Determinism, predestination and freedom

Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
To me at least(!) there were some interesting exchanges touching on this topic in the much tangented Divinity of Christ thread.

I’m not sure what the interest level might be. And the topic goes wider than Christian faith into issues of autonomy and personal responsibility. But I thought I’d set up a separate thread.

Here’s a trial balloon for you to have a pop at.
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Comments

  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    To provide some context from the other thread, here is an arresting quote (found online) from the Russian philosopher and Christian Nikolai Berdyaev, arguing against determinism.
    Freedom is fundamental and comes before all. Without it there can be no creativity. Without freedom all is mechanical and dead. There could be no love, no goodness, no friendship, and no meaning.

    Anyone compelled to act is responsible neither for the good nor the evil that he causes through his actions.

    Creativity requires agency. An agent is a center of consciousness, of decision-making, embodying intentionality and purpose. Determinism removes agency from the individual and effectively ascribes it to the Big Bang or the laws of nature, making human agency an illusion. Determinism reduces humans to the steel balls in a pinball machine that have no control over the spring-loaded mechanism that starts the ball’s journey around the machine, nor are there paddles that can be manipulated to alter the ball’s trajectory once the trip has begun.

    Freedom is the alternative to nihilism.


  • Barnabas62 wrote: »
    I’m not sure what the interest level might be. And the topic goes wider than Christian faith into issues of autonomy and personal responsibility. But I thought I’d set up a separate thread.

    Just a note Luther and some of the earlier reformers preferred to talk about the 'bound will' rather than engage in philosophical speculation about determination and free will itself. Obviously this changes as the Reformation progresses and other people get involved.

    From a purely scientific point of view I don't see a mechanism from which free-will in the completely libertarian sense can arise, unless you have a non-physical/non-material model of neurology.
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    chrisstyles

    Your last paragraph puts your finger on what I see as a big issue. And I see it the same as you.

    I do like Berdyaev’s vivid pinball machine analogy.
  • Could you expand on that, @chrisstiles? I'm no scientist but understand things like biological imperatives - creatures being genetically wired to reproduce the species etc.

    I'm not quite sure how neuroscience applies to issues of free-will and determinism but I'd be interested in hearing more.

    My gut-feel is to go with Berdyaev based on the short snippet but would be interested to hear other or opposing views.
  • I'm not quite sure how neuroscience applies to issues of free-will and determinism but I'd be interested in hearing more.

    Because within physics, chemistry and biology, there's no room for a 'controlled un-caused cause' of the kind that would be needed for free-will.
  • I'm not quite sure how neuroscience applies to issues of free-will and determinism but I'd be interested in hearing more.

    Because within physics, chemistry and biology, there's no room for a 'controlled un-caused cause' of the kind that would be needed for free-will.

    A good summary. I assume this is one basis for atheism? But it only works if you stay within that paradigm.
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    The way I put it in the other thread is that in a Plank probabilistic universe, the uncertain future becomes the certain present by the collapse of the wave function. That would also seems to apply to the atoms in the brain associated with human thought and awareness. There is no evidence to suggest that collapse of the wave function is in any way influenced by what we call conscious thought.

    We may I suppose be sentient steel balls in the pinball machine, but if we are we are passengers and observers of external realities. We rationalise the inevitable we observe.

    It’s very disturbing if true that human agency is an illusion. That, for example, this message is inevitable and has nothing really to do with my thoughts and reflections.
  • BroJamesBroJames Purgatory Host
    And its relation to anything that might be called reality or truth is equally tenuous.
  • KarlLBKarlLB Shipmate
    I'm not quite sure how neuroscience applies to issues of free-will and determinism but I'd be interested in hearing more.

    Because within physics, chemistry and biology, there's no room for a 'controlled un-caused cause' of the kind that would be needed for free-will.

    A good summary. I assume this is one basis for atheism? But it only works if you stay within that paradigm.

    Hey, you could make it a basis for Calvinism. God has his list of saved and manipulates the universe so they inevitably have faith. I mean, to be fair, IME faith isn't anything I have any free will to have or not. Choice seems totally the wrong word for it.
  • KarlLBKarlLB Shipmate
    BroJames wrote: »
    And its relation to anything that might be called reality or truth is equally tenuous.

    Well, maybe, but we're struggling to find anything that makes it not actually the reality.

    Don't get me wrong, I want to resist determinism to the death, but I'm really struggling for an even vaguely evidenced way out of it.
  • Gosh.

    I'm not sure I have enough understanding of science to have the vocabulary to discuss this properly. I think I understand what @chrisstiles is saying but not sure he means by a 'controlled uncaused cause.' What do you mean by 'controlled'? Some kind of agency that is able to transcend evolutionary or biological determinism?

    I'm not sure I understand what @KarlLB is saying about faith either. Are you saying that if we have faith there is something deterministic about that? That if we maintain faith it's because we can't do otherwise?

    I'm not sure I follow.
  • I'm not sure I have enough understanding of science to have the vocabulary to discuss this properly. I think I understand what @chrisstiles is saying but not sure he means by a 'controlled uncaused cause.' What do you mean by 'controlled'? Some kind of agency that is able to transcend evolutionary or biological determinism?

    Something that could transcend physical determinism in a way which is under our direct agency. There are random quantum related processes like wave function collapses, but those don't help if you are trying to look for a source of agency.
  • Ok. I'm still not entirely sure but get the gist I think. There's a strong atheist in my poetry group who comes out with very deterministic stuff relating to biology, metabolite and so on, much of which goes over my head but which can sound incredibly bleak, although impressively Stoical and resilient at the same time.

    What's a 'wave function collapse'?
    What sort of waves are we talking about? Knock on effects from butterfly wings? The Big Bang?
  • 'Metabolite'? Predictive text. I thought I'd typed 'mutability'.
  • Ok. I'm still not entirely sure but get the gist I think.

    As far as we know particular mental states correspond to particular physical states (i.e arrangements of chemicals and molecules - and ultimately fundamental particles). It's not like you have a little homunculus in your brain that can re-arrange molecules at will to 'create' a new mental state inside your mind.

  • Ok ... so we can't change how we think or act?
  • Ok ... so we can't change how we think or act?

    Not within a physicalist model of neurology at any rate, and no one has advanced any evidence for an alternative model.
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    edited February 2
    What’s a wave function collapse?

    We’re in the “tulgy wood” of quantum mechanics. I’m not sure whether it will enlighten or confuse you more but as a beginning, you might try reading about Schrödinger’s cat.

    How can a cat be both alive and dead and what happens to make it one or the other instead of simultaneously both?

    Thought experiments have a value in considering particle or wave physics but to be honest Gamaliel, it’s not an easy thought world to get into.

    I’m 60 years beyond university and haven’t spent a lot of time since thinking about quantum theory and quantum mechanics. Nor am I sure whether subsequent theoretical development makes my limited standing out of date. It may a case of the semi blind leading the blind!
  • KarlLBKarlLB Shipmate
    Ok ... so we can't change how we think or act?

    Not within a physicalist model of neurology at any rate, and no one has advanced any evidence for an alternative model.

    Of course, knowing that, along with everything else, is one of the factors that determines our thoughts and actions.

    It gets a bit recursive at this point.
  • DafydDafyd Hell Host
    As far as we know particular mental states correspond to particular physical states (i.e arrangements of chemicals and molecules - and ultimately fundamental particles).
    We don't know this - at least if there is a correspondence we have only the vaguest idea of what the physical states may be. We know that some parts of the brain seem to have more to do with some functions than others. But even if reductive materialism is true we have no idea whether any particular mental state is always modelled by the same arrangement of neurons and connections and vice versa.
    The best that can be said is that we presume that because we have no sound evidence for any states of being other than matter-energy that mental states must be produced from matter-energy.
  • DafydDafyd Hell Host
    Ok ... so we can't change how we think or act?
    Not within a physicalist model of neurology at any rate, and no one has advanced any evidence for an alternative model.
    Even within a physicalist model of neurology we can change how we think and act - it's just that the processes by which we change how we think and act operate in accordance with the laws of physics.

  • Dafyd wrote: »
    But even if reductive materialism is true we have no idea whether any particular mental state is always modelled by the same arrangement of neurons and connections and vice versa.

    I don't think this necessarily matters to the question of agency.
    Dafyd wrote: »
    Ok ... so we can't change how we think or act?
    Not within a physicalist model of neurology at any rate, and no one has advanced any evidence for an alternative model.
    Even within a physicalist model of neurology we can change how we think and act - it's just that the processes by which we change how we think and act operate in accordance with the laws of physics.

    Right, but within the physicalist model there's no real mechanism by which we would initiate that change, things will change constantly, but it's hard to see how we could said to be in charge of that change in any sense.

  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    Reductive materialism is a good phrase. I think determinist understandings are necessarily reductionist. For me at least, there have never been enough to come to terms with the reality of conscious human agency. For good or ill, as Berdyaev puts it.
  • Dafyd wrote: »
    Previous Text:
    As far as we know particular mental states correspond to particular physical states (i.e arrangements of chemicals and molecules - and ultimately fundamental particles).
    We don't know this - at least if there is a correspondence we have only the vaguest idea of what the physical states may be. We know that some parts of the brain seem to have more to do with some functions than others. But even if reductive materialism is true we have no idea whether any particular mental state is always modelled by the same arrangement of neurons and connections and vice versa.

    The best that can be said is that we presume that because we have no sound evidence for any states of being other than matter-energy that mental states must be produced from matter-energy.

    Well the question becomes, if there is some other state of being than that of matter-energy, how does it interact with, or change the course of, the matter-energy that is our bodies, including our brains? If I recall Descartes suggested the pituitary gland. I believe that has fallen out of favor. If not that, then what?
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    A further comment. I’m going to use the term “reactive awareness” to describe a phenomenon which I think has existed in life on earth for a long time, certainly preceding human life. That phenomenon has, I am sure affected the reaction between living beings and their environment, and affected both. The term conscious agent seems perfectly proper to use with such creatures. I do not it is fair to use the phrase “for good or ill” to describe the effects of that agency.
  • Gramps49Gramps49 Shipmate
    I remember one Adlerian professor telling us there is nature and nurture, but what you do with them is your responsibility.

    Genetic studies have shown how certain behavioral traits can be passed down through the genes, like openness; consciousness, agreeability, extroversion, and neuroticism. Mental health issues like schizophrenia, autism, bipolar issues too.

    There are also evolutionary forces that come into play in a human. The fight or flight mode is one example

    I know in matters of salvation, I have moved from the Augustinian position of the depravity of humans more to a more Pelegrin position that humans do have some agency in coming to faith. I do think faith entails good work and I do not have a hard and fast rule about original soin
  • Barnabas62 wrote: »
    I’m not sure what the interest level might be. And the topic goes wider than Christian faith into issues of autonomy and personal responsibility. But I thought I’d set up a separate thread.

    Just a note Luther and some of the earlier reformers preferred to talk about the 'bound will' rather than engage in philosophical speculation about determination and free will itself. Obviously this changes as the Reformation progresses and other people get involved.

    From a purely scientific point of view I don't see a mechanism from which free-will in the completely libertarian sense can arise, unless you have a non-physical/non-material model of neurology.

    I believe the technical term for that would be the soul.
  • KarlLBKarlLB Shipmate
    ChastMastr wrote: »
    Barnabas62 wrote: »
    I’m not sure what the interest level might be. And the topic goes wider than Christian faith into issues of autonomy and personal responsibility. But I thought I’d set up a separate thread.

    Just a note Luther and some of the earlier reformers preferred to talk about the 'bound will' rather than engage in philosophical speculation about determination and free will itself. Obviously this changes as the Reformation progresses and other people get involved.

    From a purely scientific point of view I don't see a mechanism from which free-will in the completely libertarian sense can arise, unless you have a non-physical/non-material model of neurology.

    I believe the technical term for that would be the soul.

    For which we have no evidence. And even supposing it exists, no knowledge of any mechanism by which it can direct the chemical and electrical activity which constitute our thoughts, emotions, intentions and desires physically.
  • ChastMastrChastMastr Shipmate
    edited February 3
    KarlLB wrote: »
    ChastMastr wrote: »
    Barnabas62 wrote: »
    I’m not sure what the interest level might be. And the topic goes wider than Christian faith into issues of autonomy and personal responsibility. But I thought I’d set up a separate thread.

    Just a note Luther and some of the earlier reformers preferred to talk about the 'bound will' rather than engage in philosophical speculation about determination and free will itself. Obviously this changes as the Reformation progresses and other people get involved.

    From a purely scientific point of view I don't see a mechanism from which free-will in the completely libertarian sense can arise, unless you have a non-physical/non-material model of neurology.

    I believe the technical term for that would be the soul.

    For which we have no evidence. And even supposing it exists, no knowledge of any mechanism by which it can direct the chemical and electrical activity which constitute our thoughts, emotions, intentions and desires physically.

    Since it’s not corporeal in the first place, studies of the material world can’t detect it. For how it “works,” or is connected to/interfaces with our bodies, literally God only knows. But if we’re talking about free will and predestination, then I’d say that’s more in the supernatural/ philosophical/ theological department than any of the material sciences in the first place.
  • KarlLBKarlLB Shipmate
    Except that we do have a lot of information now about how brains work, physically. The question of how an incorporeal soul "directs" one is valid. And also the question of how it works the other way - how does brain damage and degenerative neurological disease change the decision making process, if that is ultimately housed in the incorporeal soul?

    Proposing incorporeal souls raised more questions than it answers.
  • I don’t think greater knowledge of how the brain physically works changes anything about the reality of the soul. As for brain damage and related matters, I would say that those are not the fault of the soul at all, though how much it impedes the actual will working through the “broken machinery” it has to work with is, again, something I think only God knows. It’s like someone who is legally considered not guilty, or whose guilt is ameliorated, by reason of insanity.
  • KarlLB wrote: »
    BroJames wrote: »
    And its relation to anything that might be called reality or truth is equally tenuous.

    Well, maybe, but we're struggling to find anything that makes it not actually the reality.

    Don't get me wrong, I want to resist determinism to the death, but I'm really struggling for an even vaguely evidenced way out of it.

    What kind of evidence would suffice, though? If any apparent evidence could be explained away, then I would suggest that this would mean that the methods of analyzing this—specifically, looking at analyses that by their nature only focus on the material—might not be useful to find out something non-material. The existence of free will might even be a matter of faith, rather than absolute knowledge.

    I believe that resisting determinism, and resisting materialism, is wise. Don’t give up! ❤️
  • KarlLBKarlLB Shipmate
    ChastMastr wrote: »
    KarlLB wrote: »
    BroJames wrote: »
    And its relation to anything that might be called reality or truth is equally tenuous.

    Well, maybe, but we're struggling to find anything that makes it not actually the reality.

    Don't get me wrong, I want to resist determinism to the death, but I'm really struggling for an even vaguely evidenced way out of it.

    What kind of evidence would suffice, though? If any apparent evidence could be explained away, then I would suggest that this would mean that the methods of analyzing this—specifically, looking at analyses that by their nature only focus on the material—might not be useful to find out something non-material. The existence of free will might even be a matter of faith, rather than absolute knowledge.

    I believe that resisting determinism, and resisting materialism, is wise. Don’t give up! ❤️

    Propose alternative analysis methods. That's always the problem when people criticise empirical evidence - they don't say what to use instead.
  • DafydDafyd Hell Host
    Dafyd wrote: »
    it's just that the processes by which we change how we think and act operate in accordance with the laws of physics.
    Right, but within the physicalist model there's no real mechanism by which we would initiate that change, things will change constantly, but it's hard to see how we could said to be in charge of that change in any sense.
    On a physicalist model "we" are not ineffectual angels floating above the course of events helplessly looking on; but are particular highly organised sets of molecules within the course of things that are affected by events and in turn affect other events. We are in charge of change to the extent that changes are caused by preexisting properties of the particular groups of molecules that are us.
  • DafydDafyd Hell Host
    Barnabas62 wrote: »
    Reductive materialism is a good phrase. I think determinist understandings are necessarily reductionist. For me at least, there have never been enough to come to terms with the reality of conscious human agency. For good or ill, as Berdyaev puts it.
    As I tried to say on another thread understandings of human agency as sufficiently and necessarily motivated by prior psychological states - whether reason and will, or belief and desire - appear to be determinist without necessarily being reductionist.
  • ChastMastr wrote: »
    I don’t think greater knowledge of how the brain physically works changes anything about the reality of the soul. As for brain damage and related matters, I would say that those are not the fault of the soul at all, though how much it impedes the actual will working through the “broken machinery” it has to work with is, again, something I think only God knows. It’s like someone who is legally considered not guilty, or whose guilt is ameliorated, by reason of insanity.

    If we were able to exactly map brain activity with the conscious perception of human emotions, thoughts, and decision-making, would that constitute evidence for the non-existence of the soul? Would anything?
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    edited February 3
    Dafyd

    I think you said it very well. And it’s a very helpful issue to discuss.

    I think your use of the phrase “voluntary determinism” is correct. And also the understanding of psychological determinism is used properly in psychiatry, particularly in the use of Cognitive Behavioual Therapy, to help people trapped by unhealthy thought patterns.

    I accept the premise that people may be trapped, or voluntarily constrained, by cultural or religious beliefs, or abusive applications of control by others. And that trappedness is something that we may not be consciously aware of. I also accept that voluntary restraint may be either good or bad, depending on which external belief system it derives from.

    We may not be as free as we think we are. The fathers (and mothers) may indeed have eaten sour grapes, but the children’s teeth are not necessarily set on age. As I also said, Ezekiel had a point in bringing personal autonomy and responsibility into the equation.

    If there is such a thing (!) I incline to to the view that psychological determinism is a “partly deterministic”understanding. And a useful one.

    The love of Christ constrains us? Or as other translations put it “leaves us no choice”? Perhaps we do choose to be left no choice? Despite being aware of the options.

    Or perhaps we are “predestined” to go down that path. It’s a new dimension to the discussion. Or maybe a can of worms?
  • ChastMastr wrote: »
    KarlLB wrote: »
    BroJames wrote: »
    And its relation to anything that might be called reality or truth is equally tenuous.

    Well, maybe, but we're struggling to find anything that makes it not actually the reality.

    Don't get me wrong, I want to resist determinism to the death, but I'm really struggling for an even vaguely evidenced way out of it.

    What kind of evidence would suffice, though? If any apparent evidence could be explained away

    The problem is that we don't have any evidence at this point for this kind of dualism. Very simplistically if this were the model we'd expect to see evidence of interactions between the soul and the physical world when we looked inside the brain and as far as we can tell everything we've observed so far comports with physical laws.
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    Re the particular set of brain cells that make “you you”. That may indeed impact the way we think but I’m not sure it resolves the choice question. Nor how learning for example may affect the operation of those cells.

    I don’t believe that learning is an illusion.
  • Martin54Martin54 Suspended
    edited February 3
    @Barnabas62, where did the excellent @Dafyd use the expression “voluntary determinism”?
    Barnabas62 wrote: »
    Reductive materialism is a good phrase. I think determinist understandings are necessarily reductionist. For me at least, there have never been enough to come to terms with the reality of conscious human agency. For good or ill, as Berdyaev puts it.

    I don't think it is. I don't think determinism is meaningfully reductionist at all. Reduction to what? Determinism does not imply fatalism. Quantum mechanics is determined, mathematical chaos is determined, i.e. the results of determinism, and they go on to further determine reality. So we haven't the faintest idea, and neither could any proposed transcendent agent (God), whether it's going to rain tomorrow. There is no fixed future from fixed conditions as there is no such thing as objective, absolute reality. The fixed laws, constraints of physics, of possibility, (of which the preceding is one) do not dictate how the future unfolds. How we unfold. In our weakness and ignorance, in seeking meaning. In the 'simplest' natural phenomena. Matter is unimaginably complex to 'start' with. And then it interacts with more. From which emergent phenomena of ungraspable complexity above the 'lower' levels emerges, evolves, again and again. Matter, life, mind. Matter alone is infinitely complex.

    So, neither free will nor determinism operate in any absolute, meaningful, understandable sense. But they they both meet in the middle. Us.

    There's no need for magic in that.
  • DafydDafyd Hell Host
    mousethief wrote: »
    Dafyd wrote: »
    The best that can be said is that we presume that because we have no sound evidence for any states of being other than matter-energy that mental states must be produced from matter-energy.
    Well the question becomes, if there is some other state of being than that of matter-energy, how does it interact with, or change the course of, the matter-energy that is our bodies, including our brains? If I recall Descartes suggested the pituitary gland. I believe that has fallen out of favor. If not that, then what?
    I remember that in the case of atheism and theism you opined that "we don't know" was a perfectly unproblematic answer to "gotcha" questions from theists. Presumably it's also an unproblematic answer to questions from materialists?

    Anyway the problem for physicalism is that there are secondary qualities (*) - colours, sounds, smells - even if only in our minds - and by definition physicalists have to hold those aren't real. Not only are physicalist attempts to explain them away extremely hand wavey and reliant on large promissory notes - there isn't even an apparent way that the required correlation or explanation could be achieved, since the whole problem is that one side of the correlation can't be described in terms internal to physics.

    The same goes for intentional attitudes in general. As Quine, a physicalist, noted, physics requires that two terms with the same reference can be swapped without changing truth, but that's not the case for sentences about intentional attitudes. ("That's a swallow" implies "that's a dinosaur" but "she knows that's a swallow" doesn't imply "she knows that's a dinosaur".)

    Of course one can be a materialist without being a physicalist but then one's saying that matter has properties not recognised within physics.

    Basically there isn't an unproblematic option here.

    (*) Definitions: Wavelengths of electromagnetic radiation are primary qualities. The sensation produced in our visual systems and brains by that electromagnetic radiation is a secondary quality. Secondary qualities are either qualities that appear to only one sense, or apparently equivalently, qualities that can't be quantified and which therefore don't appear in physics, or equally equivalently, qualities that only appear within intentional attitudes (beliefs, wants, perceptions, hopes, etc) and therefore don't appear in physics.
  • peasepease Tech Admin
    One predictable aspect of this thread is that it can't seem to make up its mind whether its about philosophy, neurology, theology...
    Barnabas62 wrote: »
    It’s very disturbing if true that human agency is an illusion. That, for example, this message is inevitable and has nothing really to do with my thoughts and reflections.
    Why? As long as it's a robust illusion, does it matter or make any difference? What particular problem are you trying to address here? In the context of several of your posts (including the OP), it seems to be related moral responsibility.

    Maybe it would be useful to consider For Whom Does Determinism Undermine Moral Responsibility? Surveying the Conditions for Free Will Across Cultures:
    Philosophers have long debated whether, if determinism is true, we should hold people morally responsible for their actions since in a deterministic universe, people are arguably not the ultimate source of their actions nor could they have done otherwise if initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed. To reveal how non-philosophers ordinarily reason about the conditions for free will, we conducted a cross-cultural and cross-linguistic survey (N = 5,268) spanning twenty countries and sixteen languages.
    ...
    According to the principle of alternate possibilities, free will and moral responsibility depend upon the ability to do otherwise. Since determinism implies that agents could not have done otherwise once initial conditions and the laws of nature are held fixed, it follows that free will and moral responsibility are incompatible with determinism. This conclusion was challenged when philosopher Harry Frankfurt (1969) – in an ingenious appeal to counterfactual intervention – provided an influential argument against the principle of alternate possibilities, illustrated in the following thought experiment: Suppose that I want to stay home all day on Sunday to rest for the busy week ahead. Come Sunday, I cancel my plans to go hiking with friends. Instead, I spend the day watching a movie, cooking a meal, and taking a long nap on the couch. Unbeknownst to me, the door to my apartment was jammed and I would not have been able to go hiking, or leave at all, had I tried. In this circumstance I could not have done otherwise; but did I freely stay home anyway? According to the principle of alternate possibilities, I did not; but Frankfurt had the influential insight that we should think of my behavior as being freely willed despite my lack of alternate possibilities. Do people ordinarily conceive of free will as Frankfurt does? Some evidence has shown that North Americans typically agree with Frankfurt’s assessment that alternate possibilities are unnecessary for free will or moral responsibility (Miller and Feltz, 2011).

    On moral responsibility generally (and introducing the idea of compatibilism):
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/moral-responsibility/
    Compatibilists maintain that free will and moral responsibility are compatible with determinism. Versions of compatibilism have been defended since ancient times. The Stoics—Chryssipus, in particular—argued that the truth of determinism does not entail that human actions are entirely explained by factors external to agents; thus, human actions are not necessarily explained in a way that is incompatible with praise and blame (see Bobzien 1998 and Salles 2005 for Stoic views on freedom and determinism).

    And more specifically, regarding the Stoics
    https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/freedom-ancient/#StoiFataArguCoFateEven
    Epicurus believes that both the Principle of Bivalence and causal determinism are false; the Stoics believe that both are true, and that their truth does not render us powerless or make what will happen inevitable. In fact, the Stoics think that every event is both causally determined and fated by God...
    Which seems relevant, given the context of these forums and the significance of one of the notable sons of Tarsus (a significant location of the Stoic school of thought, at the time).
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    Dafyd used the phrase in the Divinity of Christ thread.

    I interpret you as saying we might have choices in the moment by moment uncertain material universe we find ourselves but our considerations of free will or determinism cannot answer that question with any certainty given the infinutely complex nature of the material world.

    That would make you agnostic about both free will and determinism.

    Do I read you right?
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    Thanks pease, I”ll follow up the links.

    I don’t think threads make up their mind! I’m sure we can talk past one another depending on whether we are considering philosophical, neurological or theological viewpoints.

    Why does it matter to me whether human freedom, including choice, is a reality or a robust illusion? Because I also believe that abuse of human freedom is very definitely a reality! Not a robust illusion. It hurts a lot if you’re on the receiving end. That would seem to matter. The suffering is very real. Berdyaev was writing in the context of that. His philosophy and faith did not arise in a calm society. Nor did Alexander Men’s. (Men was a great admirer of his and I mentioned him in the previous thread).

    Is my concern moral or ethical or political? Yes.
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    The post above my reply to pease was addressed to Martin54. It was cross-threaded! Sorry!
  • KendelKendel Shipmate
    edited February 3
    Barnabas62 wrote: »
    To provide some context from the other thread, here is an arresting quote (found online) from the Russian philosopher and Christian Nikolai Berdyaev, arguing against determinism.
    Freedom is fundamental and comes before all. Without it there can be no creativity. Without freedom all is mechanical and dead. There could be no love, no goodness, no friendship, and no meaning.

    Anyone compelled to act is responsible neither for the good nor the evil that he causes through his actions.

    Creativity requires agency. An agent is a center of consciousness, of decision-making, embodying intentionality and purpose. Determinism removes agency from the individual and effectively ascribes it to the Big Bang or the laws of nature, making human agency an illusion. Determinism reduces humans to the steel balls in a pinball machine that have no control over the spring-loaded mechanism that starts the ball’s journey around the machine, nor are there paddles that can be manipulated to alter the ball’s trajectory once the trip has begun.

    Freedom is the alternative to nihilism.


    Reading this feels like wearing a vice on my head. I understand that Berdyaev is relying on basic assumptions that are held in (Western) philosophy, and so doesn't bother to define or support any statements. Without doing that work, he doesn't have to confront his own assumptions, or even rely on reality to inform what he says about it.

    The entire quote relies on the assumption of absolute freedom (whatever he means by it) in contrast to absolute determinism (whatever he means by it) which he equates with compulsion. For human purposes, neither pole is of value.

    Refusing the reality of some nonconscious, nonsentient beginning, or ourselves as subjects of the laws of nature is simply silly. And the fact of them has nothing to do with our freedom or lack of it in any practical sense.

    We are. And have no control over our having come into being. Until some point of maturity, we are hardly "free" in any sense at all, unable to care even for ourselves. We are. within community and all that that implies. We are utterly reliant for years on the agency of others.

    Our existence and agency are subject to our surroundings as well as our very composition.
    Get away from the desk and hang out for a few weeks with brain-injured kids or adults, or with special ed kids. Spend time with residents of senior citizen communities. Learn about the brain-altering affects of certain chemicals such as heroine. Absolute freedom is an illusion. Although Berdyaev doesn't seem to grasp that.

    His final statement, "Freedom is the alternative to nihilism," is illogical. One can have all the freedom one wants and still see it all as pointless, absurd, meaningless.
    A nihilist can view freedom as an illusion, but that doesn't mean that having more freedom will disprove the view to the nihilist. There is something else going on, and more freedom (whatever that is) doesn't cure it, might even reinforce it. That's what the book of Ecclesiastes is about. I'm sure, as a Christian Berdyaev must have read it.

    Berdyaev never addresses in the quote above that freedom and necessity are more like a sliding scale, or perhaps form us through our interaction with them acting on us. These are more complex ways of looking at the matter, which are far more reflective of the actual lives we are living.
  • Dafyd wrote: »
    We are in charge of change to the extent that changes are caused by preexisting properties of the particular groups of molecules that are us.

    The current state of which depend on their previous state and the physical forces acting on them. I don't think there's room in that model for free will in the colloquial (and libertarian) sense, which leaves various forms of compatibilism and hard determinism.
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    Does Berdyaev’s view actually exclude compassion for the sufferings you mention, chrisstyles?

    He was writing in the contexts of both reactionary Tsarism and revolutionary communist totalitarianism. Plus he wrote a lot more.

    I’m not defending the binary defects of the quote. Of course the issues are more complicated than that simple quote would indicate. And of course it has rhetorical elements.
  • Barnabas62Barnabas62 Shipmate, Host Emeritus
    edited February 3
    Sorry for the misattrubution chrisstyles and Kendel My comment was addressed to Kendel. Just a mistake.
  • A Feminine ForceA Feminine Force Shipmate
    edited February 3
    Hello dear friends.

    I've been absent/on again/off again for so long now I barely feel like I have the place to comment on such a weighty subject. But it's one that haunted me for most of my university days as a philosophy major, and it's of course inextricably entwined with the logical conundrum known as "the problem of evil".

    It took me about 20 years to assemble a coherent narrative framework that admits of BOTH a Supreme Consciousness that is all-loving all-knowing and all-powerful AND the existence of free will, suffering and atrocious evil. And that free will AND predestination are both at work simulateously in my life.

    What was required was for me to pay careful attention to some of my own experiences with regard to past-life recall, and to not dismiss out of hand the possibility of continuity-of-consciousness through a transmigratory corporeal journey. Fancy schmancy roundabout reference to the R word.

    If anybody is interested in hearing my conclusions I'd be happy to share. But I don't want to intrude on the current discussion if it doesn't feel appropriate.

    Love to everyone .

    AFF

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