I would not think of Reformed Baptists as being in the Reformed tradition, nor would I think of the CofE as being within the Reformed tradition. The same goes for the FIEC. While Reformed Baptists (who go by different designations in the U.S.) and the FIEC may embrace aspects of “Calvinist” soteriology, and while historically—see the XXXIX Articles—the CofE shows the influence of Reformed thought, I don’t think those bodies would generally self-identify as being part of “the Reformed tradition,” though some individuals in them certainly might.
I think you are correct in the case of the FIEC, which largely represents an later re-appropriation of the traditions of the Magisterial Reformation. Things are a little more blurred in the case of the Anglican Church which has always contained Reformed elements, even if there isn't a continuous line of succession of sorts.
In terms of the Reformed Baptists the question would be one of which Reformed Baptists? The earliest Reformed/Particular Baptists were an independent development of English Puritans trying to navigate the period either side of the Great Ejection. Many of whom spent time on the Continent - which is partly why the various London Baptist Confessions draw heavily on the Savoy Declaration - and why the tradition ends up looking more like a form of Congregationalism. There was a General Baptist tradition that evolved sometime later, but the Particular Baptists didn't represent a development from that movement.
They are a fairly small tradition to this day, and the bulk of 'Reformed Baptist' churches North America wouldn't be able to trace their heritage back to this movement, so yes, in that sense you could consider them as outside the 'tradition'.
The thing about project management is that it is exactly not like that. Predictable I mean. The plans open the mind to at least some of the possibilities inherent in the project future. But in every project the unforeseen happens. The path to completion is invariably an unpredicted one. And it may not be the only one. Resourcefulness may take many forms. There is a lot of muddling through as a result of prior suboptimal decisions. Project teams argue about what’s best. The best argument doesn’t always win. As deadlines approach it can get nerve wracking. Human beings are not predictable under stress.
@Barnabas62, sorry - I wasn't talking specifically about your experience of project management, but of my experience in relation to decision-making in various organisational contexts - that is: what I find and what I see. But the other part of my point is that, if you were part of the process, you would have been rather less able to see it from the point of view of an observer.
What I'm suggesting is a psychological tendency within certain types of formally-constituted groups to think that they exist to make decisions, and that everything within their remit requires a decision that needs to be made. Decisions don't always need to be "made" - sometimes, particular outcomes just need to be accepted.
Within the context of this thread, the interesting question is how this tendency relates to the attitudes of the group's members to free will and determinism.
...The element I'm particularly unable to integrate is the self as watcher or observer. At this juncture, I started looking for some external reference points regarding narrative identity (and/or narrative self). One such reference that looks promising is The Metaphysics of the Narrative Self
Your metaphysics incorporates significant additional elements, but this description might serve as a useful basis. In particular, the concepts of autobiographical identity and autobiographical self and/or true self might be relevant.
Thank you for this reference it's very interesting indeed. Going to take time to read and reflect.
There are a couple of methods I use to enter "Observer mode". Some might call it a kind of dissociation, but this word implies a kind of pathology that is the involuntary result of trauma, not a deliberately induced state of awareness for the purpose of focusing attention on and correcting, discharging, overriding or rewriting certain undesirible or subconsciously operating states of being or behaviors.
I don't really think that here is the place to share this rather sensitive personal information but I would be willing to share more privately if you like.
Thanks - what you say about "observer mode" correlates with what I thought it might involve. (So I'm OK without further details of your methodology). The issue I have is more conceptual - to do with reaching a coherent understanding of what seem to me to be the somewhat disparate roles the concept "self" appears to play in your metaphysics.
Meanwhile, I'm still digesting the article. (No rush). But it has occurred to me that, while it describes "narrative", it leaves open the nature of the narrator.
Thanks - what you say about "observer mode" correlates with what I thought it might involve. (So I'm OK without further details of your methodology).
Just to be clear, none of my methods involve the use of psychotropic substances. [redacted}
Because of my spontaneous and interesting experiences with respect to the intersection of my consciousness with reality from an early age, I felt a very strong prohibition against using any psychotropics or chemical agents that might artificially widen the limits of my perceptual bandwidth or result in an addiction.
More on the other part of your comment as I finish with the article. Thank you for your patience.
AFF
AFF, sorry, but as this is an international board, I have redacted part of your post - North East Quine, Purgatory Host.
No problem. What’s interesting about internal decision making in projects is that all decisions are intended to be in pursuit of a particular implementation.
I accept what you say about decision making bodies.
Thanks - what you say about "observer mode" correlates with what I thought it might involve. (So I'm OK without further details of your methodology).
Just to be clear, none of my methods involve the use of psychotropic substances. [redacted}
Because of my spontaneous and interesting experiences with respect to the intersection of my consciousness with reality from an early age, I felt a very strong prohibition against using any psychotropics or chemical agents that might artificially widen the limits of my perceptual bandwidth or result in an addiction.
More on the other part of your comment as I finish with the article. Thank you for your patience.
AFF
AFF, sorry, but as this is an international board, I have redacted part of your post - North East Quine, Purgatory Host.
Oh oops, sorry. My bad. Will try to be more sensitive to the international legal landscape, though my experiences have always been within the boundaries of the local laws. Thanks.
Thanks - what you say about "observer mode" correlates with what I thought it might involve. (So I'm OK without further details of your methodology).
Just to be clear, none of my methods involve the use of psychotropic substances. [redacted]
Because of my spontaneous and interesting experiences with respect to the intersection of my consciousness with reality from an early age, I felt a very strong prohibition against using any psychotropics or chemical agents that might artificially widen the limits of my perceptual bandwidth or result in an addiction.
Indeed. If one can make the necessary "shift" while minimising reliance on extrinsic resources, so much the better.
@pease Sorry to take so long to address the second part of your question re: metaphysics or composition of "self". I struggled with the article and was reminded of my undergraduate days as a philosophy major. While I love philosophy for its exploration of what and how we "know" I was reminded of the fact that philosophers are just about the worst writers anywhere.
As you pointed out, the author doesn't really address the issue of the initial point of reference, but kind of begs the question. That is , assumes we understand what is meant by "self" and "person" then points to these as proofs of his thesis that these operate within narrative constructs. There are a lot of words in between, but this was my main takeaway.
Trying to keep my personal metaphysics as simple as possible, but running on to way too many words myself. The simplest metaphor for for I perceive "self" is a kind of matrioshka doll where the contents of each layer are not necessarily confined to a single iteration of the one containing them.
With regard to "philosophers are just about the worst writers anywhere", I am reminded of a claim that the way to read a paper written by an academic philosopher is to read the first sentence of each paragraph and ignore the rest. (No, the topic sentence does not have to be the first sentence in anyone else's writing.
One general point is that there's quite a lot of theorising about the narrative self by philosophers and theologians (although much of it seems less open regarding the points of reference).
I thought the article lost focus regarding social identities (and personae), and overlooked what seemed to me a rather obvious and relevant context - our online identities. (Of which both "pease" and "A Feminine Force" would be examples. Our corresponding online "selves" are the character roles we inhabit, or animate, when we engage with other online selves here, and work out what to post.)
More generally, the author doesn't really address the "how" of the various identities and selves and their inter-relatedness. (He does say he's not trying to argue for the claim that identities and selves are narratively constituted, just show that such a claim could describe what we want to say about our selves and our identities.) But I thought his identification of an autobiographical self and a true self (both arising from an autobiographical identity) was interesting and possibly relevant.
With your conception of a matryoshka doll in mind, the conception the article suggests to me is an innermost true self surrounded by a cloud of other selves, each of which are characters given form by being embedded within one or more narrative identities (which are themselves the contents of narratively-structured representations).
More generally, the author doesn't really address the "how" of the various identities and selves and their inter-relatedness. (He does say he's not trying to argue for the claim that identities and selves are narratively constituted, just show that such a claim could describe what we want to say about our selves and our identities.) But I thought his identification of an autobiographical self and a true self (both arising from an autobiographical identity) was interesting and possibly relevant.
With your conception of a matryoshka doll in mind, the conception the article suggests to me is an innermost true self surrounded by a cloud of other selves, each of which are characters given form by being embedded within one or more narrative identities (which are themselves the contents of narratively-structured representations).
Certainly one can look at it as a "core identity", a vulnerable "authentic being" around which one constructs layers of "narrative identities" as a form of "protective layer", and certainly I believe may people experience it that way. The question still arises, who is "at the core" and "who is doing the protective storytelling" and then who is doing the "acting out the "me" in the context of which story"?
And I do believe we construct narratives for ourselves at this level of consciousness as a means of surviving trauma or as a means of successfully navigating social scenarios in order to get what we want in a situation. The utility of identity as "skill set" can't be overstated.
This explains to me why, after 60 years of "being the youngest child" in a family, despite all other experiences and achievements in life, one may be involuntarily incapable of escaping the narrative and role that one was cast in from earliest childhood when one is in the presence of the people whose dramas depend on one behaving as "the youngest child".
For me personally, the level of consciousness I experience as "ordinary waking life" constitutes the "middle layer" of the matrioshka doll, with my "this life" narrative "personas" proceeding as smaller iterations from this level of operating awareness, but which awareness itself is a projection inward into reality of progressively larger iterations within the overarching narrative of successive incarnations.
This is what enables me to see my behaviours and circumstances at this level of being as "predetermined" or "programmed" to a certain extent, but it's what also enables me to perceive that the responsibility for the ultimate authorship lies with us and our exercising our sovereign Free Will at the "outer layers" of being.
Sorry to get in so late in this debate (though others may be quite glad!) but I'd like to add my particular take on this. When I first became a Christian I got into Calvinism probably because at the time it seemed to have more intellectual heft than most protestantism, and because libertarian free-will is something I've never been strong on.
For me, the main point at issue is whether God has retained the power to draw people to himself, with no exception, or whether he has ceded this control such that the final decision is left up to the individual. The progression for Calvinists who believe that predestination to hell is morally outrageous is either to go to a free-will position or a universalist position, which is where I stand.
Whether that is true or not, what boggles my mind is that people think it a horrible thing for God to decide to send everybody to bliss and heaven, because they can't stand the idea of them not being in ultimate control. Whilst maybe, I can sort of see this for people who are already (at least to their own satisfaction) part of the elect, but presumably they much prefer the idea of their children being able to "choose Hell", as if anybody does that with anything like the knowledge that would make that a valid decision.
As to arguing over free-will, I don't think we have the concepts to do it justice. For me, the idea that God acts at a completely different level of reality is enough to enable me not to object that my choices are ultimately incapable of eternally rejecting goodness, truth and all that God is. Personally I'm quite glad of that. How people hate the idea is just weird. I can understand anyone thinking it's just wishful thinking, but not anyone not even wishing it.
I rather doubt there's anyone who doesn't wish everyone to go to heaven, unless they're quite seriously sick in the head. But in my experience, those who think human beings have the freedom to choose to go elsewhere believe their position because they think it's true, not because they find it a personally attractive idea. The words "hate" and "can't stand" don't come into it.
With your conception of a matryoshka doll in mind, the conception the article suggests to me is an innermost true self surrounded by a cloud of other selves, each of which are characters given form by being embedded within one or more narrative identities (which are themselves the contents of narratively-structured representations).
Certainly one can look at it as a "core identity", a vulnerable "authentic being" around which one constructs layers of "narrative identities" as a form of "protective layer", and certainly I believe may people experience it that way. The question still arises, who is "at the core" and "who is doing the protective storytelling" and then who is doing the "acting out the "me" in the context of which story"?
I'm intrigued that you introduce the notions of vulnerability and protection to this - they hadn't occurred to me. I don't see them as fundamental to the conception.
And I do believe we construct narratives for ourselves at this level of consciousness as a means of surviving trauma or as a means of successfully navigating social scenarios in order to get what we want in a situation. The utility of identity as "skill set" can't be overstated.
I think I see what you're suggesting. Personally, I'd say the purpose of "successfully navigating social scenarios" is navigating social scenarios - but there is utility in having a self with a social identity that can do that.
This explains to me why, after 60 years of "being the youngest child" in a family, despite all other experiences and achievements in life, one may be involuntarily incapable of escaping the narrative and role that one was cast in from earliest childhood when one is in the presence of the people whose dramas depend on one behaving as "the youngest child".
Well - in the article's conception (or mine) there is no way of escaping a social identity - that's partly because social identity is the content of a narrative constructed by a social group - in this case, family (and often incorporating wider cultural/societal expectations). The only way of changing the narrative is collectively - but that doesn't necessarily mean that all the individuals have an equal say in the process. A single individual might be able to intentionally precipitate change to the narrative of one of their social identities, if they grasp its nature.
So, with respect to reincarnation, free will and determinism, I'm suggesting it's possible for this to occur during this (material) character phase, but it isn't straightforward or common, compared to the reactive mechanisms or circumstances that you describe above.
For me personally, the level of consciousness I experience as "ordinary waking life" constitutes the "middle layer" of the matrioshka doll, with my "this life" narrative "personas" proceeding as smaller iterations from this level of operating awareness, but which awareness itself is a projection inward into reality of progressively larger iterations within the overarching narrative of successive incarnations.
This is what enables me to see my behaviours and circumstances at this level of being as "predetermined" or "programmed" to a certain extent, but it's what also enables me to perceive that the responsibility for the ultimate authorship lies with us and our exercising our sovereign Free Will at the "outer layers" of being.
Thanks for this - after some reflection and going back and re-reading some of your other posts, I think I'm getting the hang of it.
Regarding just one aspect, what I'm picking up from the above is a fairly "shell-like" conception of layers. I don't know if that's misreading you, but one of the things that interests me with a "cloudier" conception is that there's more scope for ongoing adjustment and change, as well as extrinsic awareness of who-knows-what at the outer layers of being.
Regarding just one aspect, what I'm picking up from the above is a fairly "shell-like" conception of layers. I don't know if that's misreading you, but one of the things that interests me with a "cloudier" conception is that there's more scope for ongoing adjustment and change, as well as extrinsic awareness of who-knows-what at the outer layers of being.
Yes of course - I have oversimplified the concept in order to keep the number of words I need to use to a minimum.
What I haven't conveyed by the concept, and which can't be conveyed by the example, is the enormous complexity of the constant flow of information "in" and "out" and "through" these levels of consciousness, and how narrative paths intersect, diverge, fall below the event horizon, appear and disappear from our field of "choice".
And what an incredible ballet of collaboration we engage in at every level in order to facilitate each others' experiences of their own narratives.
It truly takes a God-level type of awareness to keep everything but everything in its field of attention and in motion, and we are only a fragment of everything-that-is.
Well - in the article's conception (or mine) there is no way of escaping a social identity - that's partly because social identity is the content of a narrative constructed by a social group - in this case, family (and often incorporating wider cultural/societal expectations). The only way of changing the narrative is collectively - but that doesn't necessarily mean that all the individuals have an equal say in the process. A single individual might be able to intentionally precipitate change to the narrative of one of their social identities, if they grasp its nature.
And I agree with this. The only way I differ from you or the author is in the perception that my presence within a social milieu and the decision to construct a social identity comes from a narrative imperative that originates at a "higher" or "outer" level of consciousness than the one I find myself operating within as a part of ordinary waking awareness. I'm experiencing what I have already written and collaboratively agreed with others who facilitate that experience.
And if it's agreed among enough of us that we want to change the social narrative on a larger scale then we collaborate with each other to facilitate someone having their "Martin Luther" or "Rosa Parks" or "Mohandas Gandhi" experience.
So, with respect to reincarnation, free will and determinism, I'm suggesting it's possible for this to occur during this (material) character phase, but it isn't straightforward or common, compared to the reactive mechanisms or circumstances that you describe above.
And yes, it's not frequent or common, but we should all be prepared for these sea-change moments because I believe we all get to play these pivotal roles, for better or worse, for one another at some point.
...
What I haven't conveyed by the concept, and which can't be conveyed by the example, is the enormous complexity of the constant flow of information "in" and "out" and "through" these levels of consciousness, and how narrative paths intersect, diverge, fall below the event horizon, appear and disappear from our field of "choice".
And what an incredible ballet of collaboration we engage in at every level in order to facilitate each others' experiences of their own narratives.
It truly takes a God-level type of awareness to keep everything but everything in its field of attention and in motion, and we are only a fragment of everything-that-is.
Ah - apologies - I see that you did mention the relevance of the flow of information to consciousness (on a human, and also rather larger, scale).
The way I see it, consciousness and therefore reality is continually affected by the flow of information. The human suit necessarily constrains the reception and broadcast bandwidth of information that is available to the indwelling consciousness, and so it affects what we experience as the operating "mind".
I'm guessing you see a strong relation between information and consciousness - does your conception include a theory of consciousness itself, or understand consciousness as being an information-based "property" (for want of a word)?
I'm guessing you see a strong relation between information and consciousness - does your conception include a theory of consciousness itself, or understand consciousness as being an information-based "property" (for want of a word)?
Well I don't know if it's a theory but what I have concluded from my own observation and from the puzzling conclusions of quantum mechanics is that consciousness is a type of organized energy. Can be neither created nor destroyed and so is "eternal" in some sense. This explains to me how someone's attention can convert a wave into a particle.
I believe matter is the result of this consciousness energy organizing itself coherently out of a field of "incoherent energy" or waves, and out of that organization there springs the coherence of matter. It's essentially invisible to itself until it organizes its activity in a coherent manner. This explains to me why form and entropy continue to rise and fall out of a field of potential.
We have, many of us, been in the presence of the corpse of someone we loved and knew and have said to ourselves "That's not him/her". At some level we are aware of the individual nature of the animating energy of that being, and how its absence leaves behind something that resembles that individual, but is emphatically not them.
It also seems to me to be kind of obvious that once the indwelling animating consciousness energy is detached from the systems it powers, through failure of the system at this level or through the intention of the consciousness to relinquish its form, the structure of the matter that was held in place by that energy begins to migrate towards incoherence.
Information seems to me to be a byproduct of the activity of consciousness energy as it organizes itself into coherent matter. It's the "operating instructions" as it were.
I rather doubt there's anyone who doesn't wish everyone to go to heaven, unless they're quite seriously sick in the head.
Well nobody is arguing with that, and if you then say that some hard-line Calvinists are "sick in the head" I'm not going to strongly disagree. But there is a but.
But in my experience, those who think human beings have the freedom to choose to go elsewhere believe their position because they think it's true, not because they find it a personally attractive idea. The words "hate" and "can't stand" don't come into it.
"Hate" was a bad choice of word, but in my experience people do reject the idea of God's sovereign power to overcome all resistance (so-called irresistible grace) mainly on emotional grounds as they see it as a violation of their individuality. Like God forcing himself onto you: forcing you to love Him, which of course is nonsense and not-intended, but which seems to them an unavoidable conclusion. I've even heard it termed "abuse".
I don't think this is based on a rational argument which proves the truth of libertarian freewill, as I don't think one exists. Nor do I think I can prove mine. But I know lots of people who can't stand the idea that ultimately God is in control even over their deepest thoughts and feelings. It's the standard first line of attack against universalism.
Having said all that I do think we can go round in circles, and much as I do appreciate your ideas, I can well see that you might doubt whether this issue needs any more debate.
Well, it’s maybe premature to worry about going around in circles when the debate hasn’t started. I simply wish to tell you that I am myself a counter example to your thesis that people who see God overriding free will as an untenable position do so for emotional reasons, like actually warning people to go to hell (eyeroll here) or more understandably, feeling violated. I feel neither of those things, and yet I do think God would be violating his own ethics and morals if he overrode the free will he gave us on so important a topic. Why bother giving us free will at all if it’s taken away immediately we trying to use it for a purpose God dislikes (and other people too)?
I mean, I could imagine such a capricious God; but the evidence of this universe points to him allowing our free will to stand, even in cases where the vast majority of us would prefer him to override it (for example, cases of border and abuse). The only way I could make sense of this morally is if I suppose God has made a firm choice to respect free will across the board, in all situations as a general rule. Tell me that he rips it away from us in one case only—that of eternal destiny—and i am forced to ask why he doesn’t do so in other extreme cases, such as that of Pol Pot or Ho Chi Minh.
See? Moral logic. Not enotional desire, or likes and dislikes. Unless it’s emotional to prefer a self consistent God.
LC: Maybe one of us should start a thread on the topic of God's own ethics and morals. What does God value? What limitations does God place on God's own behavior?
I'm guessing you see a strong relation between information and consciousness - does your conception include a theory of consciousness itself, or understand consciousness as being an information-based "property" (for want of a word)?
Well I don't know if it's a theory but what I have concluded from my own observation and from the puzzling conclusions of quantum mechanics is that consciousness is a type of organized energy. Can be neither created nor destroyed and so is "eternal" in some sense. This explains to me how someone's attention can convert a wave into a particle.
I believe matter is the result of this consciousness energy organizing itself coherently out of a field of "incoherent energy" or waves, and out of that organization there springs the coherence of matter. It's essentially invisible to itself until it organizes its activity in a coherent manner. This explains to me why form and entropy continue to rise and fall out of a field of potential.
...
Information seems to me to be a byproduct of the activity of consciousness energy as it organizes itself into coherent matter. It's the "operating instructions" as it were.
Thanks - having posed the question, it occurred to me that you might see things more this way round.
Though I'm afraid that I'm unable to assimilate the idea of "operating instructions" being a byproduct (probably as a consequence of my background in tech). However, what you describe reminded me of "digital exhaust", "the data generated by our everyday digital lives, including our social-media use", which can be used for a variety of purposes by whoever is able to access and process it. John Hagel, 2015:
The trusted advisor, with our permission, can simply watch and analyze the “digital exhaust” from our activities to develop deep insight into who we are and what is important to us.
Soshana Zuboff, in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism 2018:
Amit Patel's work with these data logs [at Google] persuaded him that detailed stories about each user - thoughts, feelings, interests - could be constructed from the wake of unstructured signals that trailed every online action.
Which is by way of saying that the other aspects of your post broadly make sense to me.
LC: Maybe one of us should start a thread on the topic of God's own ethics and morals. What does God value? What limitations does God place on God's own behavior?
i’d be up for that, but the last time i tried something similar, i got reamed out by a fellow shipmate for talking about him as if he were real. I’m not super eager to deal with that again.
Though I'm afraid that I'm unable to assimilate the idea of "operating instructions" being a byproduct (probably as a consequence of my background in tech). However, what you describe reminded me of "digital exhaust", "the data generated by our everyday digital lives, including our social-media use", which can be used for a variety of purposes by whoever is able to access and process it.
Well, my ability to conceptualize the nature and activity of the consciosness of the originating "I AM" is at an amoebic kind of level.
But ordinary syantax gives us a clue as to which order information proceeds from the field of incoherent energy. First is the thing - the subject - and what follows is the predicate, the verb, which implies some type of motion or activity. Information arises when we use the verb which describes the kind of motion, or lack of motion. The original Thing is the "I", and then everything else proceeds from it.
"In the beginning was the Word and the world was without form and void. And the Word moved on the face of the waters (the waves) ..."
Though I'm afraid that I'm unable to assimilate the idea of "operating instructions" being a byproduct (probably as a consequence of my background in tech). However, what you describe reminded me of "digital exhaust", "the data generated by our everyday digital lives, including our social-media use", which can be used for a variety of purposes by whoever is able to access and process it.
Well, my ability to conceptualize the nature and activity of the consciosness of the originating "I AM" is at an amoebic kind of level.
But ordinary syantax gives us a clue as to which order information proceeds from the field of incoherent energy. First is the thing - the subject - and what follows is the predicate, the verb, which implies some type of motion or activity. Information arises when we use the verb which describes the kind of motion, or lack of motion. The original Thing is the "I", and then everything else proceeds from it.
"In the beginning was the Word and the world was without form and void. And the Word moved on the face of the waters (the waves) ..."
All the clues are there, I believe.
AFF
In Welsh we say Wyf i - am I. Does that change anything?
In Welsh we say Wyf i - am I. Does that change anything?
I don't know. Maybe it does. But it seems to me the information is contained in the verb.
Anyway, I'm speaking of a level of consciousness that is virtually impossible to grasp the mechanics of its expression through matter, energy and motion, and I'm no physicist. I use the bits and pieces of what is understandable to me in my local consciousness in order to frame what I perceive in some vaguely coherent fashion.
And speaking of verbs, subjects and predicates, I guess we are speaking of the mechanics of narratives, and so it seems the topic becomes recursive.
"Hate" was a bad choice of word, but in my experience people do reject the idea of God's sovereign power to overcome all resistance (so-called irresistible grace) mainly on emotional grounds as they see it as a violation of their individuality.
I can’t understand anyone preferring to retain their individuality and go to Hell over losing their individuality but going to Heaven.
I can’t understand anyone preferring to retain their individuality and go to Hell over losing their individuality but going to Heaven.
There's a special genre of cosmic horror that explores exactly this type of dread - the dread of losing sense of "self" to some blissful state of assimilation into an alien singular consciousness, no matter how hellish or insufferable their present reality might be.
Clearly, if this genre has a market, there are people who resonate with this type of speculative fiction.
...
Well, my ability to conceptualize the nature and activity of the consciosness of the originating "I AM" is at an amoebic kind of level.
But ordinary syantax gives us a clue as to which order information proceeds from the field of incoherent energy. First is the thing - the subject - and what follows is the predicate, the verb, which implies some type of motion or activity. Information arises when we use the verb which describes the kind of motion, or lack of motion. The original Thing is the "I", and then everything else proceeds from it.
"In the beginning was the Word and the world was without form and void. And the Word moved on the face of the waters (the waves) ..."
All the clues are there, I believe.
It's worth noting that English is a subject-prominent language, in contrast to topic-prominent languages (and other linguistic forms). More generally, I don't think syntax tells us very much about the nature of consciousness.
Fairly prosaically, the syntax of language - English, in our case - is just a commonly agreed way of giving shape and form to our communication for the sake of brevity. It's a tool or convenience - it's quite possible for humans to communicate, or just to exchange information, without it. I don't believe any particular syntax is innate or inherent to consciousness.
More personally, my experience is that language itself is not necessary for consciousness, and even that there are many aspects of cognition that don't require language. The subjects, verbs and objects, clauses and sentences only (eventually) take shape if I have some need to express what I'm thinking.
"I am" is a linguistic expression of consciousness itself, the result of someone wanting to record an encounter with consciousness. It isn't the encounter, or the consciousness. Similarly, "In the beginning was the Word" is one of many possible human descriptions of instantiated primary consciousness. I see these two phrases as representing human conceptualisations of active expressions of consciousness.
Anyway, I'm speaking of a level of consciousness that is virtually impossible to grasp the mechanics of its expression through matter, energy and motion, and I'm no physicist. I use the bits and pieces of what is understandable to me in my local consciousness in order to frame what I perceive in some vaguely coherent fashion.
And speaking of verbs, subjects and predicates, I guess we are speaking of the mechanics of narratives, and so it seems the topic becomes recursive.
In my conception, these things are not the mechanics of narrative itself, just particular human expressions of narrative. At the level of consciousness, I suspect the only thing that narrative itself needs is the concept of movement, of change.
It's worth noting that English is a subject-prominent language, in contrast to topic-prominent languages (and other linguistic forms). More generally, I don't think syntax tells us very much about the nature of consciousness.
Fair enough. But it's possible that it tells us something about the origins of information and how it is communicated. Umberto Eco and his theory of semiotics is a fascinating investigation into the intersection between consciousness, information, and its communication.
Fairly prosaically, the syntax of language - English, in our case - is just a commonly agreed way of giving shape and form to our communication for the sake of brevity. It's a tool or convenience - it's quite possible for humans to communicate, or just to exchange information, without it.
I don't believe any particular syntax is innate or inherent to consciousness.
Absolutely. There's an entire right-hemispheric "processor" that operates wordlessly and traffics entirely in sensory information. It's the conduit for creativity and emotional expression.
It's funny you mention that syntax is not innate or inherent to consciousness. I recall an experience that a friend of mine related to me where she was on an Ayahuasca retreat in Peru. The gathering was international, and she was sitting next to a Russian man. He told a joke in Russian and she laughed because she got it, even though she speaks no word of Russian.
More personally, my experience is that language itself is not necessary for consciousness, and even that there are many aspects of cognition that don't require language. The subjects, verbs and objects, clauses and sentences only (eventually) take shape if I have some need to express what I'm thinking.
I agree. This is why I say that information is a byproduct of consciousness. It's not the consciousness itself.
"I am" is a linguistic expression of consciousness itself, the result of someone wanting to record an encounter with consciousness. It isn't the encounter, or the consciousness. Similarly, "In the beginning was the Word" is one of many possible human descriptions of instantiated primary consciousness. I see these two phrases as representing human conceptualisations of active expressions of consciousness.
Yes. So the information, linguistically conveyed, arises from the field of consciousness, and is the byproduct of its "activity".
In my conception, these things are not the mechanics of narrative itself, just particular human expressions of narrative. At the level of consciousness, I suspect the only thing that narrative itself needs is the concept of movement, of change.
I believe it's this very movement that instigates the generation and flow of information. "I AM" is a static kind of awareness. It may encompass everything and every potential, but unless there is movement, no further information is generated.
With “I Am,” are we talking about the name revealed to Moses at the burning bush, or are we talking about individual consciousness or the like? Because if it’s the former, the meaning in English syntax seems less important that the meaning in Hebrew syntax, about which much inked has been spilled. And the name is revealed as both ‘Ehyeh-‘Asher-‘Ehyeh (I am what I am/I am that I am/I will be what I will be/other possibilities) as well as the simple “I am”/“I will be”/other possibilities.
Sorry if I’m completely misunderstanding. I’m afraid this has all moved to a height I’m not really following.
The whole thing seems to be a conversation in an English adjacent language known only to Pease and AFF. Certainly "quantum mechanics" seems to mean something completely different to my lay understanding of it.
With “I Am,” are we talking about the name revealed to Moses at the burning bush, or are we talking about individual consciousness or the like? Because if it’s the former, the meaning in English syntax seems less important that the meaning in Hebrew syntax, about which much inked has been spilled. And the name is revealed as both ‘Ehyeh-‘Asher-‘Ehyeh (I am what I am/I am that I am/I will be what I will be/other possibilities) as well as the simple “I am”/“I will be”/other possibilities.
Sorry if I’m completely misunderstanding. I’m afraid this has all moved to a height I’m not really following.
I don't think you're misunderstanding, if there's anything to be understood here because it's not really clear to me that I'm communicating at all well. A lot of this stuff is not even fully crystallized to my satisfaction either, so it's probably better to reel things in closer to "this level".
My most solid concepts of consciousness (to my way of thinking) are confined to one or two levels "in here" and about three, maybe stretching to a fourth level "out there".
With regard to I AM - whether in Hebrew or English - I feel as if the same thing can be said by either God or me, and it would resonate with the same meaning because I can at times perceive my consciousness as simply a fractal projection of the Originating Consciousness, the One in Whom I have my being.
My consciousness is just a single fraction in the infinitely divisible Originating Consciousness - or God Mind if you will. And I don't think I'm special, I think this is the case for all of us. We are all One in the Body of Christ and in the Mind of God. Whether we want to perceive reality like this or not is a matter of Free Will or a matter of Choice.
IMO there's no wrong answer here because everyone's experience is sacred and it just depends on the level you want to look at it from.
I do think God would be violating his own ethics and morals if he overrode the free will he gave us on so important a topic. Why bother giving us free will at all if it’s taken away immediately we trying to use it for a purpose God dislikes (and other people too)?
That is not the belief, and I agree it would make no sense. However one understands the limits of free-will, it remains the same for all decisions. Yes, he gave us free will, but the whole problem is that without further clarification, that term has at least two meanings: libertarian or compatible (not my favourite terms but generally accepted). And my view is that we do not libertarian free will, at all.
Tell me that he rips it away from us in one case only—that of eternal destiny—and i am forced to ask why he doesn’t do so in other extreme cases, such as that of Pol Pot or Ho Chi Minh.
Well from a free-will perspective you are stating the obvious and powerful objection to the whole idea that God has remained in control. If I accept God's unrestricted sovereignty I can't get out of making God the the author of evil because he could have stopped it. Why doesn't he?
And obviously there's no answer that is convincing at the logical level. I do not think that predestination makes the problem of evil any worse, unless you go as far as believing in a limited God who literally could not stop evil acts no matter how much he tried. I have flirted with this, but I don't think it flies.
So one takes refuge in saying it's an insoluble mystery, which is where most of us end up. I think we all end up believing what "seems right" which is a mixture of our deepest desires, convictions and prejudices, usually rationalised by a highly subjective choice and interpretation of biblical text.
So for me the only sense I can make of the whole think is that, in the end, all shall be well including for all of those whose lives on this earth has been anything but well. Which really is what Universal Restoration is about. It is easier for me because the oft quoted question of C.S. Lewis, does not apply. He asks if God saves everyone, does he do it with their consent or against it. That's only a problem for believers in libertarian free will.
I don’t understand the distinction you’re making with “libertarian” free will—possibly because I tend to stay out of deep philosophy as one unified for it. My own church body would say (with Lewis) that to permit something is not to do it, and the moral responsibility rests primarily, maybe solely, with the doer. And w believe only in single predestination, so have no trouble of the sort you mention.
It's worth noting that English is a subject-prominent language, in contrast to topic-prominent languages (and other linguistic forms). More generally, I don't think syntax tells us very much about the nature of consciousness.
Fair enough. But it's possible that it tells us something about the origins of information and how it is communicated. Umberto Eco and his theory of semiotics is a fascinating investigation into the intersection between consciousness, information, and its communication.
It is fascinating, but semiosis is - for Eco - cultural in nature, so I'm not sure how relevant it is to the intended focus of my post.
The point I was trying to make was about the limited relevance of syntax and language to the nature of (the various levels of) consciousness, and not about the part that information plays. However, since you've interpreted it that way, I'd say that information that is communicated linguistically by conscious humans is a pale imitation of information that is integral to consciousness, and upon which consciousness depends, unbound by the limitations of linguistic communication.
In my conception, the origins of information are not found with any linguistic analysis of communication, but as an aspect of consciousness itself. Information doesn't arise from using verbs. Consciousness and information together precede communication.
More personally, my experience is that language itself is not necessary for consciousness, and even that there are many aspects of cognition that don't require language. The subjects, verbs and objects, clauses and sentences only (eventually) take shape if I have some need to express what I'm thinking.
I agree. This is why I say that information is a byproduct of consciousness. It's not the consciousness itself.
That's not what I'm saying. Just because there aren't any subjects, verbs, objects, clauses or sentences doesn't mean there isn't any information. Information plays a role in consciousness itself. And information can be a product of consciousness, but I'm still unable to attach significance to it being a byproduct.
"I am" is a linguistic expression of consciousness itself, the result of someone wanting to record an encounter with consciousness. It isn't the encounter, or the consciousness. Similarly, "In the beginning was the Word" is one of many possible human descriptions of instantiated primary consciousness. I see these two phrases as representing human conceptualisations of active expressions of consciousness.
Yes. So the information, linguistically conveyed, arises from the field of consciousness, and is the byproduct of its "activity".
I wouldn't describe it that way - what you call the (linguistically conveyed) byproduct is an infinitesimally small part of the "bigger picture" information (of which it forms a very pale imitation indeed).
The immaterial consciousness of the "I am" encounter and of the "In the beginning was the Word" description incorporates an (infinitely) vast amount of non-linguistic information. This is both infinitely more than can be apprehended, or conveyed linguistically, by any human agent.
In my conception, these things are not the mechanics of narrative itself, just particular human expressions of narrative. At the level of consciousness, I suspect the only thing that narrative itself needs is the concept of movement, of change.
I believe it's this very movement that instigates the generation and flow of information. "I AM" is a static kind of awareness. It may encompass everything and every potential, but unless there is movement, no further information is generated.
I'm not sure if a static consciousness can be said to be conscious. I would say that internal activity is intrinsic to consciousness. And to the extent that this internal activity involves movement, it involves the movement of information, in the course of which it may (as noted) produce information, as well as consciousness.
The chicken / egg comparison had also been going through my mind in relation to the last few posts, but I find it hard to conceive of there being consciousness in the absence of information.
When a human being talks about consciousness, we generally understand it to mean that we're conscious of something - and being conscious of something is a way of describing information.
Consider the entry into consciousness that we make when we wake up. The concept expressed in the sentence "I'm awake" is information. And it's information at a conceptual level, regardless of whether we do or don't utter, or even just think, the words.
The chicken / egg comparison had also been going through my mind in relation to the last few posts, but I find it hard to conceive of there being consciousness in the absence of information.
When a human being talks about consciousness, we generally understand it to mean that we're conscious of something - and being conscious of something is a way of describing information.
Consider the entry into consciousness that we make when we wake up. The concept expressed in the sentence "I'm awake" is information. And it's information at a conceptual level, regardless of whether we do or don't utter, or even just think, the words.
So maybe it might be helpful if I understood what, in your opinion, is the essential nature of information? And where do we think it comes from?
What was it that the first consciousness was conscious of? Which is to say that I'm not sure I can address your questions without also addressing the question of where you think consciousness comes from.
For want of another approach, the wikipedia page begins as follows:
Information is an abstract concept that refers to something which has the power to inform. At the most fundamental level, it pertains to the interpretation (perhaps formally) of that which may be sensed, or their abstractions. Any natural process that is not completely random and any observable pattern in any medium can be said to convey some amount of information.
I think the relevant word is "abstract(ions)". The above quote unsurprisingly describes "information" in terms of what can be sensed, given that we inhabit a material universe, but adds that it also applies to abstractions. And the concept itself is abstract - it still conveys an idea even in the absence of a medium, sensed or otherwise. Whether or not consciousness precedes matter: to the extent that consciousness is aware of something (even just of itself), it is informed.
What was it that the first consciousness was conscious of? Which is to say that I'm not sure I can address your questions without also addressing the question of where you think consciousness comes from.
For want of another approach, the wikipedia page begins as follows:
Information is an abstract concept that refers to something which has the power to inform. At the most fundamental level, it pertains to the interpretation (perhaps formally) of that which may be sensed, or their abstractions. Any natural process that is not completely random and any observable pattern in any medium can be said to convey some amount of information.
I think the relevant word is "abstract(ions)". The above quote unsurprisingly describes "information" in terms of what can be sensed, given that we inhabit a material universe, but adds that it also applies to abstractions. And the concept itself is abstract - it still conveys an idea even in the absence of a medium, sensed or otherwise. Whether or not consciousness precedes matter: to the extent that consciousness is aware of something (even just of itself), it is informed.
So it seems to me that it's a "both and" to your way of thinking.
To me, the answers to the questions are not yet crystallized to my satisfaction, but this seems to me to be a very definite possibility.
Will report back if any insights arise from entertaining this idea.
Many many thanks for your feedback and insights, it's been such a pleasure to share and exchange with you, and to receive the benefits of your own careful reasoning.
I don’t understand the distinction you’re making with “libertarian” free will
When someone who believes in God then it goes like this. Compatible (or limited) free will means that nothing which operates on the level of physical reality is forcing you down any path that you do not want to go down. So, nobody is holding a gun to your head, your mind is not disabled by drugs or a mental illness.
Libertarian free will means that no other cause, even acting at a level of reality deeper that the physical, constrains our will either. Most would believe that God could do that, but chooses to self-limit so as allow us to be free of His overriding power. This really is what most Christians mean by free will, and as far as they are concerned the Reformed view simply denies free will.
My own church body would say (with Lewis) that to permit something is not to do it
As indeed the Reformed view is that to predestine something is not to cause or do it.
I don't think any of that cuts much ice in attempts to answer the problem of evil. At least with me. A God creating an out of control world and allowing the evil to exists and seemingly flourish, leaves Him ultimately responsible.
But what seems acceptable (even obvious) to one, can sound like nonsense to someone else. That just seems to be the way it is.
I don’t understand the distinction you’re making with “libertarian” free will
When someone who believes in God then it goes like this. Compatible (or limited) free will means that nothing which operates on the level of physical reality is forcing you down any path that you do not want to go down. So, nobody is holding a gun to your head, your mind is not disabled by drugs or a mental illness.
.
I don't think this is correct. Compatibilism means that free will and (physical) determism are compatible. For instance. someone has the ability to act according to their motivation but the nature of that motivation may be determined by other things (in a materialistic view by things like the laws of physics which govern the way particles move).
chrisstiles: I think your description would be accepted by many, and probably is standard for those of a materialist persuasion.
For me it doesn't help a lot because it assumes that "free will" has an agreed definition. So then it makes sense to say that "free will is compatible with physical determinism". But since for many, free will excludes determinism, I'm not sure it makes sense. But it is rather an argument about words.
But since for many, free will excludes determinism, .
Yes and those for whom it excludes determinism would be incompatibilists. There's a debate about what constitutes free will, that's not an argument for misrepresenting people's positions.
Comments
I think you are correct in the case of the FIEC, which largely represents an later re-appropriation of the traditions of the Magisterial Reformation. Things are a little more blurred in the case of the Anglican Church which has always contained Reformed elements, even if there isn't a continuous line of succession of sorts.
In terms of the Reformed Baptists the question would be one of which Reformed Baptists? The earliest Reformed/Particular Baptists were an independent development of English Puritans trying to navigate the period either side of the Great Ejection. Many of whom spent time on the Continent - which is partly why the various London Baptist Confessions draw heavily on the Savoy Declaration - and why the tradition ends up looking more like a form of Congregationalism. There was a General Baptist tradition that evolved sometime later, but the Particular Baptists didn't represent a development from that movement.
They are a fairly small tradition to this day, and the bulk of 'Reformed Baptist' churches North America wouldn't be able to trace their heritage back to this movement, so yes, in that sense you could consider them as outside the 'tradition'.
The thing about project management is that it is exactly not like that. Predictable I mean. The plans open the mind to at least some of the possibilities inherent in the project future. But in every project the unforeseen happens. The path to completion is invariably an unpredicted one. And it may not be the only one. Resourcefulness may take many forms. There is a lot of muddling through as a result of prior suboptimal decisions. Project teams argue about what’s best. The best argument doesn’t always win. As deadlines approach it can get nerve wracking. Human beings are not predictable under stress.
What I'm suggesting is a psychological tendency within certain types of formally-constituted groups to think that they exist to make decisions, and that everything within their remit requires a decision that needs to be made. Decisions don't always need to be "made" - sometimes, particular outcomes just need to be accepted.
Within the context of this thread, the interesting question is how this tendency relates to the attitudes of the group's members to free will and determinism.
Meanwhile, I'm still digesting the article. (No rush). But it has occurred to me that, while it describes "narrative", it leaves open the nature of the narrator.
Just to be clear, none of my methods involve the use of psychotropic substances. [redacted}
Because of my spontaneous and interesting experiences with respect to the intersection of my consciousness with reality from an early age, I felt a very strong prohibition against using any psychotropics or chemical agents that might artificially widen the limits of my perceptual bandwidth or result in an addiction.
More on the other part of your comment as I finish with the article. Thank you for your patience.
AFF
AFF, sorry, but as this is an international board, I have redacted part of your post - North East Quine, Purgatory Host.
No problem. What’s interesting about internal decision making in projects is that all decisions are intended to be in pursuit of a particular implementation.
I accept what you say about decision making bodies.
Oh oops, sorry. My bad. Will try to be more sensitive to the international legal landscape, though my experiences have always been within the boundaries of the local laws. Thanks.
AFF
North East Quine, Purgatory Host
As you pointed out, the author doesn't really address the issue of the initial point of reference, but kind of begs the question. That is , assumes we understand what is meant by "self" and "person" then points to these as proofs of his thesis that these operate within narrative constructs. There are a lot of words in between, but this was my main takeaway.
Trying to keep my personal metaphysics as simple as possible, but running on to way too many words myself. The simplest metaphor for for I perceive "self" is a kind of matrioshka doll where the contents of each layer are not necessarily confined to a single iteration of the one containing them.
AFF
One general point is that there's quite a lot of theorising about the narrative self by philosophers and theologians (although much of it seems less open regarding the points of reference).
I thought the article lost focus regarding social identities (and personae), and overlooked what seemed to me a rather obvious and relevant context - our online identities. (Of which both "pease" and "A Feminine Force" would be examples. Our corresponding online "selves" are the character roles we inhabit, or animate, when we engage with other online selves here, and work out what to post.)
More generally, the author doesn't really address the "how" of the various identities and selves and their inter-relatedness. (He does say he's not trying to argue for the claim that identities and selves are narratively constituted, just show that such a claim could describe what we want to say about our selves and our identities.) But I thought his identification of an autobiographical self and a true self (both arising from an autobiographical identity) was interesting and possibly relevant.
With your conception of a matryoshka doll in mind, the conception the article suggests to me is an innermost true self surrounded by a cloud of other selves, each of which are characters given form by being embedded within one or more narrative identities (which are themselves the contents of narratively-structured representations).
Certainly one can look at it as a "core identity", a vulnerable "authentic being" around which one constructs layers of "narrative identities" as a form of "protective layer", and certainly I believe may people experience it that way. The question still arises, who is "at the core" and "who is doing the protective storytelling" and then who is doing the "acting out the "me" in the context of which story"?
And I do believe we construct narratives for ourselves at this level of consciousness as a means of surviving trauma or as a means of successfully navigating social scenarios in order to get what we want in a situation. The utility of identity as "skill set" can't be overstated.
This explains to me why, after 60 years of "being the youngest child" in a family, despite all other experiences and achievements in life, one may be involuntarily incapable of escaping the narrative and role that one was cast in from earliest childhood when one is in the presence of the people whose dramas depend on one behaving as "the youngest child".
For me personally, the level of consciousness I experience as "ordinary waking life" constitutes the "middle layer" of the matrioshka doll, with my "this life" narrative "personas" proceeding as smaller iterations from this level of operating awareness, but which awareness itself is a projection inward into reality of progressively larger iterations within the overarching narrative of successive incarnations.
This is what enables me to see my behaviours and circumstances at this level of being as "predetermined" or "programmed" to a certain extent, but it's what also enables me to perceive that the responsibility for the ultimate authorship lies with us and our exercising our sovereign Free Will at the "outer layers" of being.
AFF
For me, the main point at issue is whether God has retained the power to draw people to himself, with no exception, or whether he has ceded this control such that the final decision is left up to the individual. The progression for Calvinists who believe that predestination to hell is morally outrageous is either to go to a free-will position or a universalist position, which is where I stand.
Whether that is true or not, what boggles my mind is that people think it a horrible thing for God to decide to send everybody to bliss and heaven, because they can't stand the idea of them not being in ultimate control. Whilst maybe, I can sort of see this for people who are already (at least to their own satisfaction) part of the elect, but presumably they much prefer the idea of their children being able to "choose Hell", as if anybody does that with anything like the knowledge that would make that a valid decision.
As to arguing over free-will, I don't think we have the concepts to do it justice. For me, the idea that God acts at a completely different level of reality is enough to enable me not to object that my choices are ultimately incapable of eternally rejecting goodness, truth and all that God is. Personally I'm quite glad of that. How people hate the idea is just weird. I can understand anyone thinking it's just wishful thinking, but not anyone not even wishing it.
Well - in the article's conception (or mine) there is no way of escaping a social identity - that's partly because social identity is the content of a narrative constructed by a social group - in this case, family (and often incorporating wider cultural/societal expectations). The only way of changing the narrative is collectively - but that doesn't necessarily mean that all the individuals have an equal say in the process. A single individual might be able to intentionally precipitate change to the narrative of one of their social identities, if they grasp its nature.
So, with respect to reincarnation, free will and determinism, I'm suggesting it's possible for this to occur during this (material) character phase, but it isn't straightforward or common, compared to the reactive mechanisms or circumstances that you describe above.
Thanks for this - after some reflection and going back and re-reading some of your other posts, I think I'm getting the hang of it.
Regarding just one aspect, what I'm picking up from the above is a fairly "shell-like" conception of layers. I don't know if that's misreading you, but one of the things that interests me with a "cloudier" conception is that there's more scope for ongoing adjustment and change, as well as extrinsic awareness of who-knows-what at the outer layers of being.
Yes of course - I have oversimplified the concept in order to keep the number of words I need to use to a minimum.
What I haven't conveyed by the concept, and which can't be conveyed by the example, is the enormous complexity of the constant flow of information "in" and "out" and "through" these levels of consciousness, and how narrative paths intersect, diverge, fall below the event horizon, appear and disappear from our field of "choice".
And what an incredible ballet of collaboration we engage in at every level in order to facilitate each others' experiences of their own narratives.
It truly takes a God-level type of awareness to keep everything but everything in its field of attention and in motion, and we are only a fragment of everything-that-is.
AFF
And I agree with this. The only way I differ from you or the author is in the perception that my presence within a social milieu and the decision to construct a social identity comes from a narrative imperative that originates at a "higher" or "outer" level of consciousness than the one I find myself operating within as a part of ordinary waking awareness. I'm experiencing what I have already written and collaboratively agreed with others who facilitate that experience.
And if it's agreed among enough of us that we want to change the social narrative on a larger scale then we collaborate with each other to facilitate someone having their "Martin Luther" or "Rosa Parks" or "Mohandas Gandhi" experience.
And yes, it's not frequent or common, but we should all be prepared for these sea-change moments because I believe we all get to play these pivotal roles, for better or worse, for one another at some point.
AFF
Well I don't know if it's a theory but what I have concluded from my own observation and from the puzzling conclusions of quantum mechanics is that consciousness is a type of organized energy. Can be neither created nor destroyed and so is "eternal" in some sense. This explains to me how someone's attention can convert a wave into a particle.
I believe matter is the result of this consciousness energy organizing itself coherently out of a field of "incoherent energy" or waves, and out of that organization there springs the coherence of matter. It's essentially invisible to itself until it organizes its activity in a coherent manner. This explains to me why form and entropy continue to rise and fall out of a field of potential.
We have, many of us, been in the presence of the corpse of someone we loved and knew and have said to ourselves "That's not him/her". At some level we are aware of the individual nature of the animating energy of that being, and how its absence leaves behind something that resembles that individual, but is emphatically not them.
It also seems to me to be kind of obvious that once the indwelling animating consciousness energy is detached from the systems it powers, through failure of the system at this level or through the intention of the consciousness to relinquish its form, the structure of the matter that was held in place by that energy begins to migrate towards incoherence.
Information seems to me to be a byproduct of the activity of consciousness energy as it organizes itself into coherent matter. It's the "operating instructions" as it were.
AFF
"Hate" was a bad choice of word, but in my experience people do reject the idea of God's sovereign power to overcome all resistance (so-called irresistible grace) mainly on emotional grounds as they see it as a violation of their individuality. Like God forcing himself onto you: forcing you to love Him, which of course is nonsense and not-intended, but which seems to them an unavoidable conclusion. I've even heard it termed "abuse".
I don't think this is based on a rational argument which proves the truth of libertarian freewill, as I don't think one exists. Nor do I think I can prove mine. But I know lots of people who can't stand the idea that ultimately God is in control even over their deepest thoughts and feelings. It's the standard first line of attack against universalism.
Having said all that I do think we can go round in circles, and much as I do appreciate your ideas, I can well see that you might doubt whether this issue needs any more debate.
I mean, I could imagine such a capricious God; but the evidence of this universe points to him allowing our free will to stand, even in cases where the vast majority of us would prefer him to override it (for example, cases of border and abuse). The only way I could make sense of this morally is if I suppose God has made a firm choice to respect free will across the board, in all situations as a general rule. Tell me that he rips it away from us in one case only—that of eternal destiny—and i am forced to ask why he doesn’t do so in other extreme cases, such as that of Pol Pot or Ho Chi Minh.
See? Moral logic. Not enotional desire, or likes and dislikes. Unless it’s emotional to prefer a self consistent God.
Though I'm afraid that I'm unable to assimilate the idea of "operating instructions" being a byproduct (probably as a consequence of my background in tech). However, what you describe reminded me of "digital exhaust", "the data generated by our everyday digital lives, including our social-media use", which can be used for a variety of purposes by whoever is able to access and process it.
John Hagel, 2015: Soshana Zuboff, in The Age of Surveillance Capitalism 2018: Which is by way of saying that the other aspects of your post broadly make sense to me.
i’d be up for that, but the last time i tried something similar, i got reamed out by a fellow shipmate for talking about him as if he were real. I’m not super eager to deal with that again.
Well, my ability to conceptualize the nature and activity of the consciosness of the originating "I AM" is at an amoebic kind of level.
But ordinary syantax gives us a clue as to which order information proceeds from the field of incoherent energy. First is the thing - the subject - and what follows is the predicate, the verb, which implies some type of motion or activity. Information arises when we use the verb which describes the kind of motion, or lack of motion. The original Thing is the "I", and then everything else proceeds from it.
"In the beginning was the Word and the world was without form and void. And the Word moved on the face of the waters (the waves) ..."
All the clues are there, I believe.
AFF
In Welsh we say Wyf i - am I. Does that change anything?
I don't know. Maybe it does. But it seems to me the information is contained in the verb.
Anyway, I'm speaking of a level of consciousness that is virtually impossible to grasp the mechanics of its expression through matter, energy and motion, and I'm no physicist. I use the bits and pieces of what is understandable to me in my local consciousness in order to frame what I perceive in some vaguely coherent fashion.
And speaking of verbs, subjects and predicates, I guess we are speaking of the mechanics of narratives, and so it seems the topic becomes recursive.
AFF
I can’t understand anyone preferring to retain their individuality and go to Hell over losing their individuality but going to Heaven.
There's a special genre of cosmic horror that explores exactly this type of dread - the dread of losing sense of "self" to some blissful state of assimilation into an alien singular consciousness, no matter how hellish or insufferable their present reality might be.
Clearly, if this genre has a market, there are people who resonate with this type of speculative fiction.
AFF
Fairly prosaically, the syntax of language - English, in our case - is just a commonly agreed way of giving shape and form to our communication for the sake of brevity. It's a tool or convenience - it's quite possible for humans to communicate, or just to exchange information, without it. I don't believe any particular syntax is innate or inherent to consciousness.
More personally, my experience is that language itself is not necessary for consciousness, and even that there are many aspects of cognition that don't require language. The subjects, verbs and objects, clauses and sentences only (eventually) take shape if I have some need to express what I'm thinking.
"I am" is a linguistic expression of consciousness itself, the result of someone wanting to record an encounter with consciousness. It isn't the encounter, or the consciousness. Similarly, "In the beginning was the Word" is one of many possible human descriptions of instantiated primary consciousness. I see these two phrases as representing human conceptualisations of active expressions of consciousness.
In my conception, these things are not the mechanics of narrative itself, just particular human expressions of narrative. At the level of consciousness, I suspect the only thing that narrative itself needs is the concept of movement, of change.
Fair enough. But it's possible that it tells us something about the origins of information and how it is communicated. Umberto Eco and his theory of semiotics is a fascinating investigation into the intersection between consciousness, information, and its communication.
Agreed, as said above
Absolutely. There's an entire right-hemispheric "processor" that operates wordlessly and traffics entirely in sensory information. It's the conduit for creativity and emotional expression.
It's funny you mention that syntax is not innate or inherent to consciousness. I recall an experience that a friend of mine related to me where she was on an Ayahuasca retreat in Peru. The gathering was international, and she was sitting next to a Russian man. He told a joke in Russian and she laughed because she got it, even though she speaks no word of Russian.
I agree. This is why I say that information is a byproduct of consciousness. It's not the consciousness itself.
Yes. So the information, linguistically conveyed, arises from the field of consciousness, and is the byproduct of its "activity".
I believe it's this very movement that instigates the generation and flow of information. "I AM" is a static kind of awareness. It may encompass everything and every potential, but unless there is movement, no further information is generated.
AFF
Sorry if I’m completely misunderstanding. I’m afraid this has all moved to a height I’m not really following.
I don't think you're misunderstanding, if there's anything to be understood here because it's not really clear to me that I'm communicating at all well. A lot of this stuff is not even fully crystallized to my satisfaction either, so it's probably better to reel things in closer to "this level".
My most solid concepts of consciousness (to my way of thinking) are confined to one or two levels "in here" and about three, maybe stretching to a fourth level "out there".
With regard to I AM - whether in Hebrew or English - I feel as if the same thing can be said by either God or me, and it would resonate with the same meaning because I can at times perceive my consciousness as simply a fractal projection of the Originating Consciousness, the One in Whom I have my being.
My consciousness is just a single fraction in the infinitely divisible Originating Consciousness - or God Mind if you will. And I don't think I'm special, I think this is the case for all of us. We are all One in the Body of Christ and in the Mind of God. Whether we want to perceive reality like this or not is a matter of Free Will or a matter of Choice.
IMO there's no wrong answer here because everyone's experience is sacred and it just depends on the level you want to look at it from.
AFF
Well from a free-will perspective you are stating the obvious and powerful objection to the whole idea that God has remained in control. If I accept God's unrestricted sovereignty I can't get out of making God the the author of evil because he could have stopped it. Why doesn't he?
And obviously there's no answer that is convincing at the logical level. I do not think that predestination makes the problem of evil any worse, unless you go as far as believing in a limited God who literally could not stop evil acts no matter how much he tried. I have flirted with this, but I don't think it flies.
So one takes refuge in saying it's an insoluble mystery, which is where most of us end up. I think we all end up believing what "seems right" which is a mixture of our deepest desires, convictions and prejudices, usually rationalised by a highly subjective choice and interpretation of biblical text.
So for me the only sense I can make of the whole think is that, in the end, all shall be well including for all of those whose lives on this earth has been anything but well. Which really is what Universal Restoration is about. It is easier for me because the oft quoted question of C.S. Lewis, does not apply. He asks if God saves everyone, does he do it with their consent or against it. That's only a problem for believers in libertarian free will.
The point I was trying to make was about the limited relevance of syntax and language to the nature of (the various levels of) consciousness, and not about the part that information plays. However, since you've interpreted it that way, I'd say that information that is communicated linguistically by conscious humans is a pale imitation of information that is integral to consciousness, and upon which consciousness depends, unbound by the limitations of linguistic communication.
In my conception, the origins of information are not found with any linguistic analysis of communication, but as an aspect of consciousness itself. Information doesn't arise from using verbs. Consciousness and information together precede communication.
That's not what I'm saying. Just because there aren't any subjects, verbs, objects, clauses or sentences doesn't mean there isn't any information. Information plays a role in consciousness itself. And information can be a product of consciousness, but I'm still unable to attach significance to it being a byproduct.
I wouldn't describe it that way - what you call the (linguistically conveyed) byproduct is an infinitesimally small part of the "bigger picture" information (of which it forms a very pale imitation indeed).
The immaterial consciousness of the "I am" encounter and of the "In the beginning was the Word" description incorporates an (infinitely) vast amount of non-linguistic information. This is both infinitely more than can be apprehended, or conveyed linguistically, by any human agent.
I'm not sure if a static consciousness can be said to be conscious. I would say that internal activity is intrinsic to consciousness. And to the extent that this internal activity involves movement, it involves the movement of information, in the course of which it may (as noted) produce information, as well as consciousness.
AFF
When a human being talks about consciousness, we generally understand it to mean that we're conscious of something - and being conscious of something is a way of describing information.
Consider the entry into consciousness that we make when we wake up. The concept expressed in the sentence "I'm awake" is information. And it's information at a conceptual level, regardless of whether we do or don't utter, or even just think, the words.
So maybe it might be helpful if I understood what, in your opinion, is the essential nature of information? And where do we think it comes from?
AFF
For want of another approach, the wikipedia page begins as follows: I think the relevant word is "abstract(ions)". The above quote unsurprisingly describes "information" in terms of what can be sensed, given that we inhabit a material universe, but adds that it also applies to abstractions. And the concept itself is abstract - it still conveys an idea even in the absence of a medium, sensed or otherwise. Whether or not consciousness precedes matter: to the extent that consciousness is aware of something (even just of itself), it is informed.
So it seems to me that it's a "both and" to your way of thinking.
To me, the answers to the questions are not yet crystallized to my satisfaction, but this seems to me to be a very definite possibility.
Will report back if any insights arise from entertaining this idea.
Many many thanks for your feedback and insights, it's been such a pleasure to share and exchange with you, and to receive the benefits of your own careful reasoning.
Many hugs!!
AFF
Libertarian free will means that no other cause, even acting at a level of reality deeper that the physical, constrains our will either. Most would believe that God could do that, but chooses to self-limit so as allow us to be free of His overriding power. This really is what most Christians mean by free will, and as far as they are concerned the Reformed view simply denies free will.
As indeed the Reformed view is that to predestine something is not to cause or do it.
I don't think any of that cuts much ice in attempts to answer the problem of evil. At least with me. A God creating an out of control world and allowing the evil to exists and seemingly flourish, leaves Him ultimately responsible.
But what seems acceptable (even obvious) to one, can sound like nonsense to someone else. That just seems to be the way it is.
I don't think this is correct. Compatibilism means that free will and (physical) determism are compatible. For instance. someone has the ability to act according to their motivation but the nature of that motivation may be determined by other things (in a materialistic view by things like the laws of physics which govern the way particles move).
For me it doesn't help a lot because it assumes that "free will" has an agreed definition. So then it makes sense to say that "free will is compatible with physical determinism". But since for many, free will excludes determinism, I'm not sure it makes sense. But it is rather an argument about words.
Yes and those for whom it excludes determinism would be incompatibilists. There's a debate about what constitutes free will, that's not an argument for misrepresenting people's positions.