Another thing I was thinking about was the nature of the "ethical". What happens when you have something which (for the sake of argument) was divine in origin - and may even have begun as an absurd idea cutting against the accepted universal "ethical" - which is then broken by a new absurd revelation?
IMO Love of God trumps Truth and the Law especially when the Truth and Law don't serve Love (- discuss (?)).
Yes. I think this could be good to discuss, at least within the context of the sphere of the dialectical lyric.
Then there could be discussion of what, if anything, it could mean outside of that sphere. I think that discussion will rely on texts beyond F&T for a clearer understanding.
AFF, how's the reread going?
The constant theme of this book is the way that slightly emotionally-constipated liberal philosophers (he suggests that Bentham and perhaps even Kant had forms of Asperger’s syndrome) have constructed supposedly rational foundations for morality with no recognition of its biological and social origins
The writers I initially describe all write brilliantly missing the point. What fascinates me is why so many smart people just keep on that missing trajectory.
Do you mean that they are missing the point of biological and social explanations for what we commonly call "ethics" or "morality?" Aren't you asking a bit much of them? It seems a bit early for these emotionally-constpipated liberal philosophers to have come in contact with research that would direct their attention this direction, while shaking off the Englightement's attempt to rationalize everything. (Kierkegaard died 4 years before Origin. And there is yet newer generation working on a similar project. They were all people of their time.
Just as we are.
Fixed broken link - la vie en rouge, Purgatory host
So was David Hume. Kant's (and therefore Kierkegaard's) inspiration. I fully accept, that in human affairs, every cul-de-sac must be gone down to the bitter end in economics, politics, religion, philosophy. I'm therefore all for the full Isaiah Berlin pursuit of the history of ideas, all part of Montaigne's proper study. And I know there is therapy, here, in literary analysis. But revolting peasant that I am I rage against the privilege.
I'm not very interested in a line-by-line reading of Kierkegaard, however I did just want to come back on this
It saves a lot of time workng from memory. As well as asserting, "That's your opinion."
You are dissatisfied by SK's choices for examples as if the work is some sort of logically consistent argument, in spite of its presention by a narrator who both claims to be and not to be a poet. The work is as it exists. One can attempt to tell it what it's supposed to be, rather than dealing with it line-by-line as written.
No, I'm reading it through, noticing new things and reflecting again on it. I'm wondering whether it is important that de Silencio uses particular/peculiar examples rather than available biblical ones. I hadn't considered that before.
Anyway, if closely reading Kierkegaard works for you, that's great. For me it only works when looked at with slightly squinted eyes, reflected, chewed upon and digested over many years.
Maybe we could discuss whether being a Kierkegaardian "Knight of Faith" is a desirable state to be in. Or something one could desire/aim to be.
Can one being authentically Christian* if one has never had the opportunity to choose between following the path of the "Knight of Faith" rather than the "Knight of Infinite Resignation"?
But revolting peasant that I am I rage against the privilege.
I really have no idea. It is of no interest to my inquiry, which appears to be a singularity.
I feel about to join you. Thermodynamics and Snow keep coming to mind.
I'm fascinated by the fascination. It obviously fills a need in many: Your singularity is in the excellent company of others'. I have a blunt, rusty broadsword in my hand and everything looks like a Gordian knot. Please don't join me in that!
But revolting peasant that I am I rage against the privilege.
I really have no idea. It is of no interest to my inquiry, which appears to be a singularity.
I feel about to join you. Thermodynamics and Snow keep coming to mind.
I'm fascinated by the fascination. It obviously fills a need in many: Your singularity is in the excellent company of others'. I have a blunt, rusty broadsword in my hand and everything looks like a Gordian knot. Please don't join me in that!
But revolting peasant that I am I rage against the privilege.
I really have no idea. It is of no interest to my inquiry, which appears to be a singularity.
I feel about to join you. Thermodynamics and Snow keep coming to mind.
I'm fascinated by the fascination. It obviously fills a need in many: Your singularity is in the excellent company of others'. I have a blunt, rusty broadsword in my hand and everything looks like a Gordian knot. Please don't join me in that!
In that case, it seems important to keep track who says what. "Kierkegaard said..." or "Kierkegaard thought..." is nearly meaningless in conjunction with F&T.
In his discussion on anguish in Existentialism Is A Humanism, Sartre wrote...
This is the anguish that Kierkegaard called "the anguish of Abraham." You know the story: An angel commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, and obedience was obligatory, if it really was an angel who had appeared and said "Thou, Abraham, shall sacrifice thy son." But anyone in such a case would wonder, first, whether it was indeed an angel and secondly, whether I am really Abraham. Where are the proofs?
Now, I'll grant that this passage is factually inaccurate, because in the bible it was God, not an angel, who gave the command. But would you really say it was meaningless, or even that it misrepresents Fear And Trembling in some way, on the grounds that it doesn't specify which pseudonym Kierkegaard was using in his analysis of anguish?
If one was to meet an 'Abraham' - who had attempted to kill their child - and they were to say to you that they'd been told to by God, experienced the individual *teleological suspension of the Ethical* which left them disgusted at themselves but nonetheless determined to see it through..
I mean it doesn't work, does it. There's no circumstance where anyone would think that acceptable.
If one was to meet an 'Abraham' - who had attempted to kill their child - and they were to say to you that they'd been told to by God, experienced the individual *teleological suspension of the Ethical* which left them disgusted at themselves but nonetheless determined to see it through..
I mean it doesn't work, does it. There's no circumstance where anyone would think that acceptable.
Especially if one doesn't believe in a deity.
But, again, it's NOT the point of the action to convince anyone else that it's acceptable. This isn't like bombing Dresden and saying "It was sad, but we had to do it to stop the nazis from winning."
If one was to meet an 'Abraham' - who had attempted to kill their child - and they were to say to you that they'd been told to by God, experienced the individual *teleological suspension of the Ethical* which left them disgusted at themselves but nonetheless determined to see it through..
I mean it doesn't work, does it. There's no circumstance where anyone would think that acceptable.
Especially if one doesn't believe in a deity.
But, again, it's NOT the point of the action to convince anyone else that it's acceptable. This isn't like bombing Dresden and saying "It was sad, but we had to do it to stop the nazis from winning."
If one was to meet an 'Abraham' - who had attempted to kill their child - and they were to say to you that they'd been told to by God, experienced the individual *teleological suspension of the Ethical* which left them disgusted at themselves but nonetheless determined to see it through..
I mean it doesn't work, does it. There's no circumstance where anyone would think that acceptable.
Especially if one doesn't believe in a deity.
But, again, it's NOT the point of the action to convince anyone else that it's acceptable. This isn't like bombing Dresden and saying "It was sad, but we had to do it to stop the nazis from winning."
So what *is* the point?
Well, in my own words...
To rise above the boring old universal into the absolute, via obedience, as a uniquely called individual, to God's command.
If one was to meet an 'Abraham' - who had attempted to kill their child - and they were to say to you that they'd been told to by God, experienced the individual *teleological suspension of the Ethical* which left them disgusted at themselves but nonetheless determined to see it through..
I mean it doesn't work, does it. There's no circumstance where anyone would think that acceptable.
Especially if one doesn't believe in a deity.
But, again, it's NOT the point of the action to convince anyone else that it's acceptable. This isn't like bombing Dresden and saying "It was sad, but we had to do it to stop the nazis from winning."
So what *is* the point?
Well, in my own words...
To rise above the boring old universal into the absolute, via obedience, as a uniquely called individual, to God's command.
And how are the rest of us supposed to live with that?
For the record, I take a much more practical approach.
And how are the rest of us supposed to live with that?
Throwing the killer in jail would probably be the response in most places. Society is not obligated to honour his view of himself as a Knight Of Faith. In fact, the whole point is that they DON'T honour him.
For the record, I take a much more practical approach.
Glad to hear it, since I wouldn't wanna think I'm chatting with someone who's about to go out and slaughter children. I WOULD call the police if I thought that was about to happen, but that wouldn't preclude the killer being a Knight Of Faith.
I guess for me I've always taken these things entirely allegorically. I cannot conceive - or accept - a deity that resembles the one in the bible, therefore the only way for me to get anything useful from it is to not take it literally. Similarly with any other mythical story.
For me, F&T says these things.
1. We have a bunch of universal accepted laws and norms that we move within. Often without even acknowledging how much we are living within a certain mindset.
2. There is only so far that these universal norms can be changed.
3. Most of the time we are absolutely right to judge ethical behaviours against the standards of society we are familiar with
4. But, absurdly, we need to be open to the idea that there is another ethic which can break through our understanding and shed completely new light onto moral and ethical problems.
5. Although we might be right 99% or 99.99% of the time to reject the claims of the divinely inspired counter-intuitive ethic, it is also important to listen for it.
6. Finally, we have examples of people in our own history who have stood against the universal ethical norms, who have been vilified and condemned but who we've come to accept were right. That's not to say that all firebrands are right, just that they are sometimes. They're not wrong just because they're saying something that sounds wrong.
6. Finally, we have examples of people in our own history who have stood against the universal ethical norms, who have been vilified and condemned but who we've come to accept were right. That's not to say that all firebrands are right, just that they are sometimes. They're not wrong just because they're saying something that sounds wrong.
Sure, but the Knight Of Faith will never be exonerated in the way you outline for the firebrand. The Knight Of Faith has violated the ethical, full stop, and you're not gonna later find evidence that allows you to say that there was some purpose within the ethical that compelled him to do so.
In that case, it seems important to keep track who says what. "Kierkegaard said..." or "Kierkegaard thought..." is nearly meaningless in conjunction with F&T.
In his discussion on anguish in Existentialism Is A Humanism, Sartre wrote...
This is the anguish that Kierkegaard called "the anguish of Abraham." You know the story: An angel commanded Abraham to sacrifice his son, and obedience was obligatory, if it really was an angel who had appeared and said "Thou, Abraham, shall sacrifice thy son." But anyone in such a case would wonder, first, whether it was indeed an angel and secondly, whether I am really Abraham. Where are the proofs?
Now, I'll grant that this passage is factually inaccurate, because in the bible it was God, not an angel, who gave the command. But would you really say it was meaningless, or even that it misrepresents Fear And Trembling in some way, on the grounds that it doesn't specify which pseudonym Kierkegaard was using in his analysis of anguish?
It depends, doesn't it? Certainly if SK develops the concept further in signed (non-pseudonymous) works, it's likely fair game. Anxiety was a major theme for him, as I understand. Other works may support the use of it as a concept.
@stetson, looking at your discussion going on above with @KoF regarding the TSoE, I see a good example of the problem of treating it as a "Kierkegaard said" moment. I keep hearing people wrangle over whether Kierkegaard is suggesting it's a blessed thing to kill your children, if God tells you to. There's even a thread dedicated to if Abraham said, "No."
To say Kierkegaard endorses one thing or another based on de silentio's description of and ruminations on the TSoE seems like a mistake to me. I mean, really; if you met someone like de silentio, would you trust him? Fixing on the TSoE as if it answers ethical questions is easy to do, if you read this as from the mouth of Kierkegaard.
Attempting to take the book as a whole, is possible, if I read de silentio as an unreliable narrator. It also changes and complicates one's reading of the contents of F&T significantly. de silentio is obsessed with Hegel, dialectics and Hegel's system. He starts on it from the beginning of the book and carries it through nearly to the end. In the TSoE he describes society and humans' relation to it and each other, our responsibilities, the (im)possibility of a personal God within this society, jabs at the state church, etc, in the most structural terms possible. de silentio is creating with the TSoE his own version of Hegel's System and attempting to describe what faith (which he repeatedly claims not to understand and likely demonstrates as well) is like in systematic terms. Does anyone really think that this is how faith or ethics works? Is there evidence outside of F&T that this is what SK thought? If so, then other readings and attributions make sense, but not with out them.
"What to do with the TSoE" is still a valid question, when one looks at it as the words of a character, rather than the words of Kierkegaard. But the answers are going to be very different.
To return to your question to me regarding if Sartre should avoid attributing statements to SK that come from F&T: Unless it can be varified in a work that SK signed or carefully through out the dialogue between his characters, maybe his diaries, where he is not attempting to be ironic, sarcastic, bomastic, parabolic, then it would be wise and careful scholarship to be clear about how the idea was represented in the work. The same way that one would be careful about attributing to Jonathan Swift the idea that we should eat the children of poor people in order to deal with all sorts of social ills.
Thanks for the detailed post. For now, just one point...
I don't know if A Modest Proposal is the best comparison, since Swift was giving a hyperbolic portrayal of ideas that he OPPOSED, ie. the amoral economic policies of the English colonialists are hyperbolized as the eating of children, in order to demonstrate the horror of it. Whereas it seems to me that Abraham and Isaac is meant to as a hyperbolic example of ideas that Kierkegaard wants us to at least consider, ie. living your life on the religious plane rather than the ethical plane is hyperbolized as Abraham attempting to kill his own son, in order to demonstrate the uniqueness of of it.
6. Finally, we have examples of people in our own history who have stood against the universal ethical norms, who have been vilified and condemned but who we've come to accept were right. That's not to say that all firebrands are right, just that they are sometimes. They're not wrong just because they're saying something that sounds wrong.
Sure, but the Knight Of Faith will never be exonerated in the way you outline for the firebrand. The Knight Of Faith has violated the ethical, full stop, and you're not gonna later find evidence that allows you to say that there was some purpose within the ethical that compelled him to do so.
This seems like a strange thing to argue about a biblical character who is seen as the Father of the Faith. Clearly for most religious believers, he absolutely is vindicated and considered exonerated.
6. Finally, we have examples of people in our own history who have stood against the universal ethical norms, who have been vilified and condemned but who we've come to accept were right. That's not to say that all firebrands are right, just that they are sometimes. They're not wrong just because they're saying something that sounds wrong.
Sure, but the Knight Of Faith will never be exonerated in the way you outline for the firebrand. The Knight Of Faith has violated the ethical, full stop, and you're not gonna later find evidence that allows you to say that there was some purpose within the ethical that compelled him to do so.
This seems like a strange thing to argue about a biblical character who is seen as the Father of the Faith. Clearly for most religious believers, he absolutely is vindicated and considered exonerated.
Well, yes, he's the Father of Faith, not the Father Of Ethics. Because the binding of Isaac, from an ethical perspective, was unjustifiable.
6. Finally, we have examples of people in our own history who have stood against the universal ethical norms, who have been vilified and condemned but who we've come to accept were right. That's not to say that all firebrands are right, just that they are sometimes. They're not wrong just because they're saying something that sounds wrong.
Sure, but the Knight Of Faith will never be exonerated in the way you outline for the firebrand. The Knight Of Faith has violated the ethical, full stop, and you're not gonna later find evidence that allows you to say that there was some purpose within the ethical that compelled him to do so.
This seems like a strange thing to argue about a biblical character who is seen as the Father of the Faith. Clearly for most religious believers, he absolutely is vindicated and considered exonerated.
Well, yes, he's the Father of Faith, not the Father Of Ethics. Because the binding of Isaac, within the ethical realm, was unjustifiable.
I'm sorry I'm not understanding.
If you are saying that a Universal Ethical understanding exists - and persists such that the TSoE is always unintelligible to all people always - then in what sense is Abraham exonerated? Nobody reading the passage would think anything other than 'Abraham was a freaky child abuser' - which is clearly not the case for most Jews, Christians and Muslims who regard him as being a noble God-lover and example to everyone.
6. Finally, we have examples of people in our own history who have stood against the universal ethical norms, who have been vilified and condemned but who we've come to accept were right. That's not to say that all firebrands are right, just that they are sometimes. They're not wrong just because they're saying something that sounds wrong.
Sure, but the Knight Of Faith will never be exonerated in the way you outline for the firebrand. The Knight Of Faith has violated the ethical, full stop, and you're not gonna later find evidence that allows you to say that there was some purpose within the ethical that compelled him to do so.
This seems like a strange thing to argue about a biblical character who is seen as the Father of the Faith. Clearly for most religious believers, he absolutely is vindicated and considered exonerated.
Well, yes, he's the Father of Faith, not the Father Of Ethics. Because the binding of Isaac, within the ethical realm, was unjustifiable.
I'm sorry I'm not understanding.
If you are saying that a Universal Ethical understanding exists - and persists such that the TSoE is always unintelligible to all people always - then in what sense is Abraham exonerated?
Well, on the Religious plane, he is honoured for obeying God's request without question. That isn't really an exoneration, because, from a religious perspective, nothing he did required exoneration.
Nobody reading the passage would think anything other than 'Abraham was a freaky child abuser' - which is clearly not the case for most Jews, Christians and Muslims who regard him as being a noble God-lover and example to everyone.
If all those Jews etc. think that Abraham was a noble God-lover because the binding was a great act of ethics, a fine example for social organization, etc, then, Kierkegaard would argue, they are wrong. Abraham was a noble God-lover precisely BECAUSE he was willing to act in a way that society would condemn as "freaky child abuse", in order to follow God.
There's a bit more I could add to this, but I'm in the middle of things right now. Maybe later.
@Kendel
was giving a hyperbolic portrayal of ideas that he OPPOSED,
This is what I am proposing about Fear and Trembling as well. Taken at face value the book may do the same with some of the topics de silentio appears to endorse. It's why I keep hammering on the need to verify claims that Kierkegaard says this or that with some other material from his body of work.
And if SK as well as Jds endorses the TSoE, F&T makes clear that there is no possibility for a nice, acceptable, sanitized version of what could be the outcome.
A few things in the book that I found very interesting were the concepts of:
greatness (which includes Mary),
the exploration of doubt,
the comparison of the church to the universal,
the cheapness of faith, particularly as discussed in the Preface and the epilogue,
what it would mean to "have one's life in" faith, once one got to it.
Some background I'm missing and would be grateful to know more about are related to:
the similarities and differences between Hegel's system and the TSoE described in F&T
sources of ancient concepts of the universal that appear in F&T and how SK may have altered them to his purposes; if so in what ways.
Kant comes up now and again. I'm only a little aware of Kant and what seems like an inverted but similar attempt at a rational or rationalized structure of morality
evidence from SK's other work (including titles and at least chapter headings) that supports any particular claim
I think it could be fun to hash over:
humorous bits or particularly fine sections of writing
the treatment of "assistant professors"
the concept of the poet that exhibits itself here
connections to other works by SK or other writers and thinkers
the way/s SK incorporated any of the things he actually endorsed in his own life
Early in my MA, one of my profs said, that we (theory students) weren't there to learn what to do on Monday morning, when our students arrived, but how to think in ways that affected our entire praxis. So finally this question:
What, if any, practical use can be made of SK's work and thought?
And if SK as well as Jds endorses the TSoE, F&T makes clear that there is no possibility for a nice, acceptable, sanitized version of what could be the outcome.
Well, yeah, it's not a nice, acceptable outcome in the sense of Abraham being regarded as a kindly old gentleman getting Dad Of The Year award. From the perspective of society(eg. the courts, the church, the man on the street), there's no possible way for him to be regarded as anything but a repulsive child-killer, and treated accordingly.
But I think we are meant to understand that there is still a clean separation between the Ethical and the Religious, and being a villain by the standards of the former doesn't preclude being a Knight Of Faith in the latter.
greatness (which includes Mary)
The text of FaT seems to suggest that Mary is "great" because she was uniquely "favored" by God, bore Jesus in "distress", dread", and "paradox", and the angel didn't go around to other women to tell them not to "despise" her(presumably for being unmarried). IOW she willingly submitted herself to all sorts of agony and humiliation, because she believed herself to be specially called by God for His purposes.
the comparison of the church to the universal
In my existentialism class, we discussed the differences between Left Hegelianism and Right Hegelianism, with the salient point being that while the Left focused on the process of the dialectic, the Right focused on the final outcome, which I assume to be something like the State.
It was then explained that FaT can be understood as an attack on Right Hegelianism specifically. I'm gonna go out on a limb here and say that, theologically speaking, the book is basically Kierkegaard saying to the Danish Church: "Hold on! Don't think just because you've established this great ethics-preaching institution to take care of widows and orphans that that's the end of it! What about Abraham? He jumped totally OUTSIDE your standard ethical framework when he went to kill Isaac, and God GLORIFIED him for it! So how the hell does that work, huh?"
Near the end of the Kierkegaard section of that class, I went for a one-on-one QNA with the prof, and asked him why Kierkegaard thought anyone would be dissatisfied with living within the universal(and hence need to jump into the religious). The answer was something along the lines of "the universal applies to everyone, and hence the individual does not feel personally called by it."
Kant comes up now and again. I'm only a little aware of Kant and what seems like an inverted but similar attempt at a rational or rationalized structure of morality
IIRC, it basically boils down to Kant thinking that God would not order Abraham to violate the categorical imperative, aka the logical basis of all morality, whereas it was that very violation which made the sacrifice exactly what God would ask a potential Knight Of Faith to do.
connections to other works by SK or other writers and thinkers
In his intro to Nietzsche, our prof said that both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche attack society, with Kierkegaard calling it "the crowd" and Nietzsche calling it "the herd".
Extrapolating from that, we can probably say that the equivalent to the Knight Of Faith in Nietzsche's schematum is the Òverman. Except for the Knight Of Faith, the criterion for abandoning the ethical is religious, whereas for the Overman, it's aesthetic, in the sense of artistic, ie. don't help old ladies across the street because it's capital-G Good, do it because it's just beautiful. (Eternal Return comes into play here, but I'm not gonna get into that right now.)
the way/s SK incorporated any of the things he actually endorsed in his own life
Well, I guess it was pretty scuzzy to dump Regine like last week's laundry, but if that makes me a Knight Of Faith like Abraham, I don't have to answer to the boring old Ethical anyway, so woo-hoo!
I think we are left in no doubt (from the Attacks) that Kierkegaard regards Christendom as being the Universal Ethical of his time in Denmark..
Which seems to me to leave a quandary; if an ethical code predicated on thousands of years of Christianity becomes accepted as a/the Universal Ethical, how can the Religious (as suggested in F&T) be identified? If everyone in Denmark is Christian and is operating within the same mindset, how are they able to recognise and appreciate the TSoE?.
Second, if we are saying that (according to de Silencio) the Religious phase can only be obtained by a "leap of faith" which propels the Knight from being in Infinite Resignation to Faith, how is it possible for those who have not made the leap to recognise the positive value of the TSoE given that they're still operating within the Ethical and thus should hate/misunderstand it?
If Kierkegaard is hiding behind the curtain and sniggering, what is his point?
That Christianity can't have the cake (divine revelation) but also eat it (Christendom)?
Or perhaps it is to say that in contrast to Hegel and Kant*, Kierkegaard thinks the idea of cultural ethics couched in terms like Universal Ethics is a load of old whooie when one closely examines the things that we/it claims to believe in.
Or perhaps it is to say that in contrast to Hegel and Kant*, Kierkegaard thinks the idea of cultural ethics couched in terms like Universal Ethics is a load of old whooie when one closely examines the things that we/it claims to believe in.
* neither of whom I really understand
I think it's not so much that it's a load of old whooie, but that it only takes you so far, and doesn't provide a proper framework for living the religious life.
Or perhaps it is to say that in contrast to Hegel and Kant*, Kierkegaard thinks the idea of cultural ethics couched in terms like Universal Ethics is a load of old whooie when one closely examines the things that we/it claims to believe in.
* neither of whom I really understand
I think it's not so much that it's a load of old whooie, but that it only takes you so far, and doesn't provide a proper framework for living the religious life.
Isn't it actually putting a wall between True Religion and (for want of a better term) Christendom?
If you want to be a true Christian, you can't do it in a situation where laws and customs are built upon Christianity. For one thing, if you have a society built as if Christianity is the highest aspirational truth for organising society, then it becomes very hard to regulate different groups claiming that they are doing things (equal and opposite things) on direct command of the deity.
Or perhaps it is to say that in contrast to Hegel and Kant*, Kierkegaard thinks the idea of cultural ethics couched in terms like Universal Ethics is a load of old whooie when one closely examines the things that we/it claims to believe in.
* neither of whom I really understand
I think it's not so much that it's a load of old whooie, but that it only takes you so far, and doesn't provide a proper framework for living the religious life.
Isn't it actually putting a wall between True Religion and (for want of a better term) Christendom?
If you want to be a true Christian, you can't do it in a situation where laws and customs are built upon Christianity. For one thing, if you have a society built as if Christianity is the highest aspirational truth for organising society, then it becomes very hard to regulate different groups claiming that they are doing things (equal and opposite things) on direct command of the deity.
We've tried this, of course. It didn't end well.
I'm not exactly sure what you mean here. If a 19th-Century Dane heeded a call by God to perform human sacrifice in the manner of the kierkegaardian Abraham, the "regulation of different groups" wouldn't make a difference, because he wouldn't be telling anyone else about it anyway.
And yes, Kierkegaard sees the Danish Church, and presumably other institutions like it, as representing "Christendom". Which is, indeed, keeping people from living the true religious life.
This is mostly just me, but I kinda think of Kierkegaard's theology as being extreme anti-good works.
Which is weird given one of his major works was called "Kjerlighedens Gjerninger" - works of love
Well, that could mean alot of things. I haven't read it myself, so shouldn't really comnent. But it remains the case that Abraham loves Isaac throughout the binding, and, in fact, fully expects to get him back. (Or so thinks Kierkegaard.)
Which is weird given one of his major works was called "Kjerlighedens Gjerninger" - works of love
Well, that could mean alot of things. I haven't read it myself, so shouldn't really comnent. But it remains the case that Abraham loves Isaac throughout the binding, and, in fact, fully expects to get him back. (Or so thinks Kierkegaard.)
Well for one thing *Works of love* is not a pseudonymous piece by Kierkegaard, it in his own name. For another thing, according to K in the forward it is supposed to be "upbuilding discourse" rather than challenging.
I think it is quite sweet, you might like it. It doesn't to me read as "anti good works", quite the reverse.
Which is weird given one of his major works was called "Kjerlighedens Gjerninger" - works of love
Well, that could mean alot of things. I haven't read it myself, so shouldn't really comnent. But it remains the case that Abraham loves Isaac throughout the binding, and, in fact, fully expects to get him back. (Or so thinks Kierkegaard.)
Well for one thing *Works of love* is not a pseudonymous piece by Kierkegaard, it in his own name. For another thing, according to K in the forward it is supposed to be "upbuilding discourse" rather than challenging.
I think it is quite sweet, you might like it. It doesn't to me read as "anti good works", quite the reverse.
I'm not sure on what basis one would suspect SK of placing little value on works for the Christian. What I have been reading by him contradicts such a view. There is an excerpt from "For Self Examination" (series 1) in the "Essential K" where he talks about Luther shoving James aside to emphasize grace and then secular thinkers taking advantage of the deemphasis on works to eliminate the requirement of works at all. The situation is treated critically.
In similar light, faith as work (not a meritorious work but as something one must do in order for it to exist) is explained in F&T.
It is entirely possible that SK redefines "works." I haven't read enough to know. But at least some concept of it is in his texts, and whatever he thinks they are, he endorses works.
Regarding the state church:
I'm reading some of the attack literature, and it even comes out in F&T. De silentio depicts the church as identical to the ethical/universal, which, according to the concept of the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical (TSoE), is the very place where faith cannot exist. This is all part of the paradox of the single individual as the single individual in absolute relation to the absolute.
If this reflects SK's own views, and I think it does based on his attack pieces, he is condemning the church as the very place one cannot practice Christianity, at least the one that requires faith and personal, immediate (unmediated) access to God.
Late attack pieces talk about the church as an impediment to seeking first God's Kingdom, making it impossible for the Christian to obey Christ.
He describes it as a self-perpetuating money-making system, which only provides earthly comforts to the clergy and the delusion of a happy afterlife to the congregation. "Either/Or" is a concept that permeates his works. Either happy now or later, but not both or not in the same way.
I just got to the part in the book abut the Knight of Infinite Resignation (who I had completely forgotten about) and realized - yup. That's where I get off. No Kierkegaardian faith for me.
I don't speak 19 century Danish, but I always think of this thing about being a Knight of "infinite resignation" as being a very silly combination of English words. It sounds to me like someone who quits a job then returns tomorrow to quit a bit more then they return the day after and so on.
To be honest, I suspect the Knight of Faith is also a pretty silly concept. I wonder if the Knight who quits has more going for him than the Knight of Faith.
I don't know if Frank Capra rated Kierkegaard, but I sometimes like to think about whether his character George Bailey is a Knight of Faith, a Knight of Infinite Resignation or a Tragic Hero in the film "It's a Wonderful Life".
I suspect he's a Knight of Inf Res. He gives and gives and gives until he has nothing more to give. Pushed to the edge, he needs angelic intervention to show him how much impact he has on the world around him.
For good works, I was mostly thinking of the soteriology implied in Fear And Trembling. There, Abraham's elevation to a Knight Of Faith is unrelated to good works, and the works he does perform are, from the ethical standpoint, the polar opposite of good.
Regarding the state church:
I'm reading some of the attack literature, and it even comes out in F&T. De silentio depicts the church as identical to the ethical/universal, which, according to the concept of the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical (TSoE), is the very place where faith cannot exist. This is all part of the paradox of the single individual as the single individual in absolute relation to the absolute.
If this reflects SK's own views, and I think it does based on his attack pieces, he is condemning the church as the very place one cannot practice Christianity, at least the one that requires faith and personal, immediate (unmediated) access to God.
Yes, exactly. I think I mentioned earlier the commentator who said Kierkegaard represents the ultimate development of the protestant idea that salvation is strictly between the individual and God, unmediated by earthly institutions.
@stetson I don't have my book with me. I refer you to text again. I think it's IPraise of Abraham where he talks about "in the world of the spirit..." and "he who works gets the bread." Look it over and the we can talk.
@Martin54 I refer you to the section where the roles and relationship between the poet and tragic hero are discussed. Wish I had my book for the section title. MP might be making a direct reference to Bravely Bold Sir Robin -- but altered slightly....which is a reference by technique to Problema III.
@A_Feminine_Force i don't know who can see oneself as having faith in light of the description of a K o F.
And I think that is the deliberate challenge of the book to its readers.
@stetson I don't have my book with me. I refer you to text again. I think it's IPraise of Abraham where he talks about "in the world of the spirit..." and "he who works gets the bread." Look it over and the we can talk.
@Martin54 I refer you to the section where the roles and relationship between the poet and tragic hero are discussed. Wish I had my book for the section title. MP might be making a direct reference to Bravely Bold Sir Robin -- but altered slightly....which is a reference by technique to Problema III.
@A_Feminine_Force i don't know who can see oneself as having faith in light of the description of a K o F.
And I think that is the deliberate challenge of the book to its readers.
Run out of time again.
From what I've gathered here I find myself absolutely not wanting to be a K'ian KoF, so that challenge rather falls flat.
I realise I'd rather follow what is Good than follow God, if it comes to it.
From what I've gathered here I find myself absolutely not wanting to be a K'ian KoF, so that challenge rather falls flat.
I realise I'd rather follow what is Good than follow God, if it comes to it.
Aw, you're just jealous because YOU'VE never heard the disembodied voice telling you to grab the hammer from your tool shed, head over to the house of your favorite relative, and smash their brains in. It makes ya feel pretty special. (Or so I've been told.)
I'm lost why we think this is Kierkegaardian. Surely it is *Christian*
Is there anything anywhere in the bible saying you shouldn't follow the example of Abraham?
Well, I think the kierkegaardian criticism of most Christendom-rooted interpretations of Abraham and Isaac is that they try to reassure us that in the end, it was all just a test: "Oh, don't worry, God would never actually let Abraham go through with it."
Whereas Kierkegaard wants us to focus on the idea that, prior to hearing the angel's voice, Abraham never once questioned the order to kill Isaac. He wasn't standing there with the knife in his hand saying "Okay, God, I know this is all just a ruse, I'll put the knife down just as soon as you give the signal."
Comments
Is this saying that divine revelations go stale?
So was David Hume. Kant's (and therefore Kierkegaard's) inspiration. I fully accept, that in human affairs, every cul-de-sac must be gone down to the bitter end in economics, politics, religion, philosophy. I'm therefore all for the full Isaiah Berlin pursuit of the history of ideas, all part of Montaigne's proper study. And I know there is therapy, here, in literary analysis. But revolting peasant that I am I rage against the privilege.
I really have no idea. It is of no interest to my inquiry, which appears to be a singularity.
I feel about to join you. Thermodynamics and Snow keep coming to mind.
It saves a lot of time workng from memory. As well as asserting, "That's your opinion."
You are dissatisfied by SK's choices for examples as if the work is some sort of logically consistent argument, in spite of its presention by a narrator who both claims to be and not to be a poet. The work is as it exists. One can attempt to tell it what it's supposed to be, rather than dealing with it line-by-line as written.
Anyway, if closely reading Kierkegaard works for you, that's great. For me it only works when looked at with slightly squinted eyes, reflected, chewed upon and digested over many years.
Can one being authentically Christian* if one has never had the opportunity to choose between following the path of the "Knight of Faith" rather than the "Knight of Infinite Resignation"?
*and/or fully human or whatever
I'm fascinated by the fascination. It obviously fills a need in many: Your singularity is in the excellent company of others'. I have a blunt, rusty broadsword in my hand and everything looks like a Gordian knot. Please don't join me in that!
Weather evoking rage eh? Hmmmmm.
Weather?
Thermodynamics and Snow? All as metaphor?
Second law, I think it was.
And Snow.
In his discussion on anguish in Existentialism Is A Humanism, Sartre wrote...
Now, I'll grant that this passage is factually inaccurate, because in the bible it was God, not an angel, who gave the command. But would you really say it was meaningless, or even that it misrepresents Fear And Trembling in some way, on the grounds that it doesn't specify which pseudonym Kierkegaard was using in his analysis of anguish?
I mean it doesn't work, does it. There's no circumstance where anyone would think that acceptable.
Especially if one doesn't believe in a deity.
But, again, it's NOT the point of the action to convince anyone else that it's acceptable. This isn't like bombing Dresden and saying "It was sad, but we had to do it to stop the nazis from winning."
So what *is* the point?
Well, in my own words...
To rise above the boring old universal into the absolute, via obedience, as a uniquely called individual, to God's command.
And how are the rest of us supposed to live with that?
For the record, I take a much more practical approach.
Throwing the killer in jail would probably be the response in most places. Society is not obligated to honour his view of himself as a Knight Of Faith. In fact, the whole point is that they DON'T honour him.
Glad to hear it, since I wouldn't wanna think I'm chatting with someone who's about to go out and slaughter children. I WOULD call the police if I thought that was about to happen, but that wouldn't preclude the killer being a Knight Of Faith.
For me, F&T says these things.
1. We have a bunch of universal accepted laws and norms that we move within. Often without even acknowledging how much we are living within a certain mindset.
2. There is only so far that these universal norms can be changed.
3. Most of the time we are absolutely right to judge ethical behaviours against the standards of society we are familiar with
4. But, absurdly, we need to be open to the idea that there is another ethic which can break through our understanding and shed completely new light onto moral and ethical problems.
5. Although we might be right 99% or 99.99% of the time to reject the claims of the divinely inspired counter-intuitive ethic, it is also important to listen for it.
6. Finally, we have examples of people in our own history who have stood against the universal ethical norms, who have been vilified and condemned but who we've come to accept were right. That's not to say that all firebrands are right, just that they are sometimes. They're not wrong just because they're saying something that sounds wrong.
Sure, but the Knight Of Faith will never be exonerated in the way you outline for the firebrand. The Knight Of Faith has violated the ethical, full stop, and you're not gonna later find evidence that allows you to say that there was some purpose within the ethical that compelled him to do so.
It depends, doesn't it? Certainly if SK develops the concept further in signed (non-pseudonymous) works, it's likely fair game. Anxiety was a major theme for him, as I understand. Other works may support the use of it as a concept.
@stetson, looking at your discussion going on above with @KoF regarding the TSoE, I see a good example of the problem of treating it as a "Kierkegaard said" moment. I keep hearing people wrangle over whether Kierkegaard is suggesting it's a blessed thing to kill your children, if God tells you to. There's even a thread dedicated to if Abraham said, "No."
To say Kierkegaard endorses one thing or another based on de silentio's description of and ruminations on the TSoE seems like a mistake to me. I mean, really; if you met someone like de silentio, would you trust him? Fixing on the TSoE as if it answers ethical questions is easy to do, if you read this as from the mouth of Kierkegaard.
Attempting to take the book as a whole, is possible, if I read de silentio as an unreliable narrator. It also changes and complicates one's reading of the contents of F&T significantly. de silentio is obsessed with Hegel, dialectics and Hegel's system. He starts on it from the beginning of the book and carries it through nearly to the end. In the TSoE he describes society and humans' relation to it and each other, our responsibilities, the (im)possibility of a personal God within this society, jabs at the state church, etc, in the most structural terms possible. de silentio is creating with the TSoE his own version of Hegel's System and attempting to describe what faith (which he repeatedly claims not to understand and likely demonstrates as well) is like in systematic terms. Does anyone really think that this is how faith or ethics works? Is there evidence outside of F&T that this is what SK thought? If so, then other readings and attributions make sense, but not with out them.
"What to do with the TSoE" is still a valid question, when one looks at it as the words of a character, rather than the words of Kierkegaard. But the answers are going to be very different.
To return to your question to me regarding if Sartre should avoid attributing statements to SK that come from F&T: Unless it can be varified in a work that SK signed or carefully through out the dialogue between his characters, maybe his diaries, where he is not attempting to be ironic, sarcastic, bomastic, parabolic, then it would be wise and careful scholarship to be clear about how the idea was represented in the work. The same way that one would be careful about attributing to Jonathan Swift the idea that we should eat the children of poor people in order to deal with all sorts of social ills.
Thanks for the detailed post. For now, just one point...
I don't know if A Modest Proposal is the best comparison, since Swift was giving a hyperbolic portrayal of ideas that he OPPOSED, ie. the amoral economic policies of the English colonialists are hyperbolized as the eating of children, in order to demonstrate the horror of it. Whereas it seems to me that Abraham and Isaac is meant to as a hyperbolic example of ideas that Kierkegaard wants us to at least consider, ie. living your life on the religious plane rather than the ethical plane is hyperbolized as Abraham attempting to kill his own son, in order to demonstrate the uniqueness of of it.
This seems like a strange thing to argue about a biblical character who is seen as the Father of the Faith. Clearly for most religious believers, he absolutely is vindicated and considered exonerated.
Well, yes, he's the Father of Faith, not the Father Of Ethics. Because the binding of Isaac, from an ethical perspective, was unjustifiable.
I'm sorry I'm not understanding.
If you are saying that a Universal Ethical understanding exists - and persists such that the TSoE is always unintelligible to all people always - then in what sense is Abraham exonerated? Nobody reading the passage would think anything other than 'Abraham was a freaky child abuser' - which is clearly not the case for most Jews, Christians and Muslims who regard him as being a noble God-lover and example to everyone.
Well, on the Religious plane, he is honoured for obeying God's request without question. That isn't really an exoneration, because, from a religious perspective, nothing he did required exoneration.
If all those Jews etc. think that Abraham was a noble God-lover because the binding was a great act of ethics, a fine example for social organization, etc, then, Kierkegaard would argue, they are wrong. Abraham was a noble God-lover precisely BECAUSE he was willing to act in a way that society would condemn as "freaky child abuse", in order to follow God.
There's a bit more I could add to this, but I'm in the middle of things right now. Maybe later.
This is what I am proposing about Fear and Trembling as well. Taken at face value the book may do the same with some of the topics de silentio appears to endorse. It's why I keep hammering on the need to verify claims that Kierkegaard says this or that with some other material from his body of work.
And if SK as well as Jds endorses the TSoE, F&T makes clear that there is no possibility for a nice, acceptable, sanitized version of what could be the outcome.
A few things in the book that I found very interesting were the concepts of:
Some background I'm missing and would be grateful to know more about are related to:
I think it could be fun to hash over:
Early in my MA, one of my profs said, that we (theory students) weren't there to learn what to do on Monday morning, when our students arrived, but how to think in ways that affected our entire praxis. So finally this question:
What, if any, practical use can be made of SK's work and thought?
Well, yeah, it's not a nice, acceptable outcome in the sense of Abraham being regarded as a kindly old gentleman getting Dad Of The Year award. From the perspective of society(eg. the courts, the church, the man on the street), there's no possible way for him to be regarded as anything but a repulsive child-killer, and treated accordingly.
But I think we are meant to understand that there is still a clean separation between the Ethical and the Religious, and being a villain by the standards of the former doesn't preclude being a Knight Of Faith in the latter.
The text of FaT seems to suggest that Mary is "great" because she was uniquely "favored" by God, bore Jesus in "distress", dread", and "paradox", and the angel didn't go around to other women to tell them not to "despise" her(presumably for being unmarried). IOW she willingly submitted herself to all sorts of agony and humiliation, because she believed herself to be specially called by God for His purposes.
In my existentialism class, we discussed the differences between Left Hegelianism and Right Hegelianism, with the salient point being that while the Left focused on the process of the dialectic, the Right focused on the final outcome, which I assume to be something like the State.
It was then explained that FaT can be understood as an attack on Right Hegelianism specifically. I'm gonna go out on a limb here and say that, theologically speaking, the book is basically Kierkegaard saying to the Danish Church: "Hold on! Don't think just because you've established this great ethics-preaching institution to take care of widows and orphans that that's the end of it! What about Abraham? He jumped totally OUTSIDE your standard ethical framework when he went to kill Isaac, and God GLORIFIED him for it! So how the hell does that work, huh?"
Near the end of the Kierkegaard section of that class, I went for a one-on-one QNA with the prof, and asked him why Kierkegaard thought anyone would be dissatisfied with living within the universal(and hence need to jump into the religious). The answer was something along the lines of "the universal applies to everyone, and hence the individual does not feel personally called by it."
IIRC, it basically boils down to Kant thinking that God would not order Abraham to violate the categorical imperative, aka the logical basis of all morality, whereas it was that very violation which made the sacrifice exactly what God would ask a potential Knight Of Faith to do.
In his intro to Nietzsche, our prof said that both Kierkegaard and Nietzsche attack society, with Kierkegaard calling it "the crowd" and Nietzsche calling it "the herd".
Extrapolating from that, we can probably say that the equivalent to the Knight Of Faith in Nietzsche's schematum is the Òverman. Except for the Knight Of Faith, the criterion for abandoning the ethical is religious, whereas for the Overman, it's aesthetic, in the sense of artistic, ie. don't help old ladies across the street because it's capital-G Good, do it because it's just beautiful. (Eternal Return comes into play here, but I'm not gonna get into that right now.)
Well, I guess it was pretty scuzzy to dump Regine like last week's laundry, but if that makes me a Knight Of Faith like Abraham, I don't have to answer to the boring old Ethical anyway, so woo-hoo!
I think we are left in no doubt (from the Attacks) that Kierkegaard regards Christendom as being the Universal Ethical of his time in Denmark..
Which seems to me to leave a quandary; if an ethical code predicated on thousands of years of Christianity becomes accepted as a/the Universal Ethical, how can the Religious (as suggested in F&T) be identified? If everyone in Denmark is Christian and is operating within the same mindset, how are they able to recognise and appreciate the TSoE?.
Second, if we are saying that (according to de Silencio) the Religious phase can only be obtained by a "leap of faith" which propels the Knight from being in Infinite Resignation to Faith, how is it possible for those who have not made the leap to recognise the positive value of the TSoE given that they're still operating within the Ethical and thus should hate/misunderstand it?
If Kierkegaard is hiding behind the curtain and sniggering, what is his point?
That Christianity can't have the cake (divine revelation) but also eat it (Christendom)?
* neither of whom I really understand
I think it's not so much that it's a load of old whooie, but that it only takes you so far, and doesn't provide a proper framework for living the religious life.
Isn't it actually putting a wall between True Religion and (for want of a better term) Christendom?
If you want to be a true Christian, you can't do it in a situation where laws and customs are built upon Christianity. For one thing, if you have a society built as if Christianity is the highest aspirational truth for organising society, then it becomes very hard to regulate different groups claiming that they are doing things (equal and opposite things) on direct command of the deity.
We've tried this, of course. It didn't end well.
I'm not exactly sure what you mean here. If a 19th-Century Dane heeded a call by God to perform human sacrifice in the manner of the kierkegaardian Abraham, the "regulation of different groups" wouldn't make a difference, because he wouldn't be telling anyone else about it anyway.
And yes, Kierkegaard sees the Danish Church, and presumably other institutions like it, as representing "Christendom". Which is, indeed, keeping people from living the true religious life.
This is mostly just me, but I kinda think of Kierkegaard's theology as being extreme anti-good works.
Well, that could mean alot of things. I haven't read it myself, so shouldn't really comnent. But it remains the case that Abraham loves Isaac throughout the binding, and, in fact, fully expects to get him back. (Or so thinks Kierkegaard.)
Well for one thing *Works of love* is not a pseudonymous piece by Kierkegaard, it in his own name. For another thing, according to K in the forward it is supposed to be "upbuilding discourse" rather than challenging.
I think it is quite sweet, you might like it. It doesn't to me read as "anti good works", quite the reverse.
Fair enough.
I'm not sure on what basis one would suspect SK of placing little value on works for the Christian. What I have been reading by him contradicts such a view. There is an excerpt from "For Self Examination" (series 1) in the "Essential K" where he talks about Luther shoving James aside to emphasize grace and then secular thinkers taking advantage of the deemphasis on works to eliminate the requirement of works at all. The situation is treated critically.
In similar light, faith as work (not a meritorious work but as something one must do in order for it to exist) is explained in F&T.
It is entirely possible that SK redefines "works." I haven't read enough to know. But at least some concept of it is in his texts, and whatever he thinks they are, he endorses works.
Regarding the state church:
I'm reading some of the attack literature, and it even comes out in F&T. De silentio depicts the church as identical to the ethical/universal, which, according to the concept of the Teleological Suspension of the Ethical (TSoE), is the very place where faith cannot exist. This is all part of the paradox of the single individual as the single individual in absolute relation to the absolute.
If this reflects SK's own views, and I think it does based on his attack pieces, he is condemning the church as the very place one cannot practice Christianity, at least the one that requires faith and personal, immediate (unmediated) access to God.
Late attack pieces talk about the church as an impediment to seeking first God's Kingdom, making it impossible for the Christian to obey Christ.
He describes it as a self-perpetuating money-making system, which only provides earthly comforts to the clergy and the delusion of a happy afterlife to the congregation. "Either/Or" is a concept that permeates his works. Either happy now or later, but not both or not in the same way.
More later, if I can.
I just got to the part in the book abut the Knight of Infinite Resignation (who I had completely forgotten about) and realized - yup. That's where I get off. No Kierkegaardian faith for me.
AFF
To be honest, I suspect the Knight of Faith is also a pretty silly concept. I wonder if the Knight who quits has more going for him than the Knight of Faith.
I don't know if Frank Capra rated Kierkegaard, but I sometimes like to think about whether his character George Bailey is a Knight of Faith, a Knight of Infinite Resignation or a Tragic Hero in the film "It's a Wonderful Life".
I suspect he's a Knight of Inf Res. He gives and gives and gives until he has nothing more to give. Pushed to the edge, he needs angelic intervention to show him how much impact he has on the world around him.
I don't blame him.
For good works, I was mostly thinking of the soteriology implied in Fear And Trembling. There, Abraham's elevation to a Knight Of Faith is unrelated to good works, and the works he does perform are, from the ethical standpoint, the polar opposite of good.
Yes, exactly. I think I mentioned earlier the commentator who said Kierkegaard represents the ultimate development of the protestant idea that salvation is strictly between the individual and God, unmediated by earthly institutions.
@Martin54 I refer you to the section where the roles and relationship between the poet and tragic hero are discussed. Wish I had my book for the section title. MP might be making a direct reference to Bravely Bold Sir Robin -- but altered slightly....which is a reference by technique to Problema III.
@A_Feminine_Force i don't know who can see oneself as having faith in light of the description of a K o F.
And I think that is the deliberate challenge of the book to its readers.
Run out of time again.
From what I've gathered here I find myself absolutely not wanting to be a K'ian KoF, so that challenge rather falls flat.
I realise I'd rather follow what is Good than follow God, if it comes to it.
Aw, you're just jealous because YOU'VE never heard the disembodied voice telling you to grab the hammer from your tool shed, head over to the house of your favorite relative, and smash their brains in. It makes ya feel pretty special. (Or so I've been told.)
Is there anything anywhere in the bible saying you shouldn't follow the example of Abraham?
Well, I think the kierkegaardian criticism of most Christendom-rooted interpretations of Abraham and Isaac is that they try to reassure us that in the end, it was all just a test: "Oh, don't worry, God would never actually let Abraham go through with it."
Whereas Kierkegaard wants us to focus on the idea that, prior to hearing the angel's voice, Abraham never once questioned the order to kill Isaac. He wasn't standing there with the knife in his hand saying "Okay, God, I know this is all just a ruse, I'll put the knife down just as soon as you give the signal."