Can you direct us to where Kierkegaard said he wasn't a Christian?
I suspect it was in the "attack upon Christendom" or in the various books of letters because he didn't often write under his own name. Unfortunately I don't have either to hand to look it up.
From memory I think he had a view that one aspired/grew to be a Christian, but that he hadn't achieved it.
Another thing I didn't write earlier was that Kierkegaard was pretty obsessed with (the characterisation by Plato of) Socrates. I think his high view of the Greek philosophers feeds into his books.
So I think when we look at Fear and Trembling, the story is supposed supposed to contrast with the (Greek philosophy -ish) idea of the Ethical.
Abraham is this vision of someone who is so strongly believing in a "God says" ethic that he overcomes his human reluctance and does the disgusting act. If God says he must, then he must.
The contrast is with the idea that there exists a shared understanding of what is ethical behaviour amongst all people (or at least all right thinking Greek men..) which we can get to if we all sit down and think and discuss stuff.
I think K's whole beef with "Christendom" is that it claims to be one thing (enlightening individuals with unexpected interaction with the deity) whilst being another (a rigid set of rules which everyone accepts with little thought). And I think the point of F&T is that to be a true believer, a "Knight of Faith" is to be that one prepared to go out on a limb and follow the voice within even when all other societal expectations say you shouldn't. A bit like having access to a personal 'oracle of Delphi' who tells you some great religious insight you'd have not thought of on your own.
And finally I think he's saying that this divine ethic breaking through the ordinary Ethical way of thinking inevitably leads to "fear and trembling" in the KoF.
Because only a complete maniac would receive a divine word to kill his only child and think "oh ok no problem".
My money is on the "something else" - that for Kierkegaard the questions (and in particular the correct type of question) was more important than the "right answer" because thinking hard about things is important to be fully human.
As I’ve said before, I really can’t comment on Kierkegaard, but I do feel the need to push back a bit on the bolded. Saying that “thinking hard about things is important to be fully human” is problematic, because if it’s true, it means that some people—those with dementia, for example, or with developmental disabilities—are not or at least may not be fully human.
Thinking hard about things may be very valuable and beneficial for an individual and for society, but if Kierkegaard tied it to being “fully human,” then I think he was wrong.
My money is on the "something else" - that for Kierkegaard the questions (and in particular the correct type of question) was more important than the "right answer" because thinking hard about things is important to be fully human.
As I’ve said before, I really can’t comment on Kierkegaard, but I do feel the need to push back a bit on the bolded. Saying that “thinking hard about things is important to be fully human” is problematic, because if it’s true, it means that some people—those with dementia, for example, or with developmental disabilities—are not or at least may not be fully human.
Thinking hard about things may be very valuable and beneficial for an individual and for society, but if Kierkegaard tied it to being “fully human,” then I think he was wrong.
Yeah, I think that part is really from the Greeks, which is obviously problematic - and clearly doesn't work in practice. If you have groups of people thinking about an issue, they don't tend to come up with the same ethical answer.
Plato was an arse, etc.
But I think Kierkegaard saw himself as riffing on the "accepted" philosophies around him, and that this (perhaps unconscious) idea that a society had groupthink and tended to elevate their own norms to the level of right/wrong.
Again, I'm not sure it is possible to say that Kierkegaard was "right" or "wrong" about anything, he seemed to like to project images and use those as a springboard to provoke thought. I doubt he would be particularly bothered by people saying his examples were rubbish.
Thanks for the clarification on Kierkegaard saying he wasn't Christian. Yes, I think in Fear And Trembling somewhere, he makes it clear he doesn't consider himself to be a Knight Of Faith, which in a sense, by his own schematum, would mean that he's not a Christian, but I think would be closer to something like "I'm not a very good Christian".
There's also that Greek idea(l), probably from Aristotle, which suggests that the only full human person is the one who engages in civic affairs.
Which is obviously problematic and unacceptable. And yet has resonance with respect to the way the political class see themselves as higher than ordinary plebs.
Thanks for the clarification on Kierkegaard saying he wasn't Christian. Yes, I think in Fear And Trembling somewhere, he makes it clear he doesn't consider himself to be a Knight Of Faith, which in a sense, by his own schematum, would mean that he's not a Christian, but I think would be closer to something like "I'm not a very good Christian".
Well it was the pseudonym Johannes de silentio who supposedly wrote F&T. Who isn't necessarily reflecting Kierkegaard.
Thanks for the clarification on Kierkegaard saying he wasn't Christian. Yes, I think in Fear And Trembling somewhere, he makes it clear he doesn't consider himself to be a Knight Of Faith, which in a sense, by his own schematum, would mean that he's not a Christian, but I think would be closer to something like "I'm not a very good Christian".
Well it was the pseudonym Johannes de silentio who supposedly wrote F&T. Who isn't necessarily reflecting Kierkegaard.
Maddening, isn't it?
Based on my recollections, Fear And Trembling is usually described by academics as expounding "the philosophy of Kierkegaard".
Yes. I've heard that one is supposed to then read Either/Or and leap up saying "no, no, this isn't the only option! One should be a Knight of Faith and transcend the ethical as much as the aesthetic."
To me the real problem with F&T is how one is supposed to deal with it in real life. If someone says to you that they've heard a voice and therefore murdered their child, I doubt it will cut much ice with anyone.
So whilst I can see that there's some value in the injection of wild ethical ideals into the normal run-of-things, I don't see how one distinguishes between really daft ideas from the deity and mental illness.
Hello, @KoF ! Nice to meet you. Welcome to the Ship. I'm fairly new here myself. There's lots going on over here on this shore, and I haven't had time to contribute as much as I'd like to the discussion last week, I expect the same this week.
I agree that F&T resists classification -- probably other pieces, too; I am approaching it much like I would any literature. A few other things that I've read, I think are easily classifiable as sermons (Lily and Bird) and polemics (the Attach literature).
For anyone, really; a couple of questions regarding F&T:
What does the narrator say the point of the book is?
To whom is the book addressed?
Is the narrator the same person as SK? If not to what degree does he reflect SK's views?
Yes. I've heard that one is supposed to then read Either/Or and leap up saying "no, no, this isn't the only option! One should be a Knight of Faith and transcend the ethical as much as the aesthetic."
To me the real problem with F&T is how one is supposed to deal with it in real life. If someone says to you that they've heard a voice and therefore murdered their child, I doubt it will cut much ice with anyone.
So whilst I can see that there's some value in the injection of wild ethical ideals into the normal run-of-things, I don't see how one distinguishes between really daft ideas from the deity and mental illness.
I think the whole point is that there is no way to distinguish morally outrageous commands from the deity from mental illness, beyond your own unverifiable belief that it's the former.
And, no, it probably won't cut ice with anyone. You will probably end up condemned by society for what you did, but that doesn't matter, because the Knight Of Faith isn't supposed to convince anyone else anyway.
(And within the later development of existentialism, the pros and cons of murdering your children in the name of God becomes a much less important issue, with the main takeaway from Kierkegaard being that ethical systems can't provide you with the guidelines to make authentic choices.)
Elephants and monkeys (Frans de Waal) and dogs and doubtless octopi and mantis shrimps know what (proportional) fairness is, no ethical system required. Are any metazoan species known for harming others of the same? Rats are empathic. What am I missing? (Apart from consideration of the group-focused binding cluster of loyalty, authority and sanctity and liberty.)
Can you direct us to where Kierkegaard said he wasn't a Christian?
I suspect it was in the "attack upon Christendom" or in the various books of letters because he didn't often write under his own name. Unfortunately I don't have either to hand to look it up.
From memory I think he had a view that one aspired/grew to be a Christian, but that he hadn't achieved it.
Yes. In some of the attack literature SK says he's not a Christian. In doing so, he is not saying anything about his faith or belief but about his association with the thing called "christianity" in Denmark at the time. "If that's what being a Christian is, I am not one!"
I can't confirm or deny statements about his aspirations.
I think K's whole beef with "Christendom" is that it claims to be one thing (enlightening individuals with unexpected interaction with the deity) whilst being another (a rigid set of rules which everyone accepts with little thought). And I think the point of F&T is that to be a true believer, a "Knight of Faith" is to be that one prepared to go out on a limb and follow the voice within even when all other societal expectations say you shouldn't. A bit like having access to a personal 'oracle of Delphi' who tells you some great religious insight you'd have not thought of on your own.
A few dips into the attack and the religious literature demonstrate that while his beef was that "Christendom" wasn't what it claimed to be, the problems were different from what you described.
SK saw the practice of christianity as inward, focused, stripped down, minimalistic, and marked by love and good works associated with the Kingdom of God.
"Christendom" as he knew it was a self-perpetuating, self-serving, money-making operation that was a service provided by the state (like roads and police). I think I linked "The Essential Kierkegaard" earlier in this thread (through Internet Archive). You can find many examples in the third to the last chapter: "Faedrelandet Articles and The Moment."
@KoF
Thanks for the clarification on Kierkegaard saying he wasn't Christian. Yes, I think in Fear And Trembling somewhere, he makes it clear he doesn't consider himself to be a Knight Of Faith, which in a sense, by his own schematum, would mean that he's not a Christian, but I think would be closer to something like "I'm not a very good Christian".
He who?
SK is the creator or Johannes de silentio, but equating the two is like equating Stephen King with Umney, or Edgar Allan Poe with Montresor, or Franz Kafka with Gregor Samsa.
The book's subtitle is "Dialectical Lyric" and has the dedication: "What Tarquin the proud said in his garden by means of the poppies was understood by the son, but not the messenger." We have been warned. It's poetic, and its meaning is hidden.
Keeping this in mind is essential to reading F&T well or being entirely misled. I think there are times that SK does probably give his own view through de silentio, but reader beware.
I believe, and I believe it's supported by the text, because Hegel is mentioned throughout, that the book can't be understood without reference to Hegel.
But I think Kierkegaard saw himself as riffing on the "accepted" philosophies around him, and that this (perhaps unconscious) idea that a society had groupthink and tended to elevate their own norms to the level of right/wrong.
There is nothing unconscious about the way he describes societal groupthink in F&T, in fact he calls it the universal. See the beginning of Problema I:
The ethical, as such, is the universal, and as the universal it applies to everyone, which from another point of view can be expressed as meaning that it applies at every moment. It reposes immanently in itself, has nothing outside itself that is its τελος [goal; end; or purpose], but is itself the τελος for everything it has outside itself, and when the ethical has incorporated this in itself, it goes no further. Defined immediately as sensuous and psychical, the single individual is the particular who has his τελος in the universal, and his ethical task consists of always expressing himself in this, of annulling his individuality in order to become the universal. Whenever the individual wants to assert himself in his particularity vis-à-vis the universal, he sins, and only by acknowledging this can he once again reconcile himself with the universal.
(F&T, Kirmmse translation, 2022. p 65)
And this is all targeted at a Hegelian view of society, which had been adopted by many of the theologias in the state church.
Based on my recollections, Fear And Trembling is usually described by academics as expounding "the philosophy of Kierkegaard".
If academics believe that F&T expounds SK's philosophy in a straight-forward way, they are simply wrong. The context of every word is essential, or one is taking irony as straight meaning. In a book that discusses the uses of irony by an author who wrote his dissertation on irony, one might seek to tread carefully.
If Kierkegaard's philosophy becomes clearer in other works, then fine. But based on this one alone, no one can be very sure about much. A few things, yes, but not a lot.
And if there is support for certain views from his other works, please direct the group to them, so we can read them.
........
no ethical system required.
........
What am I missing? (Apart from consideration of the group-focused binding cluster of loyalty, authority and sanctity and liberty.)
I don't think you're missing much.
The book is not about an ethical system. There are ethical and moral matters that come up, but they aren't the ones that I have heard anyone talk about.
Based on my recollections, Fear And Trembling is usually described by academics as expounding "the philosophy of Kierkegaard".
If academics believe that F&T expounds SK's philosophy in a straight-forward way, they are simply wrong.
Well, a philosophy professor is teaching philosophy, not literature, and in the class I took(similar to most summations I've read), I think our prof was basically taking the book as a whole, and distiling certain positions from it that could be understood as the overall opinion of Kierkegaard himself.
For example, apparently Kant had also written an analysis of Abraham and Isaac, and when the prof gave a lecture comparing the two philosophers' positions, it was like "Kant thought that God could not have given a command to sacrifice an innocent child, whereas Kierkegaard thought he could have." I don't recall that he specifically mentioned whatever pseudonym Kierkegaard used to detail the analysis of Abraham and Isaac. Though he probably would've done that when introducing the topic a few classes earlier.
Well, a philosophy professor is teaching philosophy, not literature, and in the class I took(similar to most summations I've read), I think our prof was basically taking the book as a whole, and distiling certain positions from it that could be understood as the overall opinion of Kierkegaard himself.
Philosophy is regularly delivered through literature. One must consider the nature of the text in hand. It is an error to read a novel or poetry as if it were a treatise. Or to read irony as straight essay; think of "A Modest Proposal."
Taking this book as a whole is absolutely necessary, which is what I am attempting to do. That includes understanding when the author is expressing himself ironically or furtively through the narrator, who is the author's puppet. Or recognizing that the situation is deliberately not always clear.
If the subtitle and dedication are not warning enough, there's this from the Preface:
The present author is by no means a philosopher, he has not understood the System —whether it exists, whether it is completed—this itself is already enough for his weak head: the thought of what an enormous head everyone in our times must have because everyone has such an enormous thought. Even if one were able to restate the entire content of faith in conceptual form, it does not follow that one has grasped faith, grasped how one entered into it or how it entered into oneself. The present writer is by no means a philosopher, he is, poetice et eleganter [to express it poetically and in elegant fashion], a supplementary clerk who neither writes the System nor makes any promises concerning the System, who neither obligates himself to write about the System nor obligates himself to the System. He writes because for him it is a luxury that is all the more pleasant and palpable, the fewer there are who purchase and read what he writes. He easily foresees his fate in an age when people have written off passion in order to serve scientific scholarship, a time when an author who wants to have readers must take care to write in such a way that people can leaf through the pages during an afternoon nap[.]
More warning shots fired.
Understanding form and function are essential in this work.
Well, a philosophy professor is teaching philosophy, not literature, and in the class I took(similar to most summations I've read), I think our prof was basically taking the book as a whole, and distiling certain positions from it that could be understood as the overall opinion of Kierkegaard himself.
Philosophy is regularly delivered through literature. One must consider the nature of the text in hand. It is an error to read a novel or poetry as if it were a treatise. Or to read irony as straight essay; think of "A Modest Proposal."
Taking this book as a whole is absolutely necessary, which is what I am attempting to do. That includes understanding when the author is expressing himself ironically or furtively through the narrator, who is the author's puppet. Or recognizing that the situation is deliberately not always clear.
If the subtitle and dedication are not warning enough, there's this from the Preface:
The present author is by no means a philosopher, he has not understood the System —whether it exists, whether it is completed—this itself is already enough for his weak head: the thought of what an enormous head everyone in our times must have because everyone has such an enormous thought. Even if one were able to restate the entire content of faith in conceptual form, it does not follow that one has grasped faith, grasped how one entered into it or how it entered into oneself. The present writer is by no means a philosopher, he is, poetice et eleganter [to express it poetically and in elegant fashion], a supplementary clerk who neither writes the System nor makes any promises concerning the System, who neither obligates himself to write about the System nor obligates himself to the System. He writes because for him it is a luxury that is all the more pleasant and palpable, the fewer there are who purchase and read what he writes. He easily foresees his fate in an age when people have written off passion in order to serve scientific scholarship, a time when an author who wants to have readers must take care to write in such a way that people can leaf through the pages during an afternoon nap[.]
More warning shots fired.
Understanding form and function are essential in this work.
Yes. But in academic philosophy, Kierkegaard the non-philosopher is generally treated as on a categorical par with people who were philosophers. I think our syllabus was pretty typical...
Kierkegaard(theologian; rejected the title of "philosopher")
But they're all treated as basically part of the same "conversation", so to speak. The writings of Nietzsche, who, at least according to our prof, deliberately pursues a "playful" style of writing in order to advance his points(*), are then typically followed by Sartre's essay about existentialism and humanism, which is the most straightforward, technical exposition of ideas imaginable.
(And I might have mentioned that when I quoted the Mary stuff in my essay on Fear And Tremblimg, the prof's comments seemed to indicate that he had not given those particular passages extended thought. Make of that what you will.)
(*) In How The Real World At Last Became A Myth, Nietzsche implies Plato is a braggart, makes misogynistic cracks against Christianity, derides the weather in Kant's hometown, and so on and so forth. But you can also explain the basic ideas in fairly dry, academic terms.
Anyway, I think the differences between our approaches are more related to the contexts in which we originally encountered the ideas, and I will happily admit that your knowledge of the text(s) is far, far superior to my own. I should really be spending more time reading the copy of FaT I bought on the weekend. See ya in a bit.
A few dips into the attack and the religious literature demonstrate that while his beef was that "Christendom" wasn't what it claimed to be, the problems were different from what you described.
SK saw the practice of christianity as inward, focused, stripped down, minimalistic, and marked by love and good works associated with the Kingdom of God.
I just wanted to say that there's a tendancy for certain kinds of Christianity (particularly quite weird cultish groups) to latch onto Kierkegaard because he can be read as supporting their (supposedly) minimalistic practice.
I think they'd have a shock if they actually read further into Kierkegaard. He has very little time for the cross or Christ's resurrection, he is animated by the idea of the incarnation and the idea of direct communication between a person and the deity. He seems well read on some biblical passages but also seems unbothered by conventional theology, doesn't really pray, has little time for religious hierarchies and at one stage said it would be better if all churches were closed.
I agree that these can certainly be read as an internal disagreement with the structures and practices of the Danish state church at a certain point in time, but I think that it goes much further than that. I think Kierkegaard is talking about something else altogether, using the familiar language and concepts of "Christendom" and actually proposing a form of religion that has little in common with Christianity.
With regard to F&T, the "classical" way to contrast his approach with Kant is to consider a Jew hiding in a house in Nazi Germany. An SS officer comes to the door asking if there are Jews hiding inside
Kant* has this idea that there are things like Truth which must always be obeyed. That I can't give myself an exception because it is inconvenient. That there are laws which must be followed if I believe in the Rule of Law. And thus I must give up the Jew if asked.
Kierkegaard, I think, goes some way along the same road but says that the Knight of Faith receives the divinely inspired word to protect the Jew and boldly lies. That there's no problem following laws in the generality but sometimes you have to do what you know in your gut is right.
I think that's really what Kierkegaard is bringing to the table. The idea that behaviours exist at certain times outside those acceptable to the church (and/or laws or cultural norms) and that we should be training ourselves to listen for those words and act. Even if nobody else hears it.
For me that's an idea that transcends Christianity.
* I'm not really sure how accurate this is, I find Kant very difficult to understand and apply
Kant certainly thinks one ought never to lie even to a murderer seeking his victim. Whether he thinks there is a duty to tell the murderer the whole truth is not a matter I've ever heard discussed.
Kant AIUI thinks all ethical duties are in the final analysis duties to oneself as a rational being: in some ways Kierkegaard's teleological action is Kantian ethics redirected towards God rather than Reason. Kierkegaard is I believe, as often literary writers do, following his grandfather in order to rebel against his father, who is Hegel.
With regard to F&T, the "classical" way to contrast his approach with Kant is to consider a Jew hiding in a house in Nazi Germany. An SS officer comes to the door asking if there are Jews hiding inside
Kant* has this idea that there are things like Truth which must always be obeyed. That I can't give myself an exception because it is inconvenient. That there are laws which must be followed if I believe in the Rule of Law. And thus I must give up the Jew if asked.
Kierkegaard, I think, goes some way along the same road but says that the Knight of Faith receives the divinely inspired word to protect the Jew and boldly lies. That there's no problem following laws in the generality but sometimes you have to do what you know in your gut is right.
I think that's really what Kierkegaard is bringing to the table. The idea that behaviours exist at certain times outside those acceptable to the church (and/or laws or cultural norms) and that we should be training ourselves to listen for those words and act. Even if nobody else hears it.
For me that's an idea that transcends Christianity.
* I'm not really sure how accurate this is, I find Kant very difficult to understand and apply
And good morning - oops almost afternoon - to you as well.
The glaring omission of both Ks IMO is the Law of Love given to us through the Great Commandment.
IMO Love of God trumps Truth and the Law especially when the Truth and Law don't serve Love (- discuss (?)).
The problem I see with Abraham is in framing his actions in the context of Love for God trumping Truth and Law, when Truth and Law clearly DO serve the Law of Love in this case.
IMO Kierkegaard doesn't really adequately convey the state of being that Abraham occupies in his love and devotion to the Command of the One in Whom we have our being. Maybe he stood "beside himself" - in exstasis - and in this state was able to exercise independent agency with a clear view to the possible decisions that he would be faced with once the deed was accomplished and said "come what may - I am ready for everything for the sake of my Love for the One"? But then he perhaps never saw the possibility of the substitution coming and therefore was permitted to act within the boundaries of Truth and Law in the end
I think they'd have a shock if they actually read further into Kierkegaard. He has very little time for the cross or Christ's resurrection, he is animated by the idea of the incarnation and the idea of direct communication between a person and the deity. He seems well read on some biblical passages but also seems unbothered by conventional theology, doesn't really pray, has little time for religious hierarchies and at one stage said it would be better if all churches were closed.
At least in one place the idea of direct communication of some sort could be fathomed:
And then, if he in fact prayed truly fervently, what happened to him? Something strange and wonderful happened to him: gradually, as he became more and more fervent in prayer, he had less and less to say, and finally he became entirely silent. He became silent. Indeed, he became what is, if possible, even more the opposite of talking than silence: he became a listener. He had thought that to pray was to talk; he learned that to pray is not only to keep silent, but to listen. And that is how it is: to pray is not to listen to oneself speak, but is to come to keep silent, and to continue keeping silent, to wait, until the person who prays hears God.
The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air. Kirmmse, trans. (2016) pg. 18.
I haven't read enough of SK to be sure, if this is a matter of eventually bringing back to mind, or anticipating a new word from God. On it's own, I think it could be read both ways. The focus in all of these is the gospel as understood through the Lord' Prayer, but in direct relation to "God" - entire Trinity?, God the Father, it's unclear to me.
In this set there is a strong emphasis on silence, God's will, absolute obedience, reverence before God (I think echoing commentary in F&T on how to be before "the great"), joy, etc.
Again, as you've asked before: What practical use can be made of this?
And for me, a fairly run-of-the-mill U.S. Protestant, does SK inform my faith and practice in any useful way. Maybe. I think so. But I understand reception research as well.
I agree that these can certainly be read as an internal disagreement with the structures and practices of the Danish state church at a certain point in time, but I think that it goes much further than that. I think Kierkegaard is talking about something else altogether, using the familiar language and concepts of "Christendom" and actually proposing a form of religion that has little in common with Christianity.
Can you direct us to sources for this view? So much to sort through.....
What if we assume the SK reveals nothing in F&T regarding his own belief regarding Abraham, but treats Abraham as a hypothetical example of a "worst case scenerio" of the life of faith, in contrast to the common, optimistic church teaching regarding Abraham and his?
Would such a reading help pull more of the book together for you, anyone?
Is lying to save an innocent person from being murdered by a malevolent person(as in your holocaust example) really that comparable to deciding to kill an innocent person with no benefit to anyone, solely out of duty to a voice you believe without verification to be God?
Lying in the holocaust case might go against Kant's particular interpretation of his own categorical imperative, but I don't think it takes you all the way into the absurd, either. FWIW, I've heard perfectly logical arguments in defense of withholding the truth from an ill-intentioned person, that don't make the truth-denier into anything like a Knight Of Faith, eg. I think it was Maritain who defined lying as "withholding the truth from someone who deserves it", by which standard the person sheltering innocents is behaving in a perfectly ethical manner.
I haven't read Kierkegaard for some years and came to his work after reading Fernando Pessoa and his heteronyms, to find that Kierkegaard also wrote roughly half his writings under pseudonyms as a dispersed or various set of identities. It's worth keeping in mind that Frater Taciturnus in Stages is and isn't Kierkegaard, that Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript may not be speaking for a hidden Kierkegaard. The arguments put forward by these 'authors' or characters are either poetic constructions or distinct literary personalities or provocative 'voices' according to Kierkegaard. He wanted dialogic counter-pointing of arguments and wasn't concerned to establish a consistent doctrine or teaching or create a consistent autobiographic self. He loved paradox and that was what I came to enjoy about his work. For every Johannes Climacus, there is an Anti-Climacus, and then a Kierkegaard waiting backstage.
As I understand it, Pessoa inhabited his heteronyms (Alberto Caeiro, Álvaro de Campos and Ricardo Reis) as inward and fragmented yet authentic selves; Kierkegaard created a theatre of multiple selves in dialogue with one another and their creator, each intent on deceiving and revealing different aspects of the human search for ethics, faith or meaning.
What if we assume the SK reveals nothing in F&T regarding his own belief regarding Abraham, but treats Abraham as a hypothetical example of a "worst case scenerio" of the life of faith, in contrast to the common, optimistic church teaching regarding Abraham and his?
Yeah, I think the common interpretation of Genesis 22 2-8 put forth in "Christendom" is "Abraham was willing to kill Isaac, but IT WAS ALL JUST A TEST."
Whereas Kierkegaard is saying "It was all just a test, but ABRAHAM WAS WILLING TO KILL ISAAC."
Is lying to save an innocent person from being murdered by a malevolent person(as in your holocaust example) really that comparable to deciding to kill an innocent person with no benefit to anyone, solely out of duty to a voice you believe without verification to be God?
Lying in the holocaust case might go against Kant's particular interpretation of his own categorical imperative, but I don't think it takes you all the way into the absurd, either. FWIW, I've heard perfectly logical arguments in defense of withholding the truth from an ill-intentioned person, that don't make the truth-denier into anything like a Knight Of Faith, eg. I think it was Maritain who defined lying as "withholding the truth from someone who deserves it", by which standard the person sheltering innocents is behaving in a perfectly ethical manner.
Well no, not really. Also I think if one holds Abraham as being someone who did something noble, there's a straight line to Samson killing thousands with the donkey's jawbone and onwards to people blowing up bombs to protect religious compatriots.
But for me, that's not a problem with Kierkegaard as much as a problem with the bible. As far as I'm concerned, K is using words and ideas that he knows his audience is familiar with to make a point. That's it.
As to Kant, I struggle to get my head around his stuff. Unlike Kierkegaard, it doesn't seem to reward the effort needed.
I think it is perfectly possible to think to oneself that one is not lying but withholding truth from a murderer who doesn't deserve it, but I'm doubtful that this would satisfy Kant. Who seems to me to be saying that truth is truth and that if one tells an untruth to one person, you've undermined the whole idea of truth. And if you break a law - for any reason - you've undermined the idea of the Rule of Law.
Someone else said above
Can you direct us to sources for this view? So much to sort through.....
It is hard to know how to answer this. On the one hand, no, I don't have sources for an opinion I've developed about Kierkegaard over decades of reading and thinking about it.
My personal view is as I've described, I rather suspect that had he emerged from an Islamic worldview, he'd have come to similar conclusions but couched in those terms. Of course I'm only offering my own opinions here, others are available.
On the other hand, there are plenty of people who have been able to extract meaning from Kierkegaard who are not Christian. For example Martin Buber wrote reflections on Kierkegaard from his position as a Jew. And there are many students of philosophy who have been able to see value in Kierkegaard completely outside of a theological framework to understand it.
I think if one holds Abraham as being someone who did something noble, there's a straight line to Samson killing thousands with the donkey's jawbone and onwards to people blowing up bombs to protect religious compatriots.
Well, again, though, see Kierkegaard's distinction, discussed earlier, between a Knight Of Faith and a sectarian. If the guy detonating bombs is doing it as part of a perceived duty to advance the welfare of his social group, he's not a Knight Of Faith.
Kant certainly thinks one ought never to lie even to a murderer seeking his victim. Whether he thinks there is a duty to tell the murderer the whole truth is not a matter I've ever heard discussed.
Kant AIUI thinks all ethical duties are in the final analysis duties to oneself as a rational being: in some ways Kierkegaard's teleological action is Kantian ethics redirected towards God rather than Reason. Kierkegaard is I believe, as often literary writers do, following his grandfather in order to rebel against his father, who is Hegel.
I haven't read Kierkegaard for some years and came to his work after reading Fernando Pessoa and his heteronyms, to find that Kierkegaard also wrote roughly half his writings under pseudonyms as a dispersed or various set of identities. It's worth keeping in mind that Frater Taciturnus in Stages is and isn't Kierkegaard, that Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript may not be speaking for a hidden Kierkegaard. The arguments put forward by these 'authors' or characters are either poetic constructions or distinct literary personalities or provocative 'voices' according to Kierkegaard. He wanted dialogic counter-pointing of arguments and wasn't concerned to establish a consistent doctrine or teaching or create a consistent autobiographic self. He loved paradox and that was what I came to enjoy about his work. For every Johannes Climacus, there is an Anti-Climacus, and then a Kierkegaard waiting backstage.
As I understand it, Pessoa inhabited his heteronyms (Alberto Caeiro, Álvaro de Campos and Ricardo Reis) as inward and fragmented yet authentic selves; Kierkegaard created a theatre of multiple selves in dialogue with one another and their creator, each intent on deceiving and revealing different aspects of the human search for ethics, faith or meaning.
And @A Feminine Force. Not only do K&K (our electricians incidentally) miss the point of The Great Commandment, so does the author of Hebrews, in trying to make Jewish mythic characters examples of faith, including Abraham (Heb. 11:17-19), for being prepared to butcher his son. God being a bastard didn't seem to bother any NT writer and character, especially the chief.
There's also that Greek idea(l), probably from Aristotle, which suggests that the only full human person is the one who engages in civic affairs.
Which is obviously problematic and unacceptable. And yet has resonance with respect to the way the political class see themselves as higher than ordinary plebs.
While Aristotle did indeed regard only free male citizens of Greek city states as really mattering, I think his point was that political arrangements in which there exist a political class who engage in civic affairs as opposed to a non-political class that is governed is less than ideal. His dictum can be read as advocacy for republicanism as a political philosophy, the idea that a good society should enable the people to be politically informed and engaged rather than be the "beneficiaries" of the governing class.
What exactly does Kierkegaard mean by saying that Abraham, in obeying God's command to sacrifice Isaac, does so knowing that he will get Isaac back?
In my opinion, this is impossible to answer, because I don't think this is the kind of question K intends us to ask after reading F&T. I don't think he intends or asks us to try to understand Abraham and Isaac as "historical people", but as examplars from a religious tradition we are familiar with. From within Christendom we are told from childhood about the great faith of A&I, I think K intends to subvert the unthinking fairy story and bring back the existential shock of religious child sacrifice, essentially saying that to be truly alive, truly a believer (if we accept that the Knight of Faith is for K a desirable state to be in) then the highest religious duty is to listen to the voice telling us to destroy the holiest things we have *and then do it* without expecting a saviour from the consequences.
I'm reading through Fear and Trembling, the section entitled Problemata, and Kierkegaard, or Johannes de silentio, makes a distinction between the Knight of Faith and the Tragic Hero. The Tragic Hero it seems kills Isaac at God's command, without expecting to get Isaac back. Abraham however on the strength of the absurd believes that God will give him Isaac back.
Hence at the start of Problemata, Kierkegaard writes that:
'only the one who works gets bread, only the one who knows anguish finds rest, only one who descends to the underworld saves the loved one, only one who draws the knife gets Isaac.'
What exactly does Kierkegaard mean by saying that Abraham, in obeying God's command to sacrifice Isaac, does so knowing that he will get Isaac back?
In my opinion, this is impossible to answer, because I don't think this is the kind of question K intends us to ask after reading F&T. I don't think he intends or asks us to try to understand Abraham and Isaac as "historical people", but as examplars from a religious tradition we are familiar with. From within Christendom we are told from childhood about the great faith of A&I, I think K intends to subvert the unthinking fairy story and bring back the existential shock of religious child sacrifice, essentially saying that to be truly alive, truly a believer (if we accept that the Knight of Faith is for K a desirable state to be in) then the highest religious duty is to listen to the voice telling us to destroy the holiest things we have *and then do it* without expecting a saviour from the consequences.
I'm reading through Fear and Trembling, the section entitled Problemata, and Kierkegaard, or Johannes de silentio, makes a distinction between the Knight of Faith and the Tragic Hero. The Tragic Hero it seems kills Isaac at God's command, without expecting to get Isaac back. Abraham however on the strength of the absurd believes that God will give him Isaac back.
Hence at the start of Problemata, Kierkegaard writes that:
'only the one who works gets bread, only the one who knows anguish finds rest, only one who descends to the underworld saves the loved one, only one who draws the knife gets Isaac.'
I might be completely wrong, but I thought that when Kierkegaard draws the distinction between Abraham and Agamemnon the implication is that Abraham is a Knight of Faith and Agamemnon is a Tragic Hero.
The difference isn't, I thought, that Abraham seems to expect his son to be saved but that Agamemnon is still acting within the framework of the Ethical.
So Abraham would be a Tragic Hero if he, like Agamemnon had thought that an agreement had been made by which he needs to sacrifice Isaac to meet his side of the bargain. Whereas the Abraham in F&T is the one who is disgusted with himself, who knows that everyone else is going to be disgusted with him - because of the whole *teleological suspension of the ethical* thing. It's absurd, it makes no sense, it offends the very understanding of ethics. And seems to throw a bucket of sick at the idea that Abraham will be the father of a great nation.
What exactly does Kierkegaard mean by saying that Abraham, in obeying God's command to sacrifice Isaac, does so knowing that he will get Isaac back?
In my opinion, this is impossible to answer, because I don't think this is the kind of question K intends us to ask after reading F&T. I don't think he intends or asks us to try to understand Abraham and Isaac as "historical people", but as examplars from a religious tradition we are familiar with. From within Christendom we are told from childhood about the great faith of A&I, I think K intends to subvert the unthinking fairy story and bring back the existential shock of religious child sacrifice, essentially saying that to be truly alive, truly a believer (if we accept that the Knight of Faith is for K a desirable state to be in) then the highest religious duty is to listen to the voice telling us to destroy the holiest things we have *and then do it* without expecting a saviour from the consequences.
I'm reading through Fear and Trembling, the section entitled Problemata, and Kierkegaard, or Johannes de silentio, makes a distinction between the Knight of Faith and the Tragic Hero. The Tragic Hero it seems kills Isaac at God's command, without expecting to get Isaac back. Abraham however on the strength of the absurd believes that God will give him Isaac back.
Hence at the start of Problemata, Kierkegaard writes that:
'only the one who works gets bread, only the one who knows anguish finds rest, only one who descends to the underworld saves the loved one, only one who draws the knife gets Isaac.'
I might be completely wrong, but I thought that when Kierkegaard draws the distinction between Abraham and Agamemnon the implication is that Abraham is a Knight of Faith and Agamemnon is a Tragic Hero.
The difference isn't, I thought, that Abraham seems to expect his son to be saved but that Agamemnon is still acting within the framework of the Ethical.
So Abraham would be a Tragic Hero if he, like Agamemnon had thought that an agreement had been made by which he needs to sacrifice Isaac to meet his side of the bargain. Whereas the Abraham in F&T is the one who is disgusted with himself, who knows that everyone else is going to be disgusted with him - because of the whole *teleological suspension of the ethical* thing. It's absurd, it makes no sense, it offends the very understanding of ethics. And seems to throw a bucket of sick at the idea that Abraham will be the father of a great nation.
The tragic hero acts for the good of the group. Agamemnon, Jeptha, the other guy with two sons, all kill their children to satisfy a demand or agreement that averts disaster from the community. Because the breach of social morality will have been paid for by the sacrifice of the child, the community will be spared.
Abraham is acting alone for his own sake and God's, in an entirely private matter. No one benefits from this sacrifice but Abraham.
The tragic hero acts for the good of the group. Agamemnon, Jeptha, the other guy with two sons, all kill their children to satisfy a demand or agreement that averts disaster from the community. Because the breach of social morality will have been paid for by the sacrifice of the child, the community will be spared.
Abraham is acting alone for his own sake and God's, in an entirely private matter. No one benefits from this sacrifice but Abraham.
I'm not sure that the distinction is as clear as you suggest here. De silencio only mentions two Knights of Faith in F&T; Abraham and Mary.
I don't think there's any suggestion that Mary is a Knight because her sacrifice was only for her benefit and not the community.
The tragic hero acts for the good of the group. Agamemnon, Jeptha, the other guy with two sons, all kill their children to satisfy a demand or agreement that averts disaster from the community. Because the breach of social morality will have been paid for by the sacrifice of the child, the community will be spared.
Abraham is acting alone for his own sake and God's, in an entirely private matter. No one benefits from this sacrifice but Abraham.
I'm not sure that the distinction is as clear as you suggest here. De silencio only mentions two Knights of Faith in F&T; Abraham and Mary.
I don't think there's any suggestion that Mary is a Knight because her sacrifice was only for her benefit and not the community.
Well, back to Agamemnon, based on what's been paraphrased here, it seems to me that he killed his children because, in terms of results for the overall community, it was what we would now call the lesser of two evils. I don't think that idea at all applies to Abraham choosing to sacrifice Isaac. It's not like someone said: "Abraham, if you disobey God on this, we're gonna slaughter your whole village." He chose to sacrifice his son for no other reason than that God said He wanted it to happen.
Re-reading Luke 1, it does seem that Mary is told by Gabriel that her son will "reign over the descendants of Jacob", so arguably, there is some sorta benefit to the wider community being promised there. Though the idea that this will all come about via a virginal birth seems decidedly in the category of the absurd.
The constant theme of this book is the way that slightly emotionally-constipated liberal philosophers (he suggests that Bentham and perhaps even Kant had forms of Asperger’s syndrome) have constructed supposedly rational foundations for morality with no recognition of its biological and social origins
Which is the case, whether on or off the spectrum, for all those morally inadequate geniuses.
The constant theme of this book is the way that slightly emotionally-constipated liberal philosophers (he suggests that Bentham and perhaps even Kant had forms of Asperger’s syndrome) have constructed supposedly rational foundations for morality with no recognition of its biological and social origins
Which is the case, whether on or off the spectrum, for all those morally inadequate geniuses.
That theory strikes as akin to those attempts at explaining the origins of religion in magic mushrooms.
The tragic hero acts for the good of the group. Agamemnon, Jeptha, the other guy with two sons, all kill their children to satisfy a demand or agreement that averts disaster from the community. Because the breach of social morality will have been paid for by the sacrifice of the child, the community will be spared.
Abraham is acting alone for his own sake and God's, in an entirely private matter. No one benefits from this sacrifice but Abraham.
I'm not sure that the distinction is as clear as you suggest here. De silencio only mentions two Knights of Faith in F&T; Abraham and Mary.
I don't think there's any suggestion that Mary is a Knight because her sacrifice was only for her benefit and not the community.
Sorry. Problema I. I reviewed on the way home today. I hope these quotes will help demonstrate what I mean.
Paragraph 19:
When an undertaking that is the concern of an entire people is thwarted, when an endeavor of this sort is impeded by the disfavor of heaven, when the angry god sends a dead calm sea that mocks all efforts, when the diviner does his sorrowful duty and proclaims that the god requires a young girl as a sacrificial offering —then the father must display heroic courage and make the sacrifice.
Paragraph 20:
When, with his heroic courage, the brave judge, i who saved Israel in its hour of need by binding both God and himself with the same vow in a single breath, was obligated heroically to transform the young girl’s rejoicing, the beloved daughter’s joy, into sorrow, and all Israel must grieve with her over her virginal youth—but every freeborn man must understand, every courageous woman must admire Jephthah, and every virgin in Israel must wish that she would act as did his daughter. For what would it have helped if Jephthah had been victorious by means of his vow if he did not keep it? Would not the victory have been taken away again from the people?
Paragraph 21:
When a son neglects his duty, when the state entrusts the father with the sword of judgment, when the laws require that the punishment come from the father’s hand, then #[152]# the father must heroically forget that the guilty person is his son, he must magnanimously conceal his pain, but there shall not be a single person among the people, not even the son, who does not admire the father, and this will be remembered every time the laws of Rome are interpreted: that many people interpreted them in more erudite fashion, but none did so more gloriously than Brutus.
Paragraph 25:
With Abraham, things are different. By his act he transgressed the boundary of the entire realm of the ethical; he had a higher τελος outside the ethical, in relation to which he suspended it. For I would certainly like to know how anyone can place Abraham’s deed in relation to the universal, whether #[153]# anyone can find any connection whatever between what Abraham did and the universal, other than the fact that Abraham transgressed it. Abraham did not do it to save a nation, nor to vindicate the idea of the state, nor to appease angry gods. If there could have been talk of an angry deity, it would of course have been angry with Abraham only, and Abraham’s entire deed stands in no relation to the universal—it is a purely private undertaking. Therefore, while a tragic hero is great because of his ethical virtue, 44 Abraham is great because of a purely personal virtue.
The constant theme of this book is the way that slightly emotionally-constipated liberal philosophers (he suggests that Bentham and perhaps even Kant had forms of Asperger’s syndrome) have constructed supposedly rational foundations for morality with no recognition of its biological and social origins
Which is the case, whether on or off the spectrum, for all those morally inadequate geniuses.
That theory strikes as akin to those attempts at explaining the origins of religion in magic mushrooms.
Never done 'em. Whose theory? My wild extrapolation? Or Haidt's pivotal, seminal, game changing proposition?
The writers I initially describe all write brilliantly missing the point. What fascinates me is why so many smart people just keep on that missing trajectory.
....It's worth keeping in mind that Frater Taciturnus in Stages is and isn't Kierkegaard, that Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript may not be speaking for a hidden Kierkegaard. The arguments put forward by these 'authors' or characters are either poetic constructions or distinct literary personalities or provocative 'voices' according to Kierkegaard. He wanted dialogic counter-pointing of arguments and wasn't concerned to establish a consistent doctrine or teaching or create a consistent autobiographic self. He loved paradox and that was what I came to enjoy about his work. For every Johannes Climacus, there is an Anti-Climacus, and then a Kierkegaard waiting backstage.
As I understand it, Pessoa inhabited his heteronyms (Alberto Caeiro, Álvaro de Campos and Ricardo Reis) as inward and fragmented yet authentic selves; Kierkegaard created a theatre of multiple selves in dialogue with one another and their creator, each intent on deceiving and revealing different aspects of the human search for ethics, faith or meaning.
Hello, MaryLouise. It's lovely to meet you. I've seen you around, but I don't believe we've ever spoken.
This is a good explanation of what I understand is going on with SK's fictitious voices. Thank you for writing this up. Interesting that someone else was using a similar technique to create a platform for "public discussion" that he could control.
I don't think your point can be stressed enough in regard to any reflection of Kierkegaard's own thought expressed by the narrators. Assuming that they do entirely changes the meaning of large segments of Fear and Trembling.
In that case, it seems important to keep track who says what. "Kierkegaard said..." or "Kierkegaard thought..." is nearly meaningless in conjunction with F&T.
IMO Love of God trumps Truth and the Law especially when the Truth and Law don't serve Love (- discuss (?)).
Yes. I think this could be good to discuss, at least within the context of the sphere of the dialectical lyric.
Then there could be discussion of what, if anything, it could mean outside of that sphere. I think that discussion will rely on texts beyond F&T for a clearer understanding.
AFF, how's the reread going?
The constant theme of this book is the way that slightly emotionally-constipated liberal philosophers (he suggests that Bentham and perhaps even Kant had forms of Asperger’s syndrome) have constructed supposedly rational foundations for morality with no recognition of its biological and social origins
The writers I initially describe all write brilliantly missing the point. What fascinates me is why so many smart people just keep on that missing trajectory.
Do you mean that they are missing the point of biological and social explanations for what we commonly call "ethics" or "morality?" Aren't you asking a bit much of them? It seems a bit early for these emotionally-constpipated liberal philosophers to have come in contact with research that would direct their attention this direction, while shaking off the Englightement's attempt to rationalize everything. (Kierkegaard died 4 years before Origin. And there is yet newer generation working on a similar project. They were all people of their time.
Just as we are.
Fixed broken link - la vie en rouge, Purgatory host
Or Haidt's pivotal, seminal, game changing proposition?
I'd be pretty cautious about describing anything from "evolutionary psychology" as game changing. I'll never forget the purportedly serious analysis I read in the early 90s, about why the Scandinavian nations are so pacifistic:
The Vikings were people who had the genetic make-up for violence, and when they went out on their conquests, they took those genes out of the population.
Or Haidt's pivotal, seminal, game changing proposition?
I'd be pretty cautious about describing anything from "evolutionary psychology" as game changing. I'll never forget the purportedly serious analysis I read in the early 90s, about why the Scandinavian nations are so pacifistic:
The Vikings were people who had the genetic make-up for violence, and when they went out on their conquests, they took those genes out of the population.
If only. Absolute twaddle I agree. Well, if you're right and there is no biological basis for morality, then this thread contains as good.
....It's worth keeping in mind that Frater Taciturnus in Stages is and isn't Kierkegaard, that Johannes Climacus in Concluding Unscientific Postscript may not be speaking for a hidden Kierkegaard. The arguments put forward by these 'authors' or characters are either poetic constructions or distinct literary personalities or provocative 'voices' according to Kierkegaard. He wanted dialogic counter-pointing of arguments and wasn't concerned to establish a consistent doctrine or teaching or create a consistent autobiographic self. He loved paradox and that was what I came to enjoy about his work. For every Johannes Climacus, there is an Anti-Climacus, and then a Kierkegaard waiting backstage.
As I understand it, Pessoa inhabited his heteronyms (Alberto Caeiro, Álvaro de Campos and Ricardo Reis) as inward and fragmented yet authentic selves; Kierkegaard created a theatre of multiple selves in dialogue with one another and their creator, each intent on deceiving and revealing different aspects of the human search for ethics, faith or meaning.
Hello, MaryLouise. It's lovely to meet you. I've seen you around, but I don't believe we've ever spoken.
This is a good explanation of what I understand is going on with SK's fictitious voices. Thank you for writing this up. Interesting that someone else was using a similar technique to create a platform for "public discussion" that he could control.
I don't think your point can be stressed enough in regard to any reflection of Kierkegaard's own thought expressed by the narrators. Assuming that they do entirely changes the meaning of large segments of Fear and Trembling.
In that case, it seems important to keep track who says what. "Kierkegaard said..." or "Kierkegaard thought..." is nearly meaningless in conjunction with F&T.
Good meeting you too @Kendel and I'm tempted to go off and read a little more Kierkegaard!
You do know how to have fun, @MaryLouise ! It sounds like you have already read quite a lot. I'm looking forward to what else you will bring to the thread.
I'm not very interested in a line-by-line reading of Kierkegaard, however I did just want to come back on this
Sorry. Problema I. I reviewed on the way home today. I hope these quotes will help demonstrate what I mean.
I think this is a matter of opinion. Kierkegaard/de Silencio is making a point about Abraham and Agamemnon. He says that the tragic hero (Agamemnon) contrasts with Abraham because he (Agamemnon) acts for the group.
But I don't think we are supposed to take from this that the Knight of Faith - by definition - acts only as an individual. For one thing the other example of the Knight of Faith is Mary.
Which, by the way, does seem like a very strange choice of character. As far as I know, Mary doesn't really have a choice. She's not in fear-and-trembling making an absurd moral choice is she?
I was also thinking that Agamemnon is a strange choice as a Tragic Hero. I wonder why Lot wasn't a better example, someone who felt forced by the rules of hospitality to offer his child to a stranger.
I wonder why Kierkegaard mixes biblical and mythical characters like this.
Comments
Can you direct us to where Kierkegaard said he wasn't a Christian?
There is a Welcome Aboard thread in All Saints if you'd like to introduce yourself.
If you haven't already read them, the Ten Commandments and FAQs (links on the home page) will be useful reading.
North East Quine, Purgatory host
I suspect it was in the "attack upon Christendom" or in the various books of letters because he didn't often write under his own name. Unfortunately I don't have either to hand to look it up.
From memory I think he had a view that one aspired/grew to be a Christian, but that he hadn't achieved it.
Another thing I didn't write earlier was that Kierkegaard was pretty obsessed with (the characterisation by Plato of) Socrates. I think his high view of the Greek philosophers feeds into his books.
So I think when we look at Fear and Trembling, the story is supposed supposed to contrast with the (Greek philosophy -ish) idea of the Ethical.
Abraham is this vision of someone who is so strongly believing in a "God says" ethic that he overcomes his human reluctance and does the disgusting act. If God says he must, then he must.
The contrast is with the idea that there exists a shared understanding of what is ethical behaviour amongst all people (or at least all right thinking Greek men..) which we can get to if we all sit down and think and discuss stuff.
I think K's whole beef with "Christendom" is that it claims to be one thing (enlightening individuals with unexpected interaction with the deity) whilst being another (a rigid set of rules which everyone accepts with little thought). And I think the point of F&T is that to be a true believer, a "Knight of Faith" is to be that one prepared to go out on a limb and follow the voice within even when all other societal expectations say you shouldn't. A bit like having access to a personal 'oracle of Delphi' who tells you some great religious insight you'd have not thought of on your own.
And finally I think he's saying that this divine ethic breaking through the ordinary Ethical way of thinking inevitably leads to "fear and trembling" in the KoF.
Because only a complete maniac would receive a divine word to kill his only child and think "oh ok no problem".
As I’ve said before, I really can’t comment on Kierkegaard, but I do feel the need to push back a bit on the bolded. Saying that “thinking hard about things is important to be fully human” is problematic, because if it’s true, it means that some people—those with dementia, for example, or with developmental disabilities—are not or at least may not be fully human.
Thinking hard about things may be very valuable and beneficial for an individual and for society, but if Kierkegaard tied it to being “fully human,” then I think he was wrong.
Hear, hear!
Plato was an arse, etc.
But I think Kierkegaard saw himself as riffing on the "accepted" philosophies around him, and that this (perhaps unconscious) idea that a society had groupthink and tended to elevate their own norms to the level of right/wrong.
Again, I'm not sure it is possible to say that Kierkegaard was "right" or "wrong" about anything, he seemed to like to project images and use those as a springboard to provoke thought. I doubt he would be particularly bothered by people saying his examples were rubbish.
Thanks for the clarification on Kierkegaard saying he wasn't Christian. Yes, I think in Fear And Trembling somewhere, he makes it clear he doesn't consider himself to be a Knight Of Faith, which in a sense, by his own schematum, would mean that he's not a Christian, but I think would be closer to something like "I'm not a very good Christian".
Which is obviously problematic and unacceptable. And yet has resonance with respect to the way the political class see themselves as higher than ordinary plebs.
Well it was the pseudonym Johannes de silentio who supposedly wrote F&T. Who isn't necessarily reflecting Kierkegaard.
Maddening, isn't it?
Based on my recollections, Fear And Trembling is usually described by academics as expounding "the philosophy of Kierkegaard".
To me the real problem with F&T is how one is supposed to deal with it in real life. If someone says to you that they've heard a voice and therefore murdered their child, I doubt it will cut much ice with anyone.
So whilst I can see that there's some value in the injection of wild ethical ideals into the normal run-of-things, I don't see how one distinguishes between really daft ideas from the deity and mental illness.
I agree that F&T resists classification -- probably other pieces, too; I am approaching it much like I would any literature. A few other things that I've read, I think are easily classifiable as sermons (Lily and Bird) and polemics (the Attach literature).
For anyone, really; a couple of questions regarding F&T:
What does the narrator say the point of the book is?
To whom is the book addressed?
Is the narrator the same person as SK? If not to what degree does he reflect SK's views?
I think the whole point is that there is no way to distinguish morally outrageous commands from the deity from mental illness, beyond your own unverifiable belief that it's the former.
And, no, it probably won't cut ice with anyone. You will probably end up condemned by society for what you did, but that doesn't matter, because the Knight Of Faith isn't supposed to convince anyone else anyway.
(And within the later development of existentialism, the pros and cons of murdering your children in the name of God becomes a much less important issue, with the main takeaway from Kierkegaard being that ethical systems can't provide you with the guidelines to make authentic choices.)
Yes. In some of the attack literature SK says he's not a Christian. In doing so, he is not saying anything about his faith or belief but about his association with the thing called "christianity" in Denmark at the time. "If that's what being a Christian is, I am not one!"
I can't confirm or deny statements about his aspirations.
A few dips into the attack and the religious literature demonstrate that while his beef was that "Christendom" wasn't what it claimed to be, the problems were different from what you described.
SK saw the practice of christianity as inward, focused, stripped down, minimalistic, and marked by love and good works associated with the Kingdom of God.
"Christendom" as he knew it was a self-perpetuating, self-serving, money-making operation that was a service provided by the state (like roads and police). I think I linked "The Essential Kierkegaard" earlier in this thread (through Internet Archive). You can find many examples in the third to the last chapter: "Faedrelandet Articles and The Moment."
He who?
SK is the creator or Johannes de silentio, but equating the two is like equating Stephen King with Umney, or Edgar Allan Poe with Montresor, or Franz Kafka with Gregor Samsa.
The book's subtitle is "Dialectical Lyric" and has the dedication: "What Tarquin the proud said in his garden by means of the poppies was understood by the son, but not the messenger." We have been warned. It's poetic, and its meaning is hidden.
Keeping this in mind is essential to reading F&T well or being entirely misled. I think there are times that SK does probably give his own view through de silentio, but reader beware.
I believe, and I believe it's supported by the text, because Hegel is mentioned throughout, that the book can't be understood without reference to Hegel.
There is nothing unconscious about the way he describes societal groupthink in F&T, in fact he calls it the universal. See the beginning of Problema I:
(F&T, Kirmmse translation, 2022. p 65)
And this is all targeted at a Hegelian view of society, which had been adopted by many of the theologias in the state church.
If academics believe that F&T expounds SK's philosophy in a straight-forward way, they are simply wrong. The context of every word is essential, or one is taking irony as straight meaning. In a book that discusses the uses of irony by an author who wrote his dissertation on irony, one might seek to tread carefully.
If Kierkegaard's philosophy becomes clearer in other works, then fine. But based on this one alone, no one can be very sure about much. A few things, yes, but not a lot.
And if there is support for certain views from his other works, please direct the group to them, so we can read them.
I don't think you're missing much.
The book is not about an ethical system. There are ethical and moral matters that come up, but they aren't the ones that I have heard anyone talk about.
This much I agree with.
Well, a philosophy professor is teaching philosophy, not literature, and in the class I took(similar to most summations I've read), I think our prof was basically taking the book as a whole, and distiling certain positions from it that could be understood as the overall opinion of Kierkegaard himself.
For example, apparently Kant had also written an analysis of Abraham and Isaac, and when the prof gave a lecture comparing the two philosophers' positions, it was like "Kant thought that God could not have given a command to sacrifice an innocent child, whereas Kierkegaard thought he could have." I don't recall that he specifically mentioned whatever pseudonym Kierkegaard used to detail the analysis of Abraham and Isaac. Though he probably would've done that when introducing the topic a few classes earlier.
Taking this book as a whole is absolutely necessary, which is what I am attempting to do. That includes understanding when the author is expressing himself ironically or furtively through the narrator, who is the author's puppet. Or recognizing that the situation is deliberately not always clear.
If the subtitle and dedication are not warning enough, there's this from the Preface:
More warning shots fired.
Understanding form and function are essential in this work.
Yes. But in academic philosophy, Kierkegaard the non-philosopher is generally treated as on a categorical par with people who were philosophers. I think our syllabus was pretty typical...
Kierkegaard(theologian; rejected the title of "philosopher")
Nietzsche(philologist; lampooned philosophers mercilessly)
Sartre(philosopher)
Heidegger(philosopher)
But they're all treated as basically part of the same "conversation", so to speak. The writings of Nietzsche, who, at least according to our prof, deliberately pursues a "playful" style of writing in order to advance his points(*), are then typically followed by Sartre's essay about existentialism and humanism, which is the most straightforward, technical exposition of ideas imaginable.
(And I might have mentioned that when I quoted the Mary stuff in my essay on Fear And Tremblimg, the prof's comments seemed to indicate that he had not given those particular passages extended thought. Make of that what you will.)
(*) In How The Real World At Last Became A Myth, Nietzsche implies Plato is a braggart, makes misogynistic cracks against Christianity, derides the weather in Kant's hometown, and so on and so forth. But you can also explain the basic ideas in fairly dry, academic terms.
Anyway, I think the differences between our approaches are more related to the contexts in which we originally encountered the ideas, and I will happily admit that your knowledge of the text(s) is far, far superior to my own. I should really be spending more time reading the copy of FaT I bought on the weekend. See ya in a bit.
Regarding this
I just wanted to say that there's a tendancy for certain kinds of Christianity (particularly quite weird cultish groups) to latch onto Kierkegaard because he can be read as supporting their (supposedly) minimalistic practice.
I think they'd have a shock if they actually read further into Kierkegaard. He has very little time for the cross or Christ's resurrection, he is animated by the idea of the incarnation and the idea of direct communication between a person and the deity. He seems well read on some biblical passages but also seems unbothered by conventional theology, doesn't really pray, has little time for religious hierarchies and at one stage said it would be better if all churches were closed.
I agree that these can certainly be read as an internal disagreement with the structures and practices of the Danish state church at a certain point in time, but I think that it goes much further than that. I think Kierkegaard is talking about something else altogether, using the familiar language and concepts of "Christendom" and actually proposing a form of religion that has little in common with Christianity.
With regard to F&T, the "classical" way to contrast his approach with Kant is to consider a Jew hiding in a house in Nazi Germany. An SS officer comes to the door asking if there are Jews hiding inside
Kant* has this idea that there are things like Truth which must always be obeyed. That I can't give myself an exception because it is inconvenient. That there are laws which must be followed if I believe in the Rule of Law. And thus I must give up the Jew if asked.
Kierkegaard, I think, goes some way along the same road but says that the Knight of Faith receives the divinely inspired word to protect the Jew and boldly lies. That there's no problem following laws in the generality but sometimes you have to do what you know in your gut is right.
I think that's really what Kierkegaard is bringing to the table. The idea that behaviours exist at certain times outside those acceptable to the church (and/or laws or cultural norms) and that we should be training ourselves to listen for those words and act. Even if nobody else hears it.
For me that's an idea that transcends Christianity.
* I'm not really sure how accurate this is, I find Kant very difficult to understand and apply
Kant AIUI thinks all ethical duties are in the final analysis duties to oneself as a rational being: in some ways Kierkegaard's teleological action is Kantian ethics redirected towards God rather than Reason. Kierkegaard is I believe, as often literary writers do, following his grandfather in order to rebel against his father, who is Hegel.
And good morning - oops almost afternoon - to you as well.
The glaring omission of both Ks IMO is the Law of Love given to us through the Great Commandment.
IMO Love of God trumps Truth and the Law especially when the Truth and Law don't serve Love (- discuss (?)).
The problem I see with Abraham is in framing his actions in the context of Love for God trumping Truth and Law, when Truth and Law clearly DO serve the Law of Love in this case.
IMO Kierkegaard doesn't really adequately convey the state of being that Abraham occupies in his love and devotion to the Command of the One in Whom we have our being. Maybe he stood "beside himself" - in exstasis - and in this state was able to exercise independent agency with a clear view to the possible decisions that he would be faced with once the deed was accomplished and said "come what may - I am ready for everything for the sake of my Love for the One"? But then he perhaps never saw the possibility of the substitution coming and therefore was permitted to act within the boundaries of Truth and Law in the end
I don't know. Just noodling around here.
AFF
At least in one place the idea of direct communication of some sort could be fathomed: The Lily of the Field and the Bird of the Air. Kirmmse, trans. (2016) pg. 18.
I haven't read enough of SK to be sure, if this is a matter of eventually bringing back to mind, or anticipating a new word from God. On it's own, I think it could be read both ways. The focus in all of these is the gospel as understood through the Lord' Prayer, but in direct relation to "God" - entire Trinity?, God the Father, it's unclear to me.
In this set there is a strong emphasis on silence, God's will, absolute obedience, reverence before God (I think echoing commentary in F&T on how to be before "the great"), joy, etc.
Again, as you've asked before: What practical use can be made of this?
And for me, a fairly run-of-the-mill U.S. Protestant, does SK inform my faith and practice in any useful way. Maybe. I think so. But I understand reception research as well.
Can you direct us to sources for this view? So much to sort through.....
What if we assume the SK reveals nothing in F&T regarding his own belief regarding Abraham, but treats Abraham as a hypothetical example of a "worst case scenerio" of the life of faith, in contrast to the common, optimistic church teaching regarding Abraham and his?
Would such a reading help pull more of the book together for you, anyone?
Is lying to save an innocent person from being murdered by a malevolent person(as in your holocaust example) really that comparable to deciding to kill an innocent person with no benefit to anyone, solely out of duty to a voice you believe without verification to be God?
Lying in the holocaust case might go against Kant's particular interpretation of his own categorical imperative, but I don't think it takes you all the way into the absurd, either. FWIW, I've heard perfectly logical arguments in defense of withholding the truth from an ill-intentioned person, that don't make the truth-denier into anything like a Knight Of Faith, eg. I think it was Maritain who defined lying as "withholding the truth from someone who deserves it", by which standard the person sheltering innocents is behaving in a perfectly ethical manner.
As I understand it, Pessoa inhabited his heteronyms (Alberto Caeiro, Álvaro de Campos and Ricardo Reis) as inward and fragmented yet authentic selves; Kierkegaard created a theatre of multiple selves in dialogue with one another and their creator, each intent on deceiving and revealing different aspects of the human search for ethics, faith or meaning.
Yeah, I think the common interpretation of Genesis 22 2-8 put forth in "Christendom" is "Abraham was willing to kill Isaac, but IT WAS ALL JUST A TEST."
Whereas Kierkegaard is saying "It was all just a test, but ABRAHAM WAS WILLING TO KILL ISAAC."
Well no, not really. Also I think if one holds Abraham as being someone who did something noble, there's a straight line to Samson killing thousands with the donkey's jawbone and onwards to people blowing up bombs to protect religious compatriots.
But for me, that's not a problem with Kierkegaard as much as a problem with the bible. As far as I'm concerned, K is using words and ideas that he knows his audience is familiar with to make a point. That's it.
As to Kant, I struggle to get my head around his stuff. Unlike Kierkegaard, it doesn't seem to reward the effort needed.
I think it is perfectly possible to think to oneself that one is not lying but withholding truth from a murderer who doesn't deserve it, but I'm doubtful that this would satisfy Kant. Who seems to me to be saying that truth is truth and that if one tells an untruth to one person, you've undermined the whole idea of truth. And if you break a law - for any reason - you've undermined the idea of the Rule of Law.
Someone else said above
It is hard to know how to answer this. On the one hand, no, I don't have sources for an opinion I've developed about Kierkegaard over decades of reading and thinking about it.
My personal view is as I've described, I rather suspect that had he emerged from an Islamic worldview, he'd have come to similar conclusions but couched in those terms. Of course I'm only offering my own opinions here, others are available.
On the other hand, there are plenty of people who have been able to extract meaning from Kierkegaard who are not Christian. For example Martin Buber wrote reflections on Kierkegaard from his position as a Jew. And there are many students of philosophy who have been able to see value in Kierkegaard completely outside of a theological framework to understand it.
Well, again, though, see Kierkegaard's distinction, discussed earlier, between a Knight Of Faith and a sectarian. If the guy detonating bombs is doing it as part of a perceived duty to advance the welfare of his social group, he's not a Knight Of Faith.
Now that is a perfect sketch.
As is this.
Hence at the start of Problemata, Kierkegaard writes that:
'only the one who works gets bread, only the one who knows anguish finds rest, only one who descends to the underworld saves the loved one, only one who draws the knife gets Isaac.'
Why do you think all those writers are on the spectrum?
I might be completely wrong, but I thought that when Kierkegaard draws the distinction between Abraham and Agamemnon the implication is that Abraham is a Knight of Faith and Agamemnon is a Tragic Hero.
The difference isn't, I thought, that Abraham seems to expect his son to be saved but that Agamemnon is still acting within the framework of the Ethical.
So Abraham would be a Tragic Hero if he, like Agamemnon had thought that an agreement had been made by which he needs to sacrifice Isaac to meet his side of the bargain. Whereas the Abraham in F&T is the one who is disgusted with himself, who knows that everyone else is going to be disgusted with him - because of the whole *teleological suspension of the ethical* thing. It's absurd, it makes no sense, it offends the very understanding of ethics. And seems to throw a bucket of sick at the idea that Abraham will be the father of a great nation.
The tragic hero acts for the good of the group. Agamemnon, Jeptha, the other guy with two sons, all kill their children to satisfy a demand or agreement that averts disaster from the community. Because the breach of social morality will have been paid for by the sacrifice of the child, the community will be spared.
Abraham is acting alone for his own sake and God's, in an entirely private matter. No one benefits from this sacrifice but Abraham.
See Problema II.
I'm not sure that the distinction is as clear as you suggest here. De silencio only mentions two Knights of Faith in F&T; Abraham and Mary.
I don't think there's any suggestion that Mary is a Knight because her sacrifice was only for her benefit and not the community.
Well, back to Agamemnon, based on what's been paraphrased here, it seems to me that he killed his children because, in terms of results for the overall community, it was what we would now call the lesser of two evils. I don't think that idea at all applies to Abraham choosing to sacrifice Isaac. It's not like someone said: "Abraham, if you disobey God on this, we're gonna slaughter your whole village." He chose to sacrifice his son for no other reason than that God said He wanted it to happen.
Re-reading Luke 1, it does seem that Mary is told by Gabriel that her son will "reign over the descendants of Jacob", so arguably, there is some sorta benefit to the wider community being promised there. Though the idea that this will all come about via a virginal birth seems decidedly in the category of the absurd.
Me extrapolating wildly from Haidt's Righteous Mind
Which is the case, whether on or off the spectrum, for all those morally inadequate geniuses.
That theory strikes as akin to those attempts at explaining the origins of religion in magic mushrooms.
Sorry. Problema I. I reviewed on the way home today. I hope these quotes will help demonstrate what I mean.
Paragraph 19:
When an undertaking that is the concern of an entire people is thwarted, when an endeavor of this sort is impeded by the disfavor of heaven, when the angry god sends a dead calm sea that mocks all efforts, when the diviner does his sorrowful duty and proclaims that the god requires a young girl as a sacrificial offering —then the father must display heroic courage and make the sacrifice.
Paragraph 20:
When, with his heroic courage, the brave judge, i who saved Israel in its hour of need by binding both God and himself with the same vow in a single breath, was obligated heroically to transform the young girl’s rejoicing, the beloved daughter’s joy, into sorrow, and all Israel must grieve with her over her virginal youth—but every freeborn man must understand, every courageous woman must admire Jephthah, and every virgin in Israel must wish that she would act as did his daughter. For what would it have helped if Jephthah had been victorious by means of his vow if he did not keep it? Would not the victory have been taken away again from the people?
Paragraph 21:
When a son neglects his duty, when the state entrusts the father with the sword of judgment, when the laws require that the punishment come from the father’s hand, then #[152]# the father must heroically forget that the guilty person is his son, he must magnanimously conceal his pain, but there shall not be a single person among the people, not even the son, who does not admire the father, and this will be remembered every time the laws of Rome are interpreted: that many people interpreted them in more erudite fashion, but none did so more gloriously than Brutus.
Paragraph 25:
With Abraham, things are different. By his act he transgressed the boundary of the entire realm of the ethical; he had a higher τελος outside the ethical, in relation to which he suspended it. For I would certainly like to know how anyone can place Abraham’s deed in relation to the universal, whether #[153]# anyone can find any connection whatever between what Abraham did and the universal, other than the fact that Abraham transgressed it. Abraham did not do it to save a nation, nor to vindicate the idea of the state, nor to appease angry gods. If there could have been talk of an angry deity, it would of course have been angry with Abraham only, and Abraham’s entire deed stands in no relation to the universal—it is a purely private undertaking. Therefore, while a tragic hero is great because of his ethical virtue, 44 Abraham is great because of a purely personal virtue.
SK. F&T, Kirmmse trans. pp. 69-71
Never done 'em. Whose theory? My wild extrapolation? Or Haidt's pivotal, seminal, game changing proposition?
The writers I initially describe all write brilliantly missing the point. What fascinates me is why so many smart people just keep on that missing trajectory.
Hello, MaryLouise. It's lovely to meet you. I've seen you around, but I don't believe we've ever spoken.
This is a good explanation of what I understand is going on with SK's fictitious voices. Thank you for writing this up. Interesting that someone else was using a similar technique to create a platform for "public discussion" that he could control.
I don't think your point can be stressed enough in regard to any reflection of Kierkegaard's own thought expressed by the narrators. Assuming that they do entirely changes the meaning of large segments of Fear and Trembling.
In that case, it seems important to keep track who says what. "Kierkegaard said..." or "Kierkegaard thought..." is nearly meaningless in conjunction with F&T.
I've been away for most of the day and am trying to catch up here. Yes. I think this could be good to discuss, at least within the context of the sphere of the dialectical lyric.
Then there could be discussion of what, if anything, it could mean outside of that sphere. I think that discussion will rely on texts beyond F&T for a clearer understanding.
AFF, how's the reread going?
Do you mean that they are missing the point of biological and social explanations for what we commonly call "ethics" or "morality?" Aren't you asking a bit much of them? It seems a bit early for these emotionally-constpipated liberal philosophers to have come in contact with research that would direct their attention this direction, while shaking off the Englightement's attempt to rationalize everything. (Kierkegaard died 4 years before Origin. And there is yet newer generation working on a similar project. They were all people of their time.
Just as we are.
Fixed broken link - la vie en rouge, Purgatory host
I'd be pretty cautious about describing anything from "evolutionary psychology" as game changing. I'll never forget the purportedly serious analysis I read in the early 90s, about why the Scandinavian nations are so pacifistic:
The Vikings were people who had the genetic make-up for violence, and when they went out on their conquests, they took those genes out of the population.
If only. Absolute twaddle I agree. Well, if you're right and there is no biological basis for morality, then this thread contains as good.
Good meeting you too @Kendel and I'm tempted to go off and read a little more Kierkegaard!
I'm not very interested in a line-by-line reading of Kierkegaard, however I did just want to come back on this
I think this is a matter of opinion. Kierkegaard/de Silencio is making a point about Abraham and Agamemnon. He says that the tragic hero (Agamemnon) contrasts with Abraham because he (Agamemnon) acts for the group.
But I don't think we are supposed to take from this that the Knight of Faith - by definition - acts only as an individual. For one thing the other example of the Knight of Faith is Mary.
Which, by the way, does seem like a very strange choice of character. As far as I know, Mary doesn't really have a choice. She's not in fear-and-trembling making an absurd moral choice is she?
I was also thinking that Agamemnon is a strange choice as a Tragic Hero. I wonder why Lot wasn't a better example, someone who felt forced by the rules of hospitality to offer his child to a stranger.
I wonder why Kierkegaard mixes biblical and mythical characters like this.