Very interesting. I guess the political underpinning of the military often subverts its efficiency, and this is often historically the case in Russia. I mean the Tsarist armies were pre-modern, and under Stalin, brilliant or poor, depending on which leaders were allowed to live by Joe. I wonder how other countries compare.
That was the question which got Devereaux thinking along these lines. Here's his ultimate conclusion about how widespread this kind of thing is:
All of which is to say, the brutal do-or-die demands (or in fancy speak, ‘the pressures of interstate anarchy’) which once forced most states to at least try to maintain competitive, conventionally capable militaries are fading because modern weapons and modern economies have changed the balance of incentives. Consequently, I suspect Russia is not the only paper tiger out there; the forest is likely to be full of them. Indeed, the exceptions are likely to be the handful of countries which still do feel the need to maintain competitive, conventionally capable armies either because they feel they have real security threats from revanchist powers (Israel, Taiwan, Poland, Finland, Ukraine, etc.) or because they form the backbone of an international system which requires that someone carry a big stick (the United States).
The incentives for what he calls "consolidated democracies with lots of legitimacy" are different than the coup proofing desires of autocratic states, but those incentives may be producing similar results for different reasons.
I was thinking about Vietnam, where often a distinction is made between the corrupt Southern armies, because the politics was corrupt, and the North's lean machine, with a sharp and ruthless political focus. Having said that, it's probably not correct, there are so many confounding factors, e.g., role of US, and Soviets.
the Ukrainian 35th Marine Brigade is more than a week into its own prolonged thunder run along the Mokri Yaly River. In eight or nine days of hard fighting, the 2,000-person brigade has liberated several villages—most recently Makarivka, on Monday.
9 days now. A mile a day. Not bad against fairly strong front line defence. But not exactly Blitzkrieg. And still north of the real defences.
One imagines that Russian military strategists are as capable of reading Forbes as arm-chair ones like @Gramps49 and @Martin54 or the rest of us here.
I suspect the US only got away with a 'thunder run' once or twice in Iraq. The Forbes article acknowledges as much.
Whatever the case, the US and its allies buggered up big time after the initial impact of 'shock and awe' so it's hardly a brilliant example to cite or follow.
No, as an armchair commentator with zilch military experience I still don't see anything to change my surmise that what we are going to see is a long, hard grind with possibly some significant Ukrainian success in certain areas, moderate success in others and failure or reverses elsewhere.
So far, the Ukrainians seem to have excelled in defensive warfare and whilst they are clearly capable of launching effective offensives, I don't quite see this as a 1940 style Blitzkrieg.
Time will tell of course but I think it's going to be a long hard slog with considerable losses on both sides unless someone sees sense and calls a halt to the whole thing.
Putin ain't going to do that.
Even if he resigned tomorrow we have no idea whether his successors would take a different view.
I wonder what to make of the Wagner Group Mutiny that is currently underway. They are refusing to sign a contract that will put them directly under the Russian Defense ministry. Other groups apparently have signed. Wagner is refusing. Will they march on the Kremlin (speculation on my part) or will someone find themself being pushed out of a tall building?
Question to Martin: Does the formidable Russian defences include the use of Russian FSB agents staged behind the Z invasion forces with orders to shoot any Russian troops who want to retreat? Time and time again, I have heard interviews with Russian POWs who say they had no way of retreating because they knew agents were behind them ready to shoot them if they wanted to withdraw.
There is an interesting video out there of a Russian soldier who surrendered to a Ukrainian drone. He is seen running through abandoned trenches trying to escape the drone which was following him. Finally, the soldier just stops looks to the drone and clasps his hands as if he has had enough. The drone operator was about to kill the soldier but did not drop the grenade as intended. Instead, the drone operator recalled the drone and replaced the grenade with a message for the soldier to follow the drone back to Ukrainian lines. However, as the soldier was complying with the instructions Russian artillery started to zero in on him. He survived and made it to the Ukrainian side. When he was interviewed, he said he had been with two companions. The one was wounded. That person pulled a grenade and put it to his head blowing himself up. The other shot himself. (I can produce the link of the soldier trying to flee the Ukrainian drone to the time when Russian artillery tried to take him out, but I thought it was to graphic for SoF)
Is this part of the Russian formidable defence system? Real morale booster there, Putin.
That's what NCOs have always been for in mass armies. In the Napoleonic wars, if you turned round, you were shot. At Dunkirk, 130 years later, an English officer turned round. He was shot.
I posted that video.
What point are you trying to make? If any?
Let me know when Ukraine actually breaks through. Although I will know before you do if it's for real.
Meanwhile, the BBC says it has verified 25,000 Russian military deaths. The UK government estimates up to 60,000.
I suspect the actual figure would be somewhere between the two.
The latest official Russian figures date from September last year, I think, where the losses were estimated at just under 6,000.
Whatever the actual figure, the majority seem to be what are euphemistically called 'non-professional soldiers' - mercenaries and cannon-fodder recruited from former Soviet republics rather than Russia itself.
Russia seems to be holding its trained troops in reserve. There's nothing new in that. The Roman army let the auxiliaries do most of the fighting with the legionnaires deployed at the point of victory.
Colonial troops were often used for the most hazardous operations by the British army too.
I suspect Russia has indeed taken a substantial hit with many of its best troops hors de combat in the opening stages of the war when it massively underestimated Ukrainian resistance.
All that said, I can't see mutinous Wagner mercenaries marching on Moscow and ousting Putin as Gramps49 fondly imagines.
As has been said, Russia's military machine is largely geared to stifle internal unrest. They would probably do that quite effectively.
Sooner or later, the Russians are going to have to talk. In the meantime both sides are going to sustain heavy losses.
Sadly, I don't see any way around that. Martin54 may overdo the prophet of doom shtick but quite frankly I find Gramps49's almost gleeful Bruce Willis Hollywood movie kick-ass optimism in very poor taste.
This isn't going to end soon and it ain't going to end well for soldiers and their families on both sides.
There's no guarantee that anyone's going to push Putin out of a convenient window nor that his potential successors would behave any differently.
Nobody knows how this will end. Meanwhile it's a sickening fratricidal struggle which shows little sign of letting up anytime soon.
@Gamma Gamaliel 'Martin54 may overdo the prophet of doom shtick'. Where? As in where do you find that so? How unreal is my realism compared with yours? Where do we disagree?
@Gamma Gamaliel 'Martin54 may overdo the prophet of doom shtick'. Where? As in where do you find that so? How unreal is my realism compared with yours? Where do we disagree?
Oh Martin.
At the start of this thread you predicted imminent Russian victory and/or nuclear war on a literal daily basis.
There's no guarantee that anyone's going to push Putin out of a convenient window nor that his potential successors would behave any differently.
Umm, I was not talking about Putin being pushed out of a window. I was referring to the cheif of the Wagner group being pushed out of the window.
Ok. A far more likely scenario I'll admit.
Apologies. I'd misunderstood your allusion. In the light of what appeared to be a prediction of the Kremlin's imminent storming by Wagner Group renegades I had - not unreasonably I think - assumed you were taking your gung ho optimism to another level.
Judging by Martin54's most recent post he seems unaware of how much of a Jeremiah he sounds.
Forgive me, but your posts seem to stretch to the opposite extreme and predict imminent Ukrainian victory.
Whereas my own posts ... 😉
No, seriously, I think there's a balance to be struck somewhere between Martin54's doom-laden forecasts and Gramps49's blithely optimistic ones.
If this war ended tomorrow the damage is already done. We would all still be living with the consequences for decades to come.
@Gamma Gamaliel 'Martin54 may overdo the prophet of doom shtick'. Where? As in where do you find that so? How unreal is my realism compared with yours? Where do we disagree?
Oh Martin.
At the start of this thread you predicted imminent Russian victory and/or nuclear war on a literal daily basis.
Not this one. The first of the other three may be. Both of which were rational. Happy to have been wrong in those regards, as I was in not believing Putin would invade in the first place. And you and I converged 14 months ago. When at least one mind as great as yours was also thinking rationally.
@Gamma Gamaliel 'Martin54 may overdo the prophet of doom shtick'. Where? As in where do you find that so? How unreal is my realism compared with yours? Where do we disagree?
Oh Martin.
At the start of this thread you predicted imminent Russian victory and/or nuclear war on a literal daily basis.
Not this one. The first of the other three may be. Both of which were rational. Happy to have been wrong in those regards, as I was in not believing Putin would invade in the first place. And you and I converged 14 months ago. When at least one mind as great as yours was also thinking rationally.
My apologies for getting the threads confused. I enjoyed looking back at that discussion.
Of course it's a very dangerous situation. Of course horrific geopolitical outcomes are possible. Naive optimism is foolish and helps no one but portraying negativity as not only realism but also the only rational position remains unhelpful.
I still think what I did last year: Russia has strategically failed. The question of how long this attrition mess will continue and at what cost remains.
To me, the doomsday scenario remains a Trump victory in '24 leading to insufficient support for Ukraine in '25 from a Russia enabling administration in the USA. That may well be Putin's current plan.
My sense is that European and other powers could fill the gap but a) I don't know if that's true and b) if there's the political will to do so when reproachment with Russia could mean very rapidly falling energy prices in the short term. The fact that this would be s massive strategic blunder by Western powers is beside the point, it is plausible and possible.
However, the reason I am less worried is because I don't think that's what's going happen. It is possible to appreciate the grave risks without having to believe the worst will happen.
Not a problem AFZ. Most balanced, with the critique that I don't regard the dark side as the only realism, even though there is no realism without it; not for the first time your post is realistic. Another critique (which you self-administer) is that I don't believe that energy prices are a major factor for Europe capitulating. Regardless of Trump - the worst realistic geopolitical outcome - the F16s will enable Ukraine to defend their remaining 80% increasingly from October. There is no sign of a Ukrainian breakthrough. Or the hope of a new Gorbachev in 10 years.
Are the Ukrainian's currently pushing for a breakthrough? At the moment the strategy seems much more probing, there are small territorial gains across a long front but those seem almost incidental to the main action - which is to find the weak point in the Russian defensive line (and, there will be one somewhere, most likely somewhere where the Russian forces lack morale (at least relative to the rest of the Russian forces) and/or supplies). The push for a breakthrough will only happen when that weak spot is found - or when probing has gone on so long without finding it that the Ukrainian military decide to go with the very costly route of smashing all they have against some small length of Russian front.
At this moment in time talking about no Ukrainian breakthrough is like saying I've not won the lottery jackpot and ignoring the fact that I don't buy lottery tickets.
Are the Ukrainian's currently pushing for a breakthrough? At the moment the strategy seems much more probing, there are small territorial gains across a long front but those seem almost incidental to the main action - which is to find the weak point in the Russian defensive line (and, there will be one somewhere, most likely somewhere where the Russian forces lack morale (at least relative to the rest of the Russian forces) and/or supplies). The push for a breakthrough will only happen when that weak spot is found - or when probing has gone on so long without finding it that the Ukrainian military decide to go with the very costly route of smashing all they have against some small length of Russian front.
At this moment in time talking about no Ukrainian breakthrough is like saying I've not won the lottery jackpot and ignoring the fact that I don't buy lottery tickets.
I, nearly, defer as nearly always. Would probing usually involve such heavy fighting and therefore losses? Particularly in men that Ukraine can't afford? And why not create the weakness with intense bombardment, where the Dnipro turns? Russian defensive morale looks pretty damn effective so far. I hope Ukraine doesn't do a forlorn hope. It could be Pyrrhic.
NBC obtained a video from the Ukrainian side of when the Bradley was taken out. It differs from the Russian claims. First of all, it shows the Bradleys got caught in a mine field. One of the Bradleys ran over a mine, losing its track. But the important outcome of the destruction was the soldiers inside survived the explosion and were able to escape--the Russians claimed they abandoned the vehicles and ran away. One of the soldiers mentioned if it had been a Russian armored carrier they would have been killed.
I would agree it was foolhardy to bunch a number of Armored Vehicles together. That was a Russian tactic that did not work at the beginning of the invasion. I hope the Ukrainians will learn to spread their armor out and stagger them more.
Russia seems to be holding its trained troops in reserve. There's nothing new in that. The Roman army let the auxiliaries do most of the fighting with the legionnaires deployed at the point of victory.
I have a bit of a disagreement here. First in the implication that the auxilia (and before them the socii) were untrained and second that Roman troops were routinely held back from combat. The auxilia's greatest use was to fill the gaps in the Roman military skill set (typically anything to do with archery or cavalry). As such they were most useful when employed in tandem with Roman troops rather than separately from them, kind of an ancient version of combined arms.
<snip>
I would agree it was foolhardy to bunch a number of Armored Vehicles together. That was a Russian tactic that did not work at the beginning of the invasion. I hope the Ukrainians will learn to spread their armor out and stagger them more.
AIUI the bunching was something that was forced upon them by the minefield - which is, of course, the purpose of a minefield.
Russia seems to be holding its trained troops in reserve. There's nothing new in that. The Roman army let the auxiliaries do most of the fighting with the legionnaires deployed at the point of victory.
I have a bit of a disagreement here. First in the implication that the auxilia (and before them the socii) were untrained and second that Roman troops were routinely held back from combat. The auxilia's greatest use was to fill the gaps in the Roman military skill set (typically anything to do with archery or cavalry). As such they were most useful when employed in tandem with Roman troops rather than separately from them, kind of an ancient version of combined arms.
Yes. You are right.
What I should have said was that the legionnaires tended to be committed once the auxiliaries had softened the enemy up or broken them down into bite-size chunks.
It was, as you say, a kind of combined arms operation.
What I should have said was that the legionnaires tended to be committed once the auxiliaries had softened the enemy up or broken them down into bite-size chunks.
What is your source for this?
I've been reading the same blog by a Roman military historian as Croesos and unless I've got hold of the wrong end of the stick the formation the blogger talks about is Roman infantry in the centre with allied troops holding the wings. There are skirmishers out at the front who are going to retreat through the ranks of the main infantry before that engages, but those skimishers are Romans who aren't wealthy enough to afford the full infantry kit, not auxiliaries. Also, if I understand correctly, they're there to screen the heavy infantry from missile attack rather than soften the enemy up. So the Roman infantry is basically doing all the heavy fighting.
NBC obtained a video from the Ukrainian side of when the Bradley was taken out. It differs from the Russian claims. First of all, it shows the Bradleys got caught in a mine field. One of the Bradleys ran over a mine, losing its track. But the important outcome of the destruction was the soldiers inside survived the explosion and were able to escape--the Russians claimed they abandoned the vehicles and ran away. One of the soldiers mentioned if it had been a Russian armored carrier they would have been killed.
I would agree it was foolhardy to bunch a number of Armored Vehicles together. That was a Russian tactic that did not work at the beginning of the invasion. I hope the Ukrainians will learn to spread their armor out and stagger them more.
Er, the half a mile a day linear thunder run bunches them deliberately, and if you're advancing down a narrow corridor through a minefield, under fire, you will bunch even more. What's the alternative without air cover? And they didn't use enough micklicks fort a start.
What I should have said was that the legionnaires tended to be committed once the auxiliaries had softened the enemy up or broken them down into bite-size chunks.
What is your source for this?
I've been reading the same blog by a Roman military historian as Croesos and unless I've got hold of the wrong end of the stick the formation the blogger talks about is Roman infantry in the centre with allied troops holding the wings. There are skirmishers out at the front who are going to retreat through the ranks of the main infantry before that engages, but those skimishers are Romans who aren't wealthy enough to afford the full infantry kit, not auxiliaries. Also, if I understand correctly, they're there to screen the heavy infantry from missile attack rather than soften the enemy up. So the Roman infantry is basically doing all the heavy fighting.
My source was a re-enactment event I once attended.
When you say they were 'Romans who couldn't afford the full infantry kit' what do you mean?
The Roman army drew from all over the empire and was multinational. Legionnaires only gained full Roman citizenship after they'd retired.
I've not heard that they had to pay for their own gear. In the early days possibly. That gear varied too. The famous 'lorica segmenta' we see in most depictions seems to have been developed for northern climes. In Syria and Palestine they wore lighter kit.
I don't think there's much contradiction between what we've heard. Lighter troops on the flanks and skirmishers out in front.
Yes, the legionnaires would do the heavy fighting and that could or would happen once an enemy has been softened up or drawn in by probing action by lighter troops.
NBC obtained a video from the Ukrainian side of when the Bradley was taken out. It differs from the Russian claims. First of all, it shows the Bradleys got caught in a mine field. One of the Bradleys ran over a mine, losing its track. But the important outcome of the destruction was the soldiers inside survived the explosion and were able to escape--the Russians claimed they abandoned the vehicles and ran away. One of the soldiers mentioned if it had been a Russian armored carrier they would have been killed.
I would agree it was foolhardy to bunch a number of Armored Vehicles together. That was a Russian tactic that did not work at the beginning of the invasion. I hope the Ukrainians will learn to spread their armor out and stagger them more.
Er, the half a mile a day linear thunder run bunches them deliberately, and if you're advancing down a narrow corridor through a minefield, under fire, you will bunch even more. What's the alternative without air cover? And they didn't use enough micklicks fort a start.
Yes, I can see how the Russians designed the minefield to bunch up Ukrainian armor. As I said, I hope they learn from their mistakes.
NBC obtained a video from the Ukrainian side of when the Bradley was taken out. It differs from the Russian claims. First of all, it shows the Bradleys got caught in a mine field. One of the Bradleys ran over a mine, losing its track. But the important outcome of the destruction was the soldiers inside survived the explosion and were able to escape--the Russians claimed they abandoned the vehicles and ran away. One of the soldiers mentioned if it had been a Russian armored carrier they would have been killed.
I would agree it was foolhardy to bunch a number of Armored Vehicles together. That was a Russian tactic that did not work at the beginning of the invasion. I hope the Ukrainians will learn to spread their armor out and stagger them more.
Er, the half a mile a day linear thunder run bunches them deliberately, and if you're advancing down a narrow corridor through a minefield, under fire, you will bunch even more. What's the alternative without air cover? And they didn't use enough micklicks fort a start.
Yes, I can see how the Russians designed the minefield to bunch up Ukrainian armor. As I said, I hope they learn from their mistakes.
When you say they were 'Romans who couldn't afford the full infantry kit' what do you mean?
I've not heard that they had to pay for their own gear. In the early days possibly.
Roman army organisation did vary over time I gather. The blog is currently talking about the height of the Republic, when Rome was merrily conquering the other Mediterranean powers.
Yes, at that stage Romans who were called up had to supply their own gear. Young men and poor Romans who could not afford full infantry kit and were assigned to the skirmishers who had less equipment and were there for screening and support, where it didn't matter as much if they got scared and ran away. But screening and support is not the same as softening up. (The Romans I gather were pretty flexible tactically by the standards of ancient armies, but they still were not nearly responsive enough to benefit from probing actions.)
When you say they were 'Romans who couldn't afford the full infantry kit' what do you mean?
I've not heard that they had to pay for their own gear. In the early days possibly.
Roman army organisation did vary over time I gather. The blog is currently talking about the height of the Republic, when Rome was merrily conquering the other Mediterranean powers.
Yes, at that stage Romans who were called up had to supply their own gear. Young men and poor Romans who could not afford full infantry kit and were assigned to the skirmishers who had less equipment and were there for screening and support, where it didn't matter as much if they got scared and ran away. But screening and support is not the same as softening up.
We can actually draw a fairly clear dividing line in Roman history between "supply your own gear" and "the state will supply your gear". That line was in 107 BCE (the late Republic) as part of the Marian reforms. This also serves as a starting point of Rome having a professional, year-round army, something that would be completed with the Augustan reforms of 27 BCE. Which brings me to:
The Roman army drew from all over the empire and was multinational. Legionnaires only gained full Roman citizenship after they'd retired.
@Gamma Gamaliel is describing the Roman military of the early Imperial period, which illustrates the hazards of talking about "the Roman army" as if it were a single, unchanging thing. During the Republic non-Romans serving in the Roman army were socii (literal translation = "allies") who were citizens of their own communities in Italy and remained so after their military service. After Augustus granted Roman citizenship to all socii communities (essentially all Italy) socii military units were replaced by auxilia (literally "helpers") made up of non-Romans from elsewhere in what was becoming the Roman Empire. It was these auxilia that gained Roman citizenship after completing their military service.
Nobody knows how strong the Russian defences are, not even the Russians Apparently they look sufficiently formidable on satellite images to suggest that if the Russian army defends them properly taking them will be a matter of attrition.
Whether the Russian army is sufficiently well run to defend the defences is up in the air. All we can say is that it is a lot less well run than Putin thought it was before he launched the attack.
We now know that they are 8 days strong at least. Two and a half two weeks with the long running short range thunder runs.
There was what I felt was a pretty balanced report on the military aspects on BBC2's Newsnight last night.
The general sense was that the Ukrainians will have their work cut out if they are to make any meaningful gains and that the Russians may be trying to draw them eastwards away from contested battlegrounds along the southern front.
The BBC estimated that around half of Ukraine's divisions are engaged so far and projected that it may only be a matter of weeks before it becomes apparent which side has the upper hand.
@Gramps49 contests that the Russians have air superiority. That may be the case across Ukraine as a whole but they currently seem to have the air advantage within the battle zone and are striking targets with some safety as they make their approach over their own troops who can provide covering fire.
Ukraine does seem to be shooting down a fair proportion of Russian missiles though.
I'd say it looks pretty even-stevens at the moment.
There was what I felt was a pretty balanced report on the military aspects on BBC2's Newsnight last night.
The general sense was that the Ukrainians will have their work cut out if they are to make any meaningful gains and that the Russians may be trying to draw them eastwards away from contested battlegrounds along the southern front.
The BBC estimated that around half of Ukraine's divisions are engaged so far and projected that it may only be a matter of weeks before it becomes apparent which side has the upper hand.
@Gramps49 contests that the Russians have air superiority. That may be the case across Ukraine as a whole but they currently seem to have the air advantage within the battle zone and are striking targets with some safety as they make their approach over their own troops who can provide covering fire.
Ukraine does seem to be shooting down a fair proportion of Russian missiles though.
I'd say it looks pretty even-stevens at the moment.
Breakthrough would show a Ukrainian upper hand.
I'm not aware of Russian fighter-bombers engaging with Ukrainian armour and artillery on the Zaporizhzhia or Donetsk battle zones. Where do you get that from? Or stand-off bombers.
I see no reason to assume that Russian pilots or artillery are any less prone to inflicting friendly fire on their own side than the US or other militaries. The article doesn't state where the alleged incident happened - and, if it was a long way behind the lines then the chances of an accident diminish.
It looks like some weird play in all meanings. Prigozhin talking half sense trying to give Putin a let out from his war, blaming the army for it all. The army is Putin, but he wants out, and so the army has to be blamed for recklessly leading him astray in to an unwinnable war on a false prospectus. We'll see. The possibilities are mind boggling.
I see no reason to assume that Russian pilots or artillery are any less prone to inflicting friendly fire on their own side than the US or other militaries. The article doesn't state where the alleged incident happened - and, if it was a long way behind the lines then the chances of an accident diminish.
I think it’s possible Russia went for an “accidental” strike in order to take out Prigozhin so as to replace him with someone less critical. It would explain why he feels he has nothing to lose by mounting what is effectively a coup attempt.
No country or leader is going to tolerate the armed takeover of a town, he’s crossed the Rubicon (or Don in this case).
Comments
That was the question which got Devereaux thinking along these lines. Here's his ultimate conclusion about how widespread this kind of thing is:
The incentives for what he calls "consolidated democracies with lots of legitimacy" are different than the coup proofing desires of autocratic states, but those incentives may be producing similar results for different reasons.
They haven't penetrated the antitank line. Nothing on the BBC. They should have advanced over 200km south since that article. They've managed 10.
9 days now. A mile a day. Not bad against fairly strong front line defence. But not exactly Blitzkrieg. And still north of the real defences.
I'm disappointed in Forbes. Very.
I suspect the US only got away with a 'thunder run' once or twice in Iraq. The Forbes article acknowledges as much.
Whatever the case, the US and its allies buggered up big time after the initial impact of 'shock and awe' so it's hardly a brilliant example to cite or follow.
No, as an armchair commentator with zilch military experience I still don't see anything to change my surmise that what we are going to see is a long, hard grind with possibly some significant Ukrainian success in certain areas, moderate success in others and failure or reverses elsewhere.
So far, the Ukrainians seem to have excelled in defensive warfare and whilst they are clearly capable of launching effective offensives, I don't quite see this as a 1940 style Blitzkrieg.
Time will tell of course but I think it's going to be a long hard slog with considerable losses on both sides unless someone sees sense and calls a halt to the whole thing.
Putin ain't going to do that.
Even if he resigned tomorrow we have no idea whether his successors would take a different view.
Prepare for the worst but hope for the best.
There is an interesting video out there of a Russian soldier who surrendered to a Ukrainian drone. He is seen running through abandoned trenches trying to escape the drone which was following him. Finally, the soldier just stops looks to the drone and clasps his hands as if he has had enough. The drone operator was about to kill the soldier but did not drop the grenade as intended. Instead, the drone operator recalled the drone and replaced the grenade with a message for the soldier to follow the drone back to Ukrainian lines. However, as the soldier was complying with the instructions Russian artillery started to zero in on him. He survived and made it to the Ukrainian side. When he was interviewed, he said he had been with two companions. The one was wounded. That person pulled a grenade and put it to his head blowing himself up. The other shot himself. (I can produce the link of the soldier trying to flee the Ukrainian drone to the time when Russian artillery tried to take him out, but I thought it was to graphic for SoF)
Is this part of the Russian formidable defence system? Real morale booster there, Putin.
I posted that video.
What point are you trying to make? If any?
Let me know when Ukraine actually breaks through. Although I will know before you do if it's for real.
I suspect the actual figure would be somewhere between the two.
The latest official Russian figures date from September last year, I think, where the losses were estimated at just under 6,000.
Whatever the actual figure, the majority seem to be what are euphemistically called 'non-professional soldiers' - mercenaries and cannon-fodder recruited from former Soviet republics rather than Russia itself.
Russia seems to be holding its trained troops in reserve. There's nothing new in that. The Roman army let the auxiliaries do most of the fighting with the legionnaires deployed at the point of victory.
Colonial troops were often used for the most hazardous operations by the British army too.
I suspect Russia has indeed taken a substantial hit with many of its best troops hors de combat in the opening stages of the war when it massively underestimated Ukrainian resistance.
All that said, I can't see mutinous Wagner mercenaries marching on Moscow and ousting Putin as Gramps49 fondly imagines.
As has been said, Russia's military machine is largely geared to stifle internal unrest. They would probably do that quite effectively.
Sooner or later, the Russians are going to have to talk. In the meantime both sides are going to sustain heavy losses.
Sadly, I don't see any way around that. Martin54 may overdo the prophet of doom shtick but quite frankly I find Gramps49's almost gleeful Bruce Willis Hollywood movie kick-ass optimism in very poor taste.
This isn't going to end soon and it ain't going to end well for soldiers and their families on both sides.
There's no guarantee that anyone's going to push Putin out of a convenient window nor that his potential successors would behave any differently.
Nobody knows how this will end. Meanwhile it's a sickening fratricidal struggle which shows little sign of letting up anytime soon.
Umm, I was not talking about Putin being pushed out of a window. I was referring to the cheif of the Wagner group being pushed out of the window.
Oh Martin.
At the start of this thread you predicted imminent Russian victory and/or nuclear war on a literal daily basis.
Ok. A far more likely scenario I'll admit.
Apologies. I'd misunderstood your allusion. In the light of what appeared to be a prediction of the Kremlin's imminent storming by Wagner Group renegades I had - not unreasonably I think - assumed you were taking your gung ho optimism to another level.
Judging by Martin54's most recent post he seems unaware of how much of a Jeremiah he sounds.
Forgive me, but your posts seem to stretch to the opposite extreme and predict imminent Ukrainian victory.
Whereas my own posts ... 😉
No, seriously, I think there's a balance to be struck somewhere between Martin54's doom-laden forecasts and Gramps49's blithely optimistic ones.
If this war ended tomorrow the damage is already done. We would all still be living with the consequences for decades to come.
Not this one. The first of the other three may be. Both of which were rational. Happy to have been wrong in those regards, as I was in not believing Putin would invade in the first place. And you and I converged 14 months ago. When at least one mind as great as yours was also thinking rationally.
My apologies for getting the threads confused. I enjoyed looking back at that discussion.
Of course it's a very dangerous situation. Of course horrific geopolitical outcomes are possible. Naive optimism is foolish and helps no one but portraying negativity as not only realism but also the only rational position remains unhelpful.
I still think what I did last year: Russia has strategically failed. The question of how long this attrition mess will continue and at what cost remains.
To me, the doomsday scenario remains a Trump victory in '24 leading to insufficient support for Ukraine in '25 from a Russia enabling administration in the USA. That may well be Putin's current plan.
My sense is that European and other powers could fill the gap but a) I don't know if that's true and b) if there's the political will to do so when reproachment with Russia could mean very rapidly falling energy prices in the short term. The fact that this would be s massive strategic blunder by Western powers is beside the point, it is plausible and possible.
However, the reason I am less worried is because I don't think that's what's going happen. It is possible to appreciate the grave risks without having to believe the worst will happen.
AFZ
At this moment in time talking about no Ukrainian breakthrough is like saying I've not won the lottery jackpot and ignoring the fact that I don't buy lottery tickets.
I, nearly, defer as nearly always. Would probing usually involve such heavy fighting and therefore losses? Particularly in men that Ukraine can't afford? And why not create the weakness with intense bombardment, where the Dnipro turns? Russian defensive morale looks pretty damn effective so far. I hope Ukraine doesn't do a forlorn hope. It could be Pyrrhic.
Indeed not. It was the hope I can't see. I can't imagine how such a courageous, cunning, enlightened leader could arise in this Heraclitus stream.
I would agree it was foolhardy to bunch a number of Armored Vehicles together. That was a Russian tactic that did not work at the beginning of the invasion. I hope the Ukrainians will learn to spread their armor out and stagger them more.
I have a bit of a disagreement here. First in the implication that the auxilia (and before them the socii) were untrained and second that Roman troops were routinely held back from combat. The auxilia's greatest use was to fill the gaps in the Roman military skill set (typically anything to do with archery or cavalry). As such they were most useful when employed in tandem with Roman troops rather than separately from them, kind of an ancient version of combined arms.
AIUI the bunching was something that was forced upon them by the minefield - which is, of course, the purpose of a minefield.
Yes. You are right.
What I should have said was that the legionnaires tended to be committed once the auxiliaries had softened the enemy up or broken them down into bite-size chunks.
It was, as you say, a kind of combined arms operation.
@Gramps49 apologies for the Hell call too.
I've been reading the same blog by a Roman military historian as Croesos and unless I've got hold of the wrong end of the stick the formation the blogger talks about is Roman infantry in the centre with allied troops holding the wings. There are skirmishers out at the front who are going to retreat through the ranks of the main infantry before that engages, but those skimishers are Romans who aren't wealthy enough to afford the full infantry kit, not auxiliaries. Also, if I understand correctly, they're there to screen the heavy infantry from missile attack rather than soften the enemy up. So the Roman infantry is basically doing all the heavy fighting.
Er, the half a mile a day linear thunder run bunches them deliberately, and if you're advancing down a narrow corridor through a minefield, under fire, you will bunch even more. What's the alternative without air cover? And they didn't use enough micklicks fort a start.
My source was a re-enactment event I once attended.
When you say they were 'Romans who couldn't afford the full infantry kit' what do you mean?
The Roman army drew from all over the empire and was multinational. Legionnaires only gained full Roman citizenship after they'd retired.
I've not heard that they had to pay for their own gear. In the early days possibly. That gear varied too. The famous 'lorica segmenta' we see in most depictions seems to have been developed for northern climes. In Syria and Palestine they wore lighter kit.
I don't think there's much contradiction between what we've heard. Lighter troops on the flanks and skirmishers out in front.
Yes, the legionnaires would do the heavy fighting and that could or would happen once an enemy has been softened up or drawn in by probing action by lighter troops.
Yes, I can see how the Russians designed the minefield to bunch up Ukrainian armor. As I said, I hope they learn from their mistakes.
They just don't have enough ordinance.
Yes, at that stage Romans who were called up had to supply their own gear. Young men and poor Romans who could not afford full infantry kit and were assigned to the skirmishers who had less equipment and were there for screening and support, where it didn't matter as much if they got scared and ran away. But screening and support is not the same as softening up. (The Romans I gather were pretty flexible tactically by the standards of ancient armies, but they still were not nearly responsive enough to benefit from probing actions.)
We can actually draw a fairly clear dividing line in Roman history between "supply your own gear" and "the state will supply your gear". That line was in 107 BCE (the late Republic) as part of the Marian reforms. This also serves as a starting point of Rome having a professional, year-round army, something that would be completed with the Augustan reforms of 27 BCE. Which brings me to:
@Gamma Gamaliel is describing the Roman military of the early Imperial period, which illustrates the hazards of talking about "the Roman army" as if it were a single, unchanging thing. During the Republic non-Romans serving in the Roman army were socii (literal translation = "allies") who were citizens of their own communities in Italy and remained so after their military service. After Augustus granted Roman citizenship to all socii communities (essentially all Italy) socii military units were replaced by auxilia (literally "helpers") made up of non-Romans from elsewhere in what was becoming the Roman Empire. It was these auxilia that gained Roman citizenship after completing their military service.
Yeah but they can make war AND tea!
We now know that they are 8 days strong at least. Two and a half two weeks with the long running short range thunder runs.
Over two weeks thick is thin?
The general sense was that the Ukrainians will have their work cut out if they are to make any meaningful gains and that the Russians may be trying to draw them eastwards away from contested battlegrounds along the southern front.
The BBC estimated that around half of Ukraine's divisions are engaged so far and projected that it may only be a matter of weeks before it becomes apparent which side has the upper hand.
@Gramps49 contests that the Russians have air superiority. That may be the case across Ukraine as a whole but they currently seem to have the air advantage within the battle zone and are striking targets with some safety as they make their approach over their own troops who can provide covering fire.
Ukraine does seem to be shooting down a fair proportion of Russian missiles though.
I'd say it looks pretty even-stevens at the moment.
Breakthrough would show a Ukrainian upper hand.
I'm not aware of Russian fighter-bombers engaging with Ukrainian armour and artillery on the Zaporizhzhia or Donetsk battle zones. Where do you get that from? Or stand-off bombers.
Even-stevens becomes frozen conflict.
I'm sure you're right. Difficult to find anything. There's a Wall Street Journal account. All reinforces my Jeremiad.
I think it’s possible Russia went for an “accidental” strike in order to take out Prigozhin so as to replace him with someone less critical. It would explain why he feels he has nothing to lose by mounting what is effectively a coup attempt.
No country or leader is going to tolerate the armed takeover of a town, he’s crossed the Rubicon (or Don in this case).