Reports are Biden is about to send cluster bombs to Ukraine.
On the one hand, I can understand the rational for sending them. They cover a wide area when they are released. They will have more impact than a single ammo shell.
But, on the other hand, there is a reason why many countries have banned them. They are had to completely clean up, and if a anyone, especially a child, finds one, they are very dangerous.
Cluster munitions (shells and bombs) are already banned by a large number of nations - but not Russia and Ukraine, and in terms of supply not by the US. The rationale for the ban is that a) they're indiscriminate in any situation other than against massed units of infantry and armour in open fields far from civilian populations and b) they leave unexploded munitions randomly strewn across territory which have similar impacts as land mines but with where they are even less well known.
How much of the front would be suitable for use of such munitions? Any urban areas where Russians may be dug in would be bad places to use them. Even within 1km of villages would put civilians at great risk if aiming isn't spot on. The Russians have been largely indiscriminately using cluster munitions, and in Syria used them against civilian targets in a manner that should have lead to prosecutions for war crimes IMO, but I don't expect the Ukrainians to stoop to such tactics when it's their people sheltering in cellars in villages near the front line.
Reports are Biden is about to send cluster bombs to Ukraine.
On the one hand, I can understand the rational for sending them. They cover a wide area when they are released. They will have more impact than a single ammo shell.
But, on the other hand, there is a reason why many countries have banned them. They are had to completely clean up, and if a anyone, especially a child, finds one, they are very dangerous.
Reports are Biden is about to send cluster bombs to Ukraine.
On the one hand, I can understand the rational for sending them. They cover a wide area when they are released. They will have more impact than a single ammo shell.
But, on the other hand, there is a reason why many countries have banned them. They are had to completely clean up, and if a anyone, especially a child, finds one, they are very dangerous.
I am very opposed to the idea.
Cluster bombs should be banned.
War should be banned.
And er, how you going to enforce that?
Enforcement is beyond my ability. It takes a world-wide commitment to the effort.
I believe the usual example of long-term peace was the Pax Romana, which lasted about 200 years. I am not historian enough to address whether it really was peaceful.
Auferre, trucidare, rapere, falsis nominibus imperium, atque, ubi solitudinem faciunt, pacem appellant.
(To ravage, to slaughter, to usurp under false titles, they call empire, and where they make a desert, they call it peace. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, De vita et moribus Iulii Agricolae (The life and death of Julius Agricola) c. 98AD)
It doesn't look as though the railway bridge has been damaged this time, though it wouldn't surprise me to hear that the Ukrainians had some plans for that, too...
I found this very informative. The source appears to be reputable, according to internet sources I read (who have a pro-Western position) - but of course I can't back that up in any absolute way.
The link is a Ukrainian interview on Youtube - you will need to turn captions on there I would imagine. There are no bodies shown and no graphic violence, so far as I remember. The interview addresses directly the issue of 'progress', what that means, what is achievable, and so on, from the point of view of a Ukrainian officer who appears to have an occasional PR role in the field. It is quite long - about an hour if I recall - but I found it time well-spent.
Bum. Wrong one, and missed the edit. this is the one I intended to post - my apologies. If a mod were able to correct this, it might save someone a rather long listen. Many thanks.
This is from an admittedly pro Ukrainian source but it does point out, based on the high-water mark of the Putin invasion, Ukraine has retaken half of what Putin had gained. US State Secretary Blinkin firmly believes, Ukraine will break through Russian Defenses. We will see.
I do note Ukrainian drones attacked the Russian military headquarters in Moscow. And Putin is calling it a terrorist act. Mr. Putin, it is a legitimate target, very unlike the hospitals and schools and apartment complexes you have attacked in Ukraine. Oh, and, stop lying about the Kerch bridge. It is more than a civilian bridge.
I keep hearing about a Southern offensive. Very important Russian supply lines have been cut. Kherson is within Ukrainian reach.
Then there is the report of the Russian Mafia putting a hit on Putin. They have tried to take him out three times, from what I am hearing, trying to kill him twice in his motorcade and once attempting to rig an elevator he was supposed to have used.
Although ground has been gained in Bakhmut the main thrust of the current Ukrainian offensive seem to be in Zaporizhia Oblast.
And Igor Konashenkov, the Russian Defense Ministry’s chief spokesman, reported a “massive” assault and fierce battles south of Orikhiv, a town that Ukraine holds about 60 miles north of the Sea of Azov. Vladimir Rogov, an official appointed by Moscow in southern Ukraine, said the assault involved Ukrainian troops who had been trained abroad and were equipped with about 100 armored vehicles, including German-made Leopards and American-made Bradley Fighting Vehicles.
Another Russian occupation official in Zaporizhzhia, Yevgeny Balitsky, said that Ukraine had made 36 attempts to shell settlements in the region since Tuesday. Russian assertions that the Ukrainian attacks had been repelled could not be immediately verified.
Ukrainian troops along the southern front said in interviews on Wednesday that they were steadily pushing Russian troops back, but their progress had been incremental with no major breakthroughs. They have been slowed by minefields, and some said the biggest obstacles were Russia’s withering artillery fire and airstrikes.
Ukrainian officials have told U.S. officials that the enlarged Ukrainian force would try to advance south through Russia’s minefields and other fortifications toward the city of Tokmak, and, if successful, on to Melitopol, near the coast.
Their goal is to sever the so-called land bridge between Russian-occupied Ukraine and the Crimean peninsula, or at least advance far enough to put the strategically important peninsula within range of Ukrainian artillery. Russia seized Crimea from Ukraine in 2014, and uses it as the base for its Black Sea fleet as well as to supply its forces in the south.
Reaching Melitopol would put the Ukrainians at the Sea of Azov.
There is some speculation that blowing up the Nova Kakhovka Dam has backfired spectacularly on the Russians, removing a large lake/reservoir that served as a barrier to both sides.
Crap aren't they? So, how reachable is Kherson? Do your sources tell you?
I meant Bahkmut. Kherson has been in Ukrainian control since November 2022.
The city and the 1/3rd of the oblast above the Dnipro has. So how reachable is Bakhmut? How reachable has it been since May? Has the reachability changed? Will it? What do your sources say?
Even if the Ukraians reach Mariupol, they will have to hold it innthe face of the inevitable counterattack - which could be nuclear.
This fear has been voiced in various Noos outlets. I suppose it depends on quite how mad Putin the Destroyer is feeling at the time, but it is at least remotely possible that some of his inner circle might stay his hand.
The entire counter-offensive, indeed the entire endeavour of trying to defend Ukraine against the aggression of Russia, risks Putin pushing the nuke button. Should the Ukrainian people just submit to occupation by a foreign power because the nuclear button is in the background? They've gone almost 18 months resisting Russian assault without Russia going nuclear ... are they just pushing their luck, or have they called Putin's bluff and nuclear strike was never going to be an option Putin would contemplate?
I think we are talking battlefield nukes in the first instance, rather than a nuclear strike on Kyiv.
Heaven forfend either.
I really, really don't see the Ukrainians rolling back the entire front. I can envisage them regaining territory here and there. I think it will grind on and on and on and on.
Unless some kind of negotiated settlement is reached. Neither side looks willing to talk.
Russia has ample mines, artillery and air power to keep going for a good while yet. The West looks likely to replenish Ukraine's depleted arsenal.
So how reachable is Bakhmut? How reachable has it been since May? Has the reachability changed? Will it? What do your sources say?
What exactly do you mean by "reachable"? Bakhmut has been the on front line of the war for months, so I'd say both sides have "reached" it.
I don't know, you'd have to ask @Gramps49. He said Kherson was in reach when he meant Bakhmut.
And to the generality, as for the nuclear bollocks (of which I was so fond), Stoltenberg said what would happen if they started that, months ago. It's not a mid-game chess move.
And yeah @Alan Cresswell . That bluff's been long called. Fuck him.
I think we are talking battlefield nukes in the first instance, rather than a nuclear strike on Kyiv.
Heaven forfend either.
I really, really don't see the Ukrainians rolling back the entire front. I can envisage them regaining territory here and there. I think it will grind on and on and on and on.
Unless some kind of negotiated settlement is reached. Neither side looks willing to talk.
Russia has ample mines, artillery and air power to keep going for a good while yet. The West looks likely to replenish Ukraine's depleted arsenal.
Drone strikes on Moscow are a nuisance at best.
I call it stalemate.
You're far too pessimistic. Partly because this the first conventional, symmetical land war between two uniformed armies in the field in decades. We're not used to this live instead of in the history books. The last such war to go this long was Korea and WWII is a better comparison since the Chinese intervention changed everything in Korea.
Ukraine has reclaimed half of the territory it lost in 2022. It has deliberately chosen an 'attrition then smash' strategy. It bleeds Russian formations (see Bakhmut), destroys logistics hubs, finds a weak spot then crashes through. It's very slow until the breakthrough phase.
Double that because Russia has established a dug-in defensive line in Southern Ukraine. This is very close to WWI trench warfare. As such, the breakthrough will be a pinprick, then a crater, then a flood. It will not be a solid thrust 20 km wide that penetrates 50km. It probably won't happen until September. I will bet good money Ukraine planned for every month of the non-mud season.
As for the Russian Air Force, they have been a joke, comparable to the WWII Japanese Navy submarine branch. They have not established air superiority, they cannot provide adequate ground attack for ground forces and cannot surpress Ukraine's air defence network. Compared to the US Air Force or the Royal Air Force they are utterly incompetent and ineffective.
Right now there are reports of two possible gaps in Russian lines. Ukraine has sent troops forward. This is what I expected for August 1st. Wait until the fall months.
I think we are talking battlefield nukes in the first instance, rather than a nuclear strike on Kyiv.
Heaven forfend either.
I really, really don't see the Ukrainians rolling back the entire front. I can envisage them regaining territory here and there. I think it will grind on and on and on and on.
Unless some kind of negotiated settlement is reached. Neither side looks willing to talk.
Russia has ample mines, artillery and air power to keep going for a good while yet. The West looks likely to replenish Ukraine's depleted arsenal.
Drone strikes on Moscow are a nuisance at best.
I call it stalemate.
You're far too pessimistic. Partly because this the first conventional, symmetical land war between two uniformed armies in the field in decades. We're not used to this live instead of in the history books. The last such war to go this long was Korea and WWII is a better comparison since the Chinese intervention changed everything in Korea.
Hmmm ... If what you say is true- and I'm not doubting that Russia's armed forces have proved singularly unimpressive, what then?
The Germans punched through the Western Front in 1917 but exhausted themselves and could not sustain their advantage.
I can't see Putin accepting the humiliation and pulling his troops out of Ukraine.
I'd be prepared to envisage Ukrainian territorial gains in September and October but can't quite see total Russian collapse. I've quoted Churchill before. We can either make the mistake of overestimating the Russians or we can underestimate them.
Time will tell. Russia already appears to have lost more men than it did in 10 years in Afghanistan.
The Germans punched through the Western Front in 1917 but exhausted themselves and could not sustain their advantage.
Assuming you mean Operation Michael in spring 1918, the Germans advanced across a wide front occupying an area that exceeds the area of Ukraine captured by the Russians in 2022 - if Ukraine manages something similar it could leave Crimea and possibly a bit of Donbas in Russian control, but would effectively be victory for Ukraine.
Michael stalled for basically two reasons. One was logistics, relying on horse drawn transport the German army couldn't get ammunition and other supplies to the new front lines in sufficient quantity, which wasn't helped by falling production of munitions as the blockade of Germany that had been in effect since 1914 was biting at home. The second was that the Michael advances ran into large allied reserves - including the first divisions of American troops - and didn't have the numbers to secure their flanks and continue the advance. If we're to apply that experience to Ukraine we need to ask the questions of whether the Ukrainians have the supply and reserves of munitions, fuel, food etc to maintain an advance and the means to keep supplying the front - and, with western munitions flowing in to supplement domestic production the quantity available isn't going to be a problem for a well planned advance, and even a few trucks can deliver a lot of munitions to the front. The other question is whether the Russians would be able to throw large reserve forces into the battle against a break through, do they have an equivalent to the US divisions of fresh troops to swing the tide? It seems about the only way the Russians could put that sort of manpower in the field is to draft a large proportion of their population, and it will take months to give them even a minimal training.
Sorry, yes, I meant the Spring Offensive of 1918, which followed, I think, some advances the previous year which were stemmed with great difficulty.
The Germans also made the mistake of not pushing towards the Channel Ports but of resuming their earlier advance towards Paris.
I can see the problem Russia would have with logistics and reserves should its lines be punctured which is why I worry about battlefield nukes and other nasties.
The Germans punched through the Western Front in 1917 but exhausted themselves and could not sustain their advantage.
Assuming you mean Operation Michael in spring 1918, the Germans advanced across a wide front occupying an area that exceeds the area of Ukraine captured by the Russians in 2022 - if Ukraine manages something similar it could leave Crimea and possibly a bit of Donbas in Russian control, but would effectively be victory for Ukraine.
...
This looks a damn site smaller (2,000 sq. mi.?) than the 46,000 sq. mi. in this]?
Ukraine is claiming they have broken through Russia's first line of defense in the southern part of the country. However, they are coming up against concrete barriers now. I wonder what is behind them.
The 3rd line. That should take them to the autumn rasputitsa. The 4th to Christmas. The 5th to the spring rasputitsa. And that's being very @Gramps49 sunny side up. Or are you wavering? And how close is this concrete to the Sea of Azov? How many miles of minefields and tank traps? With Alligator air cover?
Indeed not. Especially with Russian air and artillery superiority against an attacker.
Contra @Martin54, neither side of the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have air superiority (sometimes also called air supremacy).
In my abyssal ignorance I beg to differ. They aren't synonyms. And Russia has very effective Alligators on the southern front. I'm not aware of Ukrainian equivalents having much success on offense.
Indeed not. Especially with Russian air and artillery superiority against an attacker.
Contra @Martin54, neither side of the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have air superiority (sometimes also called air supremacy).
In my abyssal ignorance I beg to differ. They aren't synonyms.
And yet the Wiki article I linked to starts out "Aerial supremacy (also known as air superiority) . . . " Wikipedia isn't always right, but I'm more willing to take their word than yours.
Indeed not. Especially with Russian air and artillery superiority against an attacker.
Contra @Martin54, neither side of the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have air superiority (sometimes also called air supremacy).
In my abyssal ignorance I beg to differ. They aren't synonyms.
And yet the Wiki article I linked to starts out "Aerial supremacy (also known as air superiority) . . . " Wikipedia isn't always right, but I'm more willing to take their word than yours.
And so you should be. But there's an obvious difference. Would you say that the RAF had superiority or supremacy over the Luftwaffe in 1940? And combined with the USAAF in 1944?
Indeed not. Especially with Russian air and artillery superiority against an attacker.
Contra @Martin54, neither side of the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have air superiority (sometimes also called air supremacy).
In my abyssal ignorance I beg to differ. They aren't synonyms.
And yet the Wiki article I linked to starts out "Aerial supremacy (also known as air superiority) . . . " Wikipedia isn't always right, but I'm more willing to take their word than yours.
And so you should be. But there's an obvious difference. Would you say that the RAF had superiority or supremacy over the Luftwaffe in 1940? And combined with the USAAF in 1944?
Yes! In 1940 over the British Isles, at least during the day, and certainly over Europe in 1944. (I'm an aviation buff!)
Indeed not. Especially with Russian air and artillery superiority against an attacker.
Contra @Martin54, neither side of the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have air superiority (sometimes also called air supremacy).
In my abyssal ignorance I beg to differ. They aren't synonyms.
And yet the Wiki article I linked to starts out "Aerial supremacy (also known as air superiority) . . . " Wikipedia isn't always right, but I'm more willing to take their word than yours.
And so you should be. But there's an obvious difference. Would you say that the RAF had superiority or supremacy over the Luftwaffe in 1940? And combined with the USAAF in 1944?
Yes! In 1940 over the British Isles, at least during the day, and certainly over Europe in 1944. (I'm an aviation buff!)
So The Blitz, Coventry, Bristol, Birmingham, Hull, Manchester, Liverpool, Belfast, the Baedeker Raids, happened under conditions of British air supremacy?
Indeed not. Especially with Russian air and artillery superiority against an attacker.
Contra @Martin54, neither side of the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have air superiority (sometimes also called air supremacy).
In my abyssal ignorance I beg to differ. They aren't synonyms.
And yet the Wiki article I linked to starts out "Aerial supremacy (also known as air superiority) . . . " Wikipedia isn't always right, but I'm more willing to take their word than yours.
And so you should be. But there's an obvious difference. Would you say that the RAF had superiority or supremacy over the Luftwaffe in 1940? And combined with the USAAF in 1944?
Yes! In 1940 over the British Isles, at least during the day, and certainly over Europe in 1944. (I'm an aviation buff!)
I think he was more getting at the RAF having superiority in 1940, and supremacy in 1944...
FWIW, while you can elide the two terms, and Wikipedia clearly does, in my days of doing anti-air warfare I would definitely say that there was a difference between the two terms.
superiority = coming out on top while fairly evenly matched in lots of ways
supremacy = not even a question about who's in control.
So in the Battle of Britain it was superiority because the RAF were above their own turf and while there were lots of Germans they were at the limits of their range and endurance. More to the point, throughout the RAF had the ability to get off the ground.
In 1944-45 obviously the Luftwaffe did inflict casualties, but really they were struggling to get defenders into the air - *that's* supremacy.
FWIW I don't think with Ukraine we can usefully talk about superiority or supremacy in the air - the right term for what's going on there is 'contested airspace' - but with Ukraine probably narrowly ahead.
Although as an addendum I'm not totally convinced the RAF/USAF had air supremacy much before 1945. Gulf 1990 was a much better example of one side being able to say credibly to the other 'if it flies, it dies'
Always happy to admit when I'm wrong. Unlike others who don't seem to realise that it would actually enhance their enormous but slightly diminished stature...
Comments
On the one hand, I can understand the rational for sending them. They cover a wide area when they are released. They will have more impact than a single ammo shell.
But, on the other hand, there is a reason why many countries have banned them. They are had to completely clean up, and if a anyone, especially a child, finds one, they are very dangerous.
I am very opposed to the idea.
Cluster bombs should be banned.
War should be banned.
How much of the front would be suitable for use of such munitions? Any urban areas where Russians may be dug in would be bad places to use them. Even within 1km of villages would put civilians at great risk if aiming isn't spot on. The Russians have been largely indiscriminately using cluster munitions, and in Syria used them against civilian targets in a manner that should have lead to prosecutions for war crimes IMO, but I don't expect the Ukrainians to stoop to such tactics when it's their people sheltering in cellars in villages near the front line.
And er, how you going to enforce that?
Enforcement is beyond my ability. It takes a world-wide commitment to the effort.
(To ravage, to slaughter, to usurp under false titles, they call empire, and where they make a desert, they call it peace. Publius Cornelius Tacitus, De vita et moribus Iulii Agricolae (The life and death of Julius Agricola) c. 98AD)
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2023/jul/17/explosions-reportedly-hit-crimeas-kerch-bridge-as-russia-cites-emergency-situation
It doesn't look as though the railway bridge has been damaged this time, though it wouldn't surprise me to hear that the Ukrainians had some plans for that, too...
The link is a Ukrainian interview on Youtube - you will need to turn captions on there I would imagine. There are no bodies shown and no graphic violence, so far as I remember. The interview addresses directly the issue of 'progress', what that means, what is achievable, and so on, from the point of view of a Ukrainian officer who appears to have an occasional PR role in the field. It is quite long - about an hour if I recall - but I found it time well-spent.
Corrected link. BroJames, Purgatory Host
BroJames, Purgatory Host
I do note Ukrainian drones attacked the Russian military headquarters in Moscow. And Putin is calling it a terrorist act. Mr. Putin, it is a legitimate target, very unlike the hospitals and schools and apartment complexes you have attacked in Ukraine. Oh, and, stop lying about the Kerch bridge. It is more than a civilian bridge.
Then there is the report of the Russian Mafia putting a hit on Putin. They have tried to take him out three times, from what I am hearing, trying to kill him twice in his motorcade and once attempting to rig an elevator he was supposed to have used.
Mutiny on the right, Mob on the left.
What a way to live.
I meant Bahkmut. Kherson has been in Ukrainian control since November 2022.
Reaching Melitopol would put the Ukrainians at the Sea of Azov.
There is some speculation that blowing up the Nova Kakhovka Dam has backfired spectacularly on the Russians, removing a large lake/reservoir that served as a barrier to both sides.
The city and the 1/3rd of the oblast above the Dnipro has. So how reachable is Bakhmut? How reachable has it been since May? Has the reachability changed? Will it? What do your sources say?
What exactly do you mean by "reachable"? Bakhmut has been the on front line of the war for months, so I'd say both sides have "reached" it.
This fear has been voiced in various Noos outlets. I suppose it depends on quite how mad Putin the Destroyer is feeling at the time, but it is at least remotely possible that some of his inner circle might stay his hand.
Heaven forfend either.
I really, really don't see the Ukrainians rolling back the entire front. I can envisage them regaining territory here and there. I think it will grind on and on and on and on.
Unless some kind of negotiated settlement is reached. Neither side looks willing to talk.
Russia has ample mines, artillery and air power to keep going for a good while yet. The West looks likely to replenish Ukraine's depleted arsenal.
Drone strikes on Moscow are a nuisance at best.
I call it stalemate.
I don't know, you'd have to ask @Gramps49. He said Kherson was in reach when he meant Bakhmut.
And to the generality, as for the nuclear bollocks (of which I was so fond), Stoltenberg said what would happen if they started that, months ago. It's not a mid-game chess move.
And yeah @Alan Cresswell . That bluff's been long called. Fuck him.
You're far too pessimistic. Partly because this the first conventional, symmetical land war between two uniformed armies in the field in decades. We're not used to this live instead of in the history books. The last such war to go this long was Korea and WWII is a better comparison since the Chinese intervention changed everything in Korea.
Ukraine has reclaimed half of the territory it lost in 2022. It has deliberately chosen an 'attrition then smash' strategy. It bleeds Russian formations (see Bakhmut), destroys logistics hubs, finds a weak spot then crashes through. It's very slow until the breakthrough phase.
Double that because Russia has established a dug-in defensive line in Southern Ukraine. This is very close to WWI trench warfare. As such, the breakthrough will be a pinprick, then a crater, then a flood. It will not be a solid thrust 20 km wide that penetrates 50km. It probably won't happen until September. I will bet good money Ukraine planned for every month of the non-mud season.
As for the Russian Air Force, they have been a joke, comparable to the WWII Japanese Navy submarine branch. They have not established air superiority, they cannot provide adequate ground attack for ground forces and cannot surpress Ukraine's air defence network. Compared to the US Air Force or the Royal Air Force they are utterly incompetent and ineffective.
Right now there are reports of two possible gaps in Russian lines. Ukraine has sent troops forward. This is what I expected for August 1st. Wait until the fall months.
Would the Iran-Iraq war not count?
The Germans punched through the Western Front in 1917 but exhausted themselves and could not sustain their advantage.
I can't see Putin accepting the humiliation and pulling his troops out of Ukraine.
I'd be prepared to envisage Ukrainian territorial gains in September and October but can't quite see total Russian collapse. I've quoted Churchill before. We can either make the mistake of overestimating the Russians or we can underestimate them.
Time will tell. Russia already appears to have lost more men than it did in 10 years in Afghanistan.
Michael stalled for basically two reasons. One was logistics, relying on horse drawn transport the German army couldn't get ammunition and other supplies to the new front lines in sufficient quantity, which wasn't helped by falling production of munitions as the blockade of Germany that had been in effect since 1914 was biting at home. The second was that the Michael advances ran into large allied reserves - including the first divisions of American troops - and didn't have the numbers to secure their flanks and continue the advance. If we're to apply that experience to Ukraine we need to ask the questions of whether the Ukrainians have the supply and reserves of munitions, fuel, food etc to maintain an advance and the means to keep supplying the front - and, with western munitions flowing in to supplement domestic production the quantity available isn't going to be a problem for a well planned advance, and even a few trucks can deliver a lot of munitions to the front. The other question is whether the Russians would be able to throw large reserve forces into the battle against a break through, do they have an equivalent to the US divisions of fresh troops to swing the tide? It seems about the only way the Russians could put that sort of manpower in the field is to draft a large proportion of their population, and it will take months to give them even a minimal training.
The Germans also made the mistake of not pushing towards the Channel Ports but of resuming their earlier advance towards Paris.
I can see the problem Russia would have with logistics and reserves should its lines be punctured which is why I worry about battlefield nukes and other nasties.
Putin isn't desperate enough just yet.
This looks a damn site smaller (2,000 sq. mi.?) than the 46,000 sq. mi. in this]?
9. 9.
Indeed not. Especially with Russian air and artillery superiority against an attacker.
There is no comparison whatsoever. Not even with WWI.
Contra @Martin54, neither side of the Russia-Ukraine war seems to have air superiority (sometimes also called air supremacy).
In my abyssal ignorance I beg to differ. They aren't synonyms. And Russia has very effective Alligators on the southern front. I'm not aware of Ukrainian equivalents having much success on offense.
And yet the Wiki article I linked to starts out "Aerial supremacy (also known as air superiority) . . . " Wikipedia isn't always right, but I'm more willing to take their word than yours.
And so you should be. But there's an obvious difference. Would you say that the RAF had superiority or supremacy over the Luftwaffe in 1940? And combined with the USAAF in 1944?
Yes! In 1940 over the British Isles, at least during the day, and certainly over Europe in 1944. (I'm an aviation buff!)
So The Blitz, Coventry, Bristol, Birmingham, Hull, Manchester, Liverpool, Belfast, the Baedeker Raids, happened under conditions of British air supremacy?
I think he was more getting at the RAF having superiority in 1940, and supremacy in 1944...
FWIW, while you can elide the two terms, and Wikipedia clearly does, in my days of doing anti-air warfare I would definitely say that there was a difference between the two terms.
superiority = coming out on top while fairly evenly matched in lots of ways
supremacy = not even a question about who's in control.
So in the Battle of Britain it was superiority because the RAF were above their own turf and while there were lots of Germans they were at the limits of their range and endurance. More to the point, throughout the RAF had the ability to get off the ground.
In 1944-45 obviously the Luftwaffe did inflict casualties, but really they were struggling to get defenders into the air - *that's* supremacy.
FWIW I don't think with Ukraine we can usefully talk about superiority or supremacy in the air - the right term for what's going on there is 'contested airspace' - but with Ukraine probably narrowly ahead.