Suppose Trump is dead (or in jail) by the time the next presidential election comes around?
He's not the only evil moron available. And jail is no impediment.
Indeed, the question of whether DeSantis would be significantly better than Trump comes to mind. The question is whether Biden can get sufficient aid to Ukraine in the next year to swing the direction of the war in favour of the Ukrainian defenders before the next election and the risk of a Republican presidency who will be more in favour of supporting the aggression of Russia (by not providing Ukraine the means to recover occupied territory). Without US aid the war will become a long term attritional affair - Ukraine won't give up and still have European support, and especially if some sanctions that exceed the impact of Brexit on the UK can be imposed on Russia then will they be able to make up for the loss of men and equipment?
Agreed. This will wipe the Brexit slate clean. Trigger the Eu(ro)sociality switch. Biden could make a lend-lease deal that could appease even Trump, a trillion dollars or ten that buys Ukraine. But Trump would repeal it even if he liked it. He's that fucking evil.
And I'm well aware of the limited intensity of a neutron bomb or high altitude battlefield nuke, a dialled back H-bomb? But the probable military-geopolitical consequences are Cretaceous-Paleogene. NATO will destroy all Russian forces in Ukraine in three days for a start. All they need do instead is let Zaporizhzhia melt down is it not. Although that would only... fire up the Ukrainian counterattack to the east.
Putin only has to wait 21 months. Can they survive behind their defences? Play the Serb wild card? And in the dream scenario of an 82 year old president elect (is an incumbent president still inaugurated?), then what?
OTOH, suppose Putin dies, or is deposed, within the next year or so - is it possible that Russia will then somehow end its aggression, difficult action though that might be?
I'm trying to look beyond the doomsaying, given that there are other possible (hopefully) scenarios.
BTW, I saw an interesting video on YouTube showing how Ukrainian Railways are aiding the war effort, despite often having to cope with run-down infrastructure and rolling stock. They've recently re-opened a mothballed line into Moldova, for freight traffic, allowing goods to bypass Trans-Nistria, and get to the Romanian port of Constanta.
ISTM that with virtually the whole population mobilised, the Russians are going to have a very long war on their hands, as @Gamma Gamaliel has suggested.
When has Russia ever ended its aggression? Even 'externally'. For some reason they cannot be publicly rich within their borders. The reason being the rich.
As I said earlier, there are various possible future scenarios. Putin is human (sort of), and his eventual death from natural causes, or by assassination, is inevitable. Being deposed is another possibility,
Meanwhile, many exiles, and western politicians, are contemplating what a post-Putin Russia might be like:
You do have to take the past into account. Under Tsars of varying degrees of murderous autocracy, princes ditto, Lenin, Stalin, and Putin, Russia has had a very porous and expansive sense of its own borders. This is rooted in its pre-Mongol past, where all the territory from the current Polish border to the Urals, from the Gulf of Finland to Macedonia was all up for grabs among Slavic princes. Culture, and in particular an attitude to history in which 1000 years is like a day, make pre-Mongol history a matter of more than academic interest.
So, I don't go either for the total doom-mongering, or for the idea that Russia and its neighbours are hermetically sealed within their borders, and are able to sit next to each other without interaction.
So, I don't go either for the total doom-mongering, or for the idea that Russia and its neighbours are hermetically sealed within their borders, and are able to sit next to each other without interaction.
An eminently reasonable view IMHO, and perhaps what lies behind the discussions I mentioned above (in the Guardian article).
OTOH, suppose Putin dies, or is deposed, within the next year or so - is it possible that Russia will then somehow end its aggression, difficult action though that might be?
That depends entirely on who replaces Putin. A faction that sees the Ukrainian war as a tremendous waste of Russian resources would probably want to negotiate some kind of armistice. On the other hand a faction that believed Putin just didn't try hard enough in Ukraine would probably redouble the war effort. I had a brief post on this about a year ago.
Such a non-Machiavellian former faction, like God, shows no sign of existing. Like Him it's keeping its head down so far it has no effect on the surface. Noble old lawyer(s) notwithstanding.
OTOH, suppose Putin dies, or is deposed, within the next year or so - is it possible that Russia will then somehow end its aggression, difficult action though that might be?
That depends entirely on who replaces Putin. A faction that sees the Ukrainian war as a tremendous waste of Russian resources would probably want to negotiate some kind of armistice. On the other hand a faction that believed Putin just didn't try hard enough in Ukraine would probably redouble the war effort. I had a brief post on this about a year ago.
Fair point.
One wonders how far the average Russian in the Moscow trolleybus, as it were, might be prepared to go in the way of active opposition to a post-Putin faction which continued with Putinesque atrocities...
Suppose Trump is dead (or in jail) by the time the next presidential election comes around?
He's not the only evil moron available. And jail is no impediment.
Indeed, the question of whether DeSantis would be significantly better than Trump comes to mind. The question is whether Biden can get sufficient aid to Ukraine in the next year to swing the direction of the war in favour of the Ukrainian defenders before the next election and the risk of a Republican presidency who will be more in favour of supporting the aggression of Russia (by not providing Ukraine the means to recover occupied territory). Without US aid the war will become a long term attritional affair - Ukraine won't give up and still have European support, and especially if some sanctions that exceed the impact of Brexit on the UK can be imposed on Russia then will they be able to make up for the loss of men and equipment?
The assumption, here, is that the Republicans will retake the presidency. I doubt that will happen. Biden has his flaws, and he is (too) old. But I do not see any Republican candidate that can beat him--including the former president.
Who do you think might replace Mr Biden from the Democrat side, assuming Mr B doesn't seek re-election?
Biden has his flaws, of course, as do we all, but I have seen it reported (here in the UK) that he has achieved a great deal of good in his first term, despite the incredible difficulties thrown at him by the Republicans and the rest of the world. History may record him as one of the *greats*.
Who do you think might replace Mr Biden from the Democrat side, assuming Mr B doesn't seek re-election?
I think Biden will officially announce on 17 June 2023, If, for some reason, he drops out, there are a number of well qualified Democrats that could step in. My first pick would be Harris, but she also has some negatives.
Who do you think might replace Mr Biden from the Democrat side, assuming Mr B doesn't seek re-election?
I think Biden will officially announce on 17 June 2023, If, for some reason, he drops out, there are a number of well qualified Democrats that could step in. My first pick would be Harris, but she also has some negatives.
Time will tell.
Indeed. Ms Harris came to my mind, so to speak.
FWIW, Mr Biden is highly thought of in some quarters here in the UK, and I for one would be sad to see him stand down. Age, as you say, is against him, alas.
Apologies for prolonging this tangent, which doesn't have much to do with events in Ukraine at the present moment.
Reports here indicate that the Ukrainian counter-offensive has begun, and that some modest advances have been made. Early days yet, of course.
This is getting fairly far afield from the subject of the Russia-Ukraine war
As far as point #2 goes, I think we can make the safe assumption that any Democratic president will continue support for Ukraine, both verbally and materially, while any plausible Republican president in 2025 will want to either scale back or discontinue such support. Discussion of the exact identities of those hypothetical presidents is irrelevant for this thread.
This has a couple of strategically important points. On the other thread I mentioned Ukraine's strategic need to demonstrate to the various Western powers providing it with military aid (including, but not limited to, the U.S.) that it can achieve battlefield victories.
Suppose Trump is dead (or in jail) by the time the next presidential election comes around?
He's not the only evil moron available. And jail is no impediment.
Indeed, the question of whether DeSantis would be significantly better than Trump comes to mind. The question is whether Biden can get sufficient aid to Ukraine in the next year to swing the direction of the war in favour of the Ukrainian defenders before the next election and the risk of a Republican presidency who will be more in favour of supporting the aggression of Russia (by not providing Ukraine the means to recover occupied territory). Without US aid the war will become a long term attritional affair - Ukraine won't give up and still have European support, and especially if some sanctions that exceed the impact of Brexit on the UK can be imposed on Russia then will they be able to make up for the loss of men and equipment?
The assumption, here, is that the Republicans will retake the presidency. I doubt that will happen. Biden has his flaws, and he is (too) old. But I do not see any Republican candidate that can beat him--including the former president.
What I was trying to say was, that for the Ukrainians, there's a risk that Biden wouldn't be re-elected. Therefore, they should be seeking to get as much material aid as possible now, and make use of that to push Russian forces back as far as possible, before November 2024. If there's a Republican elected as President then they may find their material aid from the US cut drastically (though, if they'd shown an ability to use that to push Russian forces back then the "backing a winner" factor may convince even Trump, with his obsession against Ukraine for not supporting his spat with Hunter Biden, to continue supplying them - hence part of their thinking should include that). Risk management by the Ukrainian government and military has to include what might happen if they have US supplied equipment and then find access to support for that dries up after the next Presidential election.
Yes, our term limited election system does make the US a rather unstable unreliable partner for most allies. There was a time when our foreign and military policy did not change that much. But I still do not think that will be a problem for the next four years.
I see no reason to suppose that the Ukrainian counter-offensive won't be moderately successful in places. They are formidable fighters.
I don't see them retaking the Crimea anytime soon though and I'm sure Putin has more nasties up his sleeve if they gain ground elsewhere.
At best, I imagine their performance will convince US and other backers to continue backing them but like Thunderbunk I don't see the region stabilising anytime soon.
If an armistice was signed tomorrow I suspect both sides would back dissident groups in one another's territory with terrorist style attacks both within Russia and within the Ukraine.
No, irrespective of who gets into the White House my fear is that this will run and run. There will also be flash-points elsewhere. Kosovo. Moldova. Etc etc etc.
Aye, they should take a few nibbles, finish off retaking Kharkiv oblast. 20% chance of getting to Melitopol? No chance of taking Crimea even so.
The only nasty Putin has, apart from Trump, is letting Zaporhizhzhia melt down. Worse nuclear options are available.
No matter how well they do, Trump would undo it. No armistice will be signed until well in to 2025 at the earliest, even after Trump pulls the plug from prison in January.
Russophone dissidents have been attacking Ukraine for 9 years, Russia won't reign them in, far from it. And now Russian dissidents are returning the favour. There can be no reason to stop.
Moldova should invite NATO peacekeepers, as in Kosovo, which should be coerced to behave its fucking self.
What other flashpoints? Wagner will continue to fry more fish throughout Africa. It's back to the '50s-'80s. Syria's safe back in the Arab fold, thanks to Putin, despite being heretic. Blood's thicker than Islam. And real power trumps that. So Israel trumps Palestine. China's done what the West couldn't between Iran & Saudi. And now Turkey is pivotal.
East Eurasia is doing well, better than ever. As long as global warming is ignored. Which it will be.
This is not art therapy, it is a discussion forum. Per our first commandment “Lively, intelligent discussion is what we’re about.”
If you want to rant about the malevolent indifference of the universe, do it in Hell. If you want to post walls of prose poetry rehearsing your personal preoccupations, please get a blog and then you can always invite those interested to read it.
KIIS [ Kyiv International Institute of Sociology ]noted there were only 19 respondents in the sample who continue to identify themselves by nationality as Russian. This amount is not enough for statistically reliable calculations. However, it is indicative that among them only two respondents are in favor of concessions, and 15, on the contrary, reject any concessions.
The war seems to have turned a lot of formerly sympathetic Ukrainians against the Russian cause.
In other news, Russia seems to be destroying other, smaller dams in Zaporizhzhia oblast to impede Ukrainian advances. This does not seem like the action of a military confident in its ability to withstand an assault by conventional means.
Yes, I found that interesting but extreme violence often conceals shame, in Putin's case, over the collapse of the Soviet Union, the failures of the KGB, etc. But what we know from history is that the man full of shame is going to cruelly punish others again and again. Cf, Hitler.
I think $46 billion in terms of military aid for Ukraine is around 0.2% GDP of the USA. And isn't that 'cost' reduced when you factor in the value of testing your sophisticated weaponry in a real conflict and having it showcased to potential customers? In other words is it just the cost that would make Trump pull the plug on military aid?
No. I think Trump truly admires Putin and would like to see him win, or at any rate has no strong desire to go to any particular effort to defeat him. But I am still hopeful that Trump will not win the 2024 election, though he will surely be the Republican nominee (unless he dies).
KIIS [ Kyiv International Institute of Sociology ]noted there were only 19 respondents in the sample who continue to identify themselves by nationality as Russian. This amount is not enough for statistically reliable calculations. However, it is indicative that among them only two respondents are in favor of concessions, and 15, on the contrary, reject any concessions.
The war seems to have turned a lot of formerly sympathetic Ukrainians against the Russian cause.
In other news, Russia seems to be destroying other, smaller dams in Zaporizhzhia oblast to impede Ukrainian advances. This does not seem like the action of a military confident in its ability to withstand an assault by conventional means.
Sorry, but I don't see how that first finding affects those in the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics:
1,029 people were interviewed by phone in all regions of Ukraine, with the exception of the Russian-occupied territories.
Although they are unlikely to foray out from behind their defences admittedly.
And to the second point, surely, even if they were confident, they would be waging total war lite where they can?
Again, do not presume Trump is going to beat Biden. He may not even be the Republican nominee. But this is the topic of a couple of other threads.
When the Russians were forced out of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union fell. If Ukraine can make significant gains, will Putin fall?
I think that is much more likely than Trump regaining control.
Hard wired human nature is on Trump's side. The most significant gain would be Crimea, and Putin would fall. Or nuke. But that's not going to happen. A Manstein level Ukrainian counterattack breaking through west and tearing east and north behind Russian defences would be more devastating than going for Melitopol (as would an eastern breakthrough and tearing south and west), although taking the latter would give far deeper opportunities; liberating W. Zaporizhzhia and all of Kherson. It would be tempting to leave them to wither off the vine and be mopped up later (but that could lead to a deliberate Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant meltdown) and go for Mariupol. All of that's possible by January 2025. And just maybe Trump couldn't reverse it. Putin would have to mobilize. His people aren't starving and won't, why would they bring him down?
Polling people currently living in Donbas and Crimea on whether they view themselves as Russian or Ukrainian will give an automatically biased result. Large proportions of the pre-2014 population has left these areas, and those who identify as Ukrainian are far more likely to have left Russian controlled areas than those who identify as Russian. And, there has been an influx of Russians into these areas, many military, who further skew the population towards those who identify as Russian. Which is why any referendum in these areas on whether the population wants to remain in Ukraine or join Russia (or, be independent of both) needs to be very carefully organised and monitored - to ensure that those who vote have a genuine connection to the area, and includes those unable to vote in person because they're refugees elsewhere, and doesn't include temporary residents. In addition to, of course, not holding a vote while there are military forces on the street, which is a long way from an ideal for holding any sort of election.
The value of the polls we have is that it's very obvious that the Russian speaking areas not currently under Russian occupation overwhelmingly identify as Ukrainian - it's not a massive extrapolation to consider that if similar polls were conducted among the remaining pre-2014 populations in Russian controlled areas sentiments would similarly be towards identification as Ukrainian. Anecdotally from my Ukrainian friends, the pre-2014 divisions based on first language have been breaking down since 2014 with greater recognition of people as Ukrainian irrespective of first language - a process that has accelerated since the invasion last year. Whereas in 2010 the small movements in Donbas and Crimea for unification with Russia had general support from the Russian speaking populations (much as in Northern Ireland there's reportedly general support from Catholic communities for unification with the Republic) that has now largely evaporated with only very small minorities still generally supportive. That's even though, in the east particularly, many Russian-speaking Ukrainians have close family who live in Russia.
I wonder what would happen if Ukraine acquires the AC-130 Ghostrider or the A-10 Warthog. The Warthogs are about to be retired from the USAF, but they are still a formidable tank killer.
I wonder what would happen if Ukraine acquires the AC-130 Ghostrider or the A-10 Warthog. The Warthogs are about to be retired from the USAF, but they are still a formidable tank killer.
How would they help Ukraine penetrate Russia's formidable defences? They need to precision bombard multiple corridors, at least three, that fills in or smears the anti-tank ditch and removes the dragon's teeth whilst taking out the rear artillery. No sign. They might get round to that when they have air superiority. October? They need to stop wasting leopards and wait for the floods to recede and the winter freeze. Then they might be able to take SW. Zaporizhzhia and S. Kherson back. They aren't getting to the Sea of Azov this year at this rate. Or next.
The loss of any weapon system in battle is assumed. Russia does not have, and will not have, air superiority. Thier air force planes do not cross the border because they are afraid of the Ukrainian defense systems. Their attack helicopters don't last very long.
The loss of any weapon system in battle is assumed. Russia does not have, and will not have, air superiority. Thier air force planes do not cross the border because they are afraid of the Ukrainian defense systems. Their attack helicopters don't last very long.
And what does that have to do with Ukraine having less until October? And how does it help them then? They can bomb away the antitank defences? Which they should be shelling and launching Storm Shadows at now. In at least three places. You know, for the shell game. Or what the Hell. One where the Dnipro turns west.
Nobody knows how strong the Russian defences are, not even the Russians Apparently they look sufficiently formidable on satellite images to suggest that if the Russian army defends them properly taking them will be a matter of attrition.
Whether the Russian army is sufficiently well run to defend the defences is up in the air. All we can say is that it is a lot less well run than Putin thought it was before he launched the attack.
Nobody knows how strong the Russian defences are, not even the Russians Apparently they look sufficiently formidable on satellite images to suggest that if the Russian army defends them properly taking them will be a matter of attrition.
Whether the Russian army is sufficiently well run to defend the defences is up in the air. All we can say is that it is a lot less well run than Putin thought it was before he launched the attack.
What is? The defence of the defences? How do we know that? Ukraine hasn't penetrated them. If they could, like terrorists, they would.
Well, a top Russian General was taken out by the Shadow. His command centre was hit .
That's what they're for. How does that help them cross the Russian defences, the strongest on the planet?
The Russian Military depends on the direction of the leading officer in the theatre. If he is taken out there is general confusion, a lack of coordination between the units. On the other hand, the Western Militaries are more diversified with several redundancies in the command structure. If a western general is eliminated other generals can quickly take over. Russian Command centers also have to be closer to the front lines to micro-manage the mission. Western commands give a lot of power to lower officers-they are given an objective and it is up to them to figure out the how to achieve it. Therefore Western command centers are much further behind the front lines.
The Russian defenses are also spread out over 1,000 miles. It is very tough to maintain such a long line. Ukraine only has to find one or two weak links to break through,
Whether the Russian army is sufficiently well run to defend the defences is up in the air. All we can say is that it is a lot less well run than Putin thought it was before he launched the attack.
What is? The defence of the defences? How do we know that? Ukraine hasn't penetrated them. If they could, like terrorists, they would.
If the Russian army were well run (*) we would not now be talking about a Ukrainian counteroffensive. That's how we know it's not well run.
Nobody who knows what they're talking about thinks the Ukrainians can just drive their tanks through the defences. How much attrition the Ukrainians will need to inflict and suffer before they either find a weak spot or cause Russian morale collapse nobody knows.
(*) There is an argument that the Russian army is well run for the purposes of putting down popular revolts and keeping it from launching a coup against an autocratic leader. Unfortunately for Putin the qualities you need to keep senior generals from launching coups against autocratic leaders - dividing authority so there's no overall control and turning a blind eye to corruption - are not conducive to success in warfare.
What Gramps49 says about Russian command structures certainly seems to be the case and explains their lack of progress despite numerical superiority.
My surmise would be moderate to substantial success for the Ukrainian counter-offensive in some quarters but stalemate in others. Russia seems prepared to implement a 'scorched earth' (or rather drenched earth) policy where geography allows.
I still hold to my initial suggestion that this will be a long, slow grind.
I don't see the Russians luring the Ukrainians into another Verdun, but neither do I see the Russian defences collapsing like a pack of cards either.
That said, a few precise and well placed penetrations of the Russian lines at key points could have a significant effect.
The Russians will be aware of that of course and of the dangers of military humiliation and losing face. They can't keep up the pretence that all is going well indefinitely.
That's what worries me. They may do even worse than the atrocities and ecocide they've committed so far.
Whether the Russian army is sufficiently well run to defend the defences is up in the air. All we can say is that it is a lot less well run than Putin thought it was before he launched the attack.
What is? The defence of the defences? How do we know that? Ukraine hasn't penetrated them. If they could, like terrorists, they would.
If the Russian army were well run (*) we would not now be talking about a Ukrainian counteroffensive. That's how we know it's not well run.
Nobody who knows what they're talking about thinks the Ukrainians can just drive their tanks through the defences. How much attrition the Ukrainians will need to inflict and suffer before they either find a weak spot or cause Russian morale collapse nobody knows.
(*) There is an argument that the Russian army is well run for the purposes of putting down popular revolts and keeping it from launching a coup against an autocratic leader. Unfortunately for Putin the qualities you need to keep senior generals from launching coups against autocratic leaders - dividing authority so there's no overall control and turning a blind eye to corruption - are not conducive to success in warfare.
All true, especially the second para. The magic ratio needed is 3:1. And Russian morale collapse won't manifest until after the antitank defences are breached after being bombarded to undifferentiability. Then you need to send in armoured bulldozers.
There is an argument that the Russian army is well run for the purposes of putting down popular revolts and keeping it from launching a coup against an autocratic leader. Unfortunately for Putin the qualities you need to keep senior generals from launching coups against autocratic leaders - dividing authority so there's no overall control and turning a blind eye to corruption - are not conducive to success in warfare.
All of that is background for a thought I had discussing with some colleagues the dismal performance of the Russian army. We have all noticed that the Russian military appears far less capable than we thought it was; frankly it seems incapable of even some of the very basic tasks of modern industrial armies engaged in conventional military operations. Shockingly, it is a lot less capable of these things than older armies of yesteryear with much more limited technology. It’s not hard to imagine that even without all of the advanced technology, that by sheer mass and dint of high explosives (and basic logistical competence) that a capable mid-20th century army might well perform better than the Russian army has.
Yet the odd thought I had was this: what if Russian incompetence isn’t exceptional, but in fact the new normal in warfare? What if – quietly, because they haven’t tried to launch a major invasion recently – most militaries are probably similarly incapable of the basic tasks of industrial warfare?
He goes on to discuss the pressures and incentives driving states to put their resources towards competent militaries and how those incentives have changed in the industrial (and especially post-WWII) era. Then he circles back to Russia and its force structure.
Alternately, for low legitimacy forms of government, like autocracies, the concern is squarely centered on internal stability, and here we see a wave of armies designed primarily for ‘coup proofing.’ Russia’s military is actually a pretty good example of how this is done. An authoritarian government is looking to both maximize the ability of the army to engage in repression while minimize it as a threat to its rule. ‘Coup proofing’ of this sort follows a fairly consistent basic model (which I may elaborate on at a later date). First, command needs to be divided so that no one general or minister of defense can turn the whole defense apparatus against the leader. You can see this with how the Russian armed forces were fragmented, with Rosgvardiya and Wagner Group not reporting to the ministry of defense, but it also extends to the structure of the Russian Ministry of Defense, where the Army, the Navy and the Airborne forces (the VDV) all maintain infantry forces. Setting things up that way means that, in a pinch perhaps elite, well-paid and loyal VDV forces could be used to counter-balance grumbling disloyalty in, say, the army. Of course such fragmented command is really bad if you need to launch a conventional war, as, in the event, it was.
Meanwhile, maximizing the army for repression means developing paramilitary internal police forces at scale (Rosgvardiya is an obvious example), which direct resources away from core conventional military; such security-oriented forces aren’t designed for a conventional war and perform poorly at it. The People’s Republic of China is also reported to have this problem: internal security and repression absorb a lot of their security funds. At the same time, if the purpose of a military is internal repression, that means the loyalty of that army – or at least its officers and elite units – is the priority. As anyone who has ever run any kind of organization knows, making people happy and making the organization run efficiently are rarely fully compatible goals. Getting a military ready for a real fight invariably involves a lot of unpleasant tasks (or expensive ones) that soldiers might rather just not do (or might rather just embezzle the resources for), and if the goal is regime stability, it makes sense to let them not do them (or embezzle the resources). Meanwhile, the state is promoting not for capability, but for loyalty, which is why a blockhead like Valery Gerasimov might still be in command 15 months into a war in which his leadership has been astoundingly poor.
I recommend the whole entry, but this kind of analysis goes a long way towards explaining Russian incapabilities and, to a certain degree, strategic errors early in the war.
Very interesting. I guess the political underpinning of the military often subverts its efficiency, and this is often historically the case in Russia. I mean the Tsarist armies were pre-modern, and under Stalin, brilliant or poor, depending on which leaders were allowed to live by Joe. I wonder how other countries compare.
Comments
Agreed. This will wipe the Brexit slate clean. Trigger the Eu(ro)sociality switch. Biden could make a lend-lease deal that could appease even Trump, a trillion dollars or ten that buys Ukraine. But Trump would repeal it even if he liked it. He's that fucking evil.
And I'm well aware of the limited intensity of a neutron bomb or high altitude battlefield nuke, a dialled back H-bomb? But the probable military-geopolitical consequences are Cretaceous-Paleogene. NATO will destroy all Russian forces in Ukraine in three days for a start. All they need do instead is let Zaporizhzhia melt down is it not. Although that would only... fire up the Ukrainian counterattack to the east.
Putin only has to wait 21 months. Can they survive behind their defences? Play the Serb wild card? And in the dream scenario of an 82 year old president elect (is an incumbent president still inaugurated?), then what?
I'm trying to look beyond the doomsaying, given that there are other possible (hopefully) scenarios.
BTW, I saw an interesting video on YouTube showing how Ukrainian Railways are aiding the war effort, despite often having to cope with run-down infrastructure and rolling stock. They've recently re-opened a mothballed line into Moldova, for freight traffic, allowing goods to bypass Trans-Nistria, and get to the Romanian port of Constanta.
ISTM that with virtually the whole population mobilised, the Russians are going to have a very long war on their hands, as @Gamma Gamaliel has suggested.
Meanwhile, many exiles, and western politicians, are contemplating what a post-Putin Russia might be like:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jun/10/russia-exiles-life-after-vladimir-putin
It really is not reasonable to be so dogmatic about what will or will not happen in the future.
So, I don't go either for the total doom-mongering, or for the idea that Russia and its neighbours are hermetically sealed within their borders, and are able to sit next to each other without interaction.
An eminently reasonable view IMHO, and perhaps what lies behind the discussions I mentioned above (in the Guardian article).
That depends entirely on who replaces Putin. A faction that sees the Ukrainian war as a tremendous waste of Russian resources would probably want to negotiate some kind of armistice. On the other hand a faction that believed Putin just didn't try hard enough in Ukraine would probably redouble the war effort. I had a brief post on this about a year ago.
Fair point.
One wonders how far the average Russian in the Moscow trolleybus, as it were, might be prepared to go in the way of active opposition to a post-Putin faction which continued with Putinesque atrocities...
The assumption, here, is that the Republicans will retake the presidency. I doubt that will happen. Biden has his flaws, and he is (too) old. But I do not see any Republican candidate that can beat him--including the former president.
Who do you think might replace Mr Biden from the Democrat side, assuming Mr B doesn't seek re-election?
Biden has his flaws, of course, as do we all, but I have seen it reported (here in the UK) that he has achieved a great deal of good in his first term, despite the incredible difficulties thrown at him by the Republicans and the rest of the world. History may record him as one of the *greats*.
I think Biden will officially announce on 17 June 2023, If, for some reason, he drops out, there are a number of well qualified Democrats that could step in. My first pick would be Harris, but she also has some negatives.
Time will tell.
Indeed. Ms Harris came to my mind, so to speak.
FWIW, Mr Biden is highly thought of in some quarters here in the UK, and I for one would be sad to see him stand down. Age, as you say, is against him, alas.
Apologies for prolonging this tangent, which doesn't have much to do with events in Ukraine at the present moment.
Reports here indicate that the Ukrainian counter-offensive has begun, and that some modest advances have been made. Early days yet, of course.
A couple of points here.
As far as point #2 goes, I think we can make the safe assumption that any Democratic president will continue support for Ukraine, both verbally and materially, while any plausible Republican president in 2025 will want to either scale back or discontinue such support. Discussion of the exact identities of those hypothetical presidents is irrelevant for this thread.
This has a couple of strategically important points. On the other thread I mentioned Ukraine's strategic need to demonstrate to the various Western powers providing it with military aid (including, but not limited to, the U.S.) that it can achieve battlefield victories.
I've tried to get the thread back on track!
The Guardian's live blog has more up-to-date news:
https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2023/jun/10/russia-ukraine-war-livehumanitarian-crisis-hugely-worse-after-kakhovka-dam-collapse-says-un-aid-chief
I don't see them retaking the Crimea anytime soon though and I'm sure Putin has more nasties up his sleeve if they gain ground elsewhere.
At best, I imagine their performance will convince US and other backers to continue backing them but like Thunderbunk I don't see the region stabilising anytime soon.
If an armistice was signed tomorrow I suspect both sides would back dissident groups in one another's territory with terrorist style attacks both within Russia and within the Ukraine.
No, irrespective of who gets into the White House my fear is that this will run and run. There will also be flash-points elsewhere. Kosovo. Moldova. Etc etc etc.
The only nasty Putin has, apart from Trump, is letting Zaporhizhzhia melt down. Worse nuclear options are available.
No matter how well they do, Trump would undo it. No armistice will be signed until well in to 2025 at the earliest, even after Trump pulls the plug from prison in January.
Russophone dissidents have been attacking Ukraine for 9 years, Russia won't reign them in, far from it. And now Russian dissidents are returning the favour. There can be no reason to stop.
Moldova should invite NATO peacekeepers, as in Kosovo, which should be coerced to behave its fucking self.
What other flashpoints? Wagner will continue to fry more fish throughout Africa. It's back to the '50s-'80s. Syria's safe back in the Arab fold, thanks to Putin, despite being heretic. Blood's thicker than Islam. And real power trumps that. So Israel trumps Palestine. China's done what the West couldn't between Iran & Saudi. And now Turkey is pivotal.
East Eurasia is doing well, better than ever. As long as global warming is ignored. Which it will be.
Happy Days!
That's likely to be less of a problem going forward.
The war seems to have turned a lot of formerly sympathetic Ukrainians against the Russian cause.
In other news, Russia seems to be destroying other, smaller dams in Zaporizhzhia oblast to impede Ukrainian advances. This does not seem like the action of a military confident in its ability to withstand an assault by conventional means.
They are prepared to fight dirty.
An article in today's Guardian speculates on the reason for this:
https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2023/jun/11/ecocide-russia-ukraine-war-kakhovka-dam-destroyed
When the Russians were forced out of Afghanistan, the Soviet Union fell. If Ukraine can make significant gains, will Putin fall?
I think that is much more likely than Trump regaining control.
Sorry, but I don't see how that first finding affects those in the Donetsk and Luhansk People's Republics:
Although they are unlikely to foray out from behind their defences admittedly.
And to the second point, surely, even if they were confident, they would be waging total war lite where they can?
@TurquoiseTastic, yeah, autocrats love other bullies.
Hard wired human nature is on Trump's side. The most significant gain would be Crimea, and Putin would fall. Or nuke. But that's not going to happen. A Manstein level Ukrainian counterattack breaking through west and tearing east and north behind Russian defences would be more devastating than going for Melitopol (as would an eastern breakthrough and tearing south and west), although taking the latter would give far deeper opportunities; liberating W. Zaporizhzhia and all of Kherson. It would be tempting to leave them to wither off the vine and be mopped up later (but that could lead to a deliberate Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant meltdown) and go for Mariupol. All of that's possible by January 2025. And just maybe Trump couldn't reverse it. Putin would have to mobilize. His people aren't starving and won't, why would they bring him down?
The value of the polls we have is that it's very obvious that the Russian speaking areas not currently under Russian occupation overwhelmingly identify as Ukrainian - it's not a massive extrapolation to consider that if similar polls were conducted among the remaining pre-2014 populations in Russian controlled areas sentiments would similarly be towards identification as Ukrainian. Anecdotally from my Ukrainian friends, the pre-2014 divisions based on first language have been breaking down since 2014 with greater recognition of people as Ukrainian irrespective of first language - a process that has accelerated since the invasion last year. Whereas in 2010 the small movements in Donbas and Crimea for unification with Russia had general support from the Russian speaking populations (much as in Northern Ireland there's reportedly general support from Catholic communities for unification with the Republic) that has now largely evaporated with only very small minorities still generally supportive. That's even though, in the east particularly, many Russian-speaking Ukrainians have close family who live in Russia.
How would they help Ukraine penetrate Russia's formidable defences? They need to precision bombard multiple corridors, at least three, that fills in or smears the anti-tank ditch and removes the dragon's teeth whilst taking out the rear artillery. No sign. They might get round to that when they have air superiority. October? They need to stop wasting leopards and wait for the floods to recede and the winter freeze. Then they might be able to take SW. Zaporizhzhia and S. Kherson back. They aren't getting to the Sea of Azov this year at this rate. Or next.
And what does that have to do with Ukraine having less until October? And how does it help them then? They can bomb away the antitank defences? Which they should be shelling and launching Storm Shadows at now. In at least three places. You know, for the shell game. Or what the Hell. One where the Dnipro turns west.
That's what they're for. How does that help them cross the Russian defences, the strongest on the planet?
Whether the Russian army is sufficiently well run to defend the defences is up in the air. All we can say is that it is a lot less well run than Putin thought it was before he launched the attack.
What is? The defence of the defences? How do we know that? Ukraine hasn't penetrated them. If they could, like terrorists, they would.
Where? When? Less than a handful of empty villages north of the formidable defences? Your unlinked claim is less than very thin.
The Russian Military depends on the direction of the leading officer in the theatre. If he is taken out there is general confusion, a lack of coordination between the units. On the other hand, the Western Militaries are more diversified with several redundancies in the command structure. If a western general is eliminated other generals can quickly take over. Russian Command centers also have to be closer to the front lines to micro-manage the mission. Western commands give a lot of power to lower officers-they are given an objective and it is up to them to figure out the how to achieve it. Therefore Western command centers are much further behind the front lines.
The Russian defenses are also spread out over 1,000 miles. It is very tough to maintain such a long line. Ukraine only has to find one or two weak links to break through,
Going round the "formidable defences" is a time-honoured and effective military strategy. Google the Maginot Line.
Where's the Ukrainian Ardennes?
It took four years' fully mobilized attrition on the Western Front, and economic blockade.
And the effective frontline is 60% of a thousand miles @Gramps49. 600 miles of unbroken antitank defences.
Nobody who knows what they're talking about thinks the Ukrainians can just drive their tanks through the defences. How much attrition the Ukrainians will need to inflict and suffer before they either find a weak spot or cause Russian morale collapse nobody knows.
(*) There is an argument that the Russian army is well run for the purposes of putting down popular revolts and keeping it from launching a coup against an autocratic leader. Unfortunately for Putin the qualities you need to keep senior generals from launching coups against autocratic leaders - dividing authority so there's no overall control and turning a blind eye to corruption - are not conducive to success in warfare.
My surmise would be moderate to substantial success for the Ukrainian counter-offensive in some quarters but stalemate in others. Russia seems prepared to implement a 'scorched earth' (or rather drenched earth) policy where geography allows.
I still hold to my initial suggestion that this will be a long, slow grind.
I don't see the Russians luring the Ukrainians into another Verdun, but neither do I see the Russian defences collapsing like a pack of cards either.
That said, a few precise and well placed penetrations of the Russian lines at key points could have a significant effect.
The Russians will be aware of that of course and of the dangers of military humiliation and losing face. They can't keep up the pretence that all is going well indefinitely.
That's what worries me. They may do even worse than the atrocities and ecocide they've committed so far.
All true, especially the second para. The magic ratio needed is 3:1. And Russian morale collapse won't manifest until after the antitank defences are breached after being bombarded to undifferentiability. Then you need to send in armoured bulldozers.
Another link I found shows real time counter offensive maps. which uses private satellite imagery to track the front lines.
By good timing this week's entry at Bret Devereaux's blog examines the question of military competency and force design in the modern era.
He goes on to discuss the pressures and incentives driving states to put their resources towards competent militaries and how those incentives have changed in the industrial (and especially post-WWII) era. Then he circles back to Russia and its force structure.
I recommend the whole entry, but this kind of analysis goes a long way towards explaining Russian incapabilities and, to a certain degree, strategic errors early in the war.