The capacity for scientific enquiry and logical reasoning is evolved, as is the tendency to commit various logical fallacies. But there is no evolutionary imperative for belief in the periodic table over belief in the four humours, or for Darwinian evolution over Young Earth Creationism.
Morality it seems varies between people as scientific beliefs do.
But you make what appears to be an arbitrary distinction between "basic moral impulses" and the process of selecting those impulses into a morality, in effect asserting that the former is evolutionary and the latter is not, which results in a circular argument. (That evolution can't be a criterion for selecting moral impulses because it's not involved in the process for selecting moral impulses.)
I think you may need to be more concrete before this appears to be more than a theoretical possibility that misses the point.
The underlying issue is your point that "everything we are is based on emergent evolutionary properties." In evolutionary terms, our brains are still wired to assess pretty much everything in terms of survival value. These days, a lot of what we do and think isn't directly related to what we consider to be survival, yet at least part of our brain continues to process it as thought it were.
If you still need a concrete point, it seems reasonable to have a vested interest in understanding the part that evolutionary factors play in our thinking and behaviour.
I take it that the ultimate point of talking about morality is in deciding what to do. Do we break the law to protest against government policy that is harming the environment, or do we defer to authority? Both options could be considered moral: deference to authority is considered a moral value in most societies (less often in the affluent West than in others; but no society is uniform). Do I help my single parent sibling look after their disabled child in a small town or do I pursue my dreams of becoming an actor in the big city? All courses of action are equally the result of evolution.
Or not so equal. As your final example illustrates, we are social animals. But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
Saying morality is the product of evolution is of no help in practical decision making. And something that has nothing to say to deciding what to do isn't morality.
I'm afraid that looks like another circular argument.
If you're saying you think that there is no practical application in understanding the factors affecting morality, what about medical ethics boards and all manner of individual and societal interventions in the fields of health, mental health and social issues?
An appeal to evolution logically boils down to asserting that whatever is is right.
I think I understand what you're saying. But an evolutionary predisposition to a particular morality doesn't mean that we're programmed to invariably act that way. And in itself, this doesn't negate the finding about evolutionary factors. Our societies are still predicated on the notion that we are able to reason about the choices we make, and that choosing to go with our gut or our "instincts" is still a choice for which we are normally held accountable.
We clearly can distinguish between evolutionary capability and cultural adaptation.
Research over the last few decades concerning the relevance of evolutionary factors suggests the boundary is increasingly blurred.
For example, in dual inheritance theory, "human behavior is a product of two different and interacting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolution. Genes and culture continually interact in a feedback loop: changes in genes can lead to changes in culture which can then influence genetic selection, and vice versa."
These are still theories, but the basic point I'm trying to convey is that assuming there is a hard and fast boundary between "evolutionary capability" and "cultural adaptation" (in this case) is just an assumption.
The capacity for language is evolved; there is no evolved disposition to speak English rather than Arabic.
If you can speak both, it's not hard to imagine situations where the choice of language spoken is strongly influenced by survival instincts.
The capacity for scientific enquiry and logical reasoning is evolved, as is the tendency to commit various logical fallacies. But there is no evolutionary imperative for belief in the periodic table over belief in the four humours, or for Darwinian evolution over Young Earth Creationism.
Apart from their survival value. Any information that enables us to make better predictions about the world has potential survival value. Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
You continue to make an arbitrary distinction between evolution's influence on evolved capabilities (such as the capacity for scientific enquiry and logical reasoning) and everything we *do* with those capabilities (such as actually enquiring and reasoning about the world).
Morality it seems varies between people as scientific beliefs do.
If you want to move on from all this, one issue that interests me is the extent to which evolutionary factors (such as altruism within social groups) inform, or have the potential to inform, our collective response to the threat to our species' habitat that is climate change.
But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
.......
Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
(Emphases mine--KJD)
This sounds as if evolutionary processes are purpose-driven.
[in order] to behave
because we need
[in order] to protect
Why ... we acquired
Does a teleological concept of evolution underly your thinking?
You continue to make an arbitrary distinction between evolution's influence on evolved capabilities (such as the capacity for scientific enquiry and logical reasoning) and everything we *do* with those capabilities (such as actually enquiring and reasoning about the world).
Could you explain why this distinction seems arbitary to you?
For example, in dual inheritance theory, "human behavior is a product of two different and interacting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolution. Genes and culture continually interact in a feedback loop: changes in genes can lead to changes in culture which can then influence genetic selection, and vice versa."
Culture and biological evolution function differently, don't they?
Cultures, human ones at least, because they function through people can function purposefully in ways that affect genes -- sanctioning forms of coupling, preventing others; controling environments that increase or decrease likelihood of survival, and so on. You know; it's complicated.
The purposefulness of the development of various elements of cultures, though, is a different matter, which may have no connection to survival or lack of survival.
However, human mutations survive or don't. Those that survive survive within cultures. But only the ones that survived selection, have the opportunity to participate at all within the culture in which they occur. The culture may sort even further or favor the mutation or neither.
The example of the handling of albinism in various cultures throughout time and geography may be a concrete enough example.
But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
.......
Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
(Emphases mine--KJD)
This sounds as if evolutionary processes are purpose-driven.
[in order] to behave
because we need
[in order] to protect
Why ... we acquired
Does a teleological concept of evolution underly your thinking?
No. That's just how the language can sound. (Although there may be an interesting question as to why that is.)
You continue to make an arbitrary distinction between evolution's influence on evolved capabilities (such as the capacity for scientific enquiry and logical reasoning) and everything we *do* with those capabilities (such as actually enquiring and reasoning about the world).
Could you explain why this distinction seems arbitary to you?
Because if the competition for survival makes us everything we are, it also affects everything we do, to a greater or lesser extent. When we're born, it doesn't just sit back and let nurture and education to fill in all the blanks. It continues to play a significant role as we develop and during the rest of our lives.
We tend to ignore the effect on us of the evolutionary competition for survival as we go about our lives, because we're not usually conscious of it and, if we're fortunate, we don't spend a lot of our time thinking in terms of pure survival.
There's a specific, significant "biological imperative" that affects most of us in some way. But it's also the case that it is an emotive subject, so I have doubts about treating is as an evolutionary discussion point.
So, switching track, a suggestion for a more abstract concept would be our desire to be right. Where does that come from? What purpose does it serve?
For example, in dual inheritance theory, "human behavior is a product of two different and interacting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolution. Genes and culture continually interact in a feedback loop: changes in genes can lead to changes in culture which can then influence genetic selection, and vice versa."
Culture and biological evolution function differently, don't they?
Well... Yes, at least in classical terms. But telling which is which isn't always straightforward, and there seem to be an increasing number of theorists and researchers keen on blurring the lines.
Cultures, human ones at least, because they function through people can function purposefully in ways that affect genes -- sanctioning forms of coupling, preventing others; controling environments that increase or decrease likelihood of survival, and so on. You know; it's complicated.
The purposefulness of the development of various elements of cultures, though, is a different matter, which may have no connection to survival or lack of survival.
It depends what the element is. And I suspect "purposefulness" might not be a helpful way to think about the issue.
An example often given is lactase persistence - "the prevalence of the genotype for adult lactose absorption in human populations, such as Northern Europeans and some African societies, with a long history of raising cattle for milk." (Roughly 7500 years).
However, human mutations survive or don't. Those that survive survive within cultures. But only the ones that survived selection, have the opportunity to participate at all within the culture in which they occur. The culture may sort even further or favor the mutation or neither.
The example of the handling of albinism in various cultures throughout time and geography may be a concrete enough example.
But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
.......
Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
(Emphases mine--KJD)
This sounds as if evolutionary processes are purpose-driven.
[in order] to behave
because we need
[in order] to protect
Why ... we acquired
Does a teleological concept of evolution underly your thinking?
No. That's just how the language can sound. (Although there may be an interesting question as to why that is.)
Actually I am not interested in the question as to why that is. At least not in discussing it.
I am more interested in understanding how you are reading/understanding the sections I highlighted. If they don't imply purposeful mutation in evolution, what do you make of their meaning?
I will spend more time on the rest of your post later, when I can.
But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
.......
Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
(Emphases mine--KJD)
This sounds as if evolutionary processes are purpose-driven.
[in order] to behave
because we need
[in order] to protect
Why ... we acquired
Does a teleological concept of evolution underly your thinking?
No. That's just how the language can sound. (Although there may be an interesting question as to why that is.)
Actually I am not interested in the question as to why that is. At least not in discussing it.
I am more interested in understanding how you are reading/understanding the sections I highlighted. If they don't imply purposeful mutation in evolution, what do you make of their meaning?
Hmm...
For me, "we have evolved to behave altruistically" is equivalent to "altruistic behaviour in human beings is a product of evolution".
The fourth one could be:
"Why do you think evolution resulted in human beings being able to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?"
That any help?
I will spend more time on the rest of your post later, when I can.
But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
.......
Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
(Emphases mine--KJD)
This sounds as if evolutionary processes are purpose-driven.
[in order] to behave
because we need
[in order] to protect
Why ... we acquired
Does a teleological concept of evolution underly your thinking?
No. That's just how the language can sound. (Although there may be an interesting question as to why that is.)
Actually I am not interested in the question as to why that is. At least not in discussing it.
I am more interested in understanding how you are reading/understanding the sections I highlighted. If they don't imply purposeful mutation in evolution, what do you make of their meaning?
Hmm...
For me, "we have evolved to behave altruistically" is equivalent to "altruistic behaviour in human beings is a product of evolution".
The fourth one could be:
"Why do you think evolution resulted in human beings being able to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?"
That any help?
It's a start. The two sections I quoted in the middle? The ones from the Psych Today article. Since you quoted the article, I'll ask you for your take on those as well.
But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
.......
Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
(Emphases mine--KJD)
This sounds as if evolutionary processes are purpose-driven.
[in order] to behave
because we need
[in order] to protect
Why ... we acquired
Does a teleological concept of evolution underly your thinking?
No. That's just how the language can sound. (Although there may be an interesting question as to why that is.)
Actually I am not interested in the question as to why that is. At least not in discussing it.
I am more interested in understanding how you are reading/understanding the sections I highlighted. If they don't imply purposeful mutation in evolution, what do you make of their meaning?
Hmm...
For me, "we have evolved to behave altruistically" is equivalent to "altruistic behaviour in human beings is a product of evolution".
The fourth one could be:
"Why do you think evolution resulted in human beings being able to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?"
That any help?
It's a start. The two sections I quoted in the middle? The ones from the Psych Today article. Since you quoted the article, I'll ask you for your take on those as well.
My take is that the author was writing from the perspective of their own experience of the relative vulnerability of individuals and weakly-cooperating social groups, and of the ability of unrelated individuals to cooperate at least as effectively as kin groups.
Second item: because cooperation increases the chances of survival.
Third item: evolution selects for altruism in social groups.
@pease, thanks for taking the time. I find myself bristling at the phrase "evolution selects for" -- which sounds intentional. So I consulted the all-knowing Google and found the phrase is all over the place, and not merely at the lay- or lower levels. Surprising. Interesting...
Linguistically and psychologically, I mean.
It's a problematic choice of word for the process.
So, switching track, a suggestion for a more abstract concept would be our desire to be right. Where does that come from? What purpose does it serve?
Also interesting. The question smells like bait really, but I have a few thoughts about it.
There are many reasons one might appear to desire to be right. A few come to mind:
In the above case, my purpose was to negotiate meaning, often misunderstood for "arguing," which I find an interesting and unproductive phenomenon in itself. Nevertheless, attempting to gain an accurate grasp of what was meant seems important, particularly as I frequent to fail to do it and find myself mistaking as well as mistook.
"The Rules", the established and stated social conventions of SoF, indicate that Purgatory is a place for debate. Debate involves "being right" which can be an initial state or an outcome of the process. This brings up motivations for involving oneself in purgatorial debates at all. Or the very purpose of "debate" itself. And the various types of debate, and, and .....
There are certainly many things to say about the source and purpose of "being right." I haven't even touched those here.
It depends what the element is. And I suspect "purposefulness" might not be a helpful way to think about the issue.
I attempted to indicate such dependence.
We have provided two different types of examples of the interplay of cultures and genetics.
I noticed days ago that we few, we happy few, we band of shipmates, have wandered very, very far from Faith and Coincidences. In fact, even fewer have actually touched on Faith and Coincidences and not for a long time.
Has everthing been said in that area then? Is there nothing left?
But you make what appears to be an arbitrary distinction between "basic moral impulses" and the process of selecting those impulses into a morality, in effect asserting that the former is evolutionary and the latter is not, which results in a circular argument. (That evolution can't be a criterion for selecting moral impulses because it's not involved in the process for selecting moral impulses.)
I'm cutting a lot of the argument because I'd just be repeating myself.
But note: here you assert that the distinction beween basic moral impulses and the (hopefully rational) process of selecting between those impulses to construct a morality is essentially arbitrary.
An appeal to evolution logically boils down to asserting that whatever is is right.
I think I understand what you're saying. But an evolutionary predisposition to a particular morality doesn't mean that we're programmed to invariably act that way. And in itself, this doesn't negate the finding about evolutionary factors. Our societies are still predicated on the notion that we are able to reason about the choices we make, and that choosing to go with our gut or our "instincts" is still a choice for which we are normally held accountable.
And here you note that our societies are predicated on the notion that there is a distinction between 'evolutionary predispostion' and being 'able to reason about the choices we make'. Either there is a distinction, phrase the precise nature of the distinction how you will, or there isn't.
You can't just assert the distinction when it suits you, and deny the distinction when it doesn't suit you.
Do I help my single parent sibling look after their disabled child in a small town or do I pursue my dreams of becoming an actor in the big city? All courses of action are equally the result of evolution.
Or not so equal. As your final example illustrates, we are social animals. But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
If the two courses are not so equally the result of evolution, of what is the choice that you deprecate the result? Demonic possession?
Yes, that's sarcasm. The position that altruistic courses of action are somehow more the result of evolution than less altruistic courses of action is incoherent (well, unless you do accept the influence of something like demonic possession).
(By the way, you put some of your sentences in quote marks, but you don't give the source of the quote.)
(Here because I missed the edit window. Please read this in the context of my previous post.)
@pease, thanks for taking the time. I find myself bristling at the phrase "evolution selects for" -- which sounds intentional. So I consulted the all-knowing Google and found the phrase is all over the place, and not merely at the lay- or lower levels. Surprising. Interesting...
Linguistically and psychologically, I mean.
It's a problematic choice of word for the process.
Problematic for whom? And problematic in what way?
So, switching track, a suggestion for a more abstract concept would be our desire to be right. Where does that come from? What purpose does it serve?
Also interesting. The question smells like bait really, but I have a few thoughts about it.
There are many reasons one might appear to desire to be right. A few come to mind:
In the above case, my purpose was to negotiate meaning, often misunderstood for "arguing," which I find an interesting and unproductive phenomenon in itself. Nevertheless, attempting to gain an accurate grasp of what was meant seems important, particularly as I frequent to fail to do it and find myself mistaking as well as mistook.
"The Rules", the established and stated social conventions of SoF, indicate that Purgatory is a place for debate. Debate involves "being right" which can be an initial state or an outcome of the process. This brings up motivations for involving oneself in purgatorial debates at all. Or the very purpose of "debate" itself. And the various types of debate, and, and
The process of debate doesn't have to to be adversarial. Other formats are available; and practised here, although some people seem to have a preference.
There are certainly many things to say about the source and purpose of "being right." I haven't even touched those here.
Well - that was the question. Bearing in mind that the context was biological imperatives, do you think there might be any evolutionary factors involved?
Bearing in mind that the context was biological imperatives, do you think there might be any evolutionary factors involved?
It's really not a question that interests me. Considering the Real Life demands on my time these days, I must prioritize what I can do here. But that's for the invitation to discuss.
I AM very interested in the evolution of this thread from a discussion that requires an intense level of vulnerability and exposure to one that allows for the guardedness and strategy of debate.
But you make what appears to be an arbitrary distinction between "basic moral impulses" and the process of selecting those impulses into a morality, in effect asserting that the former is evolutionary and the latter is not, which results in a circular argument. (That evolution can't be a criterion for selecting moral impulses because it's not involved in the process for selecting moral impulses.)
I'm cutting a lot of the argument because I'd just be repeating myself.
But note: here you assert that the distinction beween basic moral impulses and the (hopefully rational) process of selecting between those impulses to construct a morality is essentially arbitrary.
On being rational, I agree with mousethief's point that "There is no purely rational position on anything, much less on the basis of morality." I have been trying to convey the idea that the process of you or I constructing our personal morality is affected by evolutionary factors, such as the basic moral impulse to be altruistic. Part of the history of morality is people coming up with "rational" reasoning to justify behaviour they "felt" to be right.
An appeal to evolution logically boils down to asserting that whatever is is right.
I think I understand what you're saying. But an evolutionary predisposition to a particular morality doesn't mean that we're programmed to invariably act that way. And in itself, this doesn't negate the finding about evolutionary factors. Our societies are still predicated on the notion that we are able to reason about the choices we make, and that choosing to go with our gut or our "instincts" is still a choice for which we are normally held accountable.
And here you note that our societies are predicated on the notion that there is a distinction between 'evolutionary predispostion' and being 'able to reason about the choices we make'. Either there is a distinction, phrase the precise nature of the distinction how you will, or there isn't.
You can't just assert the distinction when it suits you, and deny the distinction when it doesn't suit you.
I think you misconstrue the meaning of "notion" - I meant it in the sense of "imperfect conception". Beyond that, you're conflating the essentially scientific discipline of understanding what makes people tick, and the governance issue of how to run social groups. Understanding human behaviour and regulating human behaviour are not the same thing.
Systems of societal regulation don't tend to have a good track record when it comes to understanding why people behave as they do. And although they are based on the idea that living in social groups depends on individuals being able to modify and restrain their own behaviour, they often have rather rigid, dated models of acceptable behaviour in mind.
Do I help my single parent sibling look after their disabled child in a small town or do I pursue my dreams of becoming an actor in the big city? All courses of action are equally the result of evolution.
Or not so equal. As your final example illustrates, we are social animals. But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
If the two courses are not so equally the result of evolution, of what is the choice that you deprecate the result? Demonic possession?
Yes, that's sarcasm. The position that altruistic courses of action are somehow more the result of evolution than less altruistic courses of action is incoherent (well, unless you do accept the influence of something like demonic possession).
My take on that is you just don't like the idea that an altruistic course of action might not be solely determined by a consciously-reasoned decision to do good. But that might be because I have no idea what you mean by "of what is the choice that you deprecate the result?".
(By the way, you put some of your sentences in quote marks, but you don't give the source of the quote.)
You're right. I wanted to see if not providing the link to the article made any difference. I note that Kendel found it OK.
I did, but shouldn't have needed to. @Dafyd is right.
The difference it makes in not providing the citation or link to the source is that it wastes people's time.
I AM very interested in the evolution of this thread from a discussion that requires an intense level of vulnerability and exposure to one that allows for the guardedness and strategy of debate.
The rather mundane answer is that some people prefer guardedness and strategy to vulnerability and exposure. And I'm not convinced the discussion ever required an intense level of either: to the extent that posters (ever) feel bound by prescriptions in the OP, the three questions allowed a wide range of engagement:
I did, but shouldn't have needed to.
Dafyd is right.
The difference it makes in not providing the citation or link to the source is that it wastes people's time.
But you make what appears to be an arbitrary distinction between "basic moral impulses" and the process of selecting those impulses into a morality, in effect asserting that the former is evolutionary and the latter is not, which results in a circular argument.
But note: here you assert that the distinction beween basic moral impulses and the (hopefully rational) process of selecting between those impulses to construct a morality is essentially arbitrary.
On being rational, I agree with mousethief's point that "There is no purely rational position on anything, much less on the basis of morality." I have been trying to convey the idea that the process of you or I constructing our personal morality is affected by evolutionary factors, such as the basic moral impulse to be altruistic. Part of the history of morality is people coming up with "rational" reasoning to justify behaviour they "felt" to be right.
Maybe you should consider the possibility that I am already aware of the idea that you're trying to convey?
Just a thought.
The problem isn't that I haven't come across the idea or even that I reject it. The problem is that I think it's too simplistic.
It implies the existence of two distinct things, morality and evolutionary factors that "affect" it. That's a bit like saying marble "affects" Michelangelo's David.
Morality is entirely composed of evolutionary factors. The thing is, so is everything else in human life. It's not the evolutionary factors that make morality morality; just as it's not the marble that makes David David, rather than Daphne and Apollo or an offcut.
That means you can't offer "it's the result of evolution" as a reason to behave morally or to adopt one set of moral values over another.
But an evolutionary predisposition to a particular morality doesn't mean that we're programmed to invariably act that way. And in itself, this doesn't negate the finding about evolutionary factors. Our societies are still predicated on the notion that we are able to reason about the choices we make, and that choosing to go with our gut or our "instincts" is still a choice for which we are normally held accountable.
And here you note that our societies are predicated on the notion that there is a distinction between 'evolutionary predispostion' and being 'able to reason about the choices we make'. Either there is a distinction, phrase the precise nature of the distinction how you will, or there isn't.
You can't just assert the distinction when it suits you, and deny the distinction when it doesn't suit you.
I think you misconstrue the meaning of "notion" - I meant it in the sense of "imperfect conception". Beyond that, you're conflating the essentially scientific discipline of understanding what makes people tick, and the governance issue of how to run social groups. Understanding human behaviour and regulating human behaviour are not the same thing.
I am neither talking about understanding, 'scientific' or otherwise, of what makes people tick, nor about the governance issue of how to run social groups, but about the essentially personal issue of how a personal agent should decide what to do.
I am talking about the first person future oriented perspective of what to do, not the third person perspective of how to understand or govern other people.
What was the relevance of bringing up a conception you consider imperfect?
In any case, you were asserting that we are not programmed to invariably act in a particular way, just as you're asserting that morality is something distinct from the evolutionary factors that influence it.
Do I help my single parent sibling look after their disabled child in a small town or do I pursue my dreams of becoming an actor in the big city? All courses of action are equally the result of evolution.
Or not so equal. As your final example illustrates, we are social animals. But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival."
If the two courses are not so equally the result of evolution, of what is the choice that you deprecate the result? Demonic possession?
Yes, that's sarcasm. The position that altruistic courses of action are somehow more the result of evolution than less altruistic courses of action is incoherent (well, unless you do accept the influence of something like demonic possession).
My take on that is you just don't like the idea that an altruistic course of action might not be solely determined by a consciously-reasoned decision to do good. But that might be because I have no idea what you mean by "of what is the choice that you deprecate the result?".
It's not your take on that. It's your ad hominem take on what you wish that was. I've been saying that evolution is responsible for "altruistic" impulses all along. But I suppose it's hard to pay attention to what another person is saying when you see the conversation as a one way transaction in which you convey ideas to the other person.
I said the choice to help look after your sibling's children, and the choice to pursue one's dream of an acting career are equally the result of evolution. You said, they are not equally the result of evolution. You seem to deprecate the choice you consider not altruistic.
But if one choice is more the result of evolutionary factors than the other, what are the factors you think are more present in the other choice?
And why ought the evolutionary factors rather than the other factors determine whether the one choice should be preferred to the other?
I don't deny that compassion and other non-selfish motives are part of evolved human nature. I have cited Hrdy's arguments about the similarities between humans and marmosets in the past.
But I think evolutionary psychology is really just a tool to refute bad evolutionary psychology. As you say, people seldom reach their conclusions on purely rational grounds. In particular, nobody chooses our preferred version of evolutionary psychology on grounds internal to evolutionary psychology. I am I hope self-aware about the fact that I'm using evolutionary psychology to rationalise my preferences.
I've been pondering this thread for a few weeks and am not sure I've understood all the thoughts so will go back and re-read. I did want to pop in to share an experience I had that has been something I found comforting at the time and kept me going for a long while.
Our youngest had BMT no 1 in 2005 and when we returned to our home I thought I'd like to connect with parents who'd had a similar experience. I happened across a USA based listserv and joined 2 of the groups there. Parents shared very detailed accounts of their own kids' treatments and experiences and feel as though I learnt more than I'd learnt from our own treating team in 2 years. Just the sheer number of stories and different treatments was very educational. I also met a Mum whose son was treated in the same city as my kid but at a different hospital and we met up irl. Others of course were only known though their posts and the blog sites the parents ran. There were a couple of instances of people joining the group as fakers, which was quite incomprehensible to me and very sad.
There was one boy whose blog I used to follow who developed alarming symptoms similar to those my son experienced. Fortunately his Doctors took him and his Dad seriously and our local support not so much. Eventually our kid relapsed in a most alarming fashion and I was not best pleased. Their response was disgraceful, I think they thought I had a mental health condition. Well, I almost did, caused by them!! I will never forgive them for their attitude and their words. Thankfully the worst day of our life was saved by the nurses we knew and who were so kind and so thorough in their care of son and us.
Back on therapy, hoping for remission, doing the worst chemo ever known to us and him having a totally dreadful time. He became really unwell, developed shingles, which then became meningitis. After rushing him into the hospital with vomiting and a bad headache and not making a lot of headway, I sat down and prayed for a listserv girl whose Mum had asked for prayer as her daughter had ongoing issues post-therapy and they were trying to get a good resolution. She was to undergo a procedure and as our son had just been wheeled away I had a spare quiet minute.
As I thought about her and her condition I just had a flash of OMG and I ran out of the room to find registrar and asked them to perform a check on our son, one that I heard later was routinely done on adults but not so much on kids. The finding of the test made them look for infection and then it was discovered he had developed meningitis and started him on therapy immediately. He survived the meningitis, he went on to develop BK virus in his second transplant and some kidney failure which was resolved by tweaking his medications. Many scary, scary days though! After 8 months in hospital we were allowed to take him home and then he really began to recover.
In retrospect I have often pondered on joining that group by chance. That the parents were all so engaged with the condition and interested in research and sharing articles. That i could draw from the experiences of the 100+ families on the relapsed group and of course the in person contact with my friend who visited us at the hospital and encouraged us to push for more for our boy. That the Oncology team took on board our thoughts, listened and discussed them as though we were really partners. All of that I sometimes attribute to chance, but at the time I felt as though we really were being guided to move things in the right direction.
Of course, I would never suggest that other people's children were "meant" to die, so much of the whole thing is a science, plus an art, plus being in the right place at the right time, plus taking appropriate precautions, plus knowing when to follow instructions and when to push back if things aren't going well. This year he is 14 years off therapy and we are grateful. Still lots of challenges and complexity but we are blessed to have more time with him
@Cheery Gardener thank you for all your recent posts around the ship. You've been a real encouragement.
Different dance; similar tune.
To have any faith left at all seems like a miracle.
It's kind of you to say that @Kendel. I certainly don't feel as though I'm a cup runneth over person. I think Rachel Held Evans saying, On the days that I believe .... It's an ongoing choice every day, as it is for everyone!
That means you can't offer "it's the result of evolution" as a reason to behave morally or to adopt one set of moral values over another.
As with much else, I don't know why you think I'm saying that.
I am neither talking about understanding, 'scientific' or otherwise, of what makes people tick, ... but about the essentially personal issue of how a personal agent should decide what to do.
I am talking about the first person future oriented perspective of what to do, not the third person perspective of how to understand ... other people.
Leaving aside the issue of governance (which is as relevant as marble), this perspective makes little sense to me. Why should the issue of being personal or first-person mean that you would not want to understand the underlying principles and mechanisms? It sounds like you're saying you're better able to make (moral) decisions if you *don't* understand the various factors that affect (moral) decision-making. Furthermore, it seems strange not to want to understand anyone else's moral position, given how many of our moral decisions directly impact on the moral decisions of those around us, and vice versa.
It's plausible that this isn't your position. But, with the information available to me (your posts), although I believe that there is some coherent perspective uniting your statements, I am so far unable to discern what it is.
Do I help my single parent sibling look after their disabled child in a small town or do I pursue my dreams of becoming an actor in the big city? All courses of action are equally the result of evolution.
Or not so equal. As your final example illustrates, we are social animals. But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival."
If the two courses are not so equally the result of evolution, of what is the choice that you deprecate the result? Demonic possession?
Yes, that's sarcasm. The position that altruistic courses of action are somehow more the result of evolution than less altruistic courses of action is incoherent (well, unless you do accept the influence of something like demonic possession).
My take on that is you just don't like the idea that an altruistic course of action might not be solely determined by a consciously-reasoned decision to do good. But that might be because I have no idea what you mean by "of what is the choice that you deprecate the result?".
It's not your take on that. It's your ad hominem take on what you wish that was.
And I have no idea what you mean by that either.
I've been saying that evolution is responsible for "altruistic" impulses all along. But I suppose it's hard to pay attention to what another person is saying when you see the conversation as a one way transaction in which you convey ideas to the other person.
I said the choice to help look after your sibling's children, and the choice to pursue one's dream of an acting career are equally the result of evolution. You said, they are not equally the result of evolution. You seem to deprecate the choice you consider not altruistic.
Err - no. I didn't make any judgment on which course of action was preferable. It is difficult to see how saying that two things are not equal indicates that one should be preferred or deprecated, let alone which of the two is preferable or to be deprecated.
More prosaically, you seem to use the word "equally" a fair bit. Whether you use it to mean "being equal" is another question. Whatever else they are, the two choices in your example are not equal.
Anyway, if you want to discuss the application to making moral decisions (rather than mechanisms and principles) then, in terms of individual morality and decision-making, maybe the only factor that matters is whether a particular course of action makes you feel guilty or virtuous. And how able you are to live with those.
I don't deny that compassion and other non-selfish motives are part of evolved human nature.
Well, in one sense such motives are just as "selfish" a part of human behaviour as everything else. We are compassionate and altruistic because it increases our chances of survival - it is an effective mechanism for increasing co-operation within social groups. That it seems natural for us to describe these motives as being "non-selfish" is down to living "inside" our concept of self (that is itself evolutionary, like everything else about us, as you point out). Having a morality and locating our various motives within it (eg distinguishing between selfish motives and non-selfish motives) could be seen as an effective and efficient mechanism for encouraging co-operation and realising the benefits.
I have cited Hrdy's arguments about the similarities between humans and marmosets in the past.
But I think evolutionary psychology is really just a tool to refute bad evolutionary psychology. As you say, people seldom reach their conclusions on purely rational grounds. In particular, nobody chooses our preferred version of evolutionary psychology on grounds internal to evolutionary psychology. I am I hope self-aware about the fact that I'm using evolutionary psychology to rationalise my preferences.
I have been following this thread for a while (except for the philosophical / arguments about definitions), and finally have a chance to respond to the OP.
So, I wonder what to make of a coincidence that we seem to find meaningful. There seem to be three options:
1. It's just a coincidence - people are good at seeing patterns everywhere, and making meaning.
2. God has made something happen, so that we might draw meaning from it.
3. God provides us with the grace to see as meaningful something that would happen anyway.
My faith wanes and waxes, but I tend to settle on option (3) for the most part.
What has been your experience(s) of coincidences?
Which position do you take, and why?
Are there other options?
My life has at times been full of such "coincidences", both for my own life and from the perspective of others. A discarded letter pulled from a waste paper basket resulted in medical teams being sent to rural Africa. A phone number in another letter hidden in a closet for over 40 years resulted in two unknown siblings meeting each other. At least once I have decided to quit a job, then received offers for alternatives before I had said anything to anyone else about it.
A good example is my first trip overseas, when I rode a bicycle (pushbike) by myself around New Zealand. Now, the Kiwis are wonderfully friendly people in general, which explains a lot of things that happened. In this case I was riding down a rural road in the Southern Alps when the rim of my rear wheel broke. The next car to come along stopped, and had an empty trailer to haul my bike 10km to the next major town. The local bike shop said the nearest replacement parts were 200km away, and would take a week to arrive. At the campground in town I met a bus tour I had encountered earlier in my travels, who not only let me ride with them, but when we got to Dunedin, one of the 5 Kiwis on the bus remembered that his father repaired bicycles there, and walked me to his shop. And that was only a small part of the trip.
But it is difficult for me to fit these experiences into the specified categories, especially the latter two, because I consider myself an atheist. Actually, if I had to describe myself somehow, I'd probably say I was a Taoist* (to use the old spelling). Basically, there is a "path", or "energy flow", or something like that, and the world goes more smoothly when one is "going with the flow" than when one is trying to make one's own way instead. It tends to be about simplicity, gentleness and humility. It's not something that I try to describe, but there is no anthropomorphic "God" in charge of it. Might others interpret it in other ways? Sure. Might others achieve the same result with a more explicitly religious path? Probably. I have no need to define it or debate it or defend it: it is just how I experience the world, and I am not at all bothered that others experience it or explain it differently.
My experience is that there are times - like my trip to New Zealand - when all sorts of coincidences happen to me and around me. There are other times that I don't see them as much in my daily life. I put this down to my openness to such experiences. Perhaps there are just as many opportunities for such events, but I don't see them, or I'm too busy doing what I think I should be doing to consider some other option that presents itself. Perhaps I'm "off the path" at that point.
And even the things that happen that appear to be "good" coincidences, or accidents, or rewards for being open, or whatever they are, aren't necessarily the "best" alternative or possibility, even if it is more than I had though possible. Would something "better" have come along if I had taken some other option instead? We'll never know. And there is no use worrying about it.
One of the most important realizations for my wife and I came while driving through a small city in the American mid-west: a small yellow blotch on our map with a red highway and a blue highway passing through it, and I was trying to find my way from one to the other. It was getting late, we were hungry and grumpy, and it was not nearly as easy as it seemed to get between the two parallel colored lines. (It turns out that there was a river in the way.) At some point, one of us turned to the other and said, "Well, this is an Adventure!", and that totally changed the mood. An Adventure means you don't know what is going to happen. When I am willing to give up on my picture of how things should be, and instead enjoy discovering what happens next, I find I am much more likely to recognize the opportunities that present themselves. As well as being in a better mood once we do finally find the right road. Ever since then, we regularly remind each other that we are on an Adventure when things don't seem to be working out well, and it helps us be more open to alternatives.
So, where would I put things on the OP's list?
There certainly are components of all three. If someone has been looking for an answer, then it is easy to take what happens as an answer of some sort. Well, some things... I might have to stretch pretty hard to relate dropping a head of broccoli on my foot as an answer to a question about my job (unless I'm applying for a job in a grocery store), but I probably could if I tried hard enough. Are such patterns necessarily "accurate", or likely to lead one to the "right" conclusion? Not always. But the effort we are willing to put into interpreting it in a particular way might help us to see what it is that we really want to have happen.
It seems to me that for a "meaningful coincidence" to happen we have to:
1) be open to a change, or some sort of choice, feedback, or sign.
2) be willing to consider the particular option it points us towards
3) trust that the incident has meaning for us.
In the end, it really is about how we experience the event, and what we choose to believe about it. There is no recognizable difference between a random event and one that happened to us via "cosmic forces", whatever words might use to describe them. We choose how we interpret such occurrences, and whatever choices we make accordingly, without any guarantee that we are making the "right" choice. But that doesn't necessarily mean that it isn't.
* [In passing I would note that there is often a huge difference between a Westerner who learns the underlying philosophy or basis of a religion (like Taoism or Buddhism), and one who grows up immersed in the day-to-day life and rituals of it. I definitely am in the former category, similar to someone reading the New Testament to learn how to be a Christian, and having no idea about hymns, Lent, or the Alter Guild.]
I find that fascinating @carex. That an atheist goes with numinous cosmic flow, with destiny? Karma? That there can be intention without an intentional intender? Most of my family by marriage feel that way. If not all! I therefore have to use the language. As I do Christian language. I loved Lessing's Canopus in Argus: Archives which seem to come from such a place.
Comments
That is I’ve never seen a good argument from a humanist, why you wouldn’t - on rejecting faith - go for the perspective of Nietzsche or Ayn Rand, (Of course some people do.). But there seems to be a general expectation people will profess to be broadly prosocial, mildly selfless etc.
Even self-declared satanists do this.
Imagine if you lived in a society that didn’t default to golden rule - then what people’s faith and your own was would become much more important to you personally.
Social contract philosophers like Rawls (ok that’s the only one I know about but I imagine there are others) have tried to back engineer a logic for the prosocial, equal before the law, everybody matters perspective - but it’s rather artificial.
Of course it’s possible for atheists and agnostic people to be moral - and most are: the question is why ? Is that really derived from a different set of first principles, or is to do with being raised in a religiously informed culture which promotes a set of fundamental values “knowing right from wrong” (whether or not it actually adheres to them.)
When we say we know right from wrong, who is defining those values and based on what ?
It’s wrong to steal. Why ? The law says so. Maybe the law should be changed. Why should you not be able to have what you want if you are strong or cunning enough to take it ? There have been societies where that has been the explicit value (as opposed to professing a different idea but functionally ending up in that position.)
Murder is wrong. Why ? Because human life is special. Why ? Says who ?
In miniature, we've seen something similar in the Vietnamese mini-culture I live in. Take what follows with a grain of salt, but it seems to me that there is no default "It's expected to help the poor, be kind to those in trouble, etc." standard as a matter of public decency. I mean, those are recognized as good things, but nobody (not part of the Christian community) seems to feel particularly called upon, they themselves, to live up to that stuff right here, right now, and those who do are considered to be either crazy or trying for sainthood. Or both, I suppose.
The result is a local proverb--the Buddhists get the rich and the Christians get the poor--because only the Christians are fool enough not to charge everything the market will bear for human care / altruistic services. Which leads to the edifying spectacle of the local Christian church doing pastoral care for the Buddhist temple (e.g. visiting the grieving, helping them settle estates or whatever).
I treated my stepson with courtesy and kindness, and a bunch of people absolutely flipped at the idea that one could care for (let alone love!) a child from one's husband's previous relationship. Wha-a-a-a?
I dunno, it's just weird when the background culture doesn't have things like the Golden Rule baked in.
But speaking from my very limited experience, there is a notable difference between a culture that's been soaked in Christianity for a thousand years (however it is rebelling against it now) and one that hasn't. Makes me go "hmmm"...
The Golden Rule isn't absolute - it is entirely relative to any given culture's behavioural norms. It contains no other inherent standards of behaviour. At face value, the Golden Rule just requires you to treat other people as you wish to be treated. If you want to be left alone, it requires you to leave other people alone.
Fairly obviously (I would hope), that's not what it means at all. It could be considered somewhat disingenuous or maybe just misleading in that regard, when trying to read it from a modern western, individualistic, point of view. The assumed context is that a given society has a given set of behavioural norms. And that individuals are expected to prioritise these behaviours over their own desires and in the face of their experience of other people's behaviours.
But individualism's conception of the Golden Rule, in which each individual determines their own set of acceptable behavioural norms, is pretty disastrous when it comes to addressing prejudice. The version of the rule required for individualistic societies is "treat others as *they* wish to be treated". Unfortunately, with the breakdown of shared societal norms, this requires everyone to be able discern how other people wish to be treated.
Meanwhile, as Johnny Hart put it in the Wizard of Id, the rather more substantive version of the Golden Rule is that "whoever has the gold, makes the rules". The irony is that western Christianity is as guilty as any institution of disseminating and perpetuating this version, while congratulating itself on its attitude to the poor.
What is your point here?
What is the point of this comment? How does it affect the atheist's (or the believer's) life in any way?
They can just make up whatever they want to get out of an argument they're losing?
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Ah, the old "atheists have no basis for morality". What's wrong with defaulting to the golden rule? Morality is invented by mankind to further the race, and after that the individual. Nietzsche and Ayn Rand run contrary to this, and therefore are immoral. There you go.
See above.
No, the law has nowt to do with it, except after the fact. Human morality is based on species survival.
See above.
https://i.pinimg.com/originals/41/32/72/4132727be2c271ec7bde0d19492b4be3.gif
Theres nothing wrong with defaulting to the golden rule from my perspective - I just don't think it is a purely rational position.
I think social darwinists would argue it's not an evolutionary imperative either.
When you say morality is invented by mankind to further the race, you don't explain why the invention of the golden rule as a moral basis is better than Neitche or Rand's moral inventions.
Tidied quoting code. BroJames, Purgatory Host
If you and the neighboring tribe routinely engage in glorious battle with each other and the winners slaughter the prisoners honourably, that is compatible with the golden rule as long as your side thinks it's equally honourable for the other tribe to behave the same way.
Secondly, why on earth should we care about the species? The survival of the species qua the species is not a premoral evolutionary imperative: indeed, it's more the opposite. Darwin was only the first to point out that an organism's chief competitors are members of the same species. Wanting to further the survival of the species is a moral judgement, and basing morality upon it is circular.
Nietzsche and I suppose Rand(*) think that their preferred morality furthers the species, by weeding out the weak and encouraging the strong. Saying that you're furthering the species requires a value judgement about what counts as furthering the species; so basing morality on furthering the species is, again, circular.
(*) I don't actually know Rand's opinions on furthering the species nor do I care enough to find out.
Well, regarding Satanists specifically, yes and no. The Satanic Temple (the one that makes news by putting up statues of Baphomet as a kind of protest when Christian fundamentalists try to blur the line between church and state in the US) does basically believe in decent behavior. The Church of Satan started by LaVey, however, is essentially Ayn Rand dressed up as Alice Cooper (be a selfish jerk, etc., basically). Neither group believes in Satan, as a side note. (They are also not connected, and really don’t like each other.)
Morality as an emergent evolutionary property is an idea that's been taken seriously for a number of years now.
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/morality-biology/
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evolution_of_morality
Except in the case of social animals, where members of the same species are an organism's chief supporters. (Through modifying or restraining their behaviour for group living to be sustained and furthered.)
An evolutionary imperative for species survival is only impossible up to the point when a species becomes self-aware. At this point, it is possible for a species, especially a social species, to start conceptualising the survival of the species as a whole. And, for example, to start thinking about the point at which co-operation starts or stops being a survival advantage. And it's possible to consider these things without reference to morality. For example, with reference to available resources - you don't need a value system to recognise the amount of food required to survive the winter. (Assessing the allocation of resources between social groups and within social groups could itself be the start of a value system that includes "fairness".)
In other words, your assertion depends on morality pre-dating species self-awareness.
On the other hand, it seems to work for cats.
I think you're asking too much. There is no purely rational position on anything, much less on the basis of morality.
I wouldn't exactly call most cats social. The loaner species survive because they are equipped to. Or they don't.
Social cats like lions work well together with their group or die. I doubt that death is a concept they think about or comprehend. It is simply a natural consequence that ends a breeding line, if it happens early enough.
That I still don't know what point you're making in relation to my initial post.
It seemed relevant to consider the nature of ontological questions. When you asked the question, you didn't indicate anything about what it was supposed to demonstrate other than it was an experiment. It is often in the nature of experimental questions that if you don't get an answer you consider to be relevant, you change the question.
If you want to couch it in terms of winning and losing an argument, that's OK.
Sure. I should have quoted originally Pease's comments to you; so I will now:
I was pointing out, I think in agreement with you, that death does a pretty good, amoral job of stripping out members of species (even without self-awareness) who hinder the group's survival, either because of their unwillingness to stay with the group, or because of their unwillingness or inability to submit to the groups norms, if they are unable to dominate them.
Nothing like morality is part of the consideration. The species that survives is the one that does the best job surviving under the circumstances in which it exists.
Unfortunately, your example with lions has many long analogous variations among humans, who do (claim to) have some sort of morals, and who manage to justify such variations.
The question is, which of those emergent evolutionary impulses do we accept as 'moral' and which as 'immoral'. They're all equally emergent evolutionary impulses and they've all contributed to us being here now, or they wouldn't have their basis in evolution.
That's if we leave alone questions such as utilitarianism vs say Rawls' justice as fairness.
Social animals are not an exception. Baboons may rely on each other for support; they equally compete with each other.
A species cannot be self-aware. Only the members of a species can be aware of belonging to that species, and they may treat that fact as being of more or less importance. Species are just groups of individuals. (Also, would we not owe moral obligations to sentient members of other species, if there are any?)
You suggest above that morality is an emergent evolutionary property. Now you're suggesting that it does not pre-date the ability to conceptualise our species as a species. That seems like shifting the goalposts.
Is it within our evolved human nature to treat the species as being of more importance than say, our nation, or our tribe, or our family? History suggests that more often than not those other groups take priority over the species, often violently so. I return to the point above: morality is a particular selection out of human emotions and impulses, all of which must have some form of survival value or they would not have evolved. Therefore survival value and evolutionary history cannot be a sufficient criterion as to which human emotions and impulses are moral.
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Yes. This is what I was getting at with
I've just been working on a display at work dealing with African-American history and culture in the U.S. (where I live). Our allegiances to nation, tribe or family have nothing to do with our survival as a species. They regularly work against it. Although we regularly create "moral" justifications for the destructive behavior that comes out of those allegiances.
But you make what appears to be an arbitrary distinction between "basic moral impulses" and the process of selecting those impulses into a morality, in effect asserting that the former is evolutionary and the latter is not, which results in a circular argument. (That evolution can't be a criterion for selecting moral impulses because it's not involved in the process for selecting moral impulses.)
And it looks like evolution has a longer reach than we reckon with. Recent research (typically twin and sibling studies) is starting to suggest that aspects of our morality *are* affected by genetic factors.
Laws are not the source of "morality" or "moral" behavior, or even the measure of it. Laws reflect the ability of those with power to use their access to power to codify strategies that help them maintain and wield that power. Civil order and related structures (government, for example) can simplify the use and maintenance of power, and may look "moral" because there appears to be less violence.
To use your example, "Murder" -- based on carefully crafted legal definitions -- may be illegal, but the laws and definitions have little or nothing to do with the "morality" or immorality of taking another life. Definitions can be used to mask the immorality of laws (nearly all race- and other class-related laws in the U.S.) that harm less powerful groups. Or depending on the tastes of the powerful at any one time or another, no effort is made to sweeten the code; it is self-justifying.
Having laws allows those with access to power to employ the power of the state to exert their will. No morality is necessary.
I take it that the ultimate point of talking about morality is in deciding what to do. Do we break the law to protest against government policy that is harming the environment, or do we defer to authority? Both options could be considered moral: deference to authority is considered a moral value in most societies (less often in the affluent West than in others; but no society is uniform). Do I help my single parent sibling look after their disabled child in a small town or do I pursue my dreams of becoming an actor in the big city? All courses of action are equally the result of evolution. Saying morality is the product of evolution is of no help in practical decision making. And something that has nothing to say to deciding what to do isn't morality.
An appeal to evolution logically boils down to asserting that whatever is is right.
We clearly can distinguish between evolutionary capability and cultural adaptation. The capacity for language is evolved; there is no evolved disposition to speak English rather than Arabic.
The capacity for scientific enquiry and logical reasoning is evolved, as is the tendency to commit various logical fallacies. But there is no evolutionary imperative for belief in the periodic table over belief in the four humours, or for Darwinian evolution over Young Earth Creationism.
Morality it seems varies between people as scientific beliefs do.
If you still need a concrete point, it seems reasonable to have a vested interest in understanding the part that evolutionary factors play in our thinking and behaviour.
Or not so equal. As your final example illustrates, we are social animals. But your statement ignores the increasingly-accepted finding that we have evolved to behave altruistically: "Altruism isn't the reason we cooperate; we must cooperate in order to survive, and we are altruistic to others because we need them for our survival." And which doesn't appear to be based on genetic relationship: "In human terms, family is not so important after all; altruism emerged to protect social groups whether they are kin or not."
I'm afraid that looks like another circular argument.
If you're saying you think that there is no practical application in understanding the factors affecting morality, what about medical ethics boards and all manner of individual and societal interventions in the fields of health, mental health and social issues?
I think I understand what you're saying. But an evolutionary predisposition to a particular morality doesn't mean that we're programmed to invariably act that way. And in itself, this doesn't negate the finding about evolutionary factors. Our societies are still predicated on the notion that we are able to reason about the choices we make, and that choosing to go with our gut or our "instincts" is still a choice for which we are normally held accountable.
Research over the last few decades concerning the relevance of evolutionary factors suggests the boundary is increasingly blurred.
For example, in dual inheritance theory, "human behavior is a product of two different and interacting evolutionary processes: genetic evolution and cultural evolution. Genes and culture continually interact in a feedback loop: changes in genes can lead to changes in culture which can then influence genetic selection, and vice versa."
These are still theories, but the basic point I'm trying to convey is that assuming there is a hard and fast boundary between "evolutionary capability" and "cultural adaptation" (in this case) is just an assumption.
If you can speak both, it's not hard to imagine situations where the choice of language spoken is strongly influenced by survival instincts.
Apart from their survival value. Any information that enables us to make better predictions about the world has potential survival value. Why do you think we acquired the ability to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?
You continue to make an arbitrary distinction between evolution's influence on evolved capabilities (such as the capacity for scientific enquiry and logical reasoning) and everything we *do* with those capabilities (such as actually enquiring and reasoning about the world).
If you want to move on from all this, one issue that interests me is the extent to which evolutionary factors (such as altruism within social groups) inform, or have the potential to inform, our collective response to the threat to our species' habitat that is climate change.
This sounds as if evolutionary processes are purpose-driven.
- [in order] to behave
- because we need
- [in order] to protect
- Why ... we acquired
Does a teleological concept of evolution underly your thinking?Could you explain why this distinction seems arbitary to you?
Culture and biological evolution function differently, don't they?
Cultures, human ones at least, because they function through people can function purposefully in ways that affect genes -- sanctioning forms of coupling, preventing others; controling environments that increase or decrease likelihood of survival, and so on. You know; it's complicated.
The purposefulness of the development of various elements of cultures, though, is a different matter, which may have no connection to survival or lack of survival.
However, human mutations survive or don't. Those that survive survive within cultures. But only the ones that survived selection, have the opportunity to participate at all within the culture in which they occur. The culture may sort even further or favor the mutation or neither.
The example of the handling of albinism in various cultures throughout time and geography may be a concrete enough example.
Because if the competition for survival makes us everything we are, it also affects everything we do, to a greater or lesser extent. When we're born, it doesn't just sit back and let nurture and education to fill in all the blanks. It continues to play a significant role as we develop and during the rest of our lives.
We tend to ignore the effect on us of the evolutionary competition for survival as we go about our lives, because we're not usually conscious of it and, if we're fortunate, we don't spend a lot of our time thinking in terms of pure survival.
There's a specific, significant "biological imperative" that affects most of us in some way. But it's also the case that it is an emotive subject, so I have doubts about treating is as an evolutionary discussion point.
So, switching track, a suggestion for a more abstract concept would be our desire to be right. Where does that come from? What purpose does it serve?
Well... Yes, at least in classical terms. But telling which is which isn't always straightforward, and there seem to be an increasing number of theorists and researchers keen on blurring the lines.
It depends what the element is. And I suspect "purposefulness" might not be a helpful way to think about the issue.
An example often given is lactase persistence - "the prevalence of the genotype for adult lactose absorption in human populations, such as Northern Europeans and some African societies, with a long history of raising cattle for milk." (Roughly 7500 years).
Actually I am not interested in the question as to why that is. At least not in discussing it.
I am more interested in understanding how you are reading/understanding the sections I highlighted. If they don't imply purposeful mutation in evolution, what do you make of their meaning?
I will spend more time on the rest of your post later, when I can.
For me, "we have evolved to behave altruistically" is equivalent to "altruistic behaviour in human beings is a product of evolution".
The fourth one could be:
"Why do you think evolution resulted in human beings being able to acquire information and pass it on to others in the first place?"
That any help?
It's a start. The two sections I quoted in the middle? The ones from the Psych Today article. Since you quoted the article, I'll ask you for your take on those as well.
Second item: because cooperation increases the chances of survival.
Third item: evolution selects for altruism in social groups.
Linguistically and psychologically, I mean.
It's a problematic choice of word for the process.
Also interesting. The question smells like bait really, but I have a few thoughts about it.
There are many reasons one might appear to desire to be right. A few come to mind:
In the above case, my purpose was to negotiate meaning, often misunderstood for "arguing," which I find an interesting and unproductive phenomenon in itself. Nevertheless, attempting to gain an accurate grasp of what was meant seems important, particularly as I frequent to fail to do it and find myself mistaking as well as mistook.
"The Rules", the established and stated social conventions of SoF, indicate that Purgatory is a place for debate. Debate involves "being right" which can be an initial state or an outcome of the process. This brings up motivations for involving oneself in purgatorial debates at all. Or the very purpose of "debate" itself. And the various types of debate, and, and .....
There are certainly many things to say about the source and purpose of "being right." I haven't even touched those here.
I attempted to indicate such dependence.
We have provided two different types of examples of the interplay of cultures and genetics.
I noticed days ago that we few, we happy few, we band of shipmates, have wandered very, very far from Faith and Coincidences. In fact, even fewer have actually touched on Faith and Coincidences and not for a long time.
Has everthing been said in that area then? Is there nothing left?
But note: here you assert that the distinction beween basic moral impulses and the (hopefully rational) process of selecting between those impulses to construct a morality is essentially arbitrary.
And here you note that our societies are predicated on the notion that there is a distinction between 'evolutionary predispostion' and being 'able to reason about the choices we make'. Either there is a distinction, phrase the precise nature of the distinction how you will, or there isn't.
You can't just assert the distinction when it suits you, and deny the distinction when it doesn't suit you.
Yes, that's sarcasm. The position that altruistic courses of action are somehow more the result of evolution than less altruistic courses of action is incoherent (well, unless you do accept the influence of something like demonic possession).
(By the way, you put some of your sentences in quote marks, but you don't give the source of the quote.)
(Here because I missed the edit window. Please read this in the context of my previous post.)
The process of debate doesn't have to to be adversarial. Other formats are available; and practised here, although some people seem to have a preference.
Well - that was the question. Bearing in mind that the context was biological imperatives, do you think there might be any evolutionary factors involved?
It's really not a question that interests me. Considering the Real Life demands on my time these days, I must prioritize what I can do here. But that's for the invitation to discuss.
I AM very interested in the evolution of this thread from a discussion that requires an intense level of vulnerability and exposure to one that allows for the guardedness and strategy of debate.
I think you misconstrue the meaning of "notion" - I meant it in the sense of "imperfect conception". Beyond that, you're conflating the essentially scientific discipline of understanding what makes people tick, and the governance issue of how to run social groups. Understanding human behaviour and regulating human behaviour are not the same thing.
Systems of societal regulation don't tend to have a good track record when it comes to understanding why people behave as they do. And although they are based on the idea that living in social groups depends on individuals being able to modify and restrain their own behaviour, they often have rather rigid, dated models of acceptable behaviour in mind.
My take on that is you just don't like the idea that an altruistic course of action might not be solely determined by a consciously-reasoned decision to do good. But that might be because I have no idea what you mean by "of what is the choice that you deprecate the result?".
You're right. I wanted to see if not providing the link to the article made any difference. I note that Kendel found it OK.
@Dafyd is right.
The difference it makes in not providing the citation or link to the source is that it wastes people's time.
Just a thought.
The problem isn't that I haven't come across the idea or even that I reject it. The problem is that I think it's too simplistic.
It implies the existence of two distinct things, morality and evolutionary factors that "affect" it. That's a bit like saying marble "affects" Michelangelo's David.
Morality is entirely composed of evolutionary factors. The thing is, so is everything else in human life. It's not the evolutionary factors that make morality morality; just as it's not the marble that makes David David, rather than Daphne and Apollo or an offcut.
That means you can't offer "it's the result of evolution" as a reason to behave morally or to adopt one set of moral values over another.
I am neither talking about understanding, 'scientific' or otherwise, of what makes people tick, nor about the governance issue of how to run social groups, but about the essentially personal issue of how a personal agent should decide what to do.
I am talking about the first person future oriented perspective of what to do, not the third person perspective of how to understand or govern other people.
What was the relevance of bringing up a conception you consider imperfect?
In any case, you were asserting that we are not programmed to invariably act in a particular way, just as you're asserting that morality is something distinct from the evolutionary factors that influence it.
It's not your take on that. It's your ad hominem take on what you wish that was. I've been saying that evolution is responsible for "altruistic" impulses all along. But I suppose it's hard to pay attention to what another person is saying when you see the conversation as a one way transaction in which you convey ideas to the other person.
I said the choice to help look after your sibling's children, and the choice to pursue one's dream of an acting career are equally the result of evolution. You said, they are not equally the result of evolution. You seem to deprecate the choice you consider not altruistic.
But if one choice is more the result of evolutionary factors than the other, what are the factors you think are more present in the other choice?
And why ought the evolutionary factors rather than the other factors determine whether the one choice should be preferred to the other?
I don't deny that compassion and other non-selfish motives are part of evolved human nature. I have cited Hrdy's arguments about the similarities between humans and marmosets in the past.
But I think evolutionary psychology is really just a tool to refute bad evolutionary psychology. As you say, people seldom reach their conclusions on purely rational grounds. In particular, nobody chooses our preferred version of evolutionary psychology on grounds internal to evolutionary psychology. I am I hope self-aware about the fact that I'm using evolutionary psychology to rationalise my preferences.
Our youngest had BMT no 1 in 2005 and when we returned to our home I thought I'd like to connect with parents who'd had a similar experience. I happened across a USA based listserv and joined 2 of the groups there. Parents shared very detailed accounts of their own kids' treatments and experiences and feel as though I learnt more than I'd learnt from our own treating team in 2 years. Just the sheer number of stories and different treatments was very educational. I also met a Mum whose son was treated in the same city as my kid but at a different hospital and we met up irl. Others of course were only known though their posts and the blog sites the parents ran. There were a couple of instances of people joining the group as fakers, which was quite incomprehensible to me and very sad.
There was one boy whose blog I used to follow who developed alarming symptoms similar to those my son experienced. Fortunately his Doctors took him and his Dad seriously and our local support not so much. Eventually our kid relapsed in a most alarming fashion and I was not best pleased. Their response was disgraceful, I think they thought I had a mental health condition. Well, I almost did, caused by them!! I will never forgive them for their attitude and their words. Thankfully the worst day of our life was saved by the nurses we knew and who were so kind and so thorough in their care of son and us.
Back on therapy, hoping for remission, doing the worst chemo ever known to us and him having a totally dreadful time. He became really unwell, developed shingles, which then became meningitis. After rushing him into the hospital with vomiting and a bad headache and not making a lot of headway, I sat down and prayed for a listserv girl whose Mum had asked for prayer as her daughter had ongoing issues post-therapy and they were trying to get a good resolution. She was to undergo a procedure and as our son had just been wheeled away I had a spare quiet minute.
As I thought about her and her condition I just had a flash of OMG and I ran out of the room to find registrar and asked them to perform a check on our son, one that I heard later was routinely done on adults but not so much on kids. The finding of the test made them look for infection and then it was discovered he had developed meningitis and started him on therapy immediately. He survived the meningitis, he went on to develop BK virus in his second transplant and some kidney failure which was resolved by tweaking his medications. Many scary, scary days though! After 8 months in hospital we were allowed to take him home and then he really began to recover.
In retrospect I have often pondered on joining that group by chance. That the parents were all so engaged with the condition and interested in research and sharing articles. That i could draw from the experiences of the 100+ families on the relapsed group and of course the in person contact with my friend who visited us at the hospital and encouraged us to push for more for our boy. That the Oncology team took on board our thoughts, listened and discussed them as though we were really partners. All of that I sometimes attribute to chance, but at the time I felt as though we really were being guided to move things in the right direction.
Of course, I would never suggest that other people's children were "meant" to die, so much of the whole thing is a science, plus an art, plus being in the right place at the right time, plus taking appropriate precautions, plus knowing when to follow instructions and when to push back if things aren't going well. This year he is 14 years off therapy and we are grateful. Still lots of challenges and complexity but we are blessed to have more time with him
Different dance; similar tune.
To have any faith left at all seems like a miracle.
Leaving aside the issue of governance (which is as relevant as marble), this perspective makes little sense to me. Why should the issue of being personal or first-person mean that you would not want to understand the underlying principles and mechanisms? It sounds like you're saying you're better able to make (moral) decisions if you *don't* understand the various factors that affect (moral) decision-making. Furthermore, it seems strange not to want to understand anyone else's moral position, given how many of our moral decisions directly impact on the moral decisions of those around us, and vice versa.
It's plausible that this isn't your position. But, with the information available to me (your posts), although I believe that there is some coherent perspective uniting your statements, I am so far unable to discern what it is.
And I have no idea what you mean by that either. Err - no. I didn't make any judgment on which course of action was preferable. It is difficult to see how saying that two things are not equal indicates that one should be preferred or deprecated, let alone which of the two is preferable or to be deprecated.
More prosaically, you seem to use the word "equally" a fair bit. Whether you use it to mean "being equal" is another question. Whatever else they are, the two choices in your example are not equal.
Anyway, if you want to discuss the application to making moral decisions (rather than mechanisms and principles) then, in terms of individual morality and decision-making, maybe the only factor that matters is whether a particular course of action makes you feel guilty or virtuous. And how able you are to live with those.
Well, in one sense such motives are just as "selfish" a part of human behaviour as everything else. We are compassionate and altruistic because it increases our chances of survival - it is an effective mechanism for increasing co-operation within social groups. That it seems natural for us to describe these motives as being "non-selfish" is down to living "inside" our concept of self (that is itself evolutionary, like everything else about us, as you point out). Having a morality and locating our various motives within it (eg distinguishing between selfish motives and non-selfish motives) could be seen as an effective and efficient mechanism for encouraging co-operation and realising the benefits.
Yup - that makes sense.
My life has at times been full of such "coincidences", both for my own life and from the perspective of others. A discarded letter pulled from a waste paper basket resulted in medical teams being sent to rural Africa. A phone number in another letter hidden in a closet for over 40 years resulted in two unknown siblings meeting each other. At least once I have decided to quit a job, then received offers for alternatives before I had said anything to anyone else about it.
A good example is my first trip overseas, when I rode a bicycle (pushbike) by myself around New Zealand. Now, the Kiwis are wonderfully friendly people in general, which explains a lot of things that happened. In this case I was riding down a rural road in the Southern Alps when the rim of my rear wheel broke. The next car to come along stopped, and had an empty trailer to haul my bike 10km to the next major town. The local bike shop said the nearest replacement parts were 200km away, and would take a week to arrive. At the campground in town I met a bus tour I had encountered earlier in my travels, who not only let me ride with them, but when we got to Dunedin, one of the 5 Kiwis on the bus remembered that his father repaired bicycles there, and walked me to his shop. And that was only a small part of the trip.
But it is difficult for me to fit these experiences into the specified categories, especially the latter two, because I consider myself an atheist. Actually, if I had to describe myself somehow, I'd probably say I was a Taoist* (to use the old spelling). Basically, there is a "path", or "energy flow", or something like that, and the world goes more smoothly when one is "going with the flow" than when one is trying to make one's own way instead. It tends to be about simplicity, gentleness and humility. It's not something that I try to describe, but there is no anthropomorphic "God" in charge of it. Might others interpret it in other ways? Sure. Might others achieve the same result with a more explicitly religious path? Probably. I have no need to define it or debate it or defend it: it is just how I experience the world, and I am not at all bothered that others experience it or explain it differently.
My experience is that there are times - like my trip to New Zealand - when all sorts of coincidences happen to me and around me. There are other times that I don't see them as much in my daily life. I put this down to my openness to such experiences. Perhaps there are just as many opportunities for such events, but I don't see them, or I'm too busy doing what I think I should be doing to consider some other option that presents itself. Perhaps I'm "off the path" at that point.
And even the things that happen that appear to be "good" coincidences, or accidents, or rewards for being open, or whatever they are, aren't necessarily the "best" alternative or possibility, even if it is more than I had though possible. Would something "better" have come along if I had taken some other option instead? We'll never know. And there is no use worrying about it.
One of the most important realizations for my wife and I came while driving through a small city in the American mid-west: a small yellow blotch on our map with a red highway and a blue highway passing through it, and I was trying to find my way from one to the other. It was getting late, we were hungry and grumpy, and it was not nearly as easy as it seemed to get between the two parallel colored lines. (It turns out that there was a river in the way.) At some point, one of us turned to the other and said, "Well, this is an Adventure!", and that totally changed the mood. An Adventure means you don't know what is going to happen. When I am willing to give up on my picture of how things should be, and instead enjoy discovering what happens next, I find I am much more likely to recognize the opportunities that present themselves. As well as being in a better mood once we do finally find the right road. Ever since then, we regularly remind each other that we are on an Adventure when things don't seem to be working out well, and it helps us be more open to alternatives.
So, where would I put things on the OP's list?
There certainly are components of all three. If someone has been looking for an answer, then it is easy to take what happens as an answer of some sort. Well, some things... I might have to stretch pretty hard to relate dropping a head of broccoli on my foot as an answer to a question about my job (unless I'm applying for a job in a grocery store), but I probably could if I tried hard enough. Are such patterns necessarily "accurate", or likely to lead one to the "right" conclusion? Not always. But the effort we are willing to put into interpreting it in a particular way might help us to see what it is that we really want to have happen.
It seems to me that for a "meaningful coincidence" to happen we have to:
1) be open to a change, or some sort of choice, feedback, or sign.
2) be willing to consider the particular option it points us towards
3) trust that the incident has meaning for us.
In the end, it really is about how we experience the event, and what we choose to believe about it. There is no recognizable difference between a random event and one that happened to us via "cosmic forces", whatever words might use to describe them. We choose how we interpret such occurrences, and whatever choices we make accordingly, without any guarantee that we are making the "right" choice. But that doesn't necessarily mean that it isn't.
* [In passing I would note that there is often a huge difference between a Westerner who learns the underlying philosophy or basis of a religion (like Taoism or Buddhism), and one who grows up immersed in the day-to-day life and rituals of it. I definitely am in the former category, similar to someone reading the New Testament to learn how to be a Christian, and having no idea about hymns, Lent, or the Alter Guild.]
I'd love it to be so.